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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The problem 
The broadly worded Danish criminal code § 263(2), popularly known as “the hacking provision”, 
has been around for thirty years, and yet surprisingly little is known about its scope and how it 
might be interpreted and construed in practice. When the provision entered into force on 1 July 
1985, the only other country in the world that had enacted a dedicated computer crime statute was 
the United States.
1
  US courts have extensive experience with computer crime compared to Danish 
courts that have seen relatively few computer crime cases. The Danish hacking provision has 
therefore seen little action over the years and its scope is largely unclear; and with respect to the 
courts‟ construction of the provision in one of the few cases that exist, the construction was 
criticized by a commentator.
2
 
Under the Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime, both the US and Denmark, as well as 
other states, have undertaken international obligations to achieve some minimum harmonization of 
national substantive criminal law by criminalizing certain basic types of cybercrime. During the 
negotiation of the Convention, the US had considerable influence on the drafting process, and the 
Convention, according to the US Department of Justice, essentially reflects existing US law, which 
is presumably supported by Congress‟s statement that no legislative implementation of the 
Convention was required to meet the US‟ obligations. The Danish sentiment was the same in that 
no amendments to substantive criminal law were considered required. Even though Denmark and 
the US were among the first countries in the world to enact computer crime legislation thirty years 
ago, it is still oddly unclear what conduct is being criminalized through the broadly phrased illegal 
access statutes. Whereas the US courts, as mentioned above, have gained some experience with 
applying the CFAA, and case law, thus, provides some insights into how such a statute might be 
                                                 
1
 Bent Carlsen and Michael Elmer: Datakriminalitet (1986), Juristen, p. 297. The article mentions only the existence of 
US state laws, but the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act‟s (CFAA) predecessor, the Counterfeit Access Device 
and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CADCFAA), was already in force in 1984 although it was very narrow in scope 
compared to the CFAA. In the US, computer crime bills had been introduced into Congress on several occasions since 
the late 1970s, but their sponsors‟ pleas fell on deaf ears, as Congress ostensibly opined that current legislation was 
sufficient to address computer crimes. It was not until circa 1983, when 21 states had passed computer crime laws, after 
a number of high-profile hacks combined with Congress‟ awareness of the movie WarGames. See Susan W. Brenner: 
Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes (2012), p. 23 
2
 See criticism of a Danish High Court‟s implicit rejection of a broad construction of “unauthorized” in Mads Bryde 
Andersen: IT-retten (2005), p. 746. The same commentator has criticized the decision in other publications as well. See 
e.g. Jørn Vestergaard & Flemming Balvig (ed.): Med lov…: Retsvidenskabelige betragtninger (1998), Mads Bryde 
Andersen: Overvågning af medarbejdere, pp. 59-60. The criticized decision, U 1996.979 Ø, is analyzed below in the 
chapter on authorization with respect to insiders.  
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applied, Danish courts have very little experience with the hacking provision, and very few 
decisions are available. The few decisions that are available concern rather typical “hacking” (use 
of hacking tools to circumvent security measures) and, as is rather typical for Danish courts, the 
reasoning for the decisions is scant. 
The American Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the CoE‟s Convention on Cybercrime, the Danish 
hacking provision (criminal code § 263), all state computer crime laws in the US, and so on, have in 
common two concepts that are the fundamental building blocks of every hacking statute; namely, 
the concepts of without authorization/right and access.
3
 Thirty years ago computers were by no 
means widely owned by the public and were not integrated in everyday activities, and thus, there 
were by far fewer people with access to computers that could trigger criminal liability.  
In 1985, the World Wide Web
4
 had not yet been invented and browsers, HTTP
5
, HTML
6
, web 
servers and websites did not yet exist. Only five years later, in 1990, the commercial restriction on 
the use of the Internet was lifted.
7
 As mentioned above, in 1985, the Danish committee on criminal 
law, observant of the development in the United States and considering the few cases of computer 
crime that had arisen in Denmark at that time, reviewed the Danish criminal code in order to assess 
whether it needed to be amended to cover computer crimes. It is important to keep in mind that the 
Committee‟s report and the Danish hacking provision
8
 were written at a time that greatly differs 
from today in terms of the stage of technological advancement in computer science.  
However, at that time computers were mostly not networked, and the Internet was not 
commercialized yet. A few large university networks and military networks were interconnected, 
but on a very small scale compared to today. (See e.g. map
9
 of the mid-80s Internet below.) 
                                                 
3
 See Orin Kerr: Cybercrime‟s Scope: Interpreting „Access‟ and „Authorization‟ in Computer Misuse Statutes (2003), 
NYU Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 1596-1668, pp. 1615-1616 
4
 Note that the Web and the Internet are terms often erroneously used synonymously. Whereas the Internet is the 
“network of networks”, the Web is one of the “services” that run over the Internet. 
5
 HyperText Transfer Protocol 
6
 HyperText Markup Language 
7
 Pieter Hintjens: Culture & Empire (2013), p. 30 
8
 And so were the US senate reports regarding the US federal computer crime provisions that date back to 1984. 
9
 Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:InetCirca85.jpg on 05 January 2015. Image is public domain. 
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Image 1 A map of the entire Internet in late 1985 to early 1986 - Work of the US Department of Defense 
 
In 1985, it was much easier to determine whether a person had accessed information or programs. 
Accessing a computer, and the information and programs it contained, would either occur by 
physically sitting by the computer and opening files, using programs and so on or establishing a 
remote connection to another computer much like today but with considerably more effort, skill and 
cost and therefore of limited direct use for the average person. In order to establish a remote 
connection, one would generally have to have knowledge of the phone number associated with the 
modem connected to the computer one wanted to access, and one would generally need a password 
to establish the connection. Today we access information and programs hundreds or thousands of 
 
8 
 
 
Image 1 A map of the entire Internet in late 1985 to early 1986 - Work of the US Department of Defense 
 
In 1985, it was uch easier to determine whether a person had accessed information or programs. 
Accessing a computer, and the information and programs it contained, would either occur by 
physically sitting by the computer and opening files, using programs and so on or establishing a 
remote connection to another computer much like today but with considerably more effort, skill and 
cost and therefore of limited direct use for the average person. In order to establish a remote 
connection, one would generally have to have knowledge of the phone number associated with the 
modem connected to the computer one wanted to access, and one would generally need a password 
to establish the connection. Today we access information and programs hundreds or thousands of 
 
9 
 
times a day
10
, if not far more often, without much or any knowledge of what takes place behind the 
scenes – most of the material being publicly accessible to anyone. The user is much less, if at all, 
aware of the underlying mechanics of established connections, accesses granted or denied, and so 
on, unless explicitly presented with access restrictions. Out of the five
11
 cybercrime legislations 
addressed, albeit to varying degrees, in this dissertation, only the drafters of the Convention on 
Cybercrime
12
, took the increased interconnectivity and the invention of the World Wide Web, from 
the point of the user, into consideration when addressing unauthorized access; however, they only 
did so through the explanatory report adopted alongside the Convention. 
However, the scope of hacking statutes was not problem free even when Internet access was not an 
everyday commodity and there was no world wide web. The statutes were still unclear in terms of 
what triggered criminal liability when employees misused computers (typically for purposes that the 
employer disliked), and that lack of clarity still persists in form of disagreement between courts, 
commentators and others. The only thing we can seemingly agree on is that the typical idea of a 
hacker who breaks into computers by exploiting vulnerabilities and those accessing by the guessing 
other people‟s passwords have committed the crime of unauthorized access. However, the statutory 
language does by no means stop there. The term “without authorization/right” is sufficiently vague 
to let aggressive prosecutors and plaintiffs be creative. Combined with the fact that the objective 
element of the crime (access to a computer or information and programs) is met by most people 
hundreds of times a day, one need only find one out of those hundreds of times where authorization 
could be called into question. Thus, a number of competing approaches to construing 
“authorization” appear; prosecution and plaintiff theories typically being very broad and 
defendants‟ theories narrower. For example, in one jurisdiction in the US, if an authorized 
employee accesses a computer or information with a disloyal motive, that person will cease to be an 
agent of the employer and automatically loses their authorization at the time of the access. In other 
jurisdictions, access may become unauthorized, if the subsequent use of information or the service 
provided is an intentional breach of contract (including intentional breaches of terms of use and 
                                                 
10
 Particularly, if every dynamic element on a website is counted. We access and retrieve information from third parties‟ 
computers without necessarily being aware of doing so. 
11
 The CoE Convention on Cybercrime, the Council‟s Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against 
information systems, Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems, the Danish criminal code § 263(2), 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). U.S.C. is short for United States Code.  
12
 The Convention entered into force on January 1st 2007 in the US and on October 1st 2005 in Denmark. Currently, 42 
countries have ratified the Convention and 11 countries have signed but not ratified. See Council of Europe, Chart of 
Signatures and Ratification, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG accessed July 1st 2014 
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service on websites). Many of us have children that signed up for a Facebook account before they 
turned thirteen years old. Those of us who read the terms of service intentionally breached the terms 
of service by aiding our children in creating an account. Those who use Facebook are similarly 
contractually bound to keep their information up to date. Of course, most courts would think twice 
before basing a criminal conviction on breach of such terms, but the statutory language does not 
exclude those situations from criminal liability, and thus we find ourselves at the mercy of our 
prosecutors and courts. This not only raises the question of whether hacking statutes should perhaps 
be a bit more specific as to what they criminalize, but it also raises the question how courts 
determine what authorization means when they evaluate whether access was without 
authorization.
13
 
Thus, the problem is that unauthorized access statutes use broad terms such as “access”, and 
“computer” or “information” that essentially includes any interaction with technology and 
information. The broad language, which is itself ambiguous in that it leaves doubt as to what is 
meant by “access” (which again comes in broad and narrow flavors), is then meant to be modified 
by the rather unclear concept of “without authorization/right”. That is then further complicated by 
technology, since people often need to rely on analogies to describe the facts, and the choice of 
analogy can direct the application of the legal rule. For example, it could be relevant when 
determining if access was unauthorized, whether some software or code could be described as a 
technical barrier to access, the circumvention of which would make it clear that access was 
unauthorized and thus criminal; or whether a sequence of letters or numbers used in a certain 
context is akin to a password even though they do not fit our conventional ideas of passwords. For 
example, Netflix directs Danish customers to the Danish version of Netflix, because their IP address 
indicates they are in Denmark. Does it constitute a circumvention of a technical barrier to use a 
VPN service to access other regional versions of Netflix? That is, describing the facts in a clear and 
concise manner in unauthorized access cases can be hard and may itself be subject to interpretation 
(e.g. what a snippet of code is meant to do compared to what people may perceive it as doing). How 
you choose to describe the technology becomes relevant to the application of the legal rule in that it 
                                                 
13
 In connection with the Convention on Cybercrime and the fact that it allows each party to decide the meaning of 
“without right”, it has been remarked that lack of homogeneity with respect to the meaning of “unauthorized”/”without 
right” can create problems. See discussion paper by Lorenzo Picotti and Ivan Salvadori: National legislation 
implementing the Convention on Cybercrime – Comparative analysis and good practices (2008), p. 12. Available on the 
Council of Europe‟s website at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/reports-
presentations/567%20study2-d-version8%20_28%20august%2008.pdf. Last visited on 13 September 2015.  
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can affect the outcome of the case. Thus, when hacking statutes are very broad and contain unclear 
terms themselves, the degree of uncertainty regarding e.g. the choice of analogies when describing 
technical facts again makes hacking statutes extremely versatile, because if some software or other 
code can be described as analogous to more conventional technical barriers, this directly affects the 
determination of whether access was unauthorized. 
Although some degree of uncertainty is present in most legislation and unclear legal terms are 
nothing new, it is especially challenging when criminal liability may hinge on how code and its 
effects is interpreted and described; and there are often more than one ways to describe the 
functioning and effect of code. 
This compounded lack of clarity leaves the courts in an unenviable position when they are 
confronted with cases outside the few examples most of us agree is certainly unauthorized access, 
such as guessing passwords to gain access to another person‟s account without their permission. 
 
 
1.2 Research questions 
How can “without authorization/right” be clarified through interpretation and construction? 
What are the consequences of the various ways of interpreting “without authorization/right” with 
respect to the clarity and precision required of criminal statutes? 
The answers to those questions are then meant to lead the way to finding a suitable approach to 
interpreting broadly phrased hacking statutes. The suitable approach must live up to the 
requirements of clarity and precision required of criminal law, in that it provides reasonable 
foreseeability to the regulated persons and does not allow or encourage arbitrary enforcement of the 
law. 
 
 
1.3 Delimitation 
There is no single definition of what cybercrime is. This dissertation focuses on illegal access 
crimes committed against computers. These are crimes that fall within the category of being attacks 
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against a computer, rather than merely being a manifestation of a traditional crime committed by 
use of a computer, e.g. fraud or content-related crimes such as copyright infringement. Equally 
excluded from the scope is procedural law and rules of evidence. 
Illegal access crimes may encourage calling into play many areas of law though. However, for the 
purposes of this dissertation the main focus is criminal law and, to an extent, whether violations of 
other laws can or should trigger a violation of an illegal access provision. Examples of such other 
laws are data protection law, copyright law, trade secret law and contract law. These areas of law 
are not addressed in any detail, but are included to the extent that they are relevant to the particular 
question at hand. Thus, there will be no general or specific analysis of other areas of law than 
criminal law. 
Furthermore, this dissertation is focused on the objective elements of the crime of illegal access, 
and is not concerned with subjective elements of the crime. For that reason, there will be no 
analysis or specific accounts of the meaning of such general principles of criminal law as intent, 
recklessness, attempt, aiding and abetting, and the likes. It is recognized that such principles have 
an effect on the extent of a criminal statute‟s scope, but the harmonization efforts made by e.g. the 
Convention on Cybercrime and EU cybercrime legislation were never aimed at harmonizing general 
principles of criminal law; only the objective elements of the crime. However, the lack of 
harmonization of general principles affects the degree of harmonization possible. 
For good measure it should be noted that although criminological considerations are generally 
interesting, they fall outside the scope of this dissertation. Similarly, law and economics 
perspectives also fall outside the scope of this dissertation even though such analyses could be very 
interesting in the context of a property vs. liability inquiry, for example in terms of cases where US 
courts have given owners of public websites the right to exclude selectively certain persons from 
accessing their public websites (typically the exclusion of competitors who are seeking information 
to compete more efficiently, or exclusion of persons providing services that complement the 
owner‟s primary service). Such cases could also raise questions with respect to competition law, but 
this as well, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
It would be interesting to examine the problem of vague hacking statutes in light of conduct 
protected by fundamental human rights, such as freedom of expression, including the right to seek 
out information. However, analyzing the meaning and extent of the scope of illegal access statutes 
is arguably a prerequisite for further research into how that scope then compares to and perhaps is 
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influenced by e.g. freedom of expression. Until the scope, or rather the possible scope, of illegal 
access statutes is documented, as this dissertation attempts to do, it is hard to say whether such a 
scope conflicts with freedom of expression or other protected conduct. The scope of those human 
rights would also require extensive and time consuming research and analysis. An analysis of the 
possible scope of hacking statutes in light of fundamental rights deserves more attention and detail 
than time allows, considering the considerable challenge involved solely with figuring out what 
should and should not trigger hacking statutes by drawing upon experiences of a foreign legal 
system. 
With respect to foreign legal systems, the US law drawn upon in this dissertation is not intended to 
serve as a full-scale comparative analysis, but as inspiration and guidance with respect to 
experiences with applying very similar statutory language, which is also intended to implement the 
Convention on Cybercrime, in order to figure out an appropriate method of applying the Danish 
hacking provision whilst avoiding pitfalls that have led to unconstitutional applications of the 
federal hacking statute in the US (that might in the Danish context trigger a violation of article 7 
ECHR) or interpretations and constructions that have sharply divided US federal courts as to the 
meaning and scope of the federal hacking statute. The result of these inquiries and analyses may in 
turn be transferrable to other jurisdictions using the same or similar statutory language, who also 
have discovered that the meaning of unauthorized access is not as unambiguous and largely 
unproblematic as originally thought. This problem is hardly one isolated to the US and Denmark, 
since close to fifty countries have ratified the Convention on Cybercrime and, thus, are obligated to 
criminalize illegal access even though it is unclear what illegal access really is when it comes to 
applying the law in practice. Arguably, such lack of clarity is not the best foundation for 
harmonization of substantive criminal law. 
All in all, there are many aspects of hacking statutes that cannot be addressed within the confines of 
this dissertation that nonetheless deserve attention and research, because the problems are unlikely 
to go away on their own given the increasing interconnected-ness and computerization in most 
aspects of life. 
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1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 explains the problem of description as it relates to facts and the law. This dissertation 
does not as such focus on the particular variations in description of facts. That is primarily the role 
of evidentiary inquiries. However, the point must be made that in terms of computers and networks, 
facts can be viewed from different perspectives, forcing the legal practitioners to make choices 
between perspectives. The choice of perspective can then in turn decisively affect the process of 
applying the legal rule and may dictate different outcomes. A comparative perspective is introduced 
as an inspiration to solving the problems related to describing the meaning of the law. This 
comparative perspective, which is based on the extensive experience US courts have with 
interpreting and construing the federal hacking statute, does not stand alone, of course. The purpose 
of the comparative perspective is not to import US law, but to examine possible extents of a statute 
quite similar to the Danish provision, where both are intended to implement the Convention on 
Cybercrime. Furthermore, it may be possible to derive at least an analytical framework for 
determining when access is authorized without borrowing any the legal rules themselves. That way, 
the framework would provide a more methodical way of applying the Danish provision, or perhaps 
just explains the way Danish courts are already applying the hacking provision (because Danish 
courts do not provide extensive explanations of their interpretative approaches if such approaches 
were intentionally applied). A framework for applying the provision, and/or explaining the current 
application of the provision, would serve to further clarity and foreseeability of the provision‟s 
application. 
Chapter 3 rather briefly introduces the sources of law that play a part in understanding unauthorized 
access provisions, along with a few secondary authorities associated with those sources. The 
chapter addresses what status the international sources have in the domestic legal systems (although 
strictly they are not necessarily sources of law, depending their status within the domestic legal 
systems). Furthermore, the chapter reveals that the Convention, EU cybercrime law, US law and 
Danish law are not drafted independently of each other, but it turns out that US law may have 
affected the drafting of the Convention, which in turn is the basis for EU cybercrime law. At the 
time the Danish hacking provision was enacted, only the US had computer crime laws. One of the 
earliest computer crime literature in Denmark also looked to US law to an extent
14
, as well as US 
experience with computer crime law being mentioned in the committee report in which the Danish 
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hacking provision was proposed. Of course, that does not mean that the Danish hacking provision 
or the Convention are directly based on US law, but it is natural when drafting a new law or 
convention to look around and see what others have done and consider their experiences. 
Chapter 4 addresses interpretation and construction. These are vital processes to any legal 
professional, but they particularly important tools when applying broad and unclear provisions. The 
chapter also serves the purpose of providing the framework for the use of the sources of law (and a 
few secondary authorities) discussed in chapter 3. This is particularly needed in terms of figuring 
out to what degree international and EU sources can affect US and Danish domestic law. This is 
particularly interesting with respect to determining the possible degree of harmonization when the 
rules meant to be harmonized leave extensive room for vastly different approaches to interpretation 
and construction of those rules when implemented in domestic law. 
Chapter 5 describes the meaning of nullum crimen sine lege principle. The purpose of the chapter is 
to reveal the extent of legal protection the principle provides, and discuss whether lack of clarity, 
vagueness or ambiguity inherent in statutory language using broad and general terms could conflict 
with the principle. Very open-ended criminal statutes may be convenient for the state, but less so for 
the citizens‟ ability to predict whether any given behavior is criminal or not. 
Chapter 6 describes the history and purpose of the 2001 Convention, the criminalization therein, 
and how the Explanatory Report accompanying the Convention takes the advent of the Web and the 
commercialization of the Internet into consideration when describing the intended scope of the 
criminalization.  
Chapter 7 concerns EU cybercrime legislation. The EU followed up with its own legislation, the 
Council‟s Framework Decision on attacks against information systems. Due to lack of will to 
renegotiate the Convention to adjust for modern day cybercrimes, the EU took legislative action in 
form of a directive in 2013, which repealed and replaced the older framework decision. 
Chapter 8 addresses the Danish hacking provisions. The initial criminalization of computer crime in 
1985, as well as the 2002 implementation of the Cybercrime Convention and the EU Framework 
Decision on attacks against information systems are covered in this chapter. 
Chapter 9 discusses the US Federal hacking statute known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA). The CFAA contains very similar language to the Danish legislation. Contrary to the 
Danish hacking provisions, there has been much more case law generated under the CFAA. This 
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US case law therefore provides a comparative perspective as to the possible reaches of a broadly 
worded hacking statute, since hacking statutes generally contain the same fundamental elements of 
the crime. This despite the seemingly much narrower intended scope of the statute. 
Chapter 10 contains an analysis and discussion of the meaning of “access”, and how it is or may be 
interpreted under the various hacking provisions. For example, the explanatory report adopt 
alongside the Convention provides a non-authoritative interpretation of access. It is therefore the 
goal of this chapter to figure out how “access” is interpreted and construed, and how that 
interpretation may affect the scope of hacking statutes and the role “without authorization/right” 
plays. 
Chapter 11 contains an analysis and discussion of the meaning of authorization with respect to 
outsiders; that is, with respect to people who do not have special permission to access. These 
situations typically involve access to websites, where authorization to access is implied. The chapter 
thus also touches upon exclusion from access to public websites and cases where plaintiffs or the 
prosecution have claimed that access to information was unauthorized because it was not purposely 
made public, and that the defendant did or should have realized that. Because the hacking statutes 
are thirty years old, they do not take into account situations where access is authorized in absence of 
special permission such as is the case with public websites, and thus do not explicitly exclude e.g. 
access to public websites from their scope. Thus, the hacking statutes can provide for some 
surprising applications in that sense. 
Chapter 12 addresses the application of hacking statutes to insiders. Their authorization is delegated 
specifically to them, and they have access to information that exceeds that which is accessible to the 
public or other insiders. Insiders are typically employees, since employees gain special access to 
their employers systems that is not available to those with no such relationship with the employer. 
Authorization with respect to insiders is a tricky issue, even though it was something that was 
specifically contemplated in legislative history. 
Chapter 13 contains an article discussing the lack of qualitative limitation of the scope of the Danish 
Criminal Code‟s section 193. Section 193 prohibits causing massive disturbance of the functioning 
of a number of systems, including information systems. The article was published in the journal 
Juristen in July 2015. 
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Chapter 14 contains the conclusion and other final remarks. Whilst chapters 15 and 16 contain 
abstracts in Danish and English, respectively. 
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2 PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROBLEM 
2.1 Problems with description 
The problem with description concerns both problems with describing facts and problems with 
describing law and thus determining the legally relevant facts.  The problem with describing the 
facts in context of computers can be said to be generally owed to inconsistent and unclear 
terminology in IT and the malleable functioning of computers, and thus the way of describing the 
function of computers and code. The problem with describing the law (i.e. its legal content, and 
thus, the legally relevant facts) can be expressed as legal uncertainty, vagueness or ambiguity. The 
problem with legal uncertainty is not a new problem, but coupled with problems with describing the 
facts as they relate to computers and code, the uncertainty is compounded because there is 
uncertainty regarding both the question of facts and the question of legally relevant facts. In terms 
of the primary focus of this dissertation, the meaning of “without authorization/right”, the problem 
with describing fact and the problem with describing the law overlaps. This is so, particularly in 
terms of authorization with respect to outsiders, because their authorization is hinged upon the 
context and not a special delegation of authorization as is the case with insiders. In relation to 
hacking statutes, the context is computers and code.  
 
2.1.1 Describing facts 
Technology can be hard to understand. Even when it is understood, perhaps as mathematical 
formulas or expressions of logic, it may be hard to describe facts related to technology in useful and 
accurate language. 
Mads Bryde Andersen wrote about problems with description in IT law in his 1988 doctorate EDB 
og Ansvar (Computers and liability). Although his work on this particular topic is now over 25 
years old, the general observations about problems of description that relate in particular to IT law 
are still of interest to this day, as Andersen‟s thoughts are quite abstract. Professor Orin Kerr 
similarly addressed the problem of description as a problem with perspectives in his 2002 article 
The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law. 
 
19 
 
Andersen focuses on two problems of descriptions that relate particularly to IT law: (1) the 
terminology problem and (2) the generality problem.
15
 The terminology problem and the generality 
problem in turn breed a third problem, which Andersen calls the delimitation problem.
16
 The 
terminology problem, he explains, relates to the lack of “intersubjectivity”
17
 in the IT field, and that 
there is a lack of clarity in the terminology.
18
 The generality problem relates to the fact that the 
same basic components are involved in computing today, although they are smaller, faster and 
cheaper than in 1985. They are general purpose components that can be used to construct a variety 
of devices. The shared purpose and function is data processing.
19
 The third problem of description, 
the delimitation problem, which relates to the problem that arises when trying to describe and 
delimit the scope of information technology.
20
 There is IT in everything nowadays; our Smart TVs, 
mobile phones, refrigerators, and even some toilets. Delimiting IT concepts, even such a concept as 
“computer” is difficult, because where do you draw the line between a computer and a device that 
shares the same components but perhaps has another primary purpose (such as keeping your food 
refrigerated)? The problem is arriving at a meaningful delimitation of the field. 
Even though Andersen was discussing these problems within the context of IT contract law, the 
problems he describes are transferrable to cybercrime law. There is arguably not much greater 
intersubjectivity today than there was when Andersen wrote his doctorate. The generality problem 
has similarly remained unaffected by the passing of time, as the same principal components, 
although now improved, are used in devices with different purposes and as such do not differ much 
from each other. Usually it is the software that reveals the purpose of a given machine, and even 
then, a variety of software can exist on the same machine, which in turn serves many different 
purposes. Furthermore, not everyone uses the same software or code for the same purpose. As 
Andersen predicted
21
, the delimitation problem has only been exacerbated with the integration of 
microprocessors into most appliances as well as networking capability to the point where we have 
been talking for a while now about the Internet of Things (IoT). When talking about the difference 
                                                 
15
 See Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 50 et seq. 
16
 Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 54 
17
 Intersubjectivity arguably meaning a shared understanding between people about the meaning and use of 
terminology. Andersen does not provide a definition of intersubjectivity, but as he ties the concept to the “empirical 
aspect”, which he ostensibly uses to describe decisions based on prior knowledge (seemingly experience-based). See 
Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 34-35 
18
 Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 50 
19
 Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 52-53 
20
 See Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 54-55 
21
 See Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), p. 55 
 
20 
 
between URLs and passwords as methods of access control, the two do not principally differ 
technically – not in a meaningful way, at least. These two concepts, URLs and passwords, and their 
meaning is going to be of importance in when analyzing some of the cases in the chapter on 
authorization with respect to outsiders. 
As pointed out by Mads Bryde Anders, a legal problem that arises out of an erroneous description 
of the technology, may result in a relevant problem legally speaking, but in practically terms it is 
irrelevant. When cases involve very technical accounts that may differ depending on the whether it 
is the defense or the plaintiff/prosecution that is offering the account, the court (or jury) will have to 
choose which account it relies on. Both accounts may be objectively correct, yet one account makes 
the facts legally relevant, whilst the other does not. The court has to decide, perhaps without really 
understanding the technology, to which factual description to apply the legal rule. And this is just 
assuming that both technical accounts are correct. In reality, it may very well be that one or both of 
the accounts are based on incorrect understanding of the facts, which the court is not equipped to 
discover. Thus, the courts may be solving a problem that does not really exist, or at least is not 
relevant to the legal rule applied. Again, the framing of “secret” web addresses as being equivalent 
to passwords can be made to seem plausible, but in fact the function of URLs are not related to the 
function of passwords. In some cases it may be hard for judges to determine whether such a claim is 
legitimate or not, because making the right choice is largely dependent on at least some technical 
knowledge and experience. 
This necessity of being able to understand the facts is underlined by Orin Kerr. In his 2002 article 
on perspectives, Orin Kerr discussed how the choice of description of the facts (as determined by 
the choice of perspective) could determine the outcome of cases under the CFAA and other legal 
rules where the facts of the case are related to computers. Kerr explains that technical facts can be 
described from the external and the internal perspective, which he also calls the physical world 
perspective and virtual perspective, respectively.
22
 As Kerr explains, for example, that what the 
Internet is, depends on what perspective we choose. It can be perceived as a virtual world that we 
enter and enables us, for example, to visit the library or the supermarket, meet other people or 
emerge ourselves in games that again are designed to create a virtual world experience, without us 
ever moving in the physical world, or the Internet can be perceived as loads of interconnected 
                                                 
22
 Kerr‟s approach is based on theories of systems developed by H.L.A. Hart and others. See Orin S. Kerr: The Problem 
of Perspective in Internet Law (2003), Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 91, p. 358. 
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hardware running programs that can exchange information through use of common agreed-upon 
communication protocols.
23
 However, Kerr makes another excellent point: “The real produces the 
virtual, but the virtual need not reflect the real.”
24
 For that reason, choosing one or the other will 
result in different outcomes that are independent of each other.
25
 What Kerr is driving at is that even 
if we experience, for example, an email client as being virtually the same as other email clients 
because they deliver the same results, i.e. sending mail, displaying an inbox etc., does not mean that 
the email clients deliver those experiences in the same way. Thus, dramatic changes in code can go 
unnoticed, whilst small changes in code can produce a dramatically different experience. The 
average user will be more focused on whether he can send and receive his email and search through 
his inbox than caring about how the code makes this possible for him to do and how that may differ 
from other email clients that may do things differently but still yield the same end-result.
26
 
If the facts are misunderstood, and the law is correctly understood but applied to erroneous 
assumptions about the facts, the scope of the law becomes even more confusing because it departs 
from reality. When trying to understand something that is unfamiliar to us analogies are often 
helpful. However, analogies are not always accurate, and can be rooted in misunderstanding. 
Especially, courts ought to be careful where the analogy implies that the court must follow an 
existing set of rules developed in a different context. For example, the Danish legislative history 
indicates that gaining access to information by using the password belonging to another without 
permission means that the access is unauthorized. If one could convince the court that visiting a 
web address that has not been shared directly with that person is the same as using an ill-gotten 
password, then the password analogy directs the court to find that the access was unauthorized. 
Many years ago I stumbled on to a website I enjoyed reading. It was a blog of sorts written by an Englishman who 
humorously described to his readers the cultural clashes between him and his German girlfriend. He made even the 
most mundane arguments humorous, such as their argument on the correct way of cutting a kiwi fruit in half. Anyway, I 
digress. The point of this anecdote is not the particular content of his writings nor my particular sense of humor, but 
what happened after I had signed up to his mailing list. After a few years of remaining on the mailing list, I received an 
email with a link to a page on his website that was reserved for those on the mailing list. The page, however, is entirely 
unprotected (it is accessible to anyone who knows the URL) apart from the fact that there is no link from the main page 
to this “reserved” page. In the email there was a courteous request that I not share the link with others as the page was 
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intended only for those on the mailing list. I have always respected the request, but not because I thought I risked being 
held criminally liable for sharing the link, but because – well – he asked me nicely and so far nothing has given me a 
particular reason to do otherwise. Now, however, after I have spent quite some time delving into what “without 
right”/“without authorization” means, I am not so sure what compels me more to respect the request; the faint, yet 
conceivable, threat of criminal prosecution based on a broad interpretation of a broad statute, or that he asked me nicely. 
The final point of the story is actually more of a series of questions than a statement: Should I face criminal prosecution 
should I ever share the link? Is a non-member who accesses the page, fully aware that it is intended only for those on 
the mailing list, committing the crime of access “without right” /“without authorization”? What about a non-member 
who manages to guess the URL of the page and becomes aware that there is no direct link to it from the main page? Or 
a non-member guessing the URL, or through other means stumbles onto the page (granted he would lack “intent” as to 
the lack of authorization, but if he can so easily find the page, why should I risk prosecution)? The link has long since 
been indexed by Google and appears in the search results, if you know what terms to google; would that be relevant to 
my defense that the page is so easily accessible to anyone, or is that entirely immaterial? Can I be (more or less 
unilaterally) bound to keep secret, information that is publicly accessible? Should I ever share the link or access the 
page after leaving the mailing list, I might be at the mercy of the writer‟s willingness to enforce his request and I might 
be at the mercy of the prosecution‟s interpretation of the hacking statute and later the court‟s interpretation. The 
language of the Danish and the US hacking statutes do not exempt me from prosecution at least. After all, technically, I 
can easily fulfil every element of the language of the typical hacking statute by leaving the mailing list and accessing 
the webpage afterwards. The final question: Should any of the hypotheticals above fall within the scope of a criminal 
hacking statute? 
The anecdote above frames the general theme of the dissertation; namely, how little it takes to make 
a plausible-sounding case for prosecution under a typical hacking statute. There is so much 
discretion granted to the prosecution, the owner of the computer (or information or programs), and 
the courts with respect to determining what is “unauthorized”. The statutory language itself does not 
differentiate between hacking into top secret military computer systems and my accessing the 
“reserved” webpage after leaving the mailing list – only the sentencing phase makes such 
distinctions relevant. 
As for the technical details, my accessing the “reserved” webpage looks no different from any other 
“authorized” person‟s access. But is the possession of the URL the same as possessing a password? 
How would we differentiate between possession of this particular URL that points to an 
unprotected, technically publicly accessible webpage and possession of any other URL that points 
to publicly accessible sites? How do we even technically differentiate a URL from a password? 
There is no difference technically speaking. The difference lies in our perception of the two – and 
even then there are those that would argue that a URL can be a password even if it is completely 
unprotected. That is, you can make arguments for and against a URL being a password. Through 
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our subjective interpretation, we can let ourselves believe anything is a password as long as we just 
use it as if it were a password. I could claim that my phone number is the password you put into 
your phone that enables you to call me, and that the URL of my website is the password for 
accessing it. The technical aspect of URLs is rather simple; the URL points to a web resource. That 
is it, simplistically said. Qualifying a URL as a password is a subjective interpretation of what a 
URL is, based on the individual‟s belief as to its purpose in a specific scenario. The ability to 
characterize a “tool” as having a specific purpose in a specific context other than what it is usually 
associated with means that an interpretational problem arises before we ever get to the statutory 
text; e.g. the question whether a URL is the equivalent of a password (not in the legal sense, but in 
the factual sense). The answer to that question determines the legal outcome. 
 
 
2.1.2 Describing legally relevant facts 
What facts are legally relevant is determined by the legal rule. It is then quite understandable and 
natural that where cases involve facts that are hard to understand (and describe), and additionally 
involve a legal rule that is hard to understand because it uses terms that are veiled in uncertainty, it 
becomes exponentially harder to determine when the rule is applicable, in general, and more 
specifically whether the rule is applicable to the particular facts of a case. In terms of illegal access 
statutes, the uncertainty and lack of understanding relates equally to the facts and the legal rule; the 
uncertainty is compounded in cybercrime cases because the court is applying a law it may not 
understand to facts it may not understand. A misunderstanding on either side, the factual or the 
legal, affects the outcome of the case. Since the legal rule determines what facts are legally relevant, 
it is essential to understand the rule before applying it, just as it is important to understand the facts 
before applying a legal rule. Because “without right” is left to judicial discretion, the courts have 
some freedom to choose which facts are legally relevant facts in terms of determining whether 
access was with or without right. Those choices cannot be arbitrary and it has to be reasonably 
foreseeable what conduct triggers criminal liability. 
The remainder of the dissertation involves attempting to discover an analytical framework that 
helps courts determining whether access was unauthorized or not. The discovery of a framework 
not only involves looking at “good” interpretations of unauthorized access statutes, but also cases 
that involved less fortunate interpretations that later turned out to produce odd or arbitrary outcomes 
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in other cases, or may even have been found unconstitutional – perhaps because the court started 
out deciding the conduct in question was wrong, and then found the arguments to support that 
conclusion, which is understandable at some level, since the statutory text does not give them much 
guidance to figure out where the line goes between legal and illegal; but such gut-feeling 
approaches are not desirable. 
The language of the hacking statutes do not make it possible for those applying the law easily to 
discern between criminal conduct and innocent/desirable conduct. The statutory language is unclear 
as to the standard of “without right” / “without authorization”. The standard can be construed to 
incorporate social norms, contractual obligations, agency theories, code-based access restrictions or 
just where the access precedes conduct that is criminal, even where the access was otherwise 
authorized. This is an incredibly wide spectrum of conduct, ranging from the merely annoying to 
seriously harmful conduct to irrelevant conduct. Much of the spectrum is defined by the owner of 
the computer. The owner chooses whether to incorporate code-based access restrictions, and 
whether to attach terms and conditions to the access of the computer. Similarly, where the otherwise 
authorized access precedes illegal conduct, such as illegal use of information, this opens up the 
scope of hacking statutes to include copyright violations, data protection violations, trade secret law 
violations, and so on, where violation of any of these could turn an authorized access into 
unauthorized access based solely on the criminality of later conduct that takes place subsequent to 
the access, effectively letting the legally relevant facts be determined by other statutes, so that 
violation of those statutes automatically carry with them a violation of hacking statutes. The 
question is whether all of these are relevant facts that can trigger liability under an unauthorized 
access statute. 
 
 
2.2 A comparative perspective 
At first it might not seem relevant to seek a comparative perspective in US law whilst also operating 
with Danish and international law, mainly because the legal systems differ in many respects. In 
most areas of law, it might be more relevant to look closer to home, such as neighboring countries 
with familiar legal systems, to seek comparative inspiration as to the legal status and legislative 
approaches to solving complex problems. This may be true for most areas of law. However, as 
previously explained, US law is interesting 1) because there is an abundance of case law regarding 
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the federal hacking statute in all sorts of factual contexts, 2) because the courts extensively explain 
the reasoning for their decision to apply or reject to apply the statute, and 3) because the statute they 
apply is very similar to the Danish provision, and also 4), like the Danish hacking provision, serves 
to implement the Convention on Cybercrime.  
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3 SOURCES OF LAW AND OTHER AUTHORITES 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sources of law that are relevant to this dissertation, 
and delineate the extent of their authority. The following chapter on interpretation and construction 
will sketch the rules of interpretation and construction that relate to the application of these sources 
of law in the individual legal systems. Descriptions will be relatively brief, because the more 
complex question is how to put the legal sources into action rather than merely stating their 
existence and their role. 
The purpose of touching upon sources of law in the various legal systems is two-pronged: First, the 
various legal systems‟ approach to cybercrime legislation has directly and/or indirectly influenced 
each other. As will be explained later, the 1985 Danish hacking statute seems to have been at least 
partially inspired by US experiences with computer crime (which itself ostensibly seemed to be, at 
least partially, a reaction to the 1983 movie WarGames
27
). Later, in the late 90s and early 00s, due 
to its vaster experience with computer crime, the US appears to significantly influence the drafting 
of the Convention on Cybercrime.
28
 A couple of years later, the Convention‟s substantive articles 
are essentially imported into an EU framework decision, the content of which still lives on in a 
directive and thus creating a legally binding EU measure that must be implemented in member 
states. Second, because of this apparent relationship between the various hacking legislations (and 
even if there is no clear causal link between the Convention‟s scope and US influence, the fact 
remains that the language of hacking provisions are very similar because the Convention was meant 
to harmonize national criminal law) the legislations suffer from the same problems related to their 
interpretation and construction, and thus, ultimately, their potential practical application. The 
potential scope of application is in turn affected by other laws that directly or indirectly affect how a 
source of law must be interpreted. Rules of interpretation and construction may act as some sort of 
referees by determining what influence one source of law has on the application of the other. 
The first section of this chapter concerns international law. The source of harmonization, so to 
speak, is the Convention on Cybercrime. Denmark and other EU member states are also bound by 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (as well as domestic constitutional rights 
which fall outside the scope of this dissertation) and implementations (if required by domestic law) 
and subsequent applications of the criminal provisions must be in conformity with the ECHR. 
Whereas the EU cybercrime legislation and the Danish legislation are subject to ECHR 
requirements, the US legislation is subject to domestic constitutional requirements. These non-
criminal law sources of law affect how and if a criminal law provision can be applied. 
Since EU law affects Danish law to an extent in the cybercrime area, the second section describes 
the source of law within the EU system and how these sources of law affect application of 
implementations of EU law in the domestic courts. 
The third section, outlines the sources of law in the US legal system, since this dissertation seeks 
inspiration in US case law in terms of how hacking statutes have been applied; more specifically, 
how key elements common to most, if not all, hacking statutes have been construed by US courts. 
The section furthermore describes how international sources of law are treated within the US legal 
system rather than how they are expected to be treated seen from an international law point of view. 
That is, international law does not have effect in national law unless the domestic legal system 
enables it to have effect. 
The fourth section addresses sources of law in the Danish legal system and how Danish courts 
perceive and may apply e.g. conventions, EU law, etc. That is, whereas the section of international 
law describes how, from an international law point of view “looking down”, international sources of 
law ought to be applied, the section on Danish law – as well as the section on US law – describes 
how these international sources of law are treated seen from inside the domestic legal system 
“looking up”. 
The drawing below illustrates the connections described above. 
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3.1 International law 
International law concerns itself with the legal relationship between sovereign states.
29
 Questions 
regarding the deeper meaning of the existence or non-existence of international law, whether 
international law is really law
30
, what defines a sovereign state, and so on, fall outside the scope of 
this dissertation. For the purpose of this dissertation, the existence of international law is 
unabashedly presumed. 
Not all problems are capable of being solved within the confines of national law. Especially so, 
when the problem involves interests of other states. This dissertation will focus solely on treaties, 
conventions and the likes, and not jus cogens (international customary law).
31
 
It is clear that in absence of a supreme power that enforces international law when states misbehave, 
international law is only binding insofar as national law recognizes it as binding. The Vienna 
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 Ole Spiermann: Moderne folkeret (2006), p. 1 
30
 One of the more typical questions being: Is something really binding and therefore law if it cannot be enforced? 
31
 For the purposes of this dissertation, it is primarily international law in the form of treaties that is of interest rather 
than international customary law. International customary law will thus not be the subject of any particular discussion 
as such. 
The Convention EU Framework 
Decision 
EU Directive 
Danish law 
ECHR US law 
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convention on the law of treaties
32
 expresses a rule generally accepted as a general principle of 
international law
33
: 
Article 26. "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA" 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has noted that pacta sunt servanda and fulfilling obligations 
are separate issues.
34
 According to the ICJ, a treaty may be binding even though the duties under the 
treaty are not carried out. The ICJ further noted, that the purpose of the treaty and the intentions of 
the parties to the treaty out-weight a literal application. This, the ICJ, couples with the principle of 
good faith application of the treaty in order for the treaty to fulfil its purpose.
35
 For this reason, 
chapter 6 on sources of law also addresses when international law, more specifically treaties in the 
context of this dissertation, is binding upon the US and Denmark also as seen from national law, 
and what role the binding and non-binding texts might play in national law and courts when 
applying either the treaty itself, or provisions in national law that serve to fulfil treaty obligations. 
 
3.1.1 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
The Council of Europe‟s (CoE) Convention on Cybercrime and its accompanying explanatory 
report was adopted on 8 November 2001 by the CoE‟s Committee of Ministers, and was opened for 
signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001.
36
 The conditions for the Convention entering into 
force were the ratifications by five signatories of which at least three were member states of the 
Council of Europe.
37
 The Convention entered into force on 1 July 2004. Fifty-four states are 
signatories to date, and 47 out of those 54 states have ratified/acceded to the Convention. Canada is 
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the latest state to ratify the Convention, which it did on 8 July 2015.
38
 Only member states of CoE 
and those non-member states that participated in the negotiation/drafting process of the Convention 
were eligible as signatories until the Convention entered into force.
39
 Other non-member states may 
be invited to accede to the Convention after the Convention entered into force.
40
 
The Convention has three explicitly stated aims. First, harmonization of substantive national 
criminal law provisions in the area of cybercrime. Second, providing national procedural law 
powers to investigate cybercrime. Third, establishing a regime for international cooperation.
41
 The 
Convention addresses an international problem that concerns the interests of every nation state and 
a problem that cannot be solved solely within any one nation state. 
An explanatory report was negotiated and drafted in the Committee of Experts alongside the 
Convention, was adopted at the same time as the Convention. It does not provide an authoritative 
interpretation of the Convention‟s provisions, but may be useful when applying the provisions.
42
 
Because the provisions in the Convention use terms that are, on their face, devoid of clear meaning 
or ambiguous, the explanatory report gives a more detailed account of the intended application of 
the provisions and how individual concepts were understood. 
Recalling the Vienna Convention‟s article 31, the explanatory report is such a text, which was 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe along with the Convention on 
Cybercrime, and may serve as an aid in interpreting the Convention, regardless of whether it is 
binding or not. In other words, it is capable of having persuasive authority, but is not binding. 
To summarize briefly, the Convention on Cybercrime obligates the parties to criminalize certain 
cybercrimes within their national legal system. Hence, the Convention serves to harmonize rules 
that regulate the relationship between a sovereign state and its citizens and requires the introduction 
or expansion of the powers the state that may wield against the citizens at the national level; it 
restricts freedom and expands powers to investigate violations of the required restrictions 
(criminalized acts).  
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3.1.2 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
Even though article 15 of the Convention on Cybercrime only applies to the procedural powers, it 
does not follow that the lack of application to the substantive part means that any implementation 
and application of the substantive part is free from scrutiny under human right treaties and/or rights 
provided for under domestic law. One of the most relevant human rights treaties in the context of 
this dissertation is the European Convention on Human Rights, which applies to Denmark and other 
European Union member states, and thus affects the application of the implementations of the 
Convention on Cybercrime and EU cybercrime legislation. 
Also a product of the Council of Europe, the ECHR
43
 entered into force on 3 September 1953.  
The ECHR obligates its signatories to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”
44
 Among the rights in Section I of the 
Convention, and of great relevance to the topic of this dissertation, is article 7 ECHR, which 
prohibits punishment without law (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). 
Article 19 ECHR establishes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. The 
Court‟s role is to “[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto […]”
45
. The decisions rendered by 
the ECtHR are binding upon the parties to the case, and the judgments are final.
46
 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR may give advisory opinions as to the interpretation of the Convention and its protocols.
47
 
As opposed to the Convention on Cybercrime, the ECHR is enforced by a court capable of 
rendering final and binding decisions, as well as the Court being able to secure a certain uniformity 
in the application of the ECHR. This lack of control mechanism in regards to the interpretation and 
application of the Convention on Cybercrime results in significantly different approaches to the 
subject-matter, as will be elaborated upon in later chapters in the dissertation. 
The role of and application of the ECHR within the EU and in Denmark is further discussed below 
and in the chapter on interpretation and construction. 
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3.1.2.1 The relationship between ECHR and the Convention on Cybercrime 
According to the Convention on Cybercrime‟s article 15, parties to the Convention must “ensure 
that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures” provided for 
in the section on procedural rules (rules expanding police investigative powers) “are subject to 
conditions and safeguards provided for” under the party‟s domestic law as well as those conditions 
and safeguards that flow from international human rights obligations, such as the ECHR. Article 15 
of the Convention on Cybercrime thus only applies to the expanded procedural rules. Only in the 
Convention‟s preamble is there a more general statement reminding of the need to balance the 
interests of law enforcement and respect for human rights, such as freedom of expression, including 
seeking, receiving and imparting information.
48
 The preamble specifically refers to the rights in 
ECHR and UNCPR
49
. 
 
3.2 EU Law 
The European Union has also passed cybercrime legislation. European Union law is supranational 
law and is the product of the legislative bodies of the European Union as it is interpreted by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Member states have ceded sovereignty in certain areas, 
which then are regulated either exclusively by the EU or by the EU and the member states 
concurrently.
50
 In any remaining areas, the member states, as sovereign states, can govern as they 
see fit, although legislation or practices that interfere with the fundamental freedoms are subject to 
the supremacy of EU law and other general principles in EU law. 
As opposed to US law, European Union citizens cannot file suit directly with the Court of Justice, 
and therefore do not have standing in that sense. Rather it is the national court that petitions the 
CJEU, requesting it to rule on a preliminary question regarding application of EU law in a case 
before it. 
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The Court of Justice‟s jurisdiction is to interpret EU law and promote uniform application of EU 
law
51
, but it does not interpret member state laws as such. To understand EU law and its interaction 
with national legal systems a little history does not hurt, especially with a view to understanding 
why Denmark‟s status differs from the vast majority of other member states in the cybercrime area. 
 
3.2.1 Formation of the Union 
In the wake of two world wars, a war weary Europe sought to prevent further armed conflicts in the 
region. In 1950, Robert Schuman, the French minister of foreign affairs, suggested that European 
states enter into a collaboration, which would place the coal and steel industry, both integral to war-
related production, under a single organization. What came to be known as the Schuman plan, 
envisaged independent institutions competent of issuing decisions binding on all member states, 
which in turn presupposed member states ceding sovereign powers to the institutions. The plan 
envisaged a collaboration that would grow more tight-knit over time and that could eventually pave 
the way to the formation of a European federation.
52
 
In 1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg ratified the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC; also known as the Treaty of Paris). It 
was the first supranational collaboration of its kind. The treaty entered into force in July 1952, and 
would expire 50 years later in July 2002.
53
 
In 1957, two additional treaties were signed in Rome; Euratom and the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC), both of which entered into force on 1 January 1958. The 
EEC aimed to create a common market and to integrate economic policies in member states, 
affecting a much larger portion of the industry than just steel and coal.
54
 The EU can only legislate 
within the framework of the powers conferred upon it. These areas are enumerated in the treaties. 
Denmark, along with the United Kingdom and Ireland, joined the community in 1973. 
In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht established the Treaty on the European Union, adding the fourth 
treaty to the collaboration. With the Treaty of Maastricht came the three pillars. The first pillar 
consisted of the original economic collaboration. The second pillar consisted of common foreign 
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and security policy. The third pillar concerned justice and home affairs (later narrowed to police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters). The first pillar operated at the supranational level, whilst 
the second and third pillars operated at an intergovernmental level. 
In Denmark, the public voted against the Treaty of Maastricht. This led to the adoption of the 
Edinburgh decision in which Denmark made reservations limiting the obligation to participate fully 
in the collaboration. These reservations were in regard to the collaboration under the second and 
third pillars, the union citizenship and the participation in the euro cooperation.
55
 However, the 
reservation pertaining to the union citizenship is considered largely symbolic having no real legal 
effects.
56
 Any legislation adopted under the second and third pillar would not bind Denmark. This 
did not preclude Denmark from occasionally opting in on second and third pillar legislation in 
certain cases. 
Although the pillar system was abolished in 2009 when the TFEU absorbed the third pillar into 
what is now the European Union, some of the legislative acts adopted under the third pillar remain. 
The aim is to convert these remaining legislative instruments into regulations and directives. The 
areas covered by the third pillar have therefore moved from the intergovernmental level to the 
supranational. This introduces an interesting, and rather convoluted, problem regarding the 
framework decision on attacks against information systems and its status post-Lisbon with respect 
to Denmark. This will be discussed further below. 
 
3.2.2 Sources of law in EU law 
3.2.2.1 Primary law 
The treaties and the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) are 
primary legislation. The secondary legislation has its legal basis in the treaty and can only be 
adopted within the scope of the treaty, as well as it must comply with the Charter and the general 
principles of EU law. For example, article 114 TFEU, which in some aspects resembles the 
“commerce clause” in the US Constitution, serves as a legal basis for secondary legislation 
regulating aspects of the internal market. When regulating the internal market, the secondary 
legislation adopted under article 114 TFEU, may include criminal sanctions, cf. C-176/03 
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Commission v. Council. After the third pillar was abolished, the legal basis for secondary legislation 
relating to harmonizing member state criminal laws may be found in article 83 TFEU
57
 in the 
Chapter on an area of freedom, security and justice. Article 83 TFEU allows the Council and the 
EU-Parliament, following the ordinary legislative procedure, to adopt directives on criminal law 
setting out the minimum rules for which acts to criminalize as well as the punishment associated 
with committing the acts. 
The EU Charter on fundamental rights started out as soft law when it was adopted at a meeting in 
European Council December 2000. As of the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the Charter now 
has the same status as the treaties.
58
 The Charter provides for numerous fundamental rights, many 
of which overlap with rights enshrined in the ECHR. The significance of the Charter rights of 
relevance to this dissertation, namely article 49 of the Charter, is explained briefly below in the 
section on the relationship between the EU, the Charter and the ECHR. 
 
3.2.2.2 Secondary law 
Regulations, directives, and decisions are secondary law adopted in accordance with the appropriate 
legal bases provided by the TFEU. Regulations are directly applicable and binding in all aspects
59
, 
and generally may not be transposed into national law
60
. Regulations directly obligate both the 
member state and private actors.
61
  
Directives are binding in terms of their aim, but discretion is left to the member states on how to 
transpose the directive into national law, cf. article 288 TFEU. Directives are sometimes capable of 
having direct effect. The possibility of direct effect of directives does not follow directly from the 
treaties, but from the CJEU‟s case law. This led to the member states‟ explicit statement under the 
old article 34 (2)(b) TEU that framework decisions could not have direct effect. From the time a 
directive has been adopted and until the deadline for transposing it into national law, member states 
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have a duty not to act in ways that would impede the goals of the directive; a so-called stand-still 
obligation
62
.
63
 
Framework decisions were the legislative instrument used in the third pillar, cf. pre-Lisbon article 
34 EU, and operate at an intergovernmental level, although institutions other than the Council play 
a limited role,
64
 whereas directives operate at the supranational level. Like directives, they are 
binding as to their purpose and object, but member states have discretion as to the form and 
methods of implementation in national law.
65
 As opposed to directives, framework decisions are 
incapable of having direct effect, cf. article 34 (2)(b) EU (pre-Lisbon). However, as will be 
explained in the chapter on interpretation and construction, framework decisions do have “indirect 
effect”. 
 
3.2.3 Case law 
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union plays a prominent role when one seeks 
to determine what the law is in any given area of EU law; not entirely unlike the common law 
tradition (studying EU law requires significant case law studies). Authoritative interpretation of EU 
law is the prerogative of the CJEU, which ensures uniform interpretation and application of EU law 
in the member states. Member state national courts can in turn, and in some cases are obligated to, 
request preliminary rulings from the CJEU on the interpretation of EU law. Only the CJEU has the 
competence to annul EU legislation. National courts cannot decide upon EU law validity. 
Advocate Generals assist the Court by supplying a thorough analysis of facts and law relevant to the 
case, resulting in a recommendation to the Court.
66
 Opinions of Advocate General are not binding 
upon the Court and the Court does not always follow them.
67
 Their usefulness lies in that the 
opinions can give an insight into the reasoning behind the Court‟s decision, when it does follow the 
recommendations of the Advocate General, and generally cast a light on the issues at hand.
68
 In 
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addition, the opinions often contain discussions that are more theoretical and as well as containing 
references to literature, which can give a valuable insight into the particular area of law.
69
 
 
3.2.4 The relationship between the EU, the EU Charter and the ECHR 
Even before the EU acquired the explicit competence to accede to the ECHR, the CJEU had 
acknowledged the ECHR as an influence on EU law. The CJEU has referenced the ECHR in 
numerous cases, and in 2010, the ECtHR also revised their interpretation of an ECHR right in light 
of the EU Charter on fundamental rights.
70
 
To avoid conflict between the ECtHR and the CJEU, it is stated in the Charter‟s article 52 (3), that 
insofar as the Charter contains rights corresponding to those rights contained in the ECHR, the 
rights in the Charter have the same meaning and scope as those of the ECHR. However, that does 
not preclude the Charter from providing more expansive protection than the ECHR. 
The EU has not as of yet acceded to the ECHR with the CJEU rejecting the draft agreement on EU 
accession as being incompatible with EU law in December 2014.
71
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3.3 US Law 
3.3.1 The US legal system and sources of law 
The US legal system has evolved in its own distinct manner since the US severed its connection 
with the Crown of England. Although English decisions were cited in the earlier days due to various 
factors, this is rarely the case today.
72
 Nevertheless, the US legal system was, in its infancy, heavily 
influenced by English law and its origin is found in English law, which is not surprising given the 
origins of many of those who immigrated to the New World. Remnants of influence from other 
legal systems can also be found in many states. For example, Louisiana, the only US “civil law” 
state, was heavily influenced by French law. Influence can also be seen in states formerly occupied 
by Spain and Mexico. The foremost ideas inherited from English law include the concept of the 
supremacy of law, tradition of precedent and a trial as a contentious proceeding.
73
 
The US Constitution grants powers to the federal government only in limited areas, such as taxation 
and the authority to wage war. In some areas, federal legislative authority is exclusive, while in 
others the authority to legislate is concurrent. In any remaining cases, where federal authority is not 
exclusive or concurrent, the individual states are still sovereign, and the validity of state legislation 
is subject only to the US Constitution.
74
 The validity of federal legislation is equally subject to 
judicial review in federal courts.
75
 
76
 
In the hierarchy of sources of law, the Constitution is the highest ranked in that it is the “supreme 
law of the land”. Federal statutes and treaties entered into by the United States are of equal 
authority, subject only to the Constitution. Should federal statutes and treaties conflict, the most 
recent prevails.
77
 
In areas of concurrent powers, both state and federal courts have jurisdiction and the plaintiff can 
file suit in either jurisdiction. Therefore, federal courts often have to apply state laws, and vice 
versa, as the parties may rely on rights on the state and federal level respectively, creating a 
complex conflict for the federal or state court to resolve.
78
 
                                                 
72
 See more E. Allan Farnsworth: An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, chapter 1 
73
 E. Allan Farnsworth: An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, p. 15 
74
 Fletcher v. Peck (1810), US Supreme Court 
75
 Marbury v. Marshall (1803), US Supreme Court 
76
 E. Allan Farnsworth: An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, chapter 1 
77
 E. Allan Farnsworth: An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, chapter 6 
78
 E. Allan Farnsworth: An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, chapters 4, 6 and 7 
 
39 
 
The tradition of precedent, or stare decisis, is one of the ideas inherited from the English legal 
system. When the facts of an earlier case are similar to the facts of a later case, the rule of law 
established in the earlier case applies to the later case. This is subject to some important limitations, 
the most important of which is the division of the cases into binding and persuasive authorities. A 
prior decision in a case with similar facts, is only binding upon the court deciding the later case, if 
the prior decision was made by a higher court in the same jurisdiction or if the prior decision was 
made by the same court. An additional, and equally important limitation, is the distinction between 
“holding” and “obiter dictum”. The holding represents the rule of law, which was necessary to 
reach the decision, whereas dictum is something the judges have said in passing, but is not 
necessary to reach a decision in the case at hand. Dictum is persuasive authority, on par with 
secondary authorities such as law review articles, dictionaries, encyclopedias and so on.
79
 These 
principles are important with respect to the significant number of US federal cases analyzed in this 
dissertation. 
In US law, criminal law exists at both the state and federal level. The criminal law is largely 
statutory. Federal criminal law is reserved for the regulation of investigation and prosecution of 
specified crimes with an interstate dimension. Common law crimes
80
 have been abolished at the 
federal level, as such ex post facto criminalization was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in US v. Hudson and Goodwin in 1812. Some states still recognize common law crimes, but 
in most states, criminal law is statutory, like federal criminal law. 
Case law cannot alter statutes. Courts can decide upon the validity of the legislation. “Command of 
the legislature is supreme except in point of validity of the statute itself.”
81
 
The role of legislative history and purpose in US law is not without its complexities, and opinions 
are divided on the use of legislative history in statutory construction.
82
 In any case, legislative 
history is not called upon unless the statute‟s language is ambiguous.
83
 The legislative history of 
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federal statutes is very well documented compared to state legislation.
84
 Committee reports form the 
House and the Senate generally paint a picture of the existing legislation and the intended scope of 
proposed legislation, and it is generally accepted that Congress adopts the committee‟s intent in 
terms of the details.
85
 However, the role of legislative history in the construction of criminal statutes 
is perhaps somewhat more limited due to fair notice reasons, and the rule of strict construction of 
criminal statutes.
86
 
 
3.3.2 The Cybercrime Convention and US Law 
The United States was granted observer status with the Council of Europe on 7 December 1995.
87
 
As a non-member country, the US is offered the opportunity to co-operate with the Council. This 
entails e.g. “accepting guiding principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and to send observers to [the Council‟s] expert committees and conferences 
of specialised ministers.”
88
 In Budapest, on 23 November 2001, the United States signed the 
Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime. The US was the first non-member state to ratify 
the Convention, but in recent years, five additional non-member states have joined its ranks.
89
 The 
United States Senate voted on 3 August 2006
90
 to ratify the Council of Europe‟s Convention on 
Cybercrime (attaching six reservations and five declarations, one of which declares that existing US 
law fulfils the obligations related to the convention‟s substantive provisions), and instrument of 
ratification was deposited on 29 September 2006. The Convention entered into force in the US on 1 
January 2007.
91
 
 
However, the Convention‟s substantive provisions are not self-executing and from the wording of 
the provisions, explicitly require implementation into domestic law to have any legal effect. The 
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Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, in its advice, opined that no implementation was needed as 
federal law already covered the acts in the Convention‟s Chapter II.
92
 It is important to note that 
because the Convention on Cybercrime is clearly non-self-executing concerning the substantive 
provisions it is not binding federal law, despite its ratification and despite the language of the 
Supremacy clause.
93
 There are however provisions in the Convention that are ostensibly self-
executive, in that they can serve as a legal basis for extradition.
94
 At least one thing is clear, when 
interpreting a treaty, the court looks to the text of the treaty. To aid in interpreting that text, the 
court can furthermore look to the negotiating and drafting history of the treaty as well as any post-
ratification understanding of the signatories to the treaty.
95
 
The remaining question is, whether a non-self-executing treaty that does not require implementation 
into domestic law, because domestic law is considered as already fulfilling the treaty obligations, 
has any bearing on the interpretation of the domestic provisions in domestic courts. More 
specifically, can a non-self-executing treaty affect the scope of the domestic law that the Senate 
claimed fulfilled the obligations under the treaty. The chapter on interpretation and construction 
touches upon this issue. 
It is not uncommon for the US to add so-called RUDs (reservations, understandings and 
declarations) to treaties, and US courts will interpret the US‟s international obligations in the light 
of those RUDs
96
.
97
 As mentioned previously, one of the RUDs associated with the Senate‟s advice 
and consent, was that existing US law complies with the obligations under the Convention on 
Cybercrime‟s substantive provisions. 
The Department of Justice (DoJ) has stated that the US had “a real voice in the drafting process” of 
the Convention.
98
 Furthermore, the DoJ stated that no legislative implementation was needed due to 
the US delegation‟s hard work in balancing “attentiveness to the suggestions of other countries with 
                                                 
92
 Senate Executive Report 109-6, 11 November 2005, accompanying Treaty doc. 108-11 (Convention on Cybercrime) 
93
 This is explained further in the chapter on interpretation and construction in US law. 
94
 See Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime, ETS no. 185, article 24 
95
 Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is "an agreement 
among sovereign powers," we have also considered as "aids to its interpretation" the negotiation and drafting history of 
the treaty as well as "the postratification understanding" of signatory nations.”) 
96
 Michael John Garcia (Congressional Research Service): International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. 
Law (23 January 2014), p. 4 
97
 Even though the RUDs may seek to define or limit the obligations of the United States under the treaty, the RUDs 
should presumably be seen also in light of the Vienna Convention‟s article 18, which obliges states to refrain from 
taking actions that undermine the purpose and object of the treaty. As mentioned previously, the US has not ratified the 
Vienna Convention, but recognizes it as customary international law. 
98
 Cache of the Department of Justice website (now defunct, but a cached version was accessed through the Wayback 
Machine) at https://web.archive.org/web/20111015051110/http://www.cybercrime.gov/COEFAQs.htm#QA2  
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respect for the strengths of current U.S. law. As a result, the central provisions of the Convention 
are consistent with the existing framework of U.S. law and procedure.”
99
 Furthermore, the DoJ 
notes that “the United States sought and obtained several important revisions to the Convention‟s 
text and Explanatory Report.”
100
 Addressing the generality of the substantive provisions in articles 
2-5, the DoJ stated that the “ER [Explanatory Report] describes in more detail the kind of conduct 
to be criminalized under the Convention to ensure that Parties implement the Convention 
consistently.”
101
  
Furthermore, the DoJ lists a series of paragraphs from the explanatory report in response to a 
question regarding concerns about criminalization of legitimate activities: “While ER para. 38 
explains that national law will determine precisely how to exempt legitimate activity, para. 41 
makes clear that offenses must be drafted with sufficient clarity and specificity to provide 
foreseeability as to the conduct that will be criminalized. Moreover, ER paras. 38, 46-48, 58, 62, 
68-69, 77 and 89-90 specifically provide that legitimate and common operating or commercial 
practices should not be criminalized.”
102
 Paragraph 47 of the explanatory report, which is listed by 
the DoJ, contains a very specific, clearly worded exception from criminalization that the US has not 
observed in practice; an oddity considering the DoJ explicitly cites the need for consistent 
implementation in party states in its reference to the explanatory report when responding to 
questions that relate to concerns over too broad criminalization. This paragraph is discussed later in 
the dissertation in connection with the chapter on outsiders and authorization. 
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3.4 Danish Law 
3.4.1 The Danish legal system and sources of law 
The Danish legal system is a Scandinavian civil law system
103
, as well as being a member state in 
the European Union. It differs from traditional continental civil law systems in that the civil law 
aspect, such as that regarding law of obligations, is not codified, but rests on judge-made law.
104
 
However, the criminal law is entirely codified, and “common law”-esque crimes (judge-made 
crimes) were abandoned almost 150 years ago.
105
 The courts are not formally bound by prior 
decisions (be it their own or those from higher courts), but in practice prior decisions from higher 
courts influence lower court decisions since the lower courts otherwise risk seeing their decisions 
reversed on appeal.
106
 The Supreme Court has also been known to cite its own earlier cases when 
rendering decisions
107
, something which is not characteristic of civil law system.
108
 However, 
unlike courts in common law countries, Danish courts rarely attach any detailed arguments for the 
holding or obiter dictum
109
 to their decisions, which often leaves the court‟s reasoning a bit on the 
obscure side. 
The Constitution (Grundloven) is the highest ranked in the hierarchy of sources of law.
110
 The 
Danish Supreme Court has indicated that in case of a conflict between the Constitution and EU law, 
the Constitution is controlling; despite the principle of supremacy developed in EU law.
111
 (Note 
that the CJEU may take a different position on this question.) In terms of the topic of this 
dissertation, the Constitution plays no great role, and will only be subject to limited discussion. 
                                                 
103
 See Joseph Lookofsky: Precedent and the Law in Denmark (2006), Danish National Report, XVIIth Conference of 
the International Academy of Comparative Law (“Although Scandinavian legal traditions are in many respects closer to 
those of continental Europe than to Anglo-American law, the “Scandinavian family” is surely best placed in its own 
category (conceptually distinct from both Civil and Common law). Moreover, since the judgments (opinions) rendered 
by Danish courts differ significantly from those rendered in other Scandinavian jurisdictions (i.e., Norway and Sweden), 
the Danish concept of precedent is probably best described as occupying its own unique position on the “precedential” 
scale.” (citations omitted) 
104
 Joseph Lookofsky: Precedent and the Law in Denmark (2006), Danish National Report, XVIIth Conference of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law 
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 See e.g. Knud Waaben and Lars Bo Langsted: Strafferettens almindelige del I – Ansvarslæren (2012), p. 89 
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 Lars Bo Langsted, Peter Garde and Vagn Greve: Criminal Law Denmark (2014), p. 31 
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 The most recent example being Case 146/2014 of 28 January 2015 where the Supreme Court cited and followed its 
own decision in UfR 1982.126. 
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 See more on precedents in Ruth Nielsen and Christina D. Tvarnø: Retskilder & Retsteorier (2005), p. 151 et seq. 
109
 Ruth Nielsen and Christina D. Tvarnø: Retskilder & Retsteorier (2005), p. 148 
110
 Peter Germer: Statsforfatningsret (2007), p. 21 
111
 See U 2003.1328H, p. 1331 (finding that there was no reason to assume that national constitutional law had been 
violated, indicating that had there been a conflict, national constitutional law would be controlling). See also Karsten 
Engsig Sørensen and Poul Runge Nielsen: EU-retten (2010), p. 172 
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Most rules and rights of significance with respect to addressing vagueness in criminal law are found 
in the Criminal Code itself and in the ECHR (as well as EU law where application of EU law 
principles are triggered). The Danish Constitution contains no rules that address vagueness in 
criminal law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitution expansively with 
regard to constitutional rights, more or less implicitly paying significant deference to the legislative 
power the Constitution has vested in the Parliament.
112
 Although possessing the power to rule on 
the validity of legislation, the courts almost never exercise this power
113
; even if they were inclined 
to exercise this power more liberally, there is no constitutional basis for challenging the validity of 
legislation on account of vagueness, since the Constitution does not provide any such guarantees. 
This will be addressed further in the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege. 
The main statutory criminal law legislation is the Criminal Code of 1930.
114
 The Criminal Code 
contains the most serious crimes, whilst special criminal law consists of provisions providing for 
criminal liability and punishment in various statutes, for example the Data Protection Act. 
Executive orders (orders issued by ministers pursuant to a statutory delegation of power to regulate; 
typically in more detail) may also contain provisions providing for criminal liability and 
punishment insofar as the enabling statute allows for it.
115
 The Criminal Code expresses the 
principle of legality in § 1
116
, which requires there to be a statutory legal basis for criminal liability 
and punishment. However, § 1 also allows for a “complete statutory analogy”
117
; meaning that a 
criminal conviction can be based on an analogy, if the conduct in question is completely analogous 
to the conduct criminalized by statute. This will also be subject to further discussion in the chapter 
on nullum crimen sine lege. The Criminal Code § 2 states that the principle of legality also applies 
to criminal provisions in special legislation.
118
 
Legislative history is not a source of law.
119
 However, there is a rich tradition in Denmark of using 
legislative history as an interpretive aid (subjective interpretation
120
). Subjective interpretation is 
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very common
121
 in cases where there is an ambiguity in the statute‟s language; Danish courts do not 
preface every inquiry into legislative history with an argument for the existence of an ambiguity 
justifying the inquiry (US courts, conversely, appear to be quite reluctant to recognize terms as 
being ambiguous; this will be addressed briefly in the section on the rule of lenity in the chapter on 
nullum crimen sine lege). 
 
3.4.2 Danish law and international law 
Denmark is a dualistic state.
122
 When an international convention is ratified, the convention does 
not automatically become a part of Danish law. Even if sufficiently clear, the articles of a ratified 
convention are not directly applicable and enforceable in national courts. Thus a ratified convention 
cannot become self-executing. For the convention to become a part of Danish law, the convention‟s 
articles must be incorporated into Danish national law by an act of Parliament.
123
 Where domestic 
law requires no amended or new provisions to fulfill obligations under the convention, 
incorporation is not necessary as such (see below), but the convention does not become Danish law 
such that it could override conflicting laws. 
Incorporation can take place in a couple of ways; by rewriting the convention into Danish law or by 
reference in law. Incorporation by reference is rare in Danish law.
124
 
In some cases, there is a harmony of norms between the obligations set forth in the convention and 
the norms already present in national law. Harmony of norms is determined by comparing the 
substantive rules of the convention and the existing rules in national law.
125
 In those cases, often no 
legislative steps are taken.
126
 Such conventions, however, may be relied on in Danish courts and 
applied by Danish courts
127
, presumably though only insofar as the language of the domestic rule 
leaves discretion to interpret in conformity with the international obligation.
128
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Denmark, although technically a dualistic state requiring incorporation of treaties into national law, 
inherits monism with respect to certain treaties. When the Lisbon treaty entered into force, the 
European Union was granted the ability to act as a legal person (prior to Lisbon, only the European 
Community had legal personality). That is, the EU can enter into treaties that will legally bind all 28 
member states. The EU is monistic and thus provisions in the treaties it enters can under certain 
conditions be automatically directly applicable without any further need for implementation. This 
monistic effect is passed on to the member states whether they are monistic or dualistic. For this 
self-executing effect to take place, a clear and precise obligation, the legal effect of and compliance 
with which does not presuppose acts of implementation, must be derivable from the provision‟s 
language, as well as the treaty‟s purpose and character.
129
 This means that international law can 
enter the Danish legal system in two ways: 1) Through the EU with direct applicability and no 
requirement of incorporation into national law, and 2) through entering into treaties in Denmark‟s 
capacity as a sovereign state, requiring incorporation, i.e. the absence of direct applicability of the 
treaty in accordance with dualism.
130
 
In summary, international law is only a source of law within the Danish legal system in so far as it 
is a part of Danish law. If it has not been incorporated, international law may affect the 
interpretation of existing Danish rules, as will be discussed in the chapter on interpretation and 
construction. 
 
3.4.3 The Cybercrime Convention and Danish Law 
Denmark signed the Convention on Cybercrime on 22 April 2003, ratified on 21 June 2005, and the 
Convention entered into force for Denmark on 1 October 2005.
131
 According to Committee report 
no. 2002/1417, the existing substantive provisions in the Criminal Code fulfilled the treaty 
obligations to criminalize the acts in the Convention‟s articles 2-5.
132
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It is unclear to which degree, if any, international obligations to criminalize can support or even 
compel courts to engage in a narrower reading of a national criminal statute, the language of which 
can support much broader readings. As mentioned in the section on Danish law and international 
law, it is not unusual to read Danish provisions in the light of international obligations. However, in 
the examples provided by Spiermann
133
, Danish Criminal Code provisions, so far, only seem to 
have been limited in their scope in a balancing act with opposing actionable private rights, such as 
freedom of speech, rather than having their scope limited by reference to international obligations to 
criminalize acts, the scope of which is narrower than the existing criminal provisions that fulfil 
those obligations. The latter appears to be uncharted territory. 
 
3.4.4 The ECHR and Danish law 
Denmark signed the ECHR on 4 November 1950, ratification took place on 13 April 1953 with the 
Convention entering into force on 3 September 1953. Recall that ratification of a treaty is not 
sufficient for it to become a part of Danish law. The ECHR was not incorporated into Danish law 
until the passing of Act no. 285 of 29 April 1992. Up until the point of incorporation, Danish law is 
controlling. At the time of incorporation, the ECHR becomes a part of Danish law and is equal in 
authority to other Danish laws, with only the Constitution (Grundloven) ranking above it. Prior to 
its incorporation, the ECHR was an interpretational aid and courts could only interpret Danish laws 
in compliance with the ECHR insofar as the law in question left room for judicial interpretive 
discretion, and the resulting reading did not conflict with the national provision‟s language.
134
 
 
3.4.5 The Council’s Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA and Danish Law 
One of the framework decisions adopted in the third pillar was Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems. Denmark decided to opt in on this 
framework decision and took steps towards implementation as early as 2002, with transposition in 
2004, at the same time as Denmark incorporated the 2001 Council of Europe‟s Convention on 
Cybercrime. 
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As the European Community became the European Union, and the areas that prior to Lisbon had 
remained in the third pillar, were now part of the TFEU subject to the same institutional safeguards 
as the areas formerly residing in the first pillar. The protocol on transitional provisions, appended to 
the Lisbon treaty, provides some insight into what becomes of the legislative acts adopted within 
the scope of the third pillar. According to the protocol‟s article 9, the acts adopted under the TEU 
prior to Lisbon, remain in effect so long as these acts are not repealed, annulled or amended in 
accordance with the treaties. It follows from the protocol‟s article 10(1) that the Commission‟s 
competence to bring an action against a Member State for non-fulfilment of its treaty obligations 
(article 258 TFEU) does not apply with respect to old third pillar acts. Furthermore, the CJEU‟s 
limited competence with respect to third pillar acts remains the same as before Lisbon entered into 
force. Also in cases where Member States have given an article 35(2) declaration does the Court‟s 
pre-Lisbon competence remain the same. In article 10(2) of the protocol, it follows that if an act 
covered by article 10(1) is amended the Commission and the CJEU will have their post-Lisbon 
competences with respect to the act in question. However, article 10(3) of the protocol states that 
these transitional provisions cease to have legal effect five years after the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force. 
The Lisbon Treaty celebrated its fifth birthday in 2014, and thus the transitional provisions are no 
longer in effect. This effectively removes the leash off the CJEU and the Commission with respect 
to third pillar acts that are still in effect. Unlike the United Kingdom, Denmark had seemingly no 
reservations as to this consequence. 
On 3 September 2013, the Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA was repealed and its replacement, 
Directive 2013/40/EU, was adopted. Denmark cannot opt-in on the directive (due to reservations), 
but rather, Denmark will continue to be bound by the Framework Decision with respect to the other 
Member States now operating under a directive that has expanded upon the older Framework 
Decision.
135
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In light of the expiration of the transitional provisions must be assumed that the CJEU will have full 
jurisdiction, rather than the pre-Lisbon limited third pillar “opt-in jurisdiction”
136
, over the 
Framework Decision. Similarly, the Commission can initiate infringement actions under article 258 
TFEU after the expiration of the transitional provisions. 
Article 2 of Protocol no. 22 on the position of Denmark states that none of the new legislative acts 
regarding police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters or the CJEU‟s 
interpretation of those legislative acts will be binding on Denmark or have any effect in Denmark. 
However, given the transitional provisions from which it appears that the CJEU now has 
jurisdiction over the Framework Decision (and that the Commission ostensibly can bring 
infringement actions against Denmark regarding the Framework Decision), and given that the 
language of many of the articles in the new Directive replacing the Framework Decision has largely 
been preserved, it is not unlikely that interpretation of the Directive might have effect on the 
interpretation of the Framework Decision anyway, regardless of article 2 in Protocol no. 22. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Protocol no. 22 (“acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon which are amended shall continue to be binding upon and 
applicable to Denmark unchanged.”) 
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4 INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
This chapter addresses how the sources of law in chapter 6 are used in the various legal systems. 
This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive description or analysis of rules on interpretation 
and construction
137
, their theoretical background or their rationale. Rather, the chapter more 
particularly serves to explain how I use the sources of law in the rest of the dissertation, and show 
that the use is in line with the use in the particular legal system; regardless of whether opinion may 
divided within the legal system as to the use, such as is the case with using legislative history to 
discover legislative intent (be it general or specific intent) as an interpretative aid when applying 
e.g. statutes. The chapter is integral to the dissertation since the topic of the dissertation is the 
compounded vagueness of the law and the facts in hacking cases. 
Interpretation in criminal law generally operates the same way as in any other area of law.
138
 
However, because of the serious implications of applying criminal law – that is, convicting a person 
and imposing a criminal penalty, such as imprisonment – interpretation of criminal provisions is 
subject to some limitations.
139
 As will be accounted for in the chapter on the principle nullum 
crimen sine lege, the legislature cannot adopt too unclear criminal provisions and the courts cannot 
interpret criminal provisions in a way that is not reasonably foreseeable to those regulated or in a 
way that invites a high risk of arbitrary enforcement.
140
 
Whether there is a legal basis for conviction for a criminal offense hinges on the statutory text. 
Interpretation of the statutory text is inevitable, as criminal statutes often describe categories of 
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criminal conduct rather than describing every individual conceivable variation of the conduct within 
the category. Moreover, few words are entirely unambiguous and the objects a word describes may 
be few or many depending on the context (for example, when is a boat large enough to better be 
described as a ship?). The context in which the word appears will generally resolve ambiguity 
problems, but context does not necessarily delineate the precise boundary between which objects 
are covered by the word and which are not. The question of interpretation and construction in 
criminal law then involves figuring out whether the specific conduct at hand falls within the 
category of conduct described by a criminal statute. The answer to that question is not always 
obvious. 
The language of the criminal statute, as enacted by the legislature, demarcates the outer limits of the 
statute‟s reach. Generally, the courts cannot add or detract elements from the statutory language. 
The figure below shows how conduct at the core is clearly covered by the scope, whereas the 
penumbra gives rise to increasing uncertainty as to the provision‟s application as the conduct moves 
further and further from the core, i.e. what is certainly covered by the provision‟s language. 
 
Figure 1 A visualization of the scope of any legal provision. 
 
Where there is no doubt as to whether the conduct is covered by the statute, the conduct is likely a 
manifestation of the core conduct regulated. The core typically does not require interpretation as 
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such because the applicability of the statute with respect to core conduct is certain.
141
 For example, 
application of an assault statute is certainly triggered when the defendant punches the victim and 
breaks the victim‟s nose. The conduct is a part of the core. But the language‟s meaning requires 
some stretching to cover, for example, the act of spitting on another person.
142
 The conduct is a part 
of the penumbra, because it is uncertain whether the assault statute should apply to the act of 
spitting. 
The penumbra ends where the language cannot be stretched further, and the word‟s usage, given the 
context, becomes more and more unusual.
143
 Any conduct falling outside the outer limits of the 
penumbra can only be reached by the provision by analogous application, which is problematic in 
terms of foreseeability (as will be discussed in the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege) or the 
conduct cannot be reached at all by that particular provision. 
Thus, whether conduct in the penumbra is covered by the criminal provision‟s scope is critical to 
whether there is a legal basis for a criminal conviction. Sometimes applying the provision to every 
conduct falling with the scope of the language may seem excessively harsh, and there are questions 
as to whether the legislature meant to criminalize that conduct.
144
 Since clarification of the 
penumbra, and thus the reach of the criminalization, relies on interpretation and construction, it 
makes sense to explore the tools used by the courts to clarify the penumbra. 
I will briefly examine interpretation in the following contexts (descending order): 1) International 
law (the general principles of interpretation in customary international law and interpretation of the 
ECHR), 2) EU law, 3) US law and 4) Danish law. 
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4.1 Interpretation in international law 
4.1.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
145
 provides helpful guidelines on the interpretation 
of treaties in its section 3. 
Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted 
by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
Article 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention concerns different authoritative language versions of treaties. 
The article is omitted from this chapter. 
According to the Vienna Convention‟s article 31 terms must be given their ordinary meaning, the 
ordinary meaning is tempered by the context in which the term appears (arguably as opposed to 
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applying purely any and all abstract definitions of the term, divorced from the context), and the 
ordinary meaning arrived should be in conformity with the treaty‟s object and purpose.
146
 
Of specific interest for later discussion in this dissertation is the Vienna Convention‟s article 
31(2)(a) and (b), that define as a part of the “context”, along with the text, the preamble and 
annexes, agreements and instruments accepted by all parties in connection with the conclusion of a 
treaty. In all likelihood, the term agreement or instrument in this context covers explanatory reports 
accepted by all the parties in connection with the conclusion of Council of Europe treaties, e.g. the 
Convention on Cybercrime and its explanatory report.
147
 The supplementary agreements and 
instruments “facilitate successful negotiation by clarifying sensitive diplomatic compromises that 
find imprecise expression within the original treaty text.”
148
 
Furthermore, article 31(3)(c) indicates that a treaty does not exist in a vacuum, but that other 
international law applicable to the parties are also part of the context. 
Articles 31 and 32 are considered a codification of principles of interpretation in customary 
international law.
149
 Article 31 prioritizes objective interpretation, and as article 32 indicates, 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation such as preparatory works and circumstances of 
the treaty‟s conclusion leaves subjective interpretation secondary to objective interpretation.
150
 
Article 31 describes both textual interpretation and teleological interpretation, but contains no 
information on when to apply one or the other.
151
 
Article 32 comes into play where it might confirm the ordinary meaning arrived at through article 
31 interpretation, or to determine the meaning of a term where the term is ambiguous or article 31 
interpretation leads to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results.
152
 During the drafters‟ discussion 
of preparatory works, delegates from less privileged countries expressed concerns over allowing 
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preparatory works to broadly influence interpretation and that it would favor wealthy countries with 
superior record-keeping, allowing them to disregard the text in favor of spurious unilateral 
interpretations based on materials unavailable to less privileged countries.
153
 
 
4.1.2 Interpretation of the ECHR 
The ECHR is an international treaty, which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is 
charged with interpreting and applying.
154
 The rights contained within the ECHR are phrased in 
rather broad terms and they require interpretation and construction as to the extent of their scope 
when applied to facts. The rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
articles 31-33 have been regarded by the Court as codification of the principles of customary 
international law
155
 and constituted the point of departure for the Court in its interpretation of the 
ECHR as an international treaty.
156
 That is, the Vienna Convention‟s rules on interpretation have 
been used as guidelines by the ECtHR – even before the Vienna Convention came into force in 
1980.
157
 As noted by Jacobs, White and Ovey, the Court‟s interpretation of the ECHR follows two 
general themes. First, the interpretation of the Convention is teleological, inspired by the Vienna 
Convention‟s rule that allows for interpreting treaty terms in accordance with the treaty‟s object and 
purpose.
158
 Second, the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument (evolutive/dynamic 
interpretation).
159
 The ECHR is a living instrument in that it is interpreted in light of present-day 
conditions rather than being interpreted in the light of conditions at the time of its adoption.
160
 
One of the principles found in the Vienna Convention is article 31 (1), which calls for terms to be 
given their ordinary meaning in light of the context of the treaty and its object and purpose. The 
Court does reference dictionary entries
161
 as an aid to determine the ordinary or natural meaning.
162
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The Court‟s use of context varies from just being the surrounding paragraphs to being the whole 
convention, including the preamble and protocols.
163
 Generally, the Court will reject a restrictive 
interpretation of the ECHR‟s scope of application based on claims that suggest that the nature of the 
particular conduct that gave rise to the interference and the application to the Court.
164
 However, 
see the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege (section on article 7 ECHR). The Court has repeatedly 
stated that the ECHR‟s purpose is to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, not merely 
theoretical or illusory.
165
 This principle of effectiveness underlies the dynamic (evolutive) 
interpretation of the treaty.
166
 Dynamic interpretation, however, does not permit the Court to read 
new rights into the ECHR that are not supported by the language, but it permits the Court to 
interpret existing rights in light of societal and political developments.
167
 Thus, the text of the article 
places limits on how evolutive interpretation can get. 
There is an important “exception” of sorts from the ordinary meaning rule, other than where the rule 
generates absurd or unreasonable results. What the ordinary meaning of a term is, from a general 
point of view, may differ between member states depending on their culture and legal system, and 
thus to avoid many different variations in how Convention rights‟ scopes are understood and 
applied at the national level, the ECtHR may give terms an autonomous meaning, specific to the 
Convention, to ensure uniform application throughout member states.
168
 For example, the term 
“criminal offence” in article 7 ECHR is an autonomous term specific to the Convention, and not 
subject to member state idiosyncrasies. The autonomous meaning may be arrived at through 
comparative studies of the law in the states that are parties to the Convention.
169
 Where a 
comparative approach does not yield much in terms of commonality, the Court gives member states 
flexibility with respect to their determining the scope of a certain term (“margin of appreciation”; 
usually in terms of whether an interference with a right is necessary, although the Court retains the 
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power to review the exercise of discretion within the margin of appreciation).
170
 This may also be 
the case where the particular subject matter is under development in the member states.
171
 
Furthermore, the Court often seeks inspiration in other conventions.
172
 Kjølbro argues that this may 
occur, because other conventions may contain more specific descriptions of norms than a generally 
phrased article in the ECHR, or for example, with respect to evaluating the risk of contradicting 
other applicable rules of international law.
173
 It is important to keep in mind that other conventions 
are interpretative aids and not binding on the Court. It is of no particular importance that the 
member state before the Court is not bound by the convention being used as an interpretative aid.
174
 
Even non-binding documents such as recommendations from the Council of Europe‟s Committee of 
Ministers may be used as interpretative aids, e.g. because they may document a common 
understanding among the member states in terms of a particular subject matter.
175
 Similarly, EU law 
may act as a source of inspiration, and the Court has also cited the Charter on Fundamental Rights 
in the European Union on occasion.
176
 Case law from jurisdictions outside the member states has 
also been cited, e.g. cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
177
 
As indicated by the Vienna Convention articles 31 and 32, objective interpretation, that is, the more 
textual and teleological approach, takes priority over subjective interpretation involving preparatory 
works and discovery of the intent of the drafters.
178
 Preparatory works rarely play any role in the 
ECtHR‟s interpretation apart from the cases where the reference to preparatory works is arguably 
only serving to bolster a decision already favored by the Court, or where the article in question is 
vague or ambiguous.
179
 It is highly unlikely that the Court would give weight to preparatory works 
the content of which would militate in favor of a decision the Court finds undesirable.
180
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4.2 Interpretation in EU law 
4.2.1 Teleological interpretation 
Although the text is almost always the starting point of interpretation of EU law
181
, the treaties‟ 
articles are oftentimes broad and vague and require interpretation in order to be applied to facts. In 
order to carry out its task the CJEU relies on the object and purpose of the treaties and the article in 
question to arrive at a result that comports with the purpose.
182
 A written expression of the purpose 
need not exist, nor is it necessary that just because a purpose is explicitly stated in writing that it 
will exert decisive influence on the outcome of the case.
183
 As a result, treaty provisions enshrining 
rights are interpreted broadly and the exceptions thereto are interpreted narrowly.
184
 That is, an 
interpretation that effectively realizes the goals of the provision and the treaties is preferred.
185
 With 
respect to secondary legislation, such as directives, the preamble is used in connection with 
teleological interpretation of the directive where provisions are vague or unclear, as the preamble 
generally states the object and purpose of the particular legislative act.
186
 The CJEU often refers to 
preambles of secondary legislation when interpreting said legislation, although less frequently 
references preambles when interpreting the treaties.
187
 
188
 The CJEU‟s approach to teleological 
interpretation is almost always objective and on rare occasions subjective, in that preparatory work 
such as materials relating to the legislative history are rarely referenced.
189
 
The CJEU‟s role does not involve application of a rule to the facts of the particular case before the 
member state court, which necessitated a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. Generally, it is up to 
the member state court to engage in construction, i.e. to apply the interpretation provided by the 
CJEU. However, it is not entirely uncommon for the CJEU to engage in construction, in particular 
when member state courts have phrased the question of interpretation submitted for preliminary 
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ruling in such a way that ostensibly makes the process of interpretation inextricable from 
construction.
190
  
 
4.2.2 General principles and doctrines 
General principles play an important role in the interpretation and construction of EU law.
191
 The 
principles have been developed by the CJEU, sometimes drawing inspiration from member states‟ 
legal systems, and some of the principles, such as the principle of proportionality, have been 
codified at the treaty level in later years. 
The principle of supremacy of EU law (also known as the principle of primacy of EU law) was 
firmly established in 1964 by the CJEU (at the time, the ECJ) in Costa v. ENEL, case 6/64.
192
 The 
supremacy of EU law is based on the member states‟ having ceded some of their sovereignty to the 
EU institutions and that the member states had committed themselves to observe community law.
193
 
Thus, if a conflict arises between EU law and national law, EU law is controlling. The principle is 
not limited to EU law that is directly applicable. The principle of indirect effect, or principle of 
consistent interpretation impliedly obligates national courts to give EU law priority over national 
law.
194
 
Duty to loyal cooperation is found in article 4 TEU. This duty, along with the fact that directives are 
binding in terms of their aims, led the CJEU to develop the duty to interpret national law in 
conformity with EU law.
195
 
196
 This principle of consistent interpretation calls upon the national 
courts of the member states to ensure that the objectives of directives are achieved.
197
 That is, EU 
law is applied indirectly by way of interpretation.
198
 This means that national courts must interpret 
national law in light of a directive as far as it is possible, dependent on the extent of judicial 
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discretion within the national legal system.
199
 Even if the national law in question was not passed 
for the explicit purpose of implementing EU law, and when that legislation is older than the relevant 
EU law, the national courts are still under the duty to interpret the national law consistent with the 
objectives of the directive.
200
 The principle of indirect effect also applies to framework decisions 
adopted under the old third pillar.
201
 
There is, however, at least one express limitation to the principle of consistent interpretation. The 
limitation presents itself when the principle of consistent interpretation conflicts with the principle 
of legality.
202
 Where a directive prescribes criminalization and criminal sanctions, and the directive 
has either not been implemented into national law, or has not been implemented correctly, namely, 
the national legal basis for crime and punishment is narrower than envisaged by the directive, the 
duty to interpret the national law consistently with the directive yields to the principle of legality. 
Hence, the exception to the principle of consistent interpretation applies in cases where the 
extensive interpretation, e.g. by way of analogy, of national criminal law in an effort to comply with 
EU law, would be to the detriment of the defendant. This limitation rests not on an imaginary 
“supremacy of national criminal law”
203
, even though the criminality hinges on the scope of 
national criminal law. Rather the limitation follows from the principle of legality, which is “one of 
the general legal principles underlying the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States”
204
, and which is also enshrined in article 7 ECHR, article 15 ICCPR
205
, and article 49 of the 
EU Charter. “It is a specific enunciation of the principle of legal certainty in substantive criminal 
law.”
206
 Thus, a national criminal provision cannot be interpreted extensively to achieve the purpose 
and object of a directive, if the legal basis in national law is narrower than that envisaged by the 
directive, or if the legal basis is absent all together.
207
 Since framework decisions already lack the 
capability of direct effect, it is clear that they cannot serve as a legal basis for criminal sanctions. 
Transposition into national law is necessary. Since member states are obligated to interpret the 
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implementing legislation consistently with the purpose and object of the framework decision, the 
principle of legality places a limitation on the “indirect effect” of a framework decision, just as is 
the case with directives. Ergo, directives and framework decisions cannot be relied on, in and of 
themselves, to establish criminal liability or aggravate criminal liability.
208
 In those cases, the 
member state is obliged to act contrary to EU law with respect to the defendant, so as not to violate 
the principle of legality. Of course, the “exception” to the principle of consistent interpretation does 
not exempt the member state from liability for incorrect implementation or lack of implementation. 
Going forward, the member state is obliged to bring its national provisions into compliance with 
EU law, if it is proven the member state failed its obligation to implement EU law.
209
 
In the converse situation, where the application of EU law results in a conduct not being unlawful, 
any national law criminalizing the conduct is inapplicable.
210
 
 
4.3 Interpretation of US law 
4.3.1 Interpretation of criminal statutes 
US courts have often stated that if the statutory language is unambiguous there is neither the need to 
resort to interpretation nor the need to consult legislative history.
211
 That is, there is no need to look 
outside the statutory text. This is called the plain meaning rule, and it generally applies insofar as 
the statute does not define the term in question, giving it a specific meaning other than the ordinary 
meaning. 
However, to ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory language the courts frequently look to dictionary definitions.
212
 
Dictionary definitions give the reader an abstract meaning of the word that is looked up. The statutory text, which 
supplies the context in which the word appears, may limit its reach.
213
 For example, the word “car” has a large 
penumbra in that it has many possible referenced objects; “car” may refer to a child‟s Matchbox car, a car for Barbie 
dolls, a four-person sedan that can act as a transportation for several people, a train car, and in its penumbra it might 
even refer to a tractor or an 18-wheeler, even though the language would be strained with respect to common usage in 
the last two examples. The particular expression in which the word appears provides context that limits the scope of 
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possible objects the word may reference. If the word “car” appears in a regulation on crash testing of passenger cars, 
relying on a plain meaning to include everything between Matchbox toy cars and tractors under the regulation‟s scope 
would be odd. Only the context narrows the word‟s possible references from the abstract to the specific. So establishing 
the plain meaning of a word in an expression with a very specific context by referencing abstract dictionary meanings 
appears somewhat odd in its pure form. The courts inevitably must engage in some form of construction to determine 
“plain meaning” of the statute, in that not the entire scope of a dictionary definition‟s possible references is included 
under a statute‟s scope. Choices must necessarily be made when determining what the plain meaning is, since the 
dictionary references only provide abstract definitions – not all of which are necessarily relevant to the context, nor is 
the scope of possible references of each dictionary entry necessarily relevant in the context.
214
 
Even when language appears unambiguous, the courts have held that the language is ambiguous 
nonetheless, because the language is nonsensical, irrational or harsh.
215
 In other cases, the courts 
have read “implied exceptions” into the statute.
216
 The courts refer to these implied exceptions 
when applying the statute literally is undesirable if doing so leads to “injustice, oppression, or an 
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions 
to its language, which would avoid results of this character.”
217
 As an example, LaFave mentions a 
statute punishing speeding that would impliedly except from its scope the situation where a police 
officer exceeds the speed limit as he, in the course of his duty, follows a fleeing criminal in a high-
speed pursuit.
218
 That a criminal act was committed with good motives does not suffice for the act 
to be impliedly excepted. However, LaFave notes that most “implied exceptions” are more 
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appropriately treated as the general defense “necessity” – such as a starving person stealing food to 
save his own life.
219
 
Furthermore, there are additional cases where the courts do not resort to “plain meaning”. If a 
statute borrows a term from common law, the word is given its common law meaning unless the 
legislature has stated otherwise. Thus, the common law term is not given its “plain meaning” in the 
dictionary sense, but it is given its common law meaning.
220
 There are instances where the statute‟s 
use of a common law term is not limited to the term‟s common law meaning.
221
 
Legislative history can reveal legislative intent. As will be discussed below in the section on 
interpretation and construction in Danish law, legislative intent is an interpretative aid that is in no 
way binding upon the courts. Legislative history may contain conflicting statements or outdated 
considerations. Furthermore, not all judges are equally keen on using legislative history to resolve 
statutory ambiguities.
222
 Especially in the context of criminal law where the public must be given 
fair notice as to which acts incur criminal liability, it would be problematic if legislative history 
could be used to expand the scope of criminal statutes beyond the statutory language.
223
 
There is no disputing that the concept of legislative intent is one of fiction. The legislature is not a hive mind in the 
sense that every single person is in complete agreement with the purposes of the piece of legislation, that all involved 
have the same idea of what the language of the legislation means and the same ideas about whether any possible set of 
facts capable of falling within the scope of the language should trigger the application of the statute. Not only would 
such a concept of legislative intent presuppose a hive mind, it would also presuppose a hive mind capable of oracle-like 
clairvoyance and infinite wisdom, and thus capable of taking into account all possible future situations the language 
could apply to when it drafts and passes its semi-divine infallible text.
224
 
There is, however, a difference between “general intent” (general legislative aim) and “specific intent”.
225
 Rather, the 
legislature is made up of people who frequently disagree about the details even when they agree on the bigger picture. 
In many instances, statutes may only represent the lowest common denominator of agreement capable of achieving 
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majority consensus to secure the passing of the bill – and still that rests on the assumption that every member of the 
legislature read, understood and considered the consequences of passing the bill prior to voting in favor of it. Adding to 
that, draft bills are often written by people who are not part of the legislature. Furthermore, the legislative intent, if it 
can be determined with some certainty, is only a snapshot of the intent as it manifested itself under the circumstances at 
the time the statements were made. The future the legislature imagined may be vastly different when it arrived, and 
parts of the legislative intent would be inconsistent with the actual future conditions. Then why even entertain such a 
fiction as “legislative intent”? Because consulting legislative history and deriving some legislative intent need not reach 
the heights of “what did the legislature intend with respect to unforeseeable sets of facts”, but rather deriving what 
interests the legislature sought to protect through criminal law (that is, deriving a broader, purpose-related intent, rather 
than intent as to a specific set of facts – which is arguably “less subjective” than asking what the legislature would have 
thought with respect to a specific case). Interpretation inevitably involves policy choices because it either leads to the 
inclusion or the exclusion of a set of facts under a statute that implements a policy – the question is only whose policy is 
being implemented, the court‟s or the legislature‟s? A purely “objective” approach to the interpretation of the statute, 
focusing solely on the statutory language, is in fact, arguably, even more subjective than resorting to a fictional 
legislative intent, because interpretation involves choices and the text itself does not necessarily provide those answers 
absent context.
226
 Whether that context is the fictional legislative intent or the interpreting court‟s ideas of how the 
statutory language should be interpreted to solve the issue before it is a matter of choice. Since interpretation can never 
be wholly objective, the courts might have to accept that as long as the legislature is not an infallible oracle-like hive 
mind, they will have to make policy decisions within the margins of the ambiguity of statutory text – perhaps with some 
guidance from the general purpose-related thoughts expressed by the legislature where the text itself does not clearly 
reveal the protected interests. 
The question of the legislature‟s ability to foresee possible constellations of facts has its appeal in some cases. The 
application of statutes to circumstances that the legislature never even conceived of, and could never have conceived of, 
just because the statute‟s language is capable of reaching the conduct, may result in absurd, unjust decisions along the 
way; especially if significant societal changes have taken place, such as is the case with the now pervasive use of 
computers and networks. Such decisions are in conformity with the rule of law, but the rule of law has never been and 
never will be “the rule of good law”. 
There are also situations where strict adherence to legislative intent is inappropriate. Perhaps, primarily the older the 
legislative history, from which intent is derived. Societal circumstances may have changed so drastically, and the intent 
may have been so specific as to the circumstances at the time, that the intent only partially has relevance for future 
application of the law, or no relevance at all. However, arguably, the age of legislative history is less relevant if it is 
simply a matter of determining the general legislative aim. 
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Like the usage of legislative history, the rule of lenity and others, the rule ejusdem generis, meaning 
“of the same kind”, only applies where there is uncertainty, and furthermore, its application must 
not “defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation being construed.”
227
 The rule pertains to statutes 
that list certain objects and also include a “catch-all phrase”. In this context, the ejusdem generis 
rule narrows the scope of the “catch-all phrase” to those objects that are within the same category as 
the specifically listed objects. The rule involves interpreting the statute in light of its context. Of 
course, the rule is only applicable where a category can be derived from the listed objects.
228
 
The canon of avoidance, like the rule of lenity, is a tiebreaker in the sense that it mandates a specific 
result when the statute is capable of two or more constructions. The canon of avoidance, instead of 
favoring a specific party, disfavors constructions that raise serious constitutional questions. The 
court must thus choose the construction that avoids constitutional problems.
229
 
Another important canon of statutory interpretation is the canon against superfluity. It means that 
every word of the statutory language should be given meaning and effect, if possible, to avoid 
making parts or all of the statutory text superfluous; that is, render whole or part of the language 
passed by the legislature without effect.
230
 
 
4.3.2 US law and international law231 
In the chapter on sources of law, it was explained that treaties entered into by the United States are 
at the same level in the hierarchy of sources of law as federal statutes. However, the apparent rule 
that treaties entered into by the US government share the second place with federal statutes in the 
sources of law hierarchy is only half the story. There are significant modifications to that rule. The 
Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution reads as follows:
 232
 
“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land.” 
 
                                                 
227
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 102 
228
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 102-103 
229
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 96-97 
230
 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (2004) at 101 
231
 For the purposes of this dissertation, only treaties entered into on the basis of the United States Constitution, Article 
II, § 2. Executive agreements fall outside the scope. 
232
 United States Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2 
 
66 
 
On its face, the Supremacy Clause seems quite clear on the status of international treaties in US 
law. However, early on in its case law, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between two 
types of treaties: First, treaties the authority of which equals federal legislation (self-executing), and 
second, treaties that require incorporation through legislative action by Congress and the President 
(non-self-executing). This means that only the first type of treaty is enforceable in US courts, whilst 
the second type of treaty is not.
233
 Self-executing treaties have the force of law without requiring 
further legislative action.
234
 Three reasons have been cited by courts as reasons for declaring a 
treaty non-self-executing: First, the treaty itself indicates that its provisions will not become 
effective unless legislative action is taken at the national level. Second, the Senate when giving its 
advice and consent advised that legislative action is needed. Third, legislative action is required as a 
matter of constitutional law.
235
 
In a footnote in Medellín v. Texas
236
, the Supreme Court “endorsed a “background assumption” 
against finding that treaties confer private rights or private rights of action, even when they are self-
executing.”
237
 (citation omitted) The Medellín case raises doubts about the direct enforceability of 
treaties in US courts.
238
 However, international treaties may be enforceable through other ways; 1) 
indirect enforcement, 2) defensive enforcement, and 3) interpretive enforcement.
239
 These 
alternative enforcement options, the value of which rests on the assumption that the US is interested 
in fulfilling its international obligations
240
, are more interesting and more relevant in the context of 
this dissertation, as the Convention on Cybercrime, which is central throughout most of the 
dissertation, confers no private rights to speak of nor are the substantive provisions self-executing. 
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Indirect enforcement refers to a treaty that confers a right, but where the right is made actionable 
through national legislation.
241
 This category of alternative enforcement comprises three 
subcategories; implementing legislation, section 1983 and habeus corpus. Neither this category nor 
its subcategories will be the subject of further discussion in this dissertation.
242
 Generally speaking, 
the Convention on Cybercrime confers no tangible rights, but rather simply reminds the parties to 
ensure certain more or less unspecified safeguards under its domestic law, as well as it references 
international human rights obligations.
243
 Even though the subcategory, implementing legislation, 
looks feasible on its face, no act of Congress implemented the Convention on Cybercrime into 
federal legislation. Rather, the non-self-executing parts of the Convention, namely those calling for 
criminalization, were found not to require implementing legislation as existing US law, combined 
with several reservations and declarations, was “adequate to satisfy the Convention‟s requirements 
for legislation.”
244
 
Defensive enforcement entails a private party, who is the target of a lawsuit or prosecution based on 
a statute that runs afoul of a treaty provision.
245
 Defense enforcement is generally permissible even 
when the treaty does not confer private rights or provides a private right of action.
246
 The cause of 
action is independent of the treaty.
247
 
Interpretive enforcement involves the courts seeking inspiration or guidance in treaties when 
interpreting statutes.
248
 As will be discussed further at a later point in this dissertation, an ambiguity 
brings interpretive canons into play
249
. This approach to enforcement of international treaties has 
the courts interpreting a statute so that it does not conflict with an earlier treaty. The approach is 
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applicable regardless of whether the treaty in question is self-executing or not.
250
 When a conflict 
arises between a treaty and a statute, the Supreme Court has held that “[l]egislative silence is not 
sufficient to abrogate a treaty”.
251
 The Court refused to interpret a statute in a manner that would 
render a treaty unenforceable.
252
 
Similarly, it follows from the Charming Betsy
253
 canon that faced with two constructions, one that 
conflicts with international obligations and another that does not, the court should adopt the former 
insofar as it is a reasonable reading.
254
 Furthermore, which will sound familiar to Danish jurists, a 
treaty will not be considered modified or set aside by later legislation unless doing so was the 
explicitly stated purpose of Congress.
255
 
As far as interpretation of treaties goes, the US approach to treaty jurisprudence has been described 
by one commentator as “schizophrenic”.
256
 The apparent “schizophrenia” relates to the courts not 
consistently resorting to either a nationalist or internationalist approach to treaty interpretation. 
Until the early-to-mid twentieth century, the courts had seemingly consistently followed an 
internationalist approach, but thereafter started being challenged by nationalist views.
257
 The mid-
twentieth century saw the advent of the courts‟ adopting a private-law contract analogy.
258
 That is, 
the courts would derive party intent based on all available evidence, rather than giving the treaty 
text priority
259
 as generally required under customary international law (and codified in the Vienna 
Convention). One of the canons employed by courts, when approaching treaty interpretation from a 
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nationalist perspective, is the parole evidence rule under which the text is just “symbolic 
expressions of parties‟ actual intent.”
260
 The rule allows courts to liberally examine and consider 
other sources than the text, including purely domestic documents not included in the treaty‟s 
preparatory works, such as the internal treaty drafts of the State Department and executive branch‟s 
interpretation of the treaty, to establish a party‟s intent.
261
 Such an approach may promote domestic 
interests
262
 over the object and purpose of the treaty itself.
263
 That is, subjective interpretation over 
objective interpretation – the opposite of what the Vienna Convention‟s articles 31 and 32 state. 
The United States signed the Vienna Convention on 24 April 1970, but its ratification process 
stalled in committee, and the Senate has still not given its advice and consent as required for 
ratification.
264
 Nevertheless, the State Department, as well as a number of lower federal courts, 
acknowledge many of the principles expressed in the Vienna Convention, including articles 31-33, 
as customary international law.
265
 However, the Supreme Court has never applied the 
Convention.
266
 
As discussed in the chapter on sources of law, the US are diligent users of RUDs
267
 when ratifying 
treaties.
268
 Whereas the Vienna Convention states that such RUDs must be accepted by both parties 
in order to be considered when interpreting the treaty, the US occasionally attaches RUDs 
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unilaterally, which nonetheless places constitutional
269
 restraints on US courts as they have to honor 
even unilateral RUDs.
270
 Such RUDs would require the US courts that generally do apply the 
Vienna Convention‟s interpretational principles, to depart from the Convention‟s objective 
approach to interpretation of treaties – regardless of whether the RUDs are unilateral or accepted by 
the other parties to the treaty. 
 
 
4.4 Interpretation in Danish law 
4.4.1 Interpretation of criminal statutes 
As discussed below, in the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege, the Danish criminal code § 1 clearly 
expresses a criminal-law principle of legality. A legal basis must exist in a statute that describes 
both the criminal conduct and the penalty attached to it. If the existence or extent of a legal basis is 
too murky, courts will generally render a verdict of acquittal due to lack of a legal basis for 
conviction.
271
 
In Danish law, descriptions of interpretation and construction can be divided into two categories: 
(1) Descriptions that relate to the conclusion, and (2) descriptions that relate to the premises of the 
conclusion. 
Descriptions that relate to the conclusions are: (1) construction that clarifies the scope of the 
provision
272
, (2) extensive construction, and (3) narrow construction. The second and the third both 
conflict with the natural meaning of the language of the provision in that an extensive construction 
may expand the scope outside the natural meaning of the language, and the narrow construction 
may reduce the scope of the provision even though the natural meaning of language allows for a 
broader reading. 
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Constructions that clarify the scope (“præciserende fortolkning”) are simply the results of choosing 
the most sensible reading out of two or more possible interpretations.
273
 These types of 
constructions are always within the limits of the scope of the statutory text – never narrower or 
broader. They add precision to the scope of the statute.
274
 Context is imperative to the 
understanding of the legal meaning of any rule. As explained before, most words are ambiguous 
and are capable of referencing a wide range of phenomena, which is also why context, not just of 
the word itself but the rule, is important, since words may reference different things in different 
contexts.
275
 Thus, clarifying the scope is not about theoretically possible readings of the language, 
but plausible and reasonable readings of the language.
276
 
The concept of extensive construction (“udvidende fortolkning”) is often used to refer to both those 
constructions involving analogous applications of statutes (constructions that are not supported by 
the language), and those constructions based on interpretations that go beyond the natural meaning 
of the statutory language but are technically supported by the language.
277
 Broad readings that are 
compatible with the language of the scope are not “extensive constructions”, since they do not 
exceed the limits of the natural meaning of the terms used in the statutory text even though such 
broad constructions may or may not appear harsh. The most drastic versions of extensive 
construction are those applications that are not supported by the statutory text at all but rest on 
analogies to the conduct described by that language. As discussed in the chapter on nullum crimen 
sine lege, the Danish criminal code § 1, allows for analogous applications of substantive criminal 
provisions to a limited extent. As explained later, in the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege, article 
7 ECHR prohibits analogous applications of criminal provisions, which is why the Danish criminal 
code § 1 presumably may conflict with the analogy prohibition in article 7 ECHR.
278
 
Narrow constructions (“indskrænkende fortolkning”), like extensive constructions, are not 
inherently compatible with the ordinary meaning of the enacted statutory text. Narrow construction 
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means that the court has given the statute a narrower meaning than the natural meaning dictated by 
the statutory language. The Danish legal theorist, Alf Ross, defined two subcategories of narrow 
constructions: (1) Those cases where application of the provision would be superfluous with respect 
to achieving the purpose of the legislation
279
, and (2) those cases where the conduct, although 
falling within the scope of the language, is atypical with respect to the core conduct prohibited by 
the statute. In both cases, the conduct has been exempted from the scope even though a literal 
reading of the language clearly indicates it should fall within the scope of the statute.
280
 A narrow 
construction of a statute may also be warranted, even required, for example where the conduct 
clearly falls within the scope of the language of a criminal provision, but the conduct in question is 
also “protected conduct” under another rule (e.g. the conduct is covered by the right to free speech), 
thus creating an exception to the criminal provision in question; that is, two (or more) rules conflict. 
In terms of separation of powers, both narrow and extensive constructions conflict with the ordinary 
meaning of statutory text enacted by the legislature by either giving the words a narrower or broader 
meaning than the word would ordinarily have. Thus, arguably, courts engaging in either type of 
construction technically usurp legislative power to some degree, as the power to criminalize and 
decriminalize conduct rests with the legislature.
281
 However, only the latter is disadvantageous to a 
defendant in a criminal case and for that reason is suspect from a legal certainty point of view
282
 in 
the sense that it reduces foreseeability. 
As for approaches that relate to the premises of the conclusion, three categories are described in the 
legal theory: (1) Objective interpretation, (2) subjective interpretation, and (3) teleological 
interpretation.
283
 These are all approaches that describe the “style of interpretation/construction” 
used to reach a result, irrespective of whether the end-result of the chosen approach can be 
described as an extensive, narrow or clarifying construction of the statute. 
Objective interpretation is that which, when employed, relies only on the statutory text, or at least 
explicitly rejects relying on legislative history, and thus, rejects legislative intent as an interpretative 
aid.
284
 The rationale for this approach is that the legislature only enacted the statutory text
285
 – not, 
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for example, committee reports, parliament debates and other materials related to the legislative 
history that may be used to discover legislative intent. 
Subjective interpretation, on the other hand, involves openly considering legislative history 
materials relevant to discovering legislative intent in the court‟s effort to chart the intended meaning 
and thus the reach of the statute‟s scope.
286
 
The choice between the objective and subjective approach to interpretation is not a quasi-religious 
commitment in the same way as it seemingly manifests itself in the US.
287
 The choice may depend 
on which approach results in a more sensible application of the law in the case at hand.
288
 However, 
interpretation can never be truly objective.
289
 According to Ross, the judge‟s understanding of the 
law will always depend on his understanding of the social circumstances and purposes of the law. 
Ignoring other sources, including legislative history, leaves the judge with freer hands, and since 
statutory language does not really have any meaning without context, the objective interpretation is 
arguably more subjective than the subjective approach.
290
 Both approaches add uncertainty, since 
both are subjective in different ways. The difference between the approaches is only whether 
legislative history (discovery of legislative intent) is considered or not.
291
 
Legislative history, although often used in continental legal systems as an interpretational aid 
capable of having persuasive authority with respect to interpretation of statutes, it is important to 
remember that it does not have binding authority.
292
 It is just one of many possible interpretational 
aids a court can consider when interpreting a statute. For example, if the legislative history is quite 
old
293
 and the considerations made in committee reports refer to a society that has since undergone 
substantial changes
294
, the legislative history as an interpretative aid has diminished value.
295
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
285
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 271 
286
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 271. See also Ruth Nielsen and Christina D. Tvarnø: 
Retskilder og Retsteorier (2005), p. 212 
287
 Take for example Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who identifies himself as a textualist. 
288
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 271, citing Peter Blume: Lovfortolkning i retspraksis, 
p. 122 
289
 Alf Ross: Om ret og retfærdighed (2013), p. 189 
290
 Alf Ross: Om ret og retfærdighed (2013), p. 190 
291
 Alf Ross: Om ret og retfærdighed (2013), p. 189 
292
 Alf Ross: Om ret og retfærdighed (2013), p. 191 
293
 See Ruth Nielsen and Christina D. Tvarnø: Retskilder og Retsteorier (2005), p. 221 
294
 When reading about the Liivik v. Estonia case later on in the article 7 ECHR section of the nullum crimen sine lege 
chapter, consider, as a hypothetical scenario, the appropriateness of using the legislative history associated with a Soviet 
era provision as an interpretational aid when applying the provision in a market economy. 
295
 See Alf Ross: Om ret og retfærdighed (2013), p. 191 et seq. 
 
74 
 
Canons of construction, like in US law, play a role in statutory construction in Danish law although 
they are rarely if ever discussed or mentioned in court decisions. For example, in case of conflicting 
statutes, the lex specialis (the specific governs the general) and lex posterior (the newer governs the 
older) canons may be applied to decide which of the conflicting statutes to apply. 
Generally, if the meaning of the statute is clear with respect to its applicability in the case at hand, 
there is no need to resort to construction. That is, there is no need for construction where the 
conduct in question falls within the core of the statute, because in the core there is no uncertainty to 
clarify. In Danish law, an exception exist for some conduct that clearly falls within the scope of the 
provision‟s language. Conduct may exist that fall within the scope of the statutory language (even 
the core), but is nonetheless exempted from the scope, for example because although covered by the 
scope of the language, the conduct somehow differs from the essence of the crime. This principle of 
statutory construction, called principle of material atypicality, only applies when interpreting 
criminal statutes. The principle is explained further below in the chapter on authorization with 
respect to outsiders (“Without right” in the Danish Criminal Code § 263(2)). 
It should be noted that oftentimes, Danish courts, although obligated to give reasons for decisions, 
do not articulate the precise reasoning, and thus, not articulating the exact method of reaching the 
decision in a case; i.e. why a specific interpretation was chosen over another, which rules of 
interpretation and construction it relied on in reaching its decision and so on are not recounted by 
the court. US courts are much more expressive in that respect. 
 
4.4.2 International law as a source of law in Danish law 
When a convention has been ratified but not incorporated into Danish law, it is not a source of law 
in the Danish legal system by the strictest definition. Should a conflict arise between a Danish law 
and such a convention, the convention cannot not override Danish law, as it is itself not Danish law. 
In the case UfR 2006.770H, the Danish Supreme Court held that treaties were not directly 
applicable in the sense that they could effect an override of Danish legislation.
296
 
Even though a ratified treaty is not a part of Danish law as such, it is not without relevance. Treaties 
may act as a persuasive (meaning non-binding) authority when interpreting and construing Danish 
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laws that in some ways relate to or overlap with a treaty.
297
 In other words, international law may 
act as an interpretive aid. The outer limits of the possible influence of international law as an 
interpretive aid is that its influence can never support an interpretation of national law that clearly 
conflicts with the language of the national provision in question.
298
 In other words, the extent of the 
interpretive influence is limited to reasonable readings of the national provision. 
Should an incorporated treaty conflict with another domestic law, the incorporated treaty generally 
prevails, unless the legislature has clearly stated its intent to breach its international obligations 
under the treaty.
299
  
 
Explanatory reports (non-binding) 
An explanatory report is negotiated and adopted by the Council of Europe‟s expert committees and 
accompanies a Council of Europe treaty. The report provides clarifications on topics such as the 
purpose of the treaty, preparatory works, and interpretations of the articles in the treaty. The 
explanatory reports are non-binding, and do not provide an authoritative interpretation of treaty 
provisions although it may serve as an aid when applying treaty provisions.
300
 
The explanatory report accompanying the Convention on Cybercrime was cited and referenced to 
rather extensively by the Danish Ministry of Justice in its comments on proposed legislation, 
although almost entirely regarding the procedural part of the Convention.
301
 Explanatory reports 
have also been cited by the prosecution in at least one case, U 1986.200V where the court followed 
the interpretation in the explanatory report, and have also been cited in the cases U 2014.15Ø and U 
2010.1035H. In both cases, the court relied on the interpretational guidelines in the explanatory 
reports.  
                                                 
297
 See Ole Spiermann: Moderne folkeret, pp. 161 et seq. 
298
 Ole Spiermann: Moderne folkeret, p. 163 
299
 U2006B.187, Ole Spiermann: Lovgivnings tilsidesættelse og det retlige grundlag herfor: grundlov – 
menneskerettighedskonvention – trakat, p. 193, referring to the Danish Supreme Court‟s decision in U2006.770H. 
300
 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties article 31 (2)(a) and (b) regarding agreements relating to the 
treaty made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. 
301
 LFF 2003-11-05 nr. 55 
 
76 
 
5 NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE 
This chapter covers the concept of nullum crimen sine lege. The chapter is not meant to be a 
comprehensive coverage of the principle of legality, e.g. its history etc. The chapter is mainly 
concerned with extensive interpretation of existing law – that is, judicial extension and gradual 
clarification, that is, construction of the scope of criminalization adopted by the legislature. 
Furthermore, the chapter will briefly address the limits on the legislature‟s power to criminalize 
conduct. The purpose of this is to examine the possibilities of limiting the effects of 
overcriminalization, or risk of overcriminalization, when the judiciary is entrusted with clarifying 
broadly worded and/or vague substantive criminal provisions. 
The descriptions and analysis in this chapter serve to explore the potential impact of the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle on the broadly worded unauthorized access statutes. This will later serve 
to examine whether the principle is capable of placing some restraints on the courts as they construe 
these broadly worded statutes. 
The principle of legality has its roots in ideas of separations of powers. The separation of powers 
was in turn spawned by a desire to prevent arbitrary use of power against citizens. From a criminal 
law point of view, as noted by Trine Baumbach, the separation of powers is imperative in the sense 
that if the legislature can make judicial decisions then the legislature is not bound by law, but is free 
to adjudicate arbitrarily, without any prior warning to citizens by way of pre-existing law.
302
 As 
Peter Germer states, the separation of powers served to create a form of government where the 
power is balanced between the top government bodies, thereby protecting citizens from arbitrary 
use of power.
303
 By requiring legislation prohibiting the particular conduct to pre-date a defendant‟s 
conduct, the defendant likely to be able to foresee the consequences of his conduct if he so desires. 
One of the interesting questions pertaining to legislation in the context of this dissertation is: If a 
statute has been promulgated, but its language is so broad and/or vague that it leaves the statute 
capable of reaching any and all conduct and thus contains no particular criteria for its application 
that separates the legal from the illegal. In other words, even when legislation pre-dates a 
defendant‟s conduct the legislation may give no notice to the defendant, or solely gives notice in the 
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form that anything one does can be framed as a violation of the statute should the government 
desire to do so, i.e. the citizen‟s only notice may be that the statute enables arbitrary enforcement. 
 
 
5.1 Article 7 ECHR 
The ECHR article 7 embodies one of the more important principles in the Convention, as article 15 
(2) allows no derogation from article 7, including during time of war and public emergencies. It is 
an essential element of the rule of law.
304
 
 
“ARTICLE 7 
No punishment without law 
1. 
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
2. 
This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it 
was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” 
 
Article 7(1), first sentence, prohibits retrospective criminalization. The second sentence prohibits 
retrospective increase of punishment. The article is considered to embody both the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege and the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
305
 For conduct to be criminal, 
the law must define the crime and its associated penalty.
306
 Not only must the law define the crime, 
it must do so clearly.
307
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The rights in the Convention primarily regulate the relationship between state and individual and 
places some restraints on the state‟s power to intrude on aspects of an individual‟s life protected by 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention.  
Article 7 ECHR must be interpreted and construed in accordance with its purpose in order to 
effectively guard against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.
308
 
In its case law, the ECtHR has construed the article 7 ECHR protection against retroactive criminal 
laws so that the article imposes certain qualitative requirements on criminal legislation. This is the 
topic of the section and subsections below. 
This dissertation only concerns itself with cases that are indisputably criminal cases and involve punishment/penalties 
for violation of criminal law rules. For that reason, it is not necessary to digress into analyzing when an offense is a 
criminal offense – thus, triggering article 7 ECHR – or when a penalty is a penalty within the scope of article 7 
ECHR.
309
 
 
5.1.1 Qualitative requirements: Accessibility and foreseeability 
The qualitative requirements imposed on criminal law rules are those the Court has derived in case 
law from its interpretation of article 7 ECHR. As explained in the chapter on interpretation and 
construction, the Court interprets the ECHR in light of the purpose and object of the article it is 
interpreting. In order to make the rights effective in practice, sometimes they must be construed as 
containing requirements that are not expressed in the literal language of the article. “The guarantee 
enshrined in Article 7 […], which is an essential element of the rule of law, occupies a prominent 
place in the Convention system of protection, as is underlined by the fact that no derogation from it 
is permissible under Article 15 […] in time of war or other public emergency. It should be 
construed and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective 
safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.”
310
 
From the principle that a crime can only be defined by law, and the principle that a criminal 
provision cannot be extensively construed to the detriment of the defendant, e.g. by way of analogy, 
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it follows that a crime must be clearly defined by law.
311
 A criminal provision that suffers from 
vagueness issues to the extent that a person cannot reasonably foresee its application, or a criminal 
provision that is applied analogously, is arguably no different from retroactive criminalization, since 
in both situations there is an element of surprise that cannot reasonably be guarded against. As the 
US Supreme Court held on this point, there is no reason to allow the courts to do what the 
legislature could not; that is, criminalize retrospectively.
312
 
The Court‟s test for whether a crime is defined by the law in the context of article 7, is largely the 
same as that which it applies to test the legal basis for interferences with the rights in articles 8 
through 11 ECHR.
313
 Under articles 8 through 11, the Court carries out a three-pronged test to 
evaluate interferences with said rights. First, the Court tests whether the interference is prescribed 
by law. This first prong largely equates to the entire article 7 test.
314
  
“When speaking of “law” Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the 
Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises statute law as well as 
case-law and implies qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility and 
foreseeability.”
315
 
The first prong, which corresponds with the article 7 test, is itself a three-pronged test known as the 
test of foreseeability.
316
 First, there must be a legal basis in national or international law. Second, 
the law must be accessible. Third, the law must provide the regulated with reasonable foreseeability 
as to the consequences of his actions. The Court has labeled accessibility and foreseeability as 
qualitative requirements for the law.
317
 
The concept of “law” not only comprises written law, but also unwritten law.
318
 “[…][T]he Court 
has always understood the term “law” in its “substantive” sense, not its “formal” one. It has thus 
included both enactments of lower rank than statutes and unwritten law […]. In sum, the “law” is 
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the provision in force as the competent courts have interpreted it.”
319
 The Court will generally “not 
question the national courts‟ interpretation of domestic law unless there has been a flagrant non-
observance or arbitrariness in the application of the said provisions.”
320
 
Should the legal basis defining the crime and prescribing the punishment be absent seen from the 
point of national law, it is difficult to see how a state could defend its position and any defense on 
part of the Government will certainly fail.
321
 If the rule has a legal basis in national law, the legal 
basis is subject to the qualitative requirements of accessibility and foreseeability to qualify as “law” 
within the context of the Convention.
322
 
It is unclear whether accessibility and foreseeability are distinct requirements or more or less different shades of the 
same concept.
323
 One commentator equates “accessibility” with “clarity”.
324
 Whether that characterization is accurate or 
not, I dare not say. However, the Court‟s case law seems to indicate that accessibility relates to whether the “law” has 
been promulgated
325
 or is in some other way public – such as publication of the national courts‟ case law. In any case, it 
is unlikely that a conviction based on “secret law” not reasonably accessible to the public could pass a challenge under 
article 7.
326
 It is seemingly rarely possible to distinguish between where the accessibility “analysis” ends and the 
foreseeability analysis begins, but in the very least, if a legal rule is not accessible, then its application and the effects 
thereof are hardly foreseeable either. 
When the Court tests a national legal rule, such as a promulgated statute, it will, as mentioned, not 
test the statutory language, or other relevant source of law, on its face, but with its judicial gloss; i.e. 
how the courts have construed the language up until the time of the conduct.
327
 Statutory language 
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may therefore be unacceptably unclear on its face, but when read in concert with its judicial gloss, it 
may survive an article 7 challenge.  
Foreseeability requires that “[a]n individual must know from the wording of the relevant provision 
and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts‟ interpretation of it what acts and omissions will 
make him criminally liable and what penalty will be imposed for the act committed and/or 
omission. Furthermore, a law may still satisfy the requirement of “foreseeability” where the person 
concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”
328
 Similarly, in N.F. v. Italy, the 
Court stated “that a law is “foreseeable” if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct.”
329
 Arguably, 
foreseeability, in the ECHR context, is a kind of “lawyer‟s notice”, rather than notice to the average 
individual, especially seeing as the average individual would likely lack the skills and knowledge to 
be able to read a legal text in the light of other sources of law that might cure the vagueness. Thus, 
rather than relying on whether the average individual can reasonably foresee the statute‟s 
application, the average individual may only need notice of when to seek legal advice. However, it 
should be kept in mind that the foreseeability requirement, and thus arguably the expectation of 
obtaining legal advice, varies depending on e.g. the characteristics and number of the regulated. 
That is, criminal provisions regulating certain types of business, rather than the general public, are 
subject to less stringent foreseeability requirements than criminal provisions that apply to every 
member of the public. See more below in the discussion of Cantoni. 
The certainty, and thus the foreseeability, required is not absolute. Regardless of how clear the 
language, interpretation and construction is unavoidable.
330
 As the ECtHR expressed it: “There will 
always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. 
Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law 
must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably 
couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and 
application are questions of practice.”
331
 Article 7 does, therefore, not prohibit vague laws that 
                                                 
328
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 140 
329
 N.F. v. Italy, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 29. See also e.g. Cantoni v. France, Judgment of 11 November 1996, 
para. 35. 
330
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 141 
331
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 141 
 
82 
 
require interpretation, and the effect and reach of which becomes gradually apparent rather than 
being facially apparent. The Court only requires, with respect to such laws, that the gradual 
clarification of the rules prescribing criminal liability, “that the resultant development is consistent 
with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.”
332
 It must be borne in mind that 
the Court “will not question the national courts‟ interpretation of domestic law unless there has been 
a flagrant non-observance or arbitrariness in the application of the said provisions.”
333
 (citations 
omitted) “The Court‟s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation 
are compatible with the Convention.”
334
 (citations omitted) This seems to be in congruency with the 
Court‟s statement that criminal law policy is a matter for the states. The Court will, therefore, not 
question whether a rule should apply to a particular set of facts, even if there are more than one 
plausible construction of the rule under national law and the chosen construction is harsher on the 
defendant (unless the conduct is protected as a substantive right under the Convention), but only 
whether the application of the rule was reasonably foreseeable and non-arbitrary. 
 
5.1.1.1 Gradual clarification through case-law 
In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court had before it a case concerning the Greek Constitution‟s 
proselytism prohibition. The applicant, a Jehova‟s witness, had been convicted of proselytism 
because he had attempted “directly and indirectly, to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a 
different religious persuasion from his own, [namely] the Orthodox Christian faith, with the 
intention of changing those beliefs, by taking advantage of [the person‟s] inexperience, her low 
intellect and naivety.”
335
 The Court set out to investigate whether the interference with freedom of 
religion under article 9 had been prescribed by law. As may be recalled, that inquiry is largely the 
same as that under article 7. The applicant had complained that there was a “logical and legal 
difficulty of drawing any even remotely clear dividing-line between proselytism and freedom to 
change one‟s religion […].” In other words, he argued that the prohibition was so vague that it was 
uncertain to which degree, if any, he could exercise his right to freedom of religion. In line with the 
Court‟s case law, the proselytism rule must be read in light of its judicial gloss. The Court stated, 
that “[i]n this instance there existed a body of settled national case-law. This case-law, which had 
                                                 
332
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 141 
333
 Custers, Deveaux and Turk v. Denmark, Judgment of 3 May 2007, para. 84 
334
 Liivik v. Estonia, Judgment of 25 June 2009, para. 95 
335
 Kokkinakis v. Greece, Judgment of 25 May 1993, para. 10 
 
83 
 
been published and was accessible, supplemented the letter of [the proselytism prohibition] and was 
such as to enable Mr Kokkinakis to regulate his conduct in the matter.”
336
 The Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court, in its 1953 definition of proselytism where it attempted to distinguish 
between “purely spiritual teaching” (legal conduct) and proselytism (illegal conduct), had written 
amongst other things: “Outside such spiritual teaching, which may be freely given, any determined, 
importunate attempt to entice disciples away from the dominant religion by means that are unlawful 
or morally reprehensible constitutes proselytism as prohibited by the aforementioned provision of 
the Constitution.”
337
 (The “dominant religion” requirement was later removed from the Constitution 
in 1975, and it then prohibited proselytism against all religions.) Recalling that the wording of many 
statutes is not absolutely precise, and that many laws are couched in vague terms to avoid excessive 
rigidity, the Court found that the proselytism prohibition fell in the category of vague laws, and was 
thus reliant on the practice of the national courts in clarifying the prohibition on a case-by-case 
basis, which the Court determined had occurred given the “well-settled case-law”. The Court 
therefore found that the measure constituting the interference was prescribed by law. And thus, the 
Court, in its short article 7 analysis, simply referring to its article 9 analysis of whether the 
interference was prescribed by law, found that there was no breach of article 7.
338
 
In C.R. v. The United Kingdom the applicant had been convicted of the attempted rape upon his 
wife, from whom he was separated at the time. The conviction was based on a statutory provision 
criminalizing rape. At the time, at common law, an exception was provided to the effect that a 
husband could not commit rape upon his wife as she had given consent to sexual intercourse at the 
time she entered into the marriage – so-called marital immunity. As unpalatable as such an 
immunity is, it nevertheless existed at the time of the applicant‟s conduct as a matter of law. Over 
the years, the domestic courts had created a number of exceptions to the immunity, thus allowing 
prosecution; however, none of these exceptions applied in the applicant‟s situation. Regardless, the 
national courts upheld the applicant‟s conviction and removed the marital immunity entire. The 
removal of the immunity defense occurred at a time when also the Law Commission recommended 
Parliament remove the immunity, but Parliament had not yet had a chance to act upon that 
recommendation. The Court found that there had been no breach of article 7. The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he evolution had reached a stage where judicial recognition of the absence of immunity had 
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become a reasonably foreseeable development of the law.” The Court continued: “The essentially 
debasing character of rape is so manifest that the result of the decisions of [the national courts] – 
that the applicant could be convicted of attempted rape, irrespective of his relationship with the 
victim – cannot be said to be at variance with the object and purpose of Article 7 (art. 7) of the 
Convention, namely to ensure that no one should be subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction 
or punishment. What is more, the abandonment of the unacceptable idea of a husband being 
immune against prosecution for rape of his wife was in conformity not only with a civilised concept 
of marriage but also, and above all, with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, the very 
essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom.”
339
 In Pessino v. France, a case 
about the continued construction activities of the applicant after the revocation of a previously 
issued construction permit, the Court found that the French court‟s departure from its precedent 
could not have been foreseeable to the applicant, and distinguished the case from C.R. v. The United 
Kingdom in stating that the debasing character of rape made the criminalization of the applicant‟s 
act foreseeable.
340
 It is thus clear that the Court considered the removal of marital immunity as 
technically constituting retroactive criminalization, but due to the morally condemnable 
characteristics of the act in question, its criminalization should have been foreseeable despite of 
legal technicalities. Regardless of the despicableness of the applicant‟s conduct by any moral 
standard, and the obvious need to remove the marital immunity, the Court‟s reasoning leaves the 
taste of the rationalizing of a conclusion that, in essence, allows for a form of retroactive 
punishment of conduct, which is clearly highly undesirable, and yet not subject to punishment under 
the national law without retrospective removal of the marital immunity. The national courts adopted 
the marital immunity, albeit in a different time, but still had not abolished it in the late 20
th
 century. 
In fact, the national courts had always recognized some form of immunity in these kinds of cases up 
until the applicant was convicted.
341
 The legislature had also failed to act to abolish the marital 
immunity altogether. According to another commentator, had the applicant sought legal advice prior 
to his conduct, the advice would most likely have warned of the imminent reform, but maintained 
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that marital immunity was still valid law.
342
 It is odd that, ostensibly, the citizen must assume the 
risk for the state‟s failure to act upon a legal situation that long since had become socially 
unacceptable. Of course, one the one hand, it would be regrettable from a moral standpoint and 
offensive to the idea of justice for the woman involved if the applicant had benefitted from the 
state‟s failure to protect married women in such an egregious manner. However, on the other hand, 
the decision not to allow the applicant to benefit from the state‟s failure, arguably, comes at the 
price of the introduction of a degree of arbitrary enforcement of article 7 itself, by declining to find 
a violation based on moral grounds rather than legal arguments. There are negative implications 
involved no matter which alternative the Court had chosen. However morally correct I think the 
decision is, I am not entirely convinced it was the correct decision from a strict legal point of view, 
since the Parliament could have resolved the issue with prospective effect rather than the courts 
resolving the issue with retrospective effect for the applicant.
343
 
Whereas C.R. v. The United Kingdom involved retrospective revocation of an exemption from 
criminal liability, the Cantoni case involved the question of the legislature‟s use of a broad category 
in a criminal provision, and the applicant‟s complaint that the scope of the category was subject to 
lack of clarity and arbitrariness. In the Cantoni case, the legal provision in question targeted 
“medicinal products” as a category, rather than providing an exhaustive list of products considered 
“medicinal”. The domestic courts had, over time, included in the category of medicinal products 
everything from actual pharmaceuticals to Vitamin C, 70% strength alcohol and mineral 
supplements. The Court, stated in Cantoni that “[w]hen the legislative technique of categorisation is 
used, there will often be grey areas at the fringes of the definition. This penumbra of doubt in 
relation to borderline facts does not in itself make a provision incompatible with Article 7 (art. 7), 
provided that it proves to be sufficiently clear in the large majority of cases. The role of 
adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, 
taking into account the changes in everyday practice.”
344
 The Court, concluded that in the Cantoni 
case, the legal provision in question did pass article 7 muster; in light of the case law available at 
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the time, the statutory rule was sufficiently clear.
345
 Furthermore, the Court stated that it could not 
express its “view on the appropriateness of methods chosen by the legislature of a Contracting 
State; its task is confined to determining whether they are in conformity with the Convention.”
346
 In 
light of the case law at the time, which also showed that the domestic appellate court had never 
upheld a lower court‟s finding that parapharmaceutical-type product fell outside the scope of the 
provision,
347
 Mr Cantoni ought to have known that “he ran a real risk of prosecution for unlawful 
sale of medicinal products.”
348
 
The degree of foreseeability required is not the same in all cases and varies dependent on at least 
three factors. It depends to a considerable degree on the text of substantive provision in question
349
, 
the area of law in question
350
, as well as the number and characteristics
351
 of those regulated by the 
provision in question.
352
 The above reference to the need for a person to seek legal advice is 
particularly pertinent “in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to 
having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this 
account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails.”
353
 
 
5.1.1.2 Extensive interpretation and analogy 
In Kokkinakis, the Court made the important statement that article 7 not only embodies the principle 
that only the law can define crime and penalties, but also the principle that the criminal law must 
not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy. From this follows, 
the Court wrote, that an offense must be clearly defined in law. An offense is clearly defined in law 
“where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the 
assistance of the courts‟ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable.”
354
 The 
clarity requirement is thus not solely aimed at the language of the rule, but rather at the clarity of the 
law as it has been interpreted by courts. This section is dedicated to the cases where the reading of 
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the law is unreasonable because the interpretation goes beyond the limits of the provision‟s 
language. 
It is clear from Kokkinakis that laws can be quite vague without running afoul of article 7.
355
 
However, the Court does not tolerate any degree of vagueness, including unforeseeably expansive 
interpretations that go beyond the letter of the law.  
In Liivik v. Estonia, the Court held that article 7 had been breached. The case concerned an 
applicant who had served as acting Director General of the Estonian Privatisation Agency. He had 
decided that a public limited company in possession of the Estonian railways should be privatized. 
The Public Prosecutor‟s Office, as well as a number of other public officials, had on several 
occasions expressed the opinion that the privatization was lawful. However, the Public Prosecutor‟s 
Office later drastically changed its opinion and the applicant was charged with and convicted of 
misuse of an official position and thereby causing risk of significant damage, and in doing so 
allegedly had caused significant moral damage to the interests of the state. His conviction was 
based on a Soviet era provision, now being applied in a market economy. However, according to 
the provision‟s language, the risk had to have materialized, as the wording of the provision did not 
allude to risk sufficing as a trigger for its application.
356
 The applicant was also obligated to 
privatize the company, and thus, had to balance risks as a part of his position at the privatization 
agency.
357
 The Court, thus, held that it was not foreseeable to the applicant that his acts would 
trigger the application of the provision in question. Particularly troubling was the interpretation of 
“significant damage” as including “significant moral damage”, such as not acting in compliance 
with a “general sense of justice” (and the what made damage significant was that the applicant was 
a high-ranking state official) – a rather open-ended concept. As the Court noted, the domestic court 
exercised its discretionary judgment, when interpreting “moral damage”, in such a way that it was 
not susceptible to proof.
358
 The Court noted that “[i]t appears that the fact of an alleged violation of 
law by the applicant in itself served as an irrebuttable presumption that he had caused moral damage 
to the interests of the State. So broad an interpretation could, in principle, render any breach of law 
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a criminal offence within the meaning of [the provision in question].”
359
 The Court further stated 
that “the interpretation and application of [the provision] in the present case involved the use of 
such broad notions and such vague criteria that the criminal provision in question was not of the 
quality required under the Convention in terms of its clarity and the foreseeability of its effects.”
360
 
The Court thus found that article 7 had been breached.
361
 The Liivik case, compared with 
Kokkinakis and Cantoni for example, goes to show that it seemingly takes an exceptional degree of 
vagueness before article 7 is violated. Liivik contained what could arguably be labeled a 
“compounded breach”. Not only was the provision extensively interpreted to include the mere risk 
of damage where the language only reasonably supported a reading requiring damage to have 
occurred, but the interpretation of “damage” as also meaning “moral damage” made the provision‟s 
application impermissibly vague as well as being extensively interpreted to the detriment of the 
applicant, such that he could not reasonably foresee being prosecuted for a violation of the 
provision. A vague concept (e.g. moral damage) cannot be cured by interpreting it with reference to 
another vague concept (e.g. the general sense of justice).
362
 
In Baṣkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey the applicants had been charged and convicted under the 
Turkish Prevention of Terrorism Act. The first applicant had written an academic essay published 
as a book critiquing the official ideology of the state with respect to Kurdistan. The second 
applicant owned the publishing house, which published the book. The first applicant was charged 
with “disseminating propaganda against the indivisibility of the State”, and the second applicant 
was charged under a provision targeting the publishers of such propaganda. However, the 
punishment applied to the applicant targeted editors, instead of the more lenient punishment 
applicable specifically to publishers that only allowed imposition of fines upon a publisher.
363
 To 
the applicants‟ complaint of vagueness of the notion of “dissemination of propaganda against the 
indivisibility of the State”, the Court responded with reference to its case law that “Article 7 
embodies, inter alia, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty 
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal law must not be 
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extensively construed to an accused‟s detriment, for instance by analogy. From these principles it 
follows that an offence and the sanctions provided for it must be clearly defined in the law.”
364
 On a 
side-note, it is unclear whether the Court‟s addition of “inter alia” to its boilerplate-like paragraph 
on the substance of article 7 makes any tangible difference other than just keeping the door open for 
other possible applications.
365
 Regarding the vagueness of the law, the Court noted that “in the area 
under consideration it may be difficult to frame laws with absolute precision and that a certain 
degree of flexibility may be called for to enable the national courts to assess whether a publication 
should be considered separatist propaganda against the indivisibility of the State.”
366
 The Court, 
furthermore, stated that contrary to the applicants‟ claims, the terrorism provision did not confer 
over-broad discretion on the national court in interpretation the scope of the offense.
367
 It, thus, in 
the article 7 context, found that both applicants‟ convictions were compliant with article 7. 
However, the Court found that the penalty imposed on the second applicant, the publisher, was 
based on extensive construction, by analogy, of a lex specialis rule concerning editors that allowed 
the imposition of a prison sentence rather than applying the rule regarding publishers allowing only 
for a fine. The prison sentence applied to the second applicant was therefore in violation of the 
principle nulla poena sine lege embodied in article 7.
368
 
369
 
 
5.1.1.3 Quality of law? 
In Kafkaris v. Cyprus, the applicant had been convicted in 1989 of three premeditated murders 
(contract killing) he committed in 1987. Under the national criminal code, premeditated murder 
carried with it a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The concept “life imprisonment” was not 
defined by the criminal code. In the applicant‟s case, the trial court, following a prior decision, had 
stated that “life imprisonment” meant imprisonment for the remainder of the applicant‟s natural life. 
Two regulations had been adopted in 1981 and 1987 on the basis of law on prison discipline, which 
were meant to regulate the execution of sentences, including remission of sentences for good 
behavior. In the 1987 regulation, the term “life imprisonment” was defined as twenty years 
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imprisonment. Taking remission based on good behavior into account, the convicted person would 
be scheduled for release after serving fifteen years. Such a scheduled release date would be noted in 
the prisoner‟s file. When the applicant was admitted to serve his sentence, he was given written 
notice of a scheduled release date of 16 July 2002. Due to a disciplinary infraction the release date 
was delayed till 2 November 2002. In 1992, the Supreme Court declared the regulations 
unconstitutional and ultra vires. The regulations were then repealed in 1996.  
Although rules concerning the execution of sentences generally does not fall within the scope of 
article 7, the Court observed that the line between definition of sentences and rules on the execution 
of sentences is not always clear.
370
 Moreover, the Court stated that in the present case it was clear 
that “in reality the understanding and the application of these Regulations at the material time went 
beyond [the execution of penalty]. The distinction between the scope of a life sentence and the 
manner of its execution was therefore not immediately apparent.”
371
 The national courts did not 
clarify the distinction until after the time of the applicant‟s conduct, and also, that in both the 1992 
Supreme Court case, and the applicant‟s case, the prosecution appeared to take the view that a life 
sentence equated twenty years imprisonment.
372
 However, the Court did not take the view that a 
heavier penalty had been imposed retrospectively, because the criminal code did not define life 
imprisonment to mean twenty years imprisonment.
373
 The Court thus held that there had been no 
violation of article 7 – in that respect. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court added that the present case was rather a question of “quality of 
law”.
374
 “In particular, the Court finds that at the time the applicant committed the offence, the 
relevant Cypriot law taken as a whole was not formulated with sufficient precision as to enable the 
applicant to discern, even with appropriate advice, to a degree that was reasonable in the 
circumstances, the scope of the penalty of life imprisonment and the manner of its execution.”
375
 On 
that basis, the Court held that there had been a violation of article 7.
376
 
Even though the Court found a violation with respect to “quality of law”, the Court noted that it was 
a consequence of the change in the prison law that the applicant no longer had a right to remission 
                                                 
370
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 142 
371
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 148 
372
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 148 
373
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 149 
374
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 150 
375
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, 12 February 2008, para. 150 
376
 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, 12 February 2008, para. 150 
 
91 
 
of his sentence that matter related to the execution of his sentence as opposed to the penalty 
imposed in him, namely life imprisonment.
377
 The Court‟s finding of a violation brought with it no 
remedy for the applicant. 
The “quality of law” requirement, although it appears new, is likely only a mix of accessibility and 
foreseeability rather than a new requirement under article 7.
378
 
Perhaps the Court‟s reasoning can be restated in the following way. Because there was no clear 
right to a maximum of twenty years of imprisonment when sentenced to life imprisonment at the 
time of the applicant‟s sentencing, although there were arguments in favor of it, then the Court 
could not clearly establish that a retrospective increase in penalty had occurred. However, just 
because there was not enough clarity to establish definitively that the applicant was entitled to be 
released after twenty years‟ incarceration, did not mean that the unconstitutional regulations had not 
injected enough uncertainty that the law at the material time required clarification; especially when 
seen in light of the trial court‟s specification of life imprisonment in its literal sense and the legal 
basis for that penalty in the criminal code. The confusion was likely only compounded by the fact 
that the regulations not only over-stepped the limits of its enabling provision in the primary law, but 
also apparently directly contradicted a provision in the primary law, which indicated that prisoners 
serving life sentences were not eligible for remission of their sentence except where the Governor 
saw fit to release them on license. In other words, there was arguably not enough certainty to 
legitimately rely on a maximum of twenty years‟ incarceration when committing an act subject to 
life imprisonment, and the criminal code‟s lack of definition of life imprisonment left room for the 
possibility that life imprisonment meant exactly that and nothing else. Perhaps this is an indication 
that uncertainty need not reach the levels of retroactivity of criminal laws to fail under article 7 
scrutiny, but could fail due to bad draftsmanship, e.g. where the state of the law at the time of the 
conduct is so unclear and/or contradicting that it is not determinable with an acceptable degree of 
certainty. After all, for the Court to be able to determine whether a law has been applied 
retrospectively, it needs to be able to determine what the law was at the time of the conduct in the 
first place, and whether the applicant‟s conviction and penalty were consistent with that law. In 
Kafkaris there was no determinable retroactive increase in punishment. 
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In Camilleri v. Malta, the applicant had been convicted of possession of illegal substances with the 
intent to supply. Under Maltese law, the offense with which the applicant had been charged and 
convicted was clearly defined in law. However, while the law defined the punishment for such an 
offense, the law provided two different possible punishments based on whether a defendant was 
tried before the Court of Magistrates or before the Criminal Court. Before the former, the 
punishment was six months to ten years, and before the latter, four years to life imprisonment.
379
 
Clearly, the punishment for the offense had a legal basis. Even so, the law must also be accessible 
and the consequences of one‟s actions reasonably foreseeable. The Court proceeded to determine 
whether, in particular, the foreseeability requirement was satisfied, seeing as the choice of 
jurisdiction – a decision made by the prosecutor – affected the possible penalty applicable. 
The Court observed that the law did not provide any guidance with regard to which penalty bracket 
would be applied to the applicant, and he would only become aware of the applicable bracket when 
charges were brought against him.
380
 This would depend entirely on the Attorney General‟s 
discretion to choose the jurisdiction. The Court further noted, in the light of the case law provided 
to it, that the Attorney General‟s decisions were at times unpredictable.
381
 Even if the applicant had 
sought legal advice, the Court averred, the applicant would not have been able to know which 
bracket would be applied to him, because “the decision was solely dependent on the prosecutor‟s 
discretion to determine the trial court.”
382
 The law did not specify which criteria were relevant to 
the prosecutor‟s decision, and the no other guidelines existed either. The law thus did not provide 
any degree of precision with respect to when the application of which bracket would be triggered, 
because the law did not contain any guidelines as to what constituted a less serious offense and a 
more serious offense.
383
 The Court thus noted that “[t]he Attorney General had in effect an 
unfettered discretion to decide which minimum penalty would be applicable with respect to the 
same offence. The decision was inevitably subjective and left room for arbitrariness, particularly 
given the lack of procedural safeguards.”
384
 The chosen trial court would thus be bound by the 
prosecutor‟s decision in that it could not, regardless of the circumstances of the case and regardless 
of any concerns a judge might have about the use of discretion, impose a lesser sentence than that 
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which followed from the bracket associated with the crime dependant on jurisdiction.
385
 The Court 
thus concluded that “the relevant legal provision failed to satisfy the foreseeability requirement and 
provide effective safeguards against arbitrary punishment as provided in Article 7.”
386
 
In this case, the statutory law clearly defined the two alternative penalty brackets, but it failed to 
provide a procedural safeguard against arbitrariness. The prosecutor‟s discretion was not directed 
by guidelines nor was it subject to review by the courts. The prosecutor could thus independently 
and free from judicial review, define which offenses were serious and which were less serious. The 
Court seemingly did not find that case law had clarified which types of offenses would be pursued 
before which court. Arguably, even if such clarification had taken place, it would not have been the 
result of the courts‟ practice, but the prosecution‟s practice, which rested on indeterminable criteria 
and free from review even if it derogated from its own practice. There would be room left for 
arbitrariness, which could not be resolved by courts in practice, because the courts were in fact 
bound by the prosecutor‟s decision and had no recourse to address any concerns with the exercise of 
discretion. The prosecutor could freely choose to pursue two cases involving the same type of 
offense of the same degree of severity before a different court. In essence, the law provided 
sufficient guidelines to those enforcing the law, namely the prosecution. Arguably, this case shows 
that the Court considers that foreseeability and risk of arbitrary enforcement are not two distinct and 
separable concepts, but rather two concepts that go hand in hand. The difference between this case 
of unforeseeability and the other cases discussed in this section is that uncertainty in the form of 
vagueness in statutory language or other regulation may be gradually clarified by the courts. 
Uncertainty in terms of unreviewable discretion to choose between two clear and precise definitions 
of penalty brackets provided in law cannot, by definition, be clarified by the courts, who in this 
particular case, have no power to set the exercise of discretion aside even in the most suspect of 
circumstances. Vagueness in law can be cured by the courts, e.g. through strict construction, 
development of doctrines etc., whereas uncertainty in the exercise of unreviewable prosecutorial 
discretion cannot be resolved. Arguably, it would have been less controversial had the courts, rather 
than the prosecution, been granted the discretion to distinguish between less serious and more 
serious offenses and choose the appropriate penalty bracket based on its evaluation of the facts in 
each case. 
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Article 7 is, arguably, primarily focused on the state‟s enforcement of the law against the individual 
applicant before the Court – as opposed to the hypothetical enforcement against others – and thus 
the Court will focus on whether the criminality of the applicant‟s conduct and the associated 
punishment for said conduct was reasonably foreseeable, the legal basis for conviction and 
punishment was existent and accessible. That is, the Court will evaluate whether the specific 
applicant‟s conviction and the imposed punishment was in conformity with article 7 of the 
Convention. Was the crime defined in law at the time of the conduct? Was the punishment for said 
crime defined in law at the time of the conduct? Could the applicant thus have foreseen the 
consequences of his actions? 
Camilleri v. Malta arguably indicates that there are cases where the law itself is not in conformity 
with the Convention, because the law‟s uncertainty can never be cured since the law itself 
authorizes arbitrary enforcement in all cases – whether the power is actually abused or not. That is, 
there is an absence of safeguards against arbitrary enforcement inherent in the law in question that 
cannot be remedied through case law. The law is thus itself irreparably inconsistent with article 7, 
because it does not lend itself to a Convention-consistent construction, i.e. a construction that 
eliminates the unacceptably high risk of arbitrary enforcement. Such arbitrariness will continue to 
exist regardless of whether the outcome in the specific case before the court was seemingly 
justifiable.
387
  
The applicant in Camilleri v. Malta was found in possession of 953 pills of ecstasy with intent to supply, which 
probably would amount to a serious offense in most jurisdictions. The fact that he was tried before a court where the 
more serious penalty bracket applied, which by the standard of other jurisdictions is arguably appropriate, it does not 
negate the unreviewable discretion of the prosecution under the national law, the prosecution‟s ability to bind the courts 
in terms of minimal penalty, and the resultant room that discretion leaves for arbitrary decisions. The safeguard against 
arbitrary enforcement was perennially absent, because the courts, even if faced with blatant abuse of power, would have 
no legal basis for handing down a lower sentence than the minimum sentence applicable due to the prosecution‟s choice 
of jurisdiction. The Government‟s attempt to convince the Court that the national courts in fact had a legal basis for 
imposing a sentence below the minimum in an article of the Criminal Code failed, because the language of said article 
explicitly excluded the possibility of its application to those convicted of the crime in question. The national courts had 
also confirmed that the article referenced by the Government was inapplicable in such cases. The Government could not 
provide any examples of decisions where the courts had applied the article to impose a lower sentence than the 
minimum. The Government could thus not provide any proof of safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. The Court 
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never addressed whether the prosecution‟s jurisdiction decision in the applicant‟s case had in fact been arbitrary. 
Rather, it focused on the inherent inability to provide safeguards in any case, even if there were an abuse of power. 
This can be tentatively compared to the application of the US void-for-vagueness doctrine; more 
specifically, the distinction between facial vagueness (unconstitutionality of the law itself – that is, 
it has no constitutional application), and “vague as applied” (the law has constitutional applications, 
but is unconstitutional as applied in the case at hand), discussed below in the section on nullum 
crimen sine lege in the United States. Because there was no reading of the rules in Camilleri that 
could have reduced the risk of arbitrary enforcement, it could arguably be said that the rules were 
facially incompatible with article 7 ECHR; i.e. only the legislature, by way of a “do-over”, could 
provide sufficient protection against arbitrary enforcement. 
 
A case against Georgia revolved around an interesting question; whether the use of colloquial 
language, rather than conventional legislative language, rendered the language too unclear and thus 
failed to meet the qualitative requirements that follow from article 7 ECHR. In Ashlarba v. Georgia, 
the applicant had been convicted of the offense of being a member of the “thieves‟ underworld” and 
was sentenced to seven years‟ imprisonment. Interestingly, in its renewed fight against organized 
crime, the state had described the crime using colloquial language such as “thief in law”, “thieves‟ 
underworld”, “settlement of disputes using the authority of a thief in law”, etc. The provision on 
being a member of the “thieves‟ underworld” was enacted along with additional legislation on 
organized crime and racketeering, in which the colloquial concepts of “thief in law”, “thieves‟ 
underworld”, among others, were explained. A “thief in law” is a criminal boss, who is considered 
to be the guardian of the “Thieves‟ Code”. One of the most important tasks of a “thief in law” is to 
administer the “kitty” (the common monetary fund of the criminal underworld). Furthermore, a 
“thief in law” would give order to criminals of lower ranks, but would rarely engage in the criminal 
conduct themselves. Members of the “thieves‟ underworld” would recognize the rules organizing 
the “thieves‟ underworld” and actively pursue the goals of the underworld. Several socio-legal 
studies had shown that the informal authority of “thieves in law” pervaded into ordinary public life. 
These criminal bosses thus exerted social influence beyond their criminal underworld. Their rules of 
conduct were strictly enforced and failure to comply could result in punishment, including death. 
The applicant‟s complaint centered on the imprecise language used in the criminal code; that being 
terms like being a member of the “thieves‟ underworld”, and whether the meaning of the offense 
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was clear and foreseeable enough to regulate one‟s conduct accordingly.
388
 The Court specifically 
noted the rationale behind the legislation; that being fighting organized crime more effectively.
389
 
The Court referenced the socio-legal research that had been presented to it, when observing that 
“this criminal phenomenon was already so deeply rooted in society, and the societal authority of 
“thieves in law” was so high, that among ordinary members of the public criminal concepts such as 
“thieves‟ underworld”, “a thief in law”, “settlement of disputes using the authority of a thief in 
law”, “obshyak” [kitty; the thieves‟ underworld‟s common monetary fund], and so on, were matters 
of common knowledge and widely understood.”
390
 (citations omitted) The Court thus considered 
that the national legislature had “merely criminalised concepts and actions relating to a criminal 
(“thieves”) subculture, the exact meaning of which were already well known to the public at 
large.”
391
 The usage of colloquial language in the definition of the criminal offense, although 
interesting to the Court, was apparently rooted in the desire to ensure that the offense was easily 
understood by the public.
392
 
The applicant, who was complaining that the definition of the crime of being a member of the 
“thieves‟ underworld” did not provide sufficient foreseeability, had during the investigation, 
explained that he knew that the person he was receiving instructions from had the title of “thief in 
law”, as well as showing his knowledge of the underworld when visiting a potential future “thief in 
law” in prison, and he had also adjudicated in private disputes at the request of a “thief in law”. It 
follows that the colloquial terms used in the legislation were not as entirely foreign to the applicant 
as he claimed.
393
 
The Court continued, adding that, most importantly, the provision in question was a part of a larger 
legislative package on organized crime, and that a section in the law on organized crime and 
racketeering, which was a part of that package, comprehensively defined the already colloquial 
terms.
394
 “Accordingly, the Court concludes that, after the criminalisation […] of the offence of 
being a member of the “thieves‟ underworld”, the applicant, if not through common knowledge 
based on the progressive spread over decades of the subculture of the “thieves‟ underworld” over 
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the public at large, then by reference to section 3 of the Law on Organised Crime and Racketeering 
and, if need be, with the assistance of appropriate legal advice, could easily have foreseen which of 
his actions would have attracted criminal responsibility […].”
395
 (citations omitted) 
It is not clear whether the criminal code provisions would have passed article 7 muster on their own 
merit, absent the further clarification of the colloquial terms in another statute, seeing as the Court 
writes “most importantly” when it brings up the definition of the terms in another statute, which 
was a part of the same package. Usage of idioms, slang and the likes in legislation is, generally, 
hardly good draftsmanship – especially in the context of criminal law, where a higher standard of 
certainty is required. In Ashlarba, however, the terms‟ colloquial nature appeared well-documented, 
and seen in the context of the legislative package and the comprehensive definition of the colloquial 
terms in another statute, the standard of guilt was sufficiently clear and foreseeable. 
 
5.1.1.4 Foreseeability of facts 
Some criminal provisions also implicitly require foreseeability as to fact. An excellent example is 
criminal trespass. Since intent is generally required, a defendant must have intended to trespass onto 
a property to which access was prohibited. In other words, the defendant must be able to 
foresee/know where the prohibited area is and that access is prohibited, for him to plan his conduct 
accordingly; a criminal trespass provision cannot serve any preventative purpose unless a person 
can know where not to go. Foreseeability of facts seems to be required under article 7, arguably, 
dependent on the subject matter of the criminal provision.  
In Custers, Deveaux and Turk v. Denmark, the Court briefly addressed whether the applicants had 
notice of facts relevant to the application of the criminal provision prohibiting trespass. In 2001, the 
applicants were involved in a Greenpeace action to draw international attention to the use of the 
Thule Air Base‟s radar for the the U.S. missile defense program and to collect information on the 
environmental impact of the presence of the Thule Air Base, located on the Dundas peninsula in 
Greenland.
396
 Access by civilians to the area required permission from the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the U.S. authorities. The applicants, three Greenpeace protesters, were charged 
with and convicted of trespassing on the defense area. However, the exact size of the defense area 
                                                 
395
 Ashlarba v. Georgia, Judgment 15 July 2014, para. 40 
396
 Custers, Deveaux and Turk v. Denmark, Judgment of 3 May 2007, para. 9 
 
98 
 
was disputed between the parties.
397
 The applicants argued that the exact size of the defense area 
was confidential and therefore unknown to the public.
398
 The airfield was shown on an official map 
of the area, however, there was no indication of the presence of an air base.
399
 The applicants had 
only been in possession of a reproduction of that map. Only on a map published as an annex to a 
report on the relocation of the Thule Tribe in 1953 were there lines drawn on the map, a report and 
map which the Government used to argue showed a demarcation of the area of the air base.
400
 The 
air base was not fenced off, and signs of “no entry” were only placed by the harbor and on the road 
leading between the airfield and another part of the base. Under the national law, an area need not 
be fenced off or display signs prohibiting entry in order for an unauthorized entry to constitute 
trespass. The applicants did not dispute this interpretation, but pointed out that the limits of an area 
must still be defined in some manner.
401
 The Court stated that it was a crucial issue “whether the 
applicants could have foreseen that the area they had entered was “not freely accessible”.”
402
 
Regarding the applicants access to a definition of the defense area the Court noted that there was no 
indication of an air base on official maps – only on a map annexed to a report from 1994 on the 
relocation of the Thule Tribe indicated some lines drawn, the origin and reason of which were 
ostensibly unclear. The applicants could therefore “not have been expected to obtain this map in 
preference to or in addition to the official map of the area they already possessed.”
403
 
The Court found no violation of article 7, because other circumstances showed that the applicants 
had clear intention to enter the defense area, and through their updates on the Greenpeace website 
had indicated they were aware they were inside the defense area.
404
 
 
5.1.2 A “thin ice” principle? 
Ashworth briefly brings up a so-called thin ice principle in his book Principles of Criminal Law as 
he cites Lord Morris‟ words that “those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which 
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will denote the precise spot where he [sic] will fall in”.
405
 Ashworth argues that the principle ought 
not trump article 7, but notes that the ECtHR seems to leave room for the principle to effect the 
outcome of cases.
406
 In both Custers, Deveaux and Turk v. Denmark and Cantoni v. France,
407
 the 
Court noted that the applicants‟ could not have been unaware of the “risk of prosecution”.
408
 The 
concept of a thin ice principle has to do with situations where criminal defendants were aware or 
should have been aware of the risk of prosecution – that is, defendants, who ostensibly knowingly 
venture into a legal grey area and their conduct is on the fringe of illegal conduct.
409
 In Cantoni, the 
Court stated that the foreseeability requirement may still be satisfied even if the person in question 
has to seek legal advice. The Court added in that respect that “[t]his is particularly true in relation to 
persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of 
caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care 
in assessing the risks that such activity entails.”
410
 
In Custers, Deveaux and Turk, the Court noted that the absence of case law that could have 
contributed to foreseeability of the application of the executive order‟s penalty, “it was predictable 
that the applicants risked being sentenced to a fine if they entered the defence area without a 
permission.”
411
 
Ashworth challenges the legitimacy of the “thin ice” principle in light of article 7‟s absolute 
nature,
412
 but C.R. v. United Kingdom, if anything, indicates that article 7 is not as absolute in 
practice. In Cantoni, the Court relies on the fact that the domestic appellate court had never upheld 
a decision that excluded a product from the scope of the provision and had always upheld decisions 
that included a product in the scope. In Custers & Others, other factors relevant to the case 
indicated the applicants were fully aware that they were trespassing. In Cantoni and Custers & 
Others, the Court may be hinting that the applicants were aware that their conduct fell within the 
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scope of the respective provisions, and thus were using the vagueness of the law as a defense in bad 
faith, so to speak. This is, however, purely speculation. The fact remains, though, that the Court‟s 
risk-related statements, could also be construed to mean that the protection under article 7 is not as 
absolute as it appears, in that the defendant seems to be inappropriately absorbing the consequences 
deriving unclear legislation, even though clarity of legislation is clearly the responsibility of the 
legislature. A thin-ice principle would then likely produce a chilling effect, since citizens would be 
avoiding conduct that is not clearly criminalized. 
Furthermore, if the only thing that is foreseeable is that the statute enables or encourages arbitrary 
enforcement or unforeseeable enforcement; that which is foreseeable is merely the ever-looming 
possibility of prosecution for any and all conduct related to e.g. computers, then there is equally 
little protection from arbitrary use of power as if there had been no pre-existing law. A thin ice 
principle is thus a rather unsettling idea, because even a statute prohibiting “any conduct that 
offends the state in any way” technically provides foreseeability in the sense that one must always 
tread carefully with respect to the state, the thin ice principle neglects even the most serious risks of 
arbitrary enforcement, placing the risk of prosecution on the basis of an unclear statute with a 
defendant. Furthermore, the principles seems to invite the notion that if there is uncertainty about 
the criminality of the defendant‟s conduct there ought to be a presumption of criminality, rather 
than requiring the legislature to speak in a more concise manner. In other words, the principle also 
seemingly invites the possibility of extensive construction and analogy (because the thin ice looms 
in the penumbra and with analogous behavior), both of which are ostensibly precluded by article 7 
ECHR. 
As shown above, the ECtHR‟s case law leaves the distinct impression that article 7 ECHR is not 
necessarily a guarantee against unforeseeable extensive applications of criminal law (or judge-made 
retroactive criminalization) as long as the criminalization of the conduct is likely to be imminent 
(for that reason criminality is arguably foreseeable), the conduct is sufficiently morally 
reprehensible,
413
 or the courts have never excluded anything from the scope.
414
 
If the thin ice principle in fact does have a bearing on the outcome of article 7 ECHR complaints, 
then, arguably, one could argue that the legal basis for analogous application of criminal law 
provided by the Danish criminal code § 1 is not contrary to article 7 ECHR, since an extensive 
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interpretation to cover conduct that is completely analogous to the prohibited conduct, yet not 
technically covered by the statute, could always be argued to be covered under a thin ice principle; 
thus, discouraging citizens from engaging in conduct that is analogous to conduct prohibited by 
statute. Furthermore, if it is indeed a thin-ice principle affecting outcomes of article 7 complaints, it 
would make it very difficult for applicants to succeed on an article 7 complaint, even where they 
may have been genuinely blind-sided by an unclear law, even objectively so, merely because that 
they should have recognized the lack of clarity of the statute as a significant risk factor. 
 
5.1.3 Limitations of Article 7 
5.1.3.1 Overbreadth vs. vagueness? 
An important limitation on the reach of article 7 can be argued for. The limitation relates to the 
paper-thin line, or partial overlap, between overbreadth and vagueness. This differentiation has been 
explicitly made by commentators on US constitutional law in terms of challenges under the void-
for-vagueness doctrine and the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The differentiation is 
discussed below in the section on US law.  
The distinction between overbreadth and vagueness concerns becomes apparent in the ECtHR‟s 
case law at least in one aspect, namely, that criminal law policy is a matter for the states to 
decide.
415
 The ECtHR does not, and arguably cannot, review the subject matter of a criminal 
provision (i.e. policy decisions), however objectionable the content, as long as the subject matter 
does not constitute an interference with the other substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention, 
such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of association, etc.
416
 Furthermore, 
article 7 is not applicable to procedural criminal law, including rules of appeal, law of evidence and 
statutes of limitation.
417
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5.1.3.2 Protected conduct 
In its decision on admissibility in the case H.M.A. v. Spain
418
, the Commission stated with regard to 
article 7 (1), that “[t]he Convention leaves the States free to designate as a criminal offence an act 
or omission not constituting the normal exercise of one of the rights that it protects and, 
consequently, to define the constituent elements of such an offence.”
419
 Thus, it is unmistakably 
clear that article 7 does not prevent overbreadth of criminal statutes (i.e. that the scope of a criminal 
provision reaches further than needed to cover the undesirable conduct, thereby covering innocuous 
conduct) as long as the provisions do not interfere with Convention-protected conduct. Such a 
limitation can also be inferred from the existence of positive rights, meaning rights, the existence of 
which are positively expressed in law, rather than conduct that is legal because it has not been made 
illegal (i.e. inferring legality from the lack of criminalization). Positive rights consequently place a 
limit on the legislature‟s power to decide criminal policy, whereas article 7 does not scrutinize 
criminal policy at all, and hence, does not oppose continuous reduction of individual 
freedom/autonomy; only if the particular legislative act, taking into account case law, fails to 
provide notice of the reduction in individual autonomy or clearly allows arbitrary enforcement. That 
is, article 7 provides no legal basis to scrutinize the existence or extent of criminalization, because it 
offers no “opposing force” to the state‟s right to form its criminal policy – only positive rights do. It 
only demands clear communication as to “what” and “when”; that is, what the rule prohibits, which 
in turn informs when the rule is triggered – “if, then”. Article 7 is concerned with the quality of the 
communication (i.e. the law), not the content of the communication. 
As noted above, the first prong of the test under articles 8 through 11 serves to determine whether 
an interference was “prescribed by law”. The prong is largely the same as the test under article 7 as 
to whether a crime and its punishment has been defined by “law”. Second, the interference must 
pursue a legitimate aim. Third, the interference must be necessary in a democratic society (pressing 
social need). The last prong calls for a proportionality test, where only the least intrusive 
interference needed is acceptable.
420
 The addition of the last two prongs under the test carried out 
regarding interferences with rights makes it clear that the Court has authorization to scrutinize the 
breadth of national law. Thus, over-criminalization is “allowed” under article 7 as long as the legal 
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consequences of an act or omission are reasonably foreseeable. Conversely, criminalization beyond 
what is necessary to pursue an otherwise legitimate aim will in all likelihood fail the additional tests 
used by the Court in connection with e.g. article 8-11 rights that positively place a limit on criminal 
policy decisions. It can arguably be derived from Kokkinakis that a law, albeit vague and overbroad 
on its face, can be consistent with the Convention when clarified through case law, as long as it is 
interpreted narrowly to not encroach unnecessarily upon the individual‟s positive rights. 
Article 7 applies to all criminal legislation, not just that which infringes upon protected conduct. 
Article 7 will thus logically be a weaker protection, because there is less power to scrutinize 
national law. Because articles 8 through 11, trigger additional tests, such as that of whether the 
legislation in question pursues a legitimate aim and whether the interference with protected conduct 
is necessary in a democratic society, it is in some sense not odd that the Court supposedly prefers
421
 
to find violations under other articles over finding violations of article 7; however, this could also 
be explained from a lex specialis point of view. The Court‟s competence to review is broader under 
other articles in terms of national criminal policy. Rules that reach both non-protected conduct and 
protected conduct implies that the rule must be construed strictly.
422
  Criminalization of assault for 
example is not an exception from a hypothetical opposing right to cause bodily harm to people. In 
fact, it requires an exception (excuse, defense, justification) in law for such conduct not to incur 
criminal liability. Free speech is a right positively provided for and free speech is the main rule 
rather than the exception under the Convention; thus, criminal law may, if there are justifiable 
reasons, as an exception, interfere with free speech, but only if necessary. 
Although article 7 requires that criminal provisions not be interpreted extensively, e.g. by analogy, 
that is not to say that the opposite is true, i.e. that there is an obligation to construe criminal 
provisions strictly.
423
 In this sense, it is helpful to distinguish between, on the one hand, purposely 
vague criminal provisions (act of the legislature casting a wide net in furtherance of its criminal 
policy) and, on the other hand, extensive interpretation of a reasonably clear provision so that it 
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“grows” beyond its language to encompass conduct that falls outside the natural meaning of the 
language (judicial expansion/creation of criminalization). Article 7 will prevent the latter, arguably 
only to some extent, but not necessarily the former. As shown above, gradual clarification of vague 
provisions through case law is not prohibited, insofar as the resultant development is consistent with 
the essence of the offense and could reasonably be foreseen. Essentially, it is the difference between 
the courts, metaphorically, coloring inside the lines and the courts coloring outside the lines, where 
the lines represents the limits of the language‟s ordinary meaning and the goal is to keep the 
resultant picture neat and tidy. 
However, in one aspect article 7‟s protection may exceed that of articles 8 through 11. The critical 
time relevant to the article 7 examination of whether a crime was defined in law is the time the 
conduct took place. The relevant time for whether an articles 8-11 interference was prescribed by 
law is the time of the interference – not the time of the conduct, unless the interference leads to 
criminal prosecution (which would then trigger article 7). Therefore, article 7 allows for no 
retrospective criminalization, whereas interferences with article 8 through 11 rights can be 
retrospective.
424
 
 
5.1.4 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege in EU law 
The principle of no crime, no punishment without law is a general principle in EU law and 
enshrined in article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 
49(1) states: 
 
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the 
commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable.”
425
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Article 52(3) of the Charter states that where rights in the Charter correspond with the ECHR the 
right has the same meaning and scope as the latter.
426
 Article 49(1) thus has the same meaning and 
scope of article 7 ECHR. 
Article 7 ECHR embodies the principle that only the law can define crime and punishment. 
However, EU law cannot create or aggravate criminal liability in and of itself, independently of 
implementation of the EU rules in national law.
427
 A legal basis must thus exist in national law at 
the time of the conduct, since EU law cannot independently create or aggravate criminal liability. 
Similarly, national law cannot be interpreted extensively with reference to EU law (e.g. as a 
response to having failed to implement EU rules) – that is, principle of conforming interpretation – 
thereby extending the scope to conduct, which would not otherwise be covered by the language of 
the domestic provision, to the detriment of the defendant. If the EU legislation has been 
implemented incorrectly or has not been implemented (whether the time for implementation has 
elapsed or not), the legal basis requirement for description of crimes in national law places a limit 
on the member state‟s ability to interpret and apply national law in light of the EU legislation. Such 
a failure to implement criminal provisions cannot be retrospectively corrected by the member state 
through interpretation and construction in national law in order to comply with EU law, as such a 
“correction” would amount to retrospective criminalization. The duty of conforming interpretation 
cannot override the principles of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
428
 
Furthermore, it bears mentioning that if national legislation is an implementation of EU law, even if 
it is copied almost, or entirely, verbatim into national law, the member state can still be held 
responsible if the legislation violates article 7 ECHR.
429
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5.1.5 Summary 
Article 7 seemingly protects against arbitrary enforcement of a criminal law that either does not 
exist or is so vague that it provides no standard of guilt thus depriving the citizen of the ability to 
plan his conduct. Such enforcement of criminal law is not only unforeseeable to the regulated, but 
may also be arbitrary in nature. 
In terms of protected conduct, criminal rules impacting such conduct create exceptions from the 
main rule that such conduct is legal; but only if the criminalization follows legitimate aims and is 
necessary in a democratic society. Such criminal rules must be strictly construed in order to support 
effective, rather than illusory, rights. Therefore, the Court must, in some instances where the rule 
follows a legitimate aim, also make sure the rule is applied only where there is a socially pressing 
need. 
Neither article 7 nor articles 8 through 11 prevent the adoption of vague rules that need to be 
clarified gradually through case law. The question of legality hinges on whether the result of such 
development is consistent with the essence of the crime and could reasonably be foreseen. 
However, vague rules may also create a chilling effect on the exercise of positive rights, if the 
beneficiaries of these rights risk prosecution. A similar chilling effect arises under rules that 
regulate non-protected conduct, if a thin-ice principle places the burden of unclear legislation on the 
defendants whose conduct was not definitively within the scope of the criminal provision. Only the 
legislature can provide clear description of prohibited conduct. A thin-ice principle would further 
narrow the protection under article 7, because such a principle demands little else than that the lack 
of foreseeability is foreseeable, creating a presumption of criminality within a possibly very large 
penumbra, and perhaps even outside the penumbra. This is hardly in accordance with a requirement 
that criminal rules must be clear. 
The degree of required foreseeability depends on the subject matter, the area of law, and the 
characteristics and number of the regulated. Business regulation is for example subject to a less 
stringent foreseeability requirement. Furthermore, foreseeability of fact relevant to the provision in 
question may be required, e.g. maps demarcating an area that is not freely accessible in connection 
with applying a trespass provision. 
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Overall, it is unclear to which extent extensive interpretation is prohibited under article 7, especially 
in light of C.R. v. United Kingdom and Cantoni. Maybe it is a case of “you know it when you see it” 
(see below about void-for-vagueness in US law). If the slate is blank, that is, the case is not a 
reversal of prior case law, but clarification within the scope of the provision, judicial development 
seems to be fine. If the vagueness cannot be cured through case law, the provision is likely to fail an 
article 7 test – especially so, when the courts have adopted a vague standard in their interpretation 
of an already vague language.
430
 If, however, the case at hand involves a departure from prior case 
law, the rule will likely fail an article 7 test, ostensibly unless the Court finds moral reasons to 
decline to find a violation. All article 7 applicants are bound to have been convicted of a crime, 
which arguably makes them far less sympathetic
431
 than articles 8-11 applicants; however, article 7, 
arguably as opposed to articles 8-11, is not about condoning the actions of the applicant, but about 
demanding that the state give the regulated (including the applicant) sufficient notice in law of the 
illegality of the conduct prior to the applicant engaging in that conduct.
432
 
 
 
5.2 Nullum crimen sine lege in Denmark 
5.2.1 The Danish Criminal Code § 1 
In Danish law, only the law can define a crime and its associated punishment. Although this also 
follows from Denmark‟s international obligations under article 7 ECHR, the principle of legality in 
Danish criminal law dates back to 1866 when the first comprehensive criminal code was passed into 
law.
433
 Prior to 1866, Danish criminal law was marked by judicial creation of crimes, because 
Christian V‟s Danish Law (Christian den 5tes Danske lov) of 1683 and a number of subsequently 
issued regulations defined only a very limited number of crimes, and those crimes were formulated 
in casuistic terms.
434
 The judges of the time therefore almost immediately found themselves in a 
position where they had to decide cases involving unacceptable, yet not criminalized, behavior that 
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did not fit the few and casuistically worded statutory definitions provided for in the 1683 law.
435
 At 
the time, Denmark was an absolute monarchy, and it was not until the Constitution of 1849 that the 
judicial and legislative powers were separated.
436
 For that reason, prior to 1849, the Danish 
Supreme Court was presumed to be acting on behalf of the monarch, who was the highest judicial 
authority, when the Court “supplemented” the statutes by declaring conduct criminal because it was 
malum in se, its contradiction with the spirit of the law and its principles, etc.
437
 The court would 
then impose an arbitrary sentence for the crime.
438
 The constitutional separation of the legislative 
and judicial powers in 1849 was critical in paving the way for the principle of legality in criminal 
law adopted as part of the 1866 criminal code.
439
 
The principle of legality protects the citizens against the state‟s arbitrary use of power.
440
 Legality 
demands that only the legislature, in exercising its legislative power as representatives of the people 
and following the legislative procedure, can define acts and omissions as crimes and define the 
associated punishment.
441
 Because crimes are defined by the legislature, the courts, being entrusted 
with applying the laws to resolve conflicts, are in turn bound by the legislature‟s directives in those 
laws. The directives, that is, the statutory texts, are rarely so clear that they never require the courts 
to clarify them by way of interpretation and construction.
442
  
The principle of legality, finding its expression in the criminal code‟s § 1, has remained largely 
unchanged since the 1930 overhaul of the 1866 criminal code.
443
 Its translation reads: 
“Only acts punishable under a statute or entirely comparable acts shall be punished. […]”
444
 
The Danish Criminal Code § 1 is an expression of the principles nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
lege and states that punishment can only be imposed for conduct which is criminalized by law or for 
conduct that is the complete analogous to the criminalized conduct. According to the criminal 
code‟s § 2, the principle applies equally to conduct criminalized in special legislation. A legal basis 
                                                 
435
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), pp. 141-142 
436
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 150 
437
 Knud Waaben and Lars Bo Langsted: Strafferettens almindelige del I – Ansvarslæren (2012), p. 89 
438
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 141 
439
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 150 
440
 Knud Waaben and Lars Bo Langsted: Strafferettens almindelige del I – Ansvarslæren (2012), p. 89 
441
 See Knud Waaben and Lars Bo Langsted: Strafferettens almindelige del I – Ansvarslæren (2012), p. 89 and Trine 
Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 155 
442
 Knud Waaben and Lars Bo Langsted: Strafferettens almindelige del I – Ansvarslæren (2012), pp. 89-90 
443
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 140 
444
 Translation from Lars Bo Langsted: Criminal Law in Denmark (2014), p. 85 
 
109 
 
must exist which 1) criminalizes the conduct, and 2) prescribes punishment for the conduct in 
question.
445
 The strict legal basis requirement only applies where the resultant decision is to the 
defendant‟s detriment.
446
 
 
5.2.2 “Statute” 
In order to understand the extent of the protection provided under § 1, it is imperative to understand 
to what the word “statute” refers.
447
 The concept of “statute” in § 1 should be understood as 
meaning that the legislature has taken action in accordance with the legislative process described in 
the Constitution.
448
 Only the legislature has the authority define crime and prescribe punishment. 
Legislative power rests with the king and the parliament in unison, according to the Constitution‟s 
(Grundloven) § 3.
449
 
However, it is not uncommon that penalty is attached to a violation of provisions in executive 
orders or ordinances adopted under a statute containing a provision delegating authority to make 
rules; that is, the legislature has delegated some of its authority to define crime and punishment. The 
executive order must have a legal basis in a statute, though. The legal basis for the executive order, 
i.e. the enabling statutory provision, defines the scope of the executive branch‟s authority to create 
rules within the area in question. Such executive orders can describe crimes and prescribe 
punishment as long as the enabling provision delegates such authority, and then only within the 
scope defined by the enabling provision. In cases involving violation of executive order provisions, 
the legality of the executive order and its reach should be evaluated in light of the enabling 
provision in the primary law. If the executive order has overstepped the boundaries of the authority 
granted in the enabling provision by criminalizing the conduct in question, there is no need to 
determine whether the criminal provision in the executive order has been violated, since the legal 
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basis for the criminalizing provision is absent.
450
 The court must acquit.
451
 The same applies in 
terms of ordinances enabled by a primary law. 
Whether there is a legal basis for conviction and punishment for a crime, is determined by 
examining the text of the substantive provision.
452
 The text limits the scope of the provision, but 
statutory language is rarely, if ever, so clear that it never requires interpretation. The scope is, thus, 
found through interpretation of the statutory language.
453
 The act must fall within the scope of the 
provision‟s language. If it does not, there is no legal basis for conviction and punishment. 
In Danish law, there is no constitutional rule or doctrine that imposes qualitative clarity 
requirements on the legislature when they adopt statutes in general or criminal statutes specifically. 
Such a clarity requirement does not follow directly from the language of the criminal code‟s § 1 
either. Seeing as the principle of legality in § 1 was enacted to avoid arbitrary convictions and 
punishment by the courts by requiring a legal basis, it follows, at least indirectly, from its rationale, 
albeit not from its text, that for such a legality requirement to be effective, qualitative requirements 
such as foreseeability, clarity and precision are not irrelevant factors when deciding whether to 
apply a statute or not. 
Even if a criminal provision, adopted by the legislature, is impossibly vague, the Danish courts are 
technically not competent to rule on the provision‟s validity on that basis.
454
 The courts cannot 
avoid clarifying vague provisions where clarification is possible.
455
 However, that is not to say that 
the courts are required to convict on the basis of very vague language.
456
 The courts can, and 
should, decline to convict on the basis of a provision, if they find the provision so vague that it 
cannot reasonably be determined whether the conduct in question is covered by the provision; that 
is, the courts would find that there is no a legal basis for conviction and punishment.
457
 The result 
will then be an acquittal, not due to the legislature‟s failure to meet a formal clarity requirement 
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derived from higher-ranking rules, but because there is no clear legal basis to convict.
458
 Thus, even 
a statute plagued with vagueness, which then might never be used because it cannot serve as a legal 
basis for a criminal conviction, is still a “statute” within the meaning of the criminal code‟s § 1. 
According to Baumbach, if the court declines to convict because it cannot determine whether the 
conduct matches the elements of the crime as it is described, the courts are basing their acquittal on 
the absence of a legal basis for conviction in the case at hand, and that should not be confused with 
application of a clarity principle.
459
 Hence, although the courts cannot declare a statute void for 
vagueness on constitutional grounds, they can refuse to apply the statute, because the statute does 
not provide a clear legal basis to convict; this may then, impliedly, send a message to the legislature 
that it must speak clearer. 
In my opinion, a determination of lack of legal basis can relate to two different situations, both involving uncertainty, 
but where only the first situation substantially implicates lack of clarity
460
. The first situation refers to cases where the 
doubt as to applicability relates to the linguistic scope of certain words in a provision, words which already have a 
determinable meaning. Take, for example, the question whether the word “ship” also extends to include a “rubber 
dinghy”.
461
 In this situation, the lack of clarity relates to whether a word can be construed so widely as to encompass 
objects that do not normally fall within the category of sea vessels definable as “ships”. The second situation refers to 
cases where the uncertainty, relates to indeterminable standards, namely those that tend to be subjective in nature. That 
is, the uncertainty arises in the first situation because there is doubt as to whether the “core” of the provision suggests 
that “rubber dinghy” (in the penumbra) should fall inside or outside the scope. In the second situation, the “core” itself 
is ill-definable. The criminal conduct is ostensibly indeterminable, and the provision‟s language does not make it 
possible to distinguish between legal and illegal conduct. The court lacks guidance, and absent a meaningful method of 
distinguishing between the legal and the illegal, the decisions become characterized by arbitrariness. To summarize, the 
first situation encompasses cases where the word in question is sought to be expanded with respect to the natural 
meaning of the language – that is, clarification as to legal effects in the linguistic penumbra. The second situation 
encompasses cases where there is doubt as to what the “core” is, and even more so, doubt as to whether a penumbra 
even exists if the core from which it flows does not exist. An example could be a provision that prohibits a person from 
conducting themselves in a way that is annoying – a standard which is entirely subjective.
462
 In comparison, “ship” is 
capable of objective, gradual clarification in the provision‟s penumbra even though it might be disputed initially how 
large a sea vessel must be to qualify as such. 
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5.2.3 Clarity as “good draftsmanship” 
There is no Danish legal requirement, constitutional or criminal-law, that mandates clarity in 
legislation. However, it is clear that vague laws make it hard, and at times impossible, for the 
regulated person to plan his conduct, or even for the courts to apply the law at all. The law would 
not have the preventative effect to which it aspires, if the regulated cannot determine what conduct 
the law aims to prevent. It is also clear that the task of ensuring clarity in the statutory language 
belongs to the legislature, since it is the legislature that adopts the laws. 
The Danish Ministry of Justice published guidelines in 2005 on the quality of law (good 
draftsmanship
463
). The guidelines state that it is in the interest of the public, the Parliament, the 
media and those administrating the law, that the rules in the guidelines are respected.
464
 The 
majority of legislation is aimed at the public in order to regulate conduct. Therefore, it serves the 
fundamental principle of legal certainty that the public, to the widest extent possible, is able to 
understand and hence plan their conduct in accordance with the law.
465
 Those applying the law, e.g. 
lawyers, judges, prosecution authorities and other administrative authorities, also have an interest in 
good draftsmanship.
466
 The guidelines explicitly state that the quality of the law cannot be 
compromised with, by relying on the legal professionals‟ training to resolve the interpretational 
problems that inevitably arise out of poor draftsmanship.
467
 Furthermore, the Ministry emphasizes 
that drafting laws in good and clear language is a necessary precursor to a uniform application of 
the law, and thus also a necessary premise for foreseeability and legal certainty.
468
 Living up to the 
ideal of clear and intelligible laws also promotes better media discussions, as well as enabling the 
members of Parliament to better and more quickly understand bills before debating them.
469
 
According to the guidelines, the clarity requirement in terms of the law is primarily aimed at the 
statutory language. The guidelines emphasize that clarity is of even greater importance when the 
law in question acts as a legal basis for imposing restrictions on citizens, e.g. criminal punishment, 
confiscation, etc.
470
 The added importance is due to an elevated need for foreseeability in such 
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cases.
471
 The Ministry does not provide any precise rules on how to compose drafts, but it does give 
examples of what constitutes good statutory language: Simple, concise and precise language, both 
as regards choice of words as well as style, short and clear sentences, consistency in use of words, 
only use words in their ordinary meaning as far as possible, and no use of foreign words or 
technical terms if that can be avoided
472
; the latter, particularly applies with regard to legislation 
that is aimed at the general public rather than a specific group of actors.
473
 Moreover, ambiguous 
and superfluous words should be avoided.
474
 
Article 7 ECHR is mentioned in the guidelines as a legislative restraint. The Ministry acknowledges 
that article 7 ECHR limits how vague and imprecise criminal law provisions can be, and 
emphasizes that it is critical that the drafters of the law are aware of the precision requirements 
when describing crimes.
475
 
It is important to note that the Ministry‟s guidelines represent an expression of good draftsmanship 
as ideal. Just as article 7 ECHR does not require the impossible, the guidelines do not expect the 
impossible. Language is always capable of ambiguity to some extent. Rather than attempting to 
eliminate ambiguity altogether – an impossibility – it is a question of limiting ambiguity and 
vagueness to the greatest extent possible without rendering the law too rigid and unpractical to 
administrate. 
Ultimately, the guidelines are just that – guidelines. Even if a defendant were facing a novel and 
creative application of a broadly/vaguely worded statute, the guidelines are not a source of legal 
recourse. 
 
5.2.4 “Acts” 
“Acts” (or “forhold” in Danish), in the criminal code‟s § 1, encompasses both acts and omissions, 
and “acts” should be read as meaning the “actus reus” of a substantive provision.
476
 Thus, to 
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determine what constitutes an “act” in terms of the criminal code‟s § 1, each element of the 
substantive provision in question must be taken into consideration.
477
 
It should be noted that the Criminal Code‟s § 1 does not technically require the substantive criminal provision include 
mens rea or that other fundamental concepts such as causation are described in law.
478
 
 
5.2.5 Limitations of the legal basis requirement 
Neither the Constitution nor the criminal code‟s § 1 prohibits intentional or unintentional over-
criminalization (overbreadth), bad draftsmanship or vague language. The legislature is free to 
exercise its legislative power, including criminalizing any conduct as it sees fit.
479
 The primary 
restraints on legislative power follow from the Constitution and constitutional principles, EU law 
(e.g. the four fundamental freedoms) and international obligations, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
480
 
There is no constitutional prohibition against retroactive criminalization or increase in penalty.
481
 
The criminal code § 1, according to its wording, only requires the existence of a legal basis at the 
time of adjudication – not prior to the conduct.
482
 The criminal code § 3 also states that if the law 
that regulates the conduct has changed since the conduct took place, the newer law applies unless it 
carries with it more severe punishment.
483
 As is the case with the criminal code § 1, § 3 is only a 
statutory provision that can be changed/overridden by newer law.
484
 However, it is considered a 
fundamental legal principle, even though it is not a constitutionally derived one, that retrospective 
punishment or increase in punishment is not allowed.
485
 Furthermore, as discussed above, even if no 
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such legal principle existed in Danish law, article 7 ECHR prohibits criminalization after the 
conduct took place but before adjudication.
486
 
Analogous application of criminal law – i.e. application of provisions to conduct that falls outside 
the statutory language – is a close cousin of retroactive criminal legislation. The criminal code § 1 
does not prevent analogous application of criminal provisions entirely; in fact, it permits it to a 
limited extent. An analogous application of a criminal provision does, however, require that the 
conduct in question is completely analogous to the conduct described in the provision. Thus, in 
practice, the scope for analogous application is rather narrow. By using an analogy one attempts to 
explain A by using B as a reference. B must be vastly similar (not necessarily identical
487
) to A in 
order for the analogy to make sense.
488
 However, if the similarities, which lead to the analogy, are 
false assumptions, or if we know too little about the things we are comparing, the analogy is likely 
to be erroneous and it will not help us understand A at all.
489
 Hence, analogies carry with them a 
degree of risk, even when an analogy, at face value, appears convincing.
490
 In many instances, the 
analogy may not be relevant to the context. The human brain is sometimes described as a 
biochemical computer. Absent any context, the analogy appears quite convincing. But if the 
analogy is put into the context of computer crime, it inarguably makes no sense to try to apply a 
provision prohibiting unlawful interference with a computer to a case involving a defendant who 
has knocked a person unconscious. Clearly, it does not suffice that the analogy in and of itself is 
convincing, and the accuracy of the analogy and its relevance depends on the context. 
In terms of the § 1, analogous application means application outside the scope of the provision‟s 
language, but only insofar as the conduct is wholly analogous to the prohibited conduct, and the 
same reasons for applying the law exist for both the conduct that falls inside the scope and the 
conduct in question that is outside the scope.
491
 Hence, the reasons for criminalizing B, and the 
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protective interests underlying criminalizing B, must also be valid for A. Moreover, there can be no 
legally relevant difference between A and B that favors the two being treated differently.
492
  
An analogous application thus goes beyond even the broadest reading of the language,
493
 because § 
1 allows application of the substantive provision even though the conduct technically falls outside 
the language of that substantive provision.
494
 Bear in mind though, that § 1 is not itself the legal 
basis for conviction, but a legal basis to extend the scope of the substantive provision which 
describes conduct that is wholly analogous to the defendant‟s conduct. As a further possible 
limitation on analogous applications: Although analogous application of a substantive provision 
does not require that the conduct in question is unregulated, i.e. that there is a lacuna in the law, an 
analogous application is presumably unjustified if the conduct is directly covered by another 
provision.
495
 
The legal basis for analogous application of a substantive provision in § 1 is rarely used. One 
example of its usage was in a case
496
 that involved a provision that enabled the court to issue an 
order prohibiting the public naming of the defendant. In the case, the court had issued such an order, 
but a newspaper article, instead of naming the defendant, described him in terms of his age, 
nationality, job title and place of employment, which effectively identified him to the public. The 
Supreme Court found that such information identified the defendant just as effectively as had the 
newspaper article used the defendant‟s name.
497
 The prohibition of the publishing of other 
information than the defendant‟s name did not follow from the statutory text, even in its broadest 
reading, but it followed from the essence of the criminal conduct.
498
 
Regardless of the fact that § 1 constitutes a legal basis for analogous application of criminal 
provisions to the detriment of the defendant, analogous application – that is, application outside the 
scope of the language – inherently means that the courts usurp legislative power to an extent when 
applying substantive criminal provisions analogously.
499
 Furthermore, it is unclear whether every 
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shade of analogous application of criminal provisions allowed by § 1 would be consistent with 
article 7 ECHR, which has been interpreted to prohibit extensive interpretation of criminal 
provisions, including interpretation by analogy. As shown in the section on article 7 ECHR, the 
Court does not prohibit gradual clarification, but where the line is drawn between “gradual 
clarification” and “extensive interpretation” is uncertain. In light of the ECtHR‟s case law, it is 
tempting to conclude that the Court, if faced with a complaint about the Danish criminal code § 1, 
would likely state that the applicant (such as the newspaper from the example above) could not have 
been unaware of the risk that he might be prosecuted for the conduct; particularly given the rather 
limited extent of analogy allowed under § 1, and perhaps given a case where it is quite clear that the 
applicant skirted illegality by way of technicality despite having caused the exact harm the 
provision aimed to prevent. 
 
5.2.6 Summary 
Clarity and precision in criminal statutes in Denmark is not a requirement mandated by law, nor 
does it constitute a constitutional guarantee, due process right, or the likes. Clarity and precision are 
concepts that relate to the wording of a statute, i.e. the quality of the legislature‟s draftsmanship. 
However, lack of clarity and precision in describing the criminal conduct brings in its train reduced 
foreseeability as to the application of the statute. In other words, foreseeability can be said to be a 
function of clarity, precision, and consistency in interpretation and application. Only clarity and 
precision are directly within the legislature‟s control, although, there is arguably a relationship 
between good draftsmanship and the subsequent degree of consistency of judicial interpretation and 
application. 
Clarity and precision alone cannot guarantee foreseeability, but since the statutory text constitutes 
directives to the courts (as well as notice to the citizens), the text acts as a constraint on the court 
minimizing the possibility of arbitrary and unforeseeable applications. The Danish Ministry of 
Justice has issued guidelines on good draftsmanship that express the need to draft provisions that 
are as clear and precise as can be with respect, mindful of the rigidity and complexity of too much 
precision, and the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty. Although no legally mandated 
clarity requirement exists in the Constitution or the criminal code, article 7 ECHR imposes 
qualitative requirements that at the very least rest on the presumption that statutory language must 
be clear enough for it to direct the courts when they clarify uncertainties as to the provision‟s 
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application. Should Danish courts apply a provision that is devoid of standards or apply it in such a 
way that its application was not reasonably foreseeable, the application would likely be in violation 
of article 7 ECHR. 
Should the statutory text be entirely standardless, rather than finding a provision or statute 
unconstitutionally vague (which would be entirely unprecedented given the Danish courts‟ lack of 
competence to do so), Danish courts will acquit on the grounds that there is no legal basis for 
conviction, as required by the principle of legality in the criminal code‟s § 1. 
Analogous application of criminal provisions is not entirely outlawed, seeing as § 1 provides a legal 
basis for doing so when the conduct in question is wholly analogous to the conduct described in 
statute. The courts use analogy with great restraint, making the cases involving analogy in a 
criminal context few in numbers. Article 7 ECHR may or may not place a limit on this already 
narrow access to analogous application. If a thin-ice principle is influencing the ECtHR, it is 
unlikely that any application of the Danish criminal code § 1, as long as done with restraint, 
constitutes a violation of article 7 ECHR. If there is no such principle, the possibility of an article 7 
violation still looms. 
 
 
5.3 Nullum crimen sine lege in the United States 
As appears to be the case in US law, the principle nullum crimen sine lege is tenuously associated 
with the constitutional principles prohibiting retroactive law-making and vague criminal laws.
500
 
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is stated in clause 3 of article I, section 9 of the United 
States Constitution. This clause applies only to the legislature. The prohibition against vague 
criminal laws is often considered to follow from due process requirements under the Fifth 
Amendment
501
.
502
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5.3.1 Legality 
One of the basic premises of criminal law is that conduct must be criminalized prior to its 
commission so as to provide fair warning to the citizens. The principle of legality, or nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege, “is reflected in the ex post facto prohibition, the rule of strict 
construction of criminal statutes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and the trend away from open-
ended common law crimes.”
503
 
In the 1798 case, Calder v. Bull
504
 the US Supreme Court gave a list of what it perceived to be ex 
post facto laws. First, “Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.” Second, “Every law that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.” Third, “Every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed.”
505
 Fourth, “Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to 
convict the offender.”
506
  
The first three examples provided by the Court concern substantive law, whilst the fourth concerns 
procedural law.
507
 The most obvious cases of retroactive legislation concern the creation of new 
crime and applying the law to conduct predating the legislation, the elimination of elements of an 
offense, and elimination of defenses, which were available at the time of the conduct.
508
 The 
Supreme Court has stated that the ex post facto prohibition serves to important purposes. First, “to 
assure that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their 
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meaning until explicitly changed”.
509
 Second, that it “also restricts governmental power by 
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.”
510
 
Clearly, these ex post facto prohibitions apply only to legislation and not case law, and generally 
only apply in criminal matters.
511
 Inherently, case law is retrospectively operating judicial 
interpretation, and thus, the ex post facto prohibition is applied in a narrower version in that 
respect.
512
 However, the purposes of the ex post facto prohibition are not well served if judicial 
decisions always have retroactive effect, since some applications of the law might lack fair warning 
or might be arbitrary in nature. For that reason, the Supreme Court has held that the due process 
clause prevents courts from doing what the legislature is prohibited from doing under the ex post 
facto clause.
513
 That is, if the legislature cannot pass a law that criminalizes conduct that took place 
before the law‟s enactment, neither so can the courts construe the law so as to achieve the same 
result.
514
  
The classic examples of prohibited ex post facto judicial decisions are the overruling of a precedent 
the application of which would have resulted in acquittal for the defendant, disallowing a defense 
permitted in earlier cases, and interpreting a statute as applying to conduct previously excluded 
from its scope.
515
 It appears, though, that if a judicial construction of a statute is “unexpected and 
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue”, an 
acquittal is appropriate in light of fair warning concerns.
516
 In the case of a statute that on its face 
may be unconstitutionally vague or broad, the clarifying judicial construction that saves the statute 
from unconstitutionality, is applied retroactively, insofar as “the limiting construction is a relatively 
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simple and natural one”.
517
 That is, the way in which a statute may be construed can reasonably be 
foreseen, and thus some warning is provided.
518
 
 
5.3.2 The void-for-vagueness doctrine 
Above, in the discussion of sources of law, and the role of international law in US law, I cited the 
US Constitution when stating that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The US 
Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy in terms of sources of law. All legislation, both state and 
federal, must comply with the Constitution. If legislation does not comply with the Constitution, the 
legislation is unconstitutional and void. The specific topic of this section is the doctrine called 
“void-for-vagueness”. The doctrine addresses unconstitutional uncertainty in statutes and it derives 
from the due process clauses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution.
519
 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in the federal arena while the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees due process in the state arena.
520
 The void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses at least two 
due process concerns; fair notice, and guarding against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
521
 
(Additionally, a statute must provide sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights.
522
) 
Vagueness in statutes is framed as a constitutional issue, and as such, a statute that is void-for-
vagueness is unconstitutional and, thus, can be struck down by the courts.
523
 Substantive due 
process under the Fifth Amendment requires that Congress “be reasonably definite in declaring 
what conduct is criminal.”
524
 The clarity requirement addresses two concerns, as mentioned earlier: 
first, that the regulated have notice and, thus, can foresee the legality or illegality of their acts, and 
second, providing guidance to those enforcing the law to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of the law.
525
 The void-for-vagueness doctrine “is the operational arm of legality.”
526
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“The connection to legality is obvious: a law whose meaning can only be guessed at remits the 
actual task of defining criminal misconduct to retroactive judicial decisionmaking.”
527
  
Regarding indeterminacy, the question is two-pronged. The degree of indeterminacy must be 
evaluated, and then it must be evaluated whether the indeterminacy is acceptable in the given 
context.
528
 Thus, indeterminacy is more of a sliding scale than an exact math. This comes as no 
surprise. However, criminal provisions tolerate much less indeterminacy than civil provisions.
529
 
But the most suspect type of indeterminacy is that which encroaches upon constitutional rights.
530
 
These are questions regarding limits as to what conduct the legislature can criminalize (in light of 
protected conduct), how much discretion can be granted to those enforcing the law (police officers, 
prosecutors) and to the courts, and it is a question of foreseeability (the regulated person‟s ability to 
adjust his conduct to the rules beforehand).
531
 At the center of all these questions is clarity 
(specificity) insofar as a statute exists. The clearer and more precise a criminal provision is defined 
by the legislature, the less discretion it grants to other branches of the state and the more likely it is 
that the regulated persons can plan their conduct in accordance with the law. Of course, where no 
legislative criminalization has taken place, but rather a matter of judicial creation of crimes, it 
makes no sense requiring clarity since clarity is a qualitative aspect of the text of an already existing 
rule. Fair notice, however, relates to the predictability of the application of the rule. Clarity and 
foreseeability, whilst being closely related, are not synonymous.
532
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It follows from the Fifth Amendment to the US constitution that a criminal statute must be declared 
void for vagueness if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application.”
533
 It means that if a criminal statute is vague enough, it is unconstitutional. 
One can wonder, though, how vague the language must be for a statute to become 
unconstitutionally vague, and whether, and how, lesser cases of vagueness can be “cured” by way 
of construction. In examining whether a statute is vague, the statute must be tested as it has been 
construed by courts.
534
 The statutory text can therefore be vague in and of itself, but case law may 
have cured the vagueness. It should be noted that the courts start testing the statute under the 
presumption that it is constitutional.
535
 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is not limited to fair warning cases. Guarding against arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement has also been named as a basis of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
536
 
Also a basis, is the need for sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights.
537
 
Summarily, the void-for-vagueness doctrine targets vague statutes. The consequence of a statute 
conflicting with this due process protection is unconstitutionality, and thus, invalidation of the 
statute. 
The question is when a statute is so vague as to warrant invalidation. Fair notice and providing 
sufficient guidelines to the administrators of the law are ostensibly two independent prongs. Hence, 
a statute can be unconstitutional because it does not provide fair notice to the regulated, or, it can be 
unconstitutional because it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. A statute can also 
fail on both tests. 
Whether a statute can survive scrutiny cannot be easily predicted. The void-for-vagueness doctrine 
does not come with an owner‟s manual, so to speak. As one commentator describes the appearance 
of the concept of vagueness: “I know it when I see it”.
538
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It is important to differentiate between ambiguity and vagueness. Ambiguity and vagueness are 
sometimes used interchangeably to convey general uncertainty. Courts are not necessarily 
consistent in their use of the terms, but one term is relevant to the vagueness doctrine and the other 
is not. 
 
5.3.2.1 Ambiguity vs. vagueness 
Ambiguity and vagueness are words that are often used interchangeably. In fact, one usage of the 
word ambiguity equates it to vagueness and uncertainty. Rather in this particular context, mindful of 
the irony that the word ambiguity itself is ambiguous, ambiguity is used in the sense that a word has 
two or more meanings; for example the word “light” (light as opposed to heavy, or light as opposed 
to dark). Legal language can be ambiguous and legal language can be vague. When a provision is 
ambiguous, it has more than one linguistic meaning, and its legal effect depends on which linguistic 
meaning is accepted by the courts. We use interpretation to resolve ambiguity and determine the 
linguistic meaning of the text, that is, its semantic content.
539
 The context of the ambiguous word in 
a legal text will usually clarify whether the word takes on one or the other of various possible 
meanings. However, if the legal text does not provide enough context to choose between possible 
meanings, interpretation cannot resolve the ambiguity.
540
  
When a provision is vague, the vagueness indicates that borderline cases exist – i.e. there are cases 
where the provision may or may not apply.
541
 We use construction to resolve vagueness
542
 “when 
the information conveyed by the text itself is insufficient to decide an issue, but the issue still must 
somehow be decided.”
543
 Construction gives the vague language legal content.
544
 For example, the 
doctrines on “time, place, and manner” under the First Amendment. “Time, place and manner” 
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restrictions do not follow from the text of the Constitution, but the doctrines are a way of putting 
First Amendment rights into effect.
545
  
Some provisions, however, cannot be saved by construction.  
To indulge in a brief example from the section on article 7 ECHR, recall the case Liivik v. Estonia. A criminal provision 
interpreted as prohibiting mere creation of risk of causing significant moral damage to the interest of the state, where 
the moral damage (a term itself fraught with vagueness) was considered “significant” based solely on the fact that the 
defendant was a high-ranking official. Liivik is arguably a prime example of a case involving a provision that relies too 
much on judicial construction (as well as creativity), or at least has been construed by the courts in a manner that 
rendered the provision entirely too vague, since any person in Liivik‟s position would be unable to defend himself or, 
arguably, even avoid conviction, unless the prosecution decided within its discretion not to pursue the case. 
 
5.3.2.2 Vagueness vs. overbreadth 
Decker explains the difference between vagueness and overbreadth in the following way: 
“If a party challenges an enactment based on the assertion that one cannot determine whether the regulation intrudes 
upon otherwise “innocent terrain,” then the complaint is one of vagueness. On the other hand, if a challenge is based on 
an objection that the regulation does, in fact, intrude into territory where it does not belong, then the claim is one of 
overbreadth.”
546
 
Overbreadth in this context relates to constitutionally protected conduct, typically conduct protected 
by the First Amendment. In cases of facial overbreadth the courts examine whether the provision 
reaches a substantial amount of protected conduct.
547
 In other words, the statute is capable of 
producing a chilling effect on constitutionally protected conduct. “Facial” means that the entire 
statute is unconstitutional (as opposed unconstitutional “as applied” in a particular case). One of the 
important differences between attacking a statute on overbreadth grounds and vagueness grounds 
lies in that, with regard to overbreadth
548
, a defendant can argue that the statute is capable of 
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possible unconstitutional application to others even though his own conduct does not constitute 
protected conduct. In facial vagueness challenges, the defendant has to show that the statute is 
vague as applied to him as well as being vague “in all its applications”.
549
 
Another option is to challenge the statute on the grounds of its being vague “as applied”. When a 
defendant claims that a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied, it means that he claims the 
statute, that criminalizes the conduct with which he has been charged, did not define the conduct 
with sufficient clarity.
550
 The court can only evaluate the statute in light of the facts in the case 
before it, not whether the statute is too vague to be applied in any case at all.
551
 That is, the 
defendant whose conduct clearly falls within the scope cannot challenge the statute with reference 
to possible vagueness as applied to others, as he would have been able to had his challenge focused 
on “overbreadth” rather than vagueness. “Where an individual engages in conduct without any 
reasonable realization that it falls within the reach of a legal prohibition, that person may succeed 
with an as applied challenge.”
552
 When a statute is void as applied it generally means that although 
the provision‟s language does not clearly differentiate between illegal and legal conduct, it still has 
general value that outweighs the harm of the uncertainty. With respect to marginal conduct, the 
statute can then be declared void as applied.
553
 
LaFave contrasts the two, vagueness and overbreadth, by pointing out the discrete messages sent by 
courts. If a court finds a statute void for vagueness, it means that it is uncertain to which extent the 
legislature intended to exercise its power, and that the uncertainty is such that it is for the legislature 
to cure it, not the courts.
554
 The message to the legislature is “try again”.
555
 However, if the 
legislature has overstepped its power to create crimes – such as crimes that infringe upon 
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constitutionally protected conduct – the message to the legislature is “hands off”.
556
 “Try again” 
means that the legislature can try again, but must define with greater care the conduct it seeks to 
criminalize, whereas “hands off” definitively excludes the conduct from the statute‟s scope and the 
legislature cannot again try to include the conduct, unless the legislature can make a stronger 
demonstration of the need to interfere with the protected conduct.
557
 
 
5.3.2.3 Fair notice 
Fair notice means that the defendant could have found out, had he wanted, whether his acts or 
omissions would trigger the application of the statute in question. A statute must therefore be 
sufficiently precise so as to draw a reasonably clear line between illegal and legal conduct.
558
 “[A] 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”
559
 In other words, a statute must provide fair notice and cannot be 
“so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”
560
  
The clarity requirement regarding criminal law is fundamental in terms of the Fifth Amendment due 
process clause.
561
 This requirement necessitates “the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly 
vague.”
562
 “Undue vagueness in the statute will result in it being held unconstitutional, whether the 
uncertainty goes to the persons within the scope of the statute, the conduct that is forbidden, or the 
punishment that may be imposed.”
563
 
564
 (citations omitted) However, not just any vagueness 
renders the statute unconstitutional. 
                                                 
556
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 139 
557
 See Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 139 
558
 John F. Decker: Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws (2002), 80 
Denv.U.L.Rev. 241, p. 248 
559
 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) 
560
 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. XXX (2012), citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 
(2008) 
561
 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. XXX (2012) 
562
 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. XXX (2012) 
563
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 109 
564
 The same principle applies to common law crimes and sanctions in administrative regulations, as noted by Wayne R. 
LaFave in Criminal Law (2010), p. 109 
 
128 
 
First and foremost, the fact that a statute is vague, to a degree, on its face is not sufficient in and of 
itself.
565
 The statute is tested with its judicial gloss. This means that the statute is tested in light of 
how it has been construed by courts.
566
 Thus, the courts can “cure” the vagueness, and the statute 
can escape unconstitutionality even though its language is vague seen in isolation. The courts can 
sufficiently clarify vague language, and therefore provide the necessary clarity that both gives fair 
notice to the regulated and gives sufficiently clear guidelines to those enforcing the laws to avoid 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Furthermore, language that may seem unclear on its face to 
the average individual may also have an established meaning in common law or in other 
legislation.
567
 A statute can thus very well be vague on its face and incomprehensible to the average 
person and yet be constitutional when it is read in light of other sources providing clarification.
568
 
However, those cases may require the average individual to seek out legal advice.
569
 For that 
reason, notice can be hard to come by, since that notice may only reveal itself after extensive 
research of precedents – more akin to notice to the individual that he must seek legal advice
570
, i.e. 
notice that his conduct may be illegal.
571
 
Comparable to the foreseeability requirements under article 7 ECHR, the fair notice requirement is 
not universally the same for all statutes. There is a greater tolerance for vagueness if the statute in 
question regulates businesses rather than individuals.
572
 Greater precision is also required in 
criminal statutes than in civil statutes, because civil consequences are less severe.
573
 Scienter 
requirements may reduce vagueness where the statute requires that the defendant is aware of his 
                                                 
565
 John Calvin Jeffries: Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes (1985), Virginia Law Review, Vol. 
71, No. 2, p. 207 
566
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 109. See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
567
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 110 
568
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 110. See also John Calvin Jeffries: Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes (1985), Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 207. 
569
 Wayne R. LaFave: Criminal Law (2010), p. 110 
570
 See generally John Calvin Jeffries: Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes (1985), Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 208 
571
 Arguing against so-called “lawyer‟s notice”, see John Calvin Jeffries: Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of 
Penal Statutes (1985), Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 211 
572
 John F. Decker: Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws (2002), 80 
Denv.U.L.Rev. 241, p. 248-249 (citing Vill. Of Hoffmann Estates, 455 U.S. at 498) 
573
 John F. Decker: Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws (2002), 80 
Denv.U.L.Rev. 241, p. 249 
 
129 
 
conduct‟s illegality.
574
 Finally, if the statute might interfere with constitutionally protected conduct, 
the notice requirement is less likely to be fulfilled.
575
 
As Jeffries explains it
576
, if the purpose of requiring the legislature to give fair notice of what is 
forbidden, and that ignorance of the law is no excuse, surely there is an assumption that what is not 
clearly forbidden is permitted. But if the law is fraught with uncertainty or practically inaccessible, 
then the “ignorance of the law is no excuse”
577
 mantra is converted into a risk-based game where 
illegality is presumed. Jeffries explains it this way in order to demonstrate that fair notice, and the 
clarity requirements associated with it, seems to inconsistent with the policy that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse. This is eerily similar to the ECtHRs references to risks of possible prosecution in 
grey areas of the law; Ashworth‟s thin-ice principle. However, Jeffries expressly states that this 
kind of “notice” should not be sufficient to trigger criminal liability, rather he notes that the absence 
of signals to the citizen that he may risk liability should preclude liability.
578
 
 
5.3.2.4 Guarding against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
This requirement is also referred to as “ascertainable standard of guilt”. This aspect of legality is 
considered the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.
579
 The aspect concerns itself not 
with notice to the citizens as such, but with requiring the legislature to provide law enforcement 
with minimal guidelines.
580
 Even when the defendant is on notice, those enforcing the law may 
have unchecked discretion to enforce the law as they see fit. An example of such discretion is 
embodied in a statute that requires a person who has been lawfully stopped to provide “credible and 
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reliable” identification.
581
 Those enforcing the law, in the first instance the police officers, can 
arbitrarily decide whether identification lives up to being “credible and reliable”. When the 
legislature does not include determinate standards in criminal provisions those enforcing the law 
and the triers of fact have unchecked discretion.
582
 That is, an absence of a legally fixed standard 
leaves the trier of fact to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the conduct in question is 
reasonable or not.
583
 Therefore, the statute or a specific provision in the statute allows, or even 
encourages, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law because the subjective judgment of 
the enforcer controls the conduct‟s criminality entirely unaided by objective norms.
584
 That is, the 
law is “wholly lacking in „terms susceptible of objective measurement.‟”
585
 Such laws are 
invalidated because they are incompatible with due process requirements and thus 
unconstitutional.
586
 
Allowing the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in First Amendment cases, even where the challenged 
statute is not vague as applied to the defendant, is a special instance of guarding protected conduct from arbitrary 
interference from those enforcing the law.
587
 
 
5.3.2.4.1 Discretion and the rule of law 
Clearly not any level of discretion granted to those enforcing the law calls for voiding the statute in 
question. The legislator regularly grants the administrators of the law discretion.
588
 LaFave 
mentions the term “reasonable” as an example.
589
 A standard of reasonableness does not necessarily 
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render a statute void for vagueness.
590
 The principle of necessity may lend support to upholding a 
statute that leaves room for arbitrariness in its enforcement because it is not possible to narrow the 
language without rendering the statute too rigid and difficult to administrate, or, on the other hand, 
necessity could perhaps necessitate rewording of the language to lower the risk of arbitrary 
enforcement.
591
 Possibly, less risky wording could yield the same result. Therefore, whether a 
certain degree of discretion can be upheld as constitutional may depend on whether that degree of 
discretion is necessary and appropriate.
592
 
The rule of law is at the heart of the principle of legality and thus the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.
593
 Following Jeffries‟ definition of the rule, “[t]he rule of law signifies the constraint of 
arbitrariness in the exercise of government power. In the context of the penal law, it means that the 
agencies of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided by rules – that is, by openly 
acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally applicable statements of proscribed conduct. The 
evils to be retarded are caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for private ends, and the 
unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection. The goals to be advanced are 
regularity and evenhandedness in the administration of justice and accountability in the use of 
government power. In short, the “rule of law” designates the cluster of values associated with 
conformity to law by government.”
594
  
As Jeffries also points out, the rule of law is a sliding scale rather than a binary state. Discretion 
plays a role in every legal system.
595
 If a statute is too rigid, it may be difficult to administrate the 
statute in practice or it may lose its usefulness to combat the crime it targets. If a statute leaves too 
much discretion, the administrators of the law can arrest whomever they want. However, the rule of 
law is not a rule of equality. Strict adherence to the rule of law says nothing about the subject matter 
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addressed by a statute. A statute might even authorize discrimination of the worst kinds, and its 
application would still conform to the rule of law.
596
 
 
5.3.3 The Rule of Lenity 
As mentioned in the section on ambiguity vs. vagueness, ambiguity entails that a provision is 
somewhat precise but lends itself to two or more discrete readings. The rule of lenity, also known as 
the rule of strict construction, and sometimes referred to as junior version of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine
597
, requires that the ambiguity in a criminal provision is resolved in favor of the 
defendant.
598
 Thus, for the rule to apply, an ambiguity must be present in the statute. The rule of 
lenity is not one derived from the Constitution, nor is it directly derived from the principle of 
legality, although it may be considered to implement the ideal of legality.
599
 The rule of lenity has 
been said to further the purpose of due process and the idea that only the legislature can define 
crimes.
600
 It only applies to criminal statutes. 
The Supreme Court has held that the rule of lenity applies only in cases where the statute is inflicted 
with a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty”
601
, although in its original form it applies to all 
ambiguities in criminal statutes. Like the ECtHR, the US Supreme Court has also recognized that 
most statutes are ambiguous to some extent.
602
 Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the rule of 
lenity is a rule of last resort, when all other interpretive tools have been exhausted and the court can 
no more than guess at what Congress intended.
603
 When applied, the rule cannot be used to force a 
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nonsensical or overly strict construction.
604
 These reservations to the original form of the rule, all 
narrow its potential applications. 
A statute‟s applicability to situations that ostensibly were not anticipated by the legislature does not 
constitute ambiguity, but rather breadth.
605
 Over-inclusion does not equate ambiguity, and thus does 
not require the application of the rule of lenity. 
The rule of lenity appears to have fallen into disuse, and is not favored e.g. by the Model Penal 
Code, in addition to some states have, by way of statute, expressly excluded its application.
606
 One 
aspect of the critique of the rule centers on its ability to run contrary to legislative intent.
607
 
The rule of lenity‟s apparent hardline approach to ambiguity may be explained from a historical 
perspective. The rule originated in English law in the 18
th
 century where capital punishment was 
imposed for a vast number of crimes, even minor ones. Strict construction of criminal statutes was 
thus a matter of resolving ambiguities in favor of life rather than death
608
 and the English courts 
would in fact strive to find ambiguities so that they were required to resolve it in favor of the 
defendant, sparing his life.
609
 However, the rule has been cited in the US at least as far back as 1820 
when Chief Justice Marshall cited it in United States v. Wiltberger.
610
 The apparent rationale of the 
rule in English law was ostensibly reinvented in US law in that the rule of lenity is often said to 
further due process, separation of powers and sometimes also as furthering the rule of law.
611
 
Commentators have criticized those rationales and arguably rather clearly shown that they do not 
justify the rule of lenity, because strict application of the rule of lenity in all cases of ambiguity can 
lead to results that contradict those rationales.
612
 In other words, the rule‟s critics argue either that it 
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is applied inconsistently
613
 or randomly, or that it has ceased to be used, with many of its critics 
willing welcoming its apparent demise.
614
 
Today, the rule, both in US law and English law, its critics argue, only survives as additional 
padding for a conclusion already arrived at through other means, and thus its reference appears pro 
forma
615
, rather than being the deciding or an influential factor for the outcome of the case.
616
 
Additionally, due to the rule requiring an ambiguity in the statute, the courts may see a need to 
“manipulate the threshold determination of ambiguity in order to avoid applying the old rule [of 
lenity].”
617
 
However, a study of the Rehnquist court‟s application of the rule argues that a new, but narrower, 
rule of lenity has gradually emerged, as the traditional rule of lenity has weakened since the 
1970s.
618
 
The study concludes that the rule of lenity has indeed been decisive, and not just cited pro forma, in 
a small but significant number of cases.
619
 However, not in its traditional form. In the study, it is 
argued that the cases “reflect the Court‟s desire to avoid the criminalization of innocent conduct.”
620
 
Innocent conduct, according to the study, involves situations where “the defendant does not even 
need to be aware of the factual circumstances that make her actions criminal to be convicted or if 
the defendant must be aware of the relevant facts but need not be aware of their legal significance. 
Actions that are malum in se provide notice of wrongfulness by their very nature. When the conduct 
at issue is only malum prohibitum, however, this notice can only be guaranteed if the statute 
incorporates knowledge of illegality […] or wrongfulness […] into the definition of the offense.”
621
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5.3.4 Summary 
As with article 7 ECHR, the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not demand absolute certainty, nor 
does it require impossible standards of clarity. Figuring out what degree of certainty is required 
seems to be a case of “I know it when I see it”, rather than being based on objective tests. However, 
in US law, those laws that have succumbed to a vagueness attack, are those which do not provide a 
reasonably clear line between legal (including constitutionally protected conduct) and illegal 
conduct, those laws that require no proof of scienter, those prescribing criminal penalties rather than 
civil penalties, and those where the regulated are individuals rather than business entities.
622
 The 
fair notice required is a matter of degree, rather than a “one size fits all” standard. However, those 
statutes that allow or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in that they leave the 
enforcers or the triers of fact to determine, subjectively in absence of an objective standard, the 
applicability of a statute, are those most suspect and least tolerated. 
Statutes which are “merely” ambiguous, but not vague, are generally not unconstitutional. At least 
insofar as the ambiguity can be resolved. If the ambiguity is of the grievous kind, it calls for the 
application of the rule of lenity, although ostensibly only if all other interpretative sources have 
failed to resolve the ambiguity; the rule of lenity as a last resort. Alternatively, if there is indeed a 
new rule of lenity, that rule will serve to strictly construe statutory language in order to protect 
innocent conduct, ostensibly providing for a more coherent and consistent rule of lenity. 
 
5.4 Brief overview 
 
 ECHR US Law Danish Law 
Foreseeability / fair 
notice/warning 
(Article 7) 
Foreseeability is a 
qualitative 
requirement along 
with accessibility. 
 
(Void-for-vagueness 
doctrine) Fair warning 
/ fair notice. Follows 
from the due process 
clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the 
(Criminal Code § 1, 
partially) Follows 
from the underlying 
rationale of § 1, but 
the text of § 1 still 
allows for punishment 
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Constitution. (Courts) 
Retroactivity is 
prohibited under the 
Constitution. 
(Legislature) 
of wholly analogous 
conduct, and it does 
not prohibit 
retroactive 
criminalization 
occurring after the 
conduct but before 
adjudication. 
However, article 7 
ECHR supplements 
the § 1 legality 
requirement in those 
respects. 
Degree of 
foreseeability 
Varies. Lesser degree 
acceptable for statutes 
regulating businesses. 
(Article 7 does not 
apply to civil statutes, 
as opposed to the 
void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.) Also 
depends on the subject 
matter (e.g. lesser 
precision accepted 
concerning terrorism 
statutes). 
Varies. Lesser degree 
acceptable for statutes 
regulating businesses 
and civil statutes. 
Statutes lacking mens 
rea requirement 
generally disfavored. 
May turn on whether 
conduct is malum in 
se or malum 
prohibitum. 
Follows from article 7 
ECHR. Only subject 
to non-binding 
standards of “good 
draftsmanship”. 
(Mens rea required is 
“intentional” by 
default according to 
the criminal code § 
19, unless lower 
degree is specified. 
Thus typically no 
mens rea issue. The 
legislature is not 
technically prohibited 
from passing criminal 
laws lacking mens rea. 
Mens rea for special 
legislation negligence 
 
137 
 
unless specifically 
limited to intentional 
acts.) 
Foreseeability 
requirement can also 
be met if legal advice 
needed to determine 
scope of application 
X X X (Follows from 
article 7 ECHR) 
Guard against 
arbitrary and 
discriminatory 
enforcement 
(Article 7 ECHR) 
Follows from 
Camilleri and Liivik 
that article 7 ECHR 
prohibits excessive 
prosecutorial (in 
Camilleri, the 
discretion was not 
subject to judicial 
review) and/or 
excessive judicial 
discretion (Liivik). 
(Void-for-vagueness 
doctrine) 
“Ascertainable 
standard of guilt” 
required of the law. 
Law has to provide 
reasonably clear lines 
between lawful and 
unlawful conduct. 
Those laws “which 
turn on language 
calling for the 
exercise of subjective 
judgment (of the 
enforcer) unaided by 
object norms” and/or 
“leaves judges and 
jurors free to decide, 
without any legally 
fixed standards, what 
is prohibited and what 
is not in each 
particular case.” 
(Decker, p. 253) 
Underlying rationale 
of the criminal code‟s 
§ 1. Also follows from 
article 7 ECHR. 
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How is the statute 
tested 
(Article 7 ECHR) As 
interpreted by national 
courts. Not tested 
facially, but in light of 
case law. 
(Void-for-vagueness 
doctrine) With its 
judicial gloss. Not 
facially. 
Follows from article 7 
ECHR. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have addressed the ways the principle of legality, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
lege, is operationalized in two legal systems and in the ECHR (and touching briefly upon EU law). 
Even though terms may differ, whether the root of the idea for protection derives explicitly from the 
Enlightenment or not, and the way the protection is realized differs, the core protection is more or 
less the same. We do not desire retroactive criminalization. We do not desire incomprehensible laws 
that take us by surprise. We do not desire arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of laws by way 
of wholesale legislative delegation of discretion. We share these values across cultures and legal 
systems. The difference lies in the extent of protection; that is, when on the sliding scale we find 
that those values are offended.  
Although the abovementioned protection guarantees us fair notice, and protects us against 
unconstrained exercise of governmental power, these two aspects of protection say nothing about 
the substantive content of a criminal provision. These protections only ensure due process under the 
law during the application of the law; that is, protection against procedural discrimination and 
arbitrariness at the administrative and judicial level. The principle of legality does not protect 
against unreasonable, undesirable or unjust substantive content; that is, discrimination and/or 
overcriminalization at the legislative level (be it explicitly stated or a natural consequence of the 
language). Even though clarity promotes notice, clarity does not necessarily constrain discretion, 
and clarity does not scrutinize the subject matter of a provision. Not all “innocent” and desirable 
behavior is constitutionally protected conduct. That is even truer in Denmark where the Danish 
Constitution enshrines very few fundamental rights compared to the United States Constitution. 
When a statute‟s language reaches “normally innocent” conduct, the question of whether the 
language allows the enforcers of the law to differentiate between illegal and legal conduct, hinges 
on the presumption that the legislator did not intend for the “normally innocent” conduct to be 
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included. That is, it rests on a presumption that there are in fact legal acts that fall within the scope 
of the statute, rather than a presumption that all that the language can cover is intended to be 
covered.  
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6 THE COE’S CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME 
6.1 Brief overview of the substantive articles 
This dissertation focuses on crimes involving unauthorized access to a computer. Unauthorized 
access, or illegal access, is addressed by a single article in the Convention on Cybercrime. Although 
the scope of the substantive part of the Convention is much broader than illegal access, illegal 
access often, but not necessarily, precedes many of the other substantive crimes, such as illegal 
interception and data interference. Articles 2-6 address attacks against computers; i.e. the computer 
is the target of the attack. The Convention also covers some traditional crimes committed through 
use of computers, such as forgery covered by article 7 and fraud covered by article 8, and also 
content-related crimes such as child pornography (article 9) and copyright protected material 
(article 10). These content-related crimes and traditional crimes whether committed through use of 
computer or not, are not directly relevant to this dissertation apart from situations where 
unauthorized access statutes are used as a proxy to prosecute undesirable use or possession of 
specific content. Of interest to this dissertation is article 2 which requires criminalization of illegal 
access to computer systems. The article states: 
“Each Party shall adopt such legislation and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under 
its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. 
A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining 
computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer 
system.” 
Chapter 1 of the Convention defines the terms “computer system”, “computer data”, “service 
provider” and “traffic data” in article 1, litra a, b, c and d, respectively. The two terms defined in 
chapter 1 that are used in article 2 are “computer system” and “computer data”. They are defined in 
article 1(a) and (b), respectively: 
(a) “[For the purposes of this Convention:] “computer system” means any device or a group of interconnected or related 
devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data;” 
(b) “[For the purposes of this Convention:] “computer data” means any representation of facts, information or concepts 
in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause a computer system to 
perform a function;” 
Chapter 2, section 1 (articles 2-6), which contains substantive criminal law, requires the parties to 
criminalize a number of offences. Articles 2-6 cover offences that are labeled as “offences against 
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the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems” – i.e. offenses where 
the computer is the target. These offenses comprise illegal access (article 2), illegal interception 
(article 3), data interference (article 4), system interference (article 5) and misuse of devices (article 
6)
623
. Arguably, article 6 on misuse of devices does not as such describe an attack against a 
computer, but rather article 6 is aimed at banning tools intended to be used to commit one of the 
attacks against computers described in articles 2-5. Possession of a device covered by article 6 
(including software) primarily for the purpose of committing offences in articles 2 through 5 is to be 
criminalized if there is intent to use (article 6 (1b)). Production, sales, distribution,
624
 etc. of such 
devices is also required to be criminalized. Article 6(3) allows parties to exempt from the scope of 
the offense mere possession of devices as long as there is no intent to sell or distribute access codes, 
passwords and similar data that are covered by article 6(1)(a)(ii), whilst article 6(2) makes it clear 
that outside the scope of article 6 falls possession, sale, distribution, use etc. of article 6 devices if 
the purpose is not the committing of any of the offenses in articles 2-5; article 6(2) exempts from 
the scope situations such as where the possession is for the purposes of authorized testing or 
protection of a computer system or other similar situations where the purpose is not to commit a 
crime as defined in articles 2 through 5. 
As noted above, the main focus of this dissertation is the lack of certainty with respect to the scope 
of hacking statutes due to the legislatures‟ use of terms the scope of which, essentially, is 
understood, or fully comprehended, by no one.
625
 The specific elements of article 2 are subject to 
further discussion in the coming chapters that address the specific elements central to hacking 
statutes, namely “access” and “without right”/“authorization”. Before diving into the definitions in 
the subsequent chapters, I will take a look at the reasons for drafting the Convention on 
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Cybercrime; that is, an inquiry into the general purpose of the Convention and the interests 
protected by the Convention‟s article 2. 
 
6.2 The General Purpose of the Convention’s Article 2 
Since the negotiations of the Convention lacked transparency
626
, the Explanatory Report, which 
accompanied the Convention and was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, generally provides the highlights of the compromises made during the drafting of the 
Convention. 
First off, the title under which article 2
627
 is placed in the Convention is called “Offences against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems”.
628
 The title nicely sums up 
the interests protected by articles 2-6 collectively; namely, the CIA-triad as it is sometimes called in 
the IT security field (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability). The Explanatory Report notably 
adds to this language that articles 2-6 are not intended “to criminalise legitimate and common 
activities inherent in the design of networks, or legitimate and common operating or commercial 
practices.”
629
 
In accordance with the idea of the articles protecting confidentiality, integrity and availability, the 
Explanatory Report emphasizes that the threat of criminal law is secondary to implementation of 
effective security measures. However, as the language of article 2 indicates, circumvention of 
security measures is not required to trigger criminal liability.
630
 And yet the Explanatory Report 
clearly shows that the drafters considered article 2 to cover “dangerous threats to and attacks against 
the security (i.e. the confidentiality, integrity and availability) of computer systems and data.”
631
 
The Report furthermore shows that the drafters intended to exclude access to publicly accessible 
systems from the scope of article 2.
632
 Apart from a few very clear exemptions, such as the access to 
publicly accessible systems, from article 2‟s broad scope that the drafters seemingly agreed upon, 
the article‟s scope is not undisputed. The dispute concerning the scope of article 2 – and likely the 
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reason for the general ambiguity concerning its scope, except for those few exceptions clearly stated 
in the Explanatory Report – is explicitly noted in the Explanatory Report. Those opposing the broad 
scope appear to have been concerned with those cases of unauthorized access where there was no 
danger created or where vulnerabilities in computers systems where discovered as a result of the 
unauthorized access.
633
  
The scope of article 2 is generally unclear and disputed (apart from some clear examples of conduct 
intended to be excluded from the scope), and the Convention grants the signatories considerably 
broad discretion as to its implementation. The signatories are free to criminalize simple computer 
trespass
634
, i.e. the bare-boned article 2, or the signatories can narrow the national criminalization of 
illegal access to instances where security measures were infringed, where the offender intended to 
obtain computer data or other types of dishonest intent, or where the access was gained remotely 
(from one system to another).
635
 These additional elements and additional scienter requirements can 
result in national implementations the scope of which vastly differ, and yet, supposedly are the 
product of an international effort to “harmonize” domestic substantive criminal law elements to 
ease cooperation between countries and prevent creation of safe-havens for cybercriminals. Even if 
all signatories had implemented the basic version of article 2, the construction of the vague concepts 
used (“authorization” and “access”) is highly unlikely to be uniform across the signatories‟ legal 
systems.  
At least one commentator has criticized the Convention for being too vague on definitions and its terms too broad to be 
enforced.
636
 Marion‟s critique seems to stem from the fact that that there is no guarantee of a uniform implementation 
and application of the Convention, nor even a guarantee of uniform interpretation of terms like “access” or 
“authorization/right”, the definitions of which are critical in determining whether a person has committed a crime or 
not. 
This presumption of lackluster harmonization appears to have a high degree of truth to it since there 
is clear disagreement and still ongoing dialog, even between the national courts within one 
signatory, as to the meaning of the terms, which has created a split between jurisdictions with 
regard to the application of the hacking statute, as shown in the following chapters on access and 
authorization with respect to outsiders and insiders. 
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7 EU LAW 
In the early 2000s, in the wake of the negotiation, drafting and adoption of the Council of Europe‟s 
Convention on Cybercrime, the European Union slowly started to look towards harmonization of 
national criminal law provision on attacks against information systems. The Commission stated that 
attacks against information systems were a threat against the establishing of a safer information 
society and an area of freedom, security and justice.
637
 Therefore, EU action was considered 
required. 
Particularly, the Commission worried about organized groups of hackers, organized crime, serious 
attacks committed by individuals, and terrorism. The gaps and differences in national laws, the 
Commission argued, could hinder the fight against these types of high-tech crimes.
638
 
 
7.1 The 2005 Framework Decision 
The harmonization would take place through a framework decision. Council framework decisions 
are the constructs of the old pre-Lisbon treaty pillar system. The Council‟s (not to be confused with 
the Council of Europe, which is not an EU institution) framework decision on attacks against 
information systems originated in the old third pillar, as explained in the chapter on sources of law. 
The goal of the Council‟s Framework Decision proposed by the Commission was to approximate 
Member State criminal law provisions, and improve law enforcement and judicial cooperation when 
dealing with attacks against information systems. Simultaneously, the proposal was meant to aid the 
EU in its fight against organized crime and terrorism.
639
 
The Commission decided to follow the same approach as, and the framework is in fact to a large 
extent based on, the Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime; namely, the framework 
decision aimed to protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems.
640
 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems entered into force on 
March 16
th
 2005. The Framework Decision‟s articles 2 to 4 criminalized what was already required 
to be criminalized under the CoE‟s Convention on Cybercrime articles 2, 4 and 5; namely, illegal 
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access to information systems, illegal interference with information systems, and illegal interference 
with data, respectively.  
Article 2(1) of the Framework Decision reads: 
“Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional access without right to the whole or 
any part of an information system is punishable as a criminal offence, at least for cases which are not minor.” 
Like the corresponding article in the Convention, the Framework Decision‟s article on illegal access 
gave the Member States the option of only criminalizing illegal access when committed by 
infringing security measures.
641
 Additionally, according to the Framework Decision, the Member 
States were afforded the option to criminalize only cases, which were not minor.
642
 
In a 2002 proposal for the Framework Decision contained definitions and understandings of a 
concept “authorized person”, which e.g. included exempting legitimate scientific research from the 
scope of the article 2.
643
 This concrete exception did not make it into the 2005 Framework Decision. 
Similarly, the “illegal access” article proposed in 2002 was significantly narrower than the one in 
the final version, limiting the scope of article 2 to where the illegal access involved systems with 
specific protection measures, or the illegal access was committed with either the intent to cause 
damage or the intent to benefit economically.
644
 
A few years later, in 2008, the Commission published its report on the implementation of the 
Framework Decision. In the report, the Commission criticized how the few Member States, which 
had chosen to exclude applicability to minor cases, had implemented that “minor case” limitation of 
the criminalization. The Member States had apparently added additional elements to the crime, for 
example, that the information obtained from the illegal access had to have been abused 
subsequently, or had added requirements of specific risks or damages. The Commission then 
clarified how it interpreted the concept of minor cases: “[T]he concept of minor cases must refer to 
cases where instances of illegal access are of minor importance or where an infringement of 
information system confidentiality is of a minor degree.”
645
 The four countries that had 
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implemented the “minor cases” limitation had therefore not implemented the illegal access article 
properly because they had added additional elements to the crime, where they instead ostensibly 
should have weeded out the minor cases on a case-by-case basis. The option of limiting the illegal 
access provision to cases that involved infringement of security measures had been applied by seven 
countries.  
Furthermore, the Commission had reservations about the Danish implementation of articles 3 and 4 
(illegal interference with information systems and illegal interference with data, respectively). 
Denmark had informed the Commission that these two articles were implemented via the Danish 
Criminal Code § 291 (damage to, destruction of or removal of all types of property). This kind of 
unclear implementation, however, did seemingly not equate to lack off or improper 
implementation
646
 despite the lack of clarity that concerned the Commission.
647
 It should be noted, 
however, that at the time the Commission did not have any power to bring action against Denmark 
for failing to implement the Framework Decision correctly, since the Framework Decision was 
adopted under the third pillar, under which the Commission had limited powers. 
The Commission‟s report on the implementation of the Framework Decision concluded that in view 
of the emergence of botnets and massive simultaneous attacks against information systems 
(presumably, DDoS, or distributed denial of service) the Commission was going to aim at finding 
legislative responses to those threats. 
 
7.2 The 2013 Directive 
That response came in 2010 in the form of a proposal for a directive on attacks against information 
systems, which would amend and repeal the 2005 Framework Decision
648
 with respect for the 
countries participating.
649
 Apart from the new focus on botnets and massive simultaneous attacks, 
the directive proposal also directed its attention to “tools”, naming malware and botnets as 
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examples.
650
 The Directive, like its predecessor the 2005 Framework Decision, again builds on the 
Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime.
651
 
The illegal access prohibition changed when the Directive was adopted. The offense is now 
provided for in article 3 of the Directive, and reads as follows: 
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, when committed intentionally, the access without 
right, to the whole or any part of an information system, is punishable as a criminal offence where committed by 
infringing a security measures, at least for cases which are not minor.” 
The wording, albeit still staying close to that of article 2 of the Convention on Cybercrime, now 
requires the additional element that a security measure must have been infringed. The 
criminalization of minor cases appears to remain optional, given the language “at least for cases 
which are not minor” indicating that every case of illegal access that is not minor must be 
criminalized and punishable. 
At this point, one might ask why the Convention was not updated to respond to DDoS and botnet threats, as it was 
already being ratified by a number of countries. The Commission briefly addressed this option, as an alternative to EU 
legislative action, both in the proposal and in its impact assessment.
652
 The Commission argued that it would require 
substantial renegotiation of the Convention, a process, which would take a long time, and considering that the proposal 
includes introduction of aggravating circumstances and penalties (increased) on which no agreement could be reached 
during the negotiations of the Convention. The Commission then concluded that there is no international willingness to 
renegotiate the Convention, as renegotiation would interfere with the ratification process, which is still underway.
653
 
The Commission again defined how it interpreted “minor cases”. “Minor cases” was introduced as 
an element of flexibility and the intention was to allow Member States not to cover cases that in 
theory fit the definition of the crime but where the protected legal interest is not harmed, for 
example, acts committed by young people attempting to prove their expertise with computers.
654
 
This makes it rather clear that minor cases are cases where every single element of the offense, 
including infringing security measures, is present; adding to or detracting elements from the offense 
as it is defined in article is not allowed for the purposes of excluding (by adding elements) or 
including (by detracting elements) minor cases. This indicates at least that the Commission is of the 
opinion that even where security measures are infringed (an ostensibly narrower scope of “illegal 
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access” than required under the Framework Decision), a case could be minor in the sense that the 
protected legal interest was not harmed. 
On August 14 2013, Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems amended and 
replaced the Framework Decision. Some differences between the Directive and the old Framework 
Decision appear, on which the proposal for the directive and the impact assessment do not seem to 
explain. At least six of these differences are of immediate interest. 
First, in the Directive‟s preamble, recital 12, it is acknowledged that identifying and reporting 
threats and risks, and vulnerabilities of information systems are germane elements of prevention of 
and response to attacks, as well as to improving the security of information systems. The recital 
encourages Member States to provide ways of legal detection and reporting of vulnerabilities. Since 
the meaning of this recital is not discussed directly in the preparatory works, it is hard to understand 
what it entails, other than, of course, that it is not binding on Member States, since it is placed in the 
preamble. The question is whether such legal detection and reporting of vulnerabilities would also 
cover security researchers/hackers that are not affiliated with the person, legal or natural, whose 
system is vulnerable; or whether it simply means that security researchers with express consent 
from the system‟s owner are not committing a crime when fulfilling their contractual agreements of 
finding and reporting vulnerabilities. The above-discussed dispute between the drafters of the 
Convention on Cybercrime with respect scope of the Convention‟s article 2 appears to have been 
restated in the directive‟s preamble – to a certain extent – because although there seems to be at 
least some consensus as to the need to allow for some discovery of and reporting of vulnerabilities, 
no substantive provisions provide a concrete solution to the problem related to IT security 
researchers‟ discovery, reporting and disclosure of security vulnerabilities. 
Second, the preamble‟s recital 17 states that in the context of the Directive, contractual obligations, 
terms of use, terms of service and labor disputes involving access to and use of the employer‟s 
systems for private purposes should not incur criminal liability where the access is deemed 
unauthorized solely on those bases. As will become apparent in the chapter on authorization with 
respect to insiders, this addition to the Directive‟s preamble is very important. The same limitation 
of scope is being proposed in the US due to the expansive interpretation of the CFAA.
655
 In light of 
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the development in US case law (regardless of whether that development was considered or not), 
i.e. the rather intense circuit split discussed later in this dissertation, and the ongoing attempt to 
amend the American Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to definitively exclude these as bases for 
criminal liability
656
, it makes perfect sense to exclude these acts from the scope of the Directive.
657
 
However appreciated this preamble recited is, there is no hint in the preparatory work as to why this 
recital suddenly appears.
658
 The recital also states that the directive is without prejudice to the right 
of access to information, but that the directive may not at the same time serve as a justification for 
unlawful or arbitrary access to information. What arbitrary access to information entails is not 
explained, and therefore leaves one wondering. 
Thirdly, as touched upon above, limiting illegal access to instances where a security measure has 
been infringed is no longer optional. This limitation is now a constituent element of article 3, which 
replaced the Framework Decision‟s article 2 prohibiting illegal access. 
Fourth, illegal interception is now also criminalized in article 6 of the directive, which aligns the EU 
legislation even more with the Convention. 
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The fifth point of immediate interest is the criminalization in article 7 of hacker tools, or tools used 
for committing offences in article 3 to 6. Tools in this context are both computer programs, 
designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing the offences in article 3 to 6, and also 
computer passwords, access codes, or similar data used to access information systems when these 
are used to commit the aforementioned offences. Although criminalizing hacker tools is a response 
to remote access malware, botnets and the like, the article and the directive‟s preparatory works do 
not reveal much about how one would categorize tools that are dual-natured and are just as often 
used for legitimate purposes. The preamble‟s recital 16 at least recognizes the dual nature of these 
tools. 
The sixth and final point of interest is the preamble‟s recital 26, which encourages Member States 
to take necessary measures to protect their critical infrastructure, and encouraging Member States to 
create measures incurring liability where legal persons have clearly not provided an appropriate 
level of protection against reasonably identifiable threats and vulnerabilities.
659
 This preamble, 
although again not binding on Member States, in the very least indicates awareness that security 
derives primarily from actual security measures rather than the protection provided by criminal law. 
This is perhaps directly related to the binding text in article 3, where the infringement of security 
measures has become an obligatory element of the offense of illegal access. Perhaps the absence of 
protection of criminal law, some incentive is provided for those desiring that protection to 
implement actual security measures. This arguably introduces more certainty to the scope of illegal 
access provisions, but also raises the extremely important question of what a security measure is. 
This is discussed further below in the chapters on access and outsiders. 
Furthermore, there is a noteworthy obstacle to harmonize of criminal law in the EU. Even though 
the Framework Decision and now the Directive mostly just replicate substantive criminal law 
provisions from the Convention, the Directive can perhaps achieve a bit more where the Convention 
cannot; a more uniform application in member states, with the support of the CJEU, insofar as the 
meaning of core elements forming the actus reus are not left to fall within the member states‟ 
margin of appreciation. Especially given the fact that general principles of criminal law are not 
harmonized, leaving further elements to member states‟ discretion, results in very limited “true” 
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harmonization. Attempting to harmonize criminal law where general principles of criminal law, 
such as intent, which can differ quite substantially between jurisdictions, is bound to be somewhat 
lackluster from the beginning because the extent of criminalization will be much greater in 
countries that e.g. consider dolus eventualis as a form of intent versus countries where dolus 
eventualis falls outside the realm of intent, falling instead within the realm of recklessness.
660
 
Any differences there might be between member states‟ in terms of general principles of criminal 
law will arguably significantly compound the problems associated with further delegating to the 
member states the interpretation and construction of essential elements of the crime. Harmonization 
will indeed be minimal and perhaps not much more likely than under the Convention alone unless 
the CJEU gives core elements, such as “security measures” an authoritative construction. A 
question arises: If the directive will not achieve more than the Convention (and the Framework 
Decision and the directive mostly are copies of the Convention), is there truly a need for EU 
cybercrime law? That remains to be seen; especially where the Commission appears not to have 
comprehensively addressed the need for EU legislative action apart from the usual “cross-border” 
argument, which is regrettable seeing as criminalization ought to be the last resort rather than the 
first.
661
 Although it is an interesting issue, whether or not there is a convincing justification for EU 
legislative action in terms of cybercrime falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Directive 2013/40/EU repealed, replaced and amended the Framework Decision for those member 
states participating in the adoption of the directive. Denmark cannot adopt the Directive due to its 
reservations, and is still bound by the framework decision.
662
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into force of the Treaty of Lisbon which are amended shall continue to be binding upon and applicable to Denmark 
unchanged.”) 
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8 THE DANISH HACKING PROVISIONS 
8.1 The Danish Criminal Code § 263 (2) and (3) 
The Danish criminal code § 263(2) is popularly known as “the hacking provision”. Subsection (3) 
increases the maximum sentence available where subsection (2) is violated under aggravating 
circumstances. The rationale of the hacking provision and its general purpose are explored in the 
next section. This section is simply reserved for citing the statutory text for future reference and as a 
starting point for the discussion below of the provision‟s legislative history. 
Subsection 2: “Any person who unlawfully obtains access to another person‟s information or programmes designated 
for use in an information system shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding one year and six 
months.”
663
 
Subsection 3: “Of the acts mentioned in Subsections (1) and (2) above are committed with the intent to procure or make 
oneself acquainted with information about trade secrets of a firm, or in other particularly aggravating circumstances, the 
penalty may be increased to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years. This penalty also applies to the acts 
described in Subsection (2) above in the case of offences of a more systematic or organised nature.”
664
 
 
 
8.2 Legislative history of the Danish hacking provision 
8.2.1 The 1985 amendment to the Criminal Code 
In early 1984, the Danish Ministry of Justice requested that the Criminal Law Committee review the 
Criminal Code with a view to amending the law to ensure its applicability to computer crime. A 
year later, in early 1985, the Committee delivered its report to the Ministry of Justice. 
 
The Committee recognized that computer crime legislation was an item on the agenda in many 
countries at the time, and noted that the vast bulk of existing research on variations in the methods 
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used to commit computer crimes was taking place in the United States. Similarly, it was also noted 
that hacking statutes contained elements that were largely the same across many legal systems.
665
  
At the very outset of the Committee‟s report the Committee emphasizes, like its American 
counterparts in Congress, that implementation and use of security measures undoubtedly has far 
greater preventative effect than a few amendments to the Criminal Code.
666
 
Very early on in the report the Committee distinguishes between two sets of offenders by using the 
terms “employees” and “outsiders”;
667
 very similar to the usage of the terms “insiders” (employees 
are ostensibly always used as examples of “insiders”) and “outsiders” in the US Committee reports 
on computer crime.
668
 
The trespass provision (§ 264) was found insufficient with respect to computer crime, for example, 
because the trespass provision did not cover any actions carried out by the offender once he has 
entered a place without right (i.e. access information on computers at the location), nor did the 
provision cover insiders, such as employees, customers, etc.
669
 And the privacy provision (§ 263) in 
effect at the time would have to rely on analogies or at least less clear extensive construction to 
cover computer crime. 
In order to avoid applications by analogy and otherwise questionable constructions of existing 
provisions, the Committee opted for proposing a new subsection (2) in § 263. 
Generally the chapter on privacy violations addresses various forms of access without right to 
places or information. The places and information covered are those that a person can reasonably 
expect to keep private.
670
 
With respect to computers, the Committee explicitly stated that the new subsection would apply to 
both insiders who exceed their authorized access and outsiders who lack any and all authorization to 
use the computer.
671
 The computer need not belong to someone else. The computer can very well 
belong to the offender. This is because the focus is not access to the computer as a thing, but on 
whether the information and programs accessed belong to someone else, such that use of one‟s own 
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computer could incur criminal liability when one accesses information and programs belonging to 
others, but reside on one‟s own computer.
672
 As an example, the Committee refers to the situation 
involving a leased computer. The lessor, just because he retains proprietary rights to the computer, 
does not for that reason have authorized access to the information belonging to the lessee during the 
time of the lease. 
As will be explained later, the term “without right” encompasses more than just the “authorization” 
granted by the owner of the information or program. “Without right” (or “unlawful as Greve et al. 
translated “uberettiget”) is also an indication that the legislature is aware of the breadth of the 
provision and that not every instance that fits the statutory language is necessarily within the legal 
scope of the provision. In explaining the warning inherent in the use of “without right”, the 
Committee noted that questions of “right” were irrelevant with respect to outsiders (the impact of 
this statement is discussed later) and typical insider transgressions were those where an employee 
had e.g. used a password not belonging to him in order to gain access to information that are outside 
of his authorization. Sometimes the situation may be such that administrative sanctions are more 
appropriate than criminal punishment.
673
 The view the Committee takes on outsiders 
Unlike the American statute, the offender need not have obtained the information (even in the sense 
that the offender need just view the information). It suffices that the offender has managed to 
establish a connection to the content.
674
 
If there was further intent to gain access without right to confidential information (trade secrets are 
mentioned in the statutory language whilst government systems are named as an example of 
aggravating circumstances in the report) a new subsection (3) provided for an enhancement for 
aggravating circumstances. 
 
8.2.2 The 2002 amendment to the Criminal Code 
In 2002, the Ministry of Justice assembled an ad hoc committee to review the law applying to 
modern technology. In particular, the Committee was assigned the task to review relevant 
legislation with a view to ratifying the Council of Europe‟s Convention on Cybercrime and prepare 
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for the implementation of the Framework Decision on attacks against information systems (EU 
law).  
The 2002 Committee had the advantage that, unlike in 1985, the internet had now been 
commercialized, personal computers had found their way into a significant number of homes, and 
the Web had been invented. However, although the Committee describes the basic function of the 
Web and the possibility of new types of crime, the Committee did not address the extent of the 
scope of the illegal access provision to any great lengths nor the implications of the meaning of 
authorization, or right, with respect to publicly accessible systems on the Internet. In other words, 
what access without right means remained unclear. 
Perhaps of relevance to the concept of authorization (or “right”), the Committee notes that 
implementation of security measures ought to be such that the protection provided for in criminal 
law should only be triggered where such security measures prove insufficient to prevent the 
offense.
675
 In other words, the criminal law protection should be secondary to implemented security 
measures. Also the level of security measures in place are relevant in the sentencing phase. Such 
security measures should be in place not only for outsiders, but also for insiders, such as 
employees.
676
 However, the Committee was aware of the possibility of unknown vulnerabilities in 
computer systems and that the owner of the system would not be able to prevent exploitation of 
such unknown vulnerabilities. Furthermore, a balance must reasonably be struck between security 
measure and practicality of using the system as well as the level of security having to be 
economically realistic.
 677
 
The 2002 amendment did not change much in the hacking provision. The term “data processing 
unit” was replaced with “information systems”, and the maximum sentence was increased to reflect 
the vulnerability of the “IT-based society”.
678
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9 THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
9.1 Current § 1030 statutes of interest 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act contains quite a few provisions aimed at unauthorized access. 
Below, the ones most relevant to this dissertation are cited.
679
 
 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(a)(2)(C) 
Whoever intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and 
thereby obtains information from a protected computer. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(a)(4) 
Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended 
fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists 
only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than § 5,000 in any 1-year 
period. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(a)(5)(A) 
Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a 
result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(a)(5)(B) 
Whoever intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such 
conduct, recklessly causes damage. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(a)(5)(C) 
Whoever intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such 
conduct causes damage and loss. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(e)(1) defines “computer” 
                                                 
679
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The term “computer” means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed 
data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data 
storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such 
device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
calculator, or other similar device. 
U.S.C. 18 § 1030(e)(6) defines “exceeds authorized access” 
The term “exceeds authorized access” means to access a computer with authorization and to use 
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to 
obtain or alter. 
 
 
9.2 Legislative history § 1030 (The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) 
The CFAA‟s scope has been expanded rather dramatically due to a mixture of small, but significant 
changes to the CFAA‟s language as well as the courts‟ often broad, and sometimes rather creative, 
readings of the CFAA. Below are the highlights from the Committee Reports produced as a part of 
the legislative process that give some insight into the original purpose of the CFAA. The chapters 
on authorization with respect to insiders and outsiders then show how the CFAA has been applied 
in practice. 
 
9.2.1 1984 Report: H.R. Rep. 98-894 
In 1984 the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CADCFAA) 
was passed into law.
680
 
The House Committee on the Judiciary stated in its report regarding the proposal for the CADCFFA 
that it was very difficult to determine the “exact nature and extent of computer crime” whilst also 
noting that it was a substantial problem and the future potential was immense.
681
 
                                                 
680
 See also history of the 1984 Act in Susan W. Brenner: Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes 
(2012), pp. 24-25 
681
 H.R. Rep. 98-894 at **3694 
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The 1984 act was fairly narrow in the sense that it only protected a limited set of confidential or 
classified information, and yet the language was too vague to be applied in practice.
682
 Ostensibly 
only one person was ever indicted under the 1984 act
683
 until the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
was passed in 1986, fixing the language to a certain extent. 
 
9.2.2 1986 Report: S. Rep. 99-432 
The Senate Committee noted that the advent of the personal computer had created a new type of 
criminal “who uses computers to steal, to defraud, and to abuse the property of others.”
684
 The 
Committee noted that computers and computer data constituted a property that was unprotected 
against crime.
685
 
The Committee did not subscribe to the belief that criminal law would be the most effective way of 
combatting computer crime. Rather, it made it clear that “much computer crime can be prevented 
by those who are potential targets of such conduct”, citing and strongly agreeing with the statements 
in an American Bar Association report that primary responsibility for prevention fell upon the 
industry and individuals rather than the government.
686
 
The Committee envisaged a federal criminal law response in form of punishment as appropriate 
“for certain acts” and that it would serve to deter and “reinforce education and security 
improvement programs.”
687
 In 1986, it did not seem that the legislature was looking to pass a 
sweeping criminalization of all wrongdoing committed by use of a computer. In fact, the Committee 
explicitly rejected such a sweeping approach, preferring an approach limited to cases where there 
was a compelling federal interest.
688
 The objection to a sweeping statute was thus arguably only a 
concern for intruding unnecessarily on the states‟ ability to legislate on computer crime, and not a 
concern with overcriminalization. The concern for overcriminalization with respect to the public in 
                                                 
682
 Christine D. Galbraith: Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information 
on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites (2004), 63 Md. L. Rev. 320, 328. See also discussion on CFAA of 1986 in 
Susan W. Brenner: Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes (2012), pp. 25-26 
683
 Christine D. Galbraith: Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information 
on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites (2004), 63 Md. L. Rev. 320, 328 
684
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2480 
685
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2480 
686
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2480-2481 
687
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2481 
688
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2482 
 
161 
 
general was limited in 1986, since the bill before the Committee only applied to federal interest 
computers, a concept that was quite narrowly defined. 
One of the proposed changes to the 1984 act, was that the scienter in the sections specifically 
protecting the computers of financial institutions and government computers was changed from 
“knowingly” to “intentionally” accessing without authorization or exceeding authorization and 
obtaining information from that type of protected computer. The reason for this change was the 
desire to exclude from the scope those persons who accidentally access someone else‟s files or 
data.
689
 The Committee was concerned with “insiders” in this respect and in the process explains its 
perception of “exceeds authorized access”. The Committee wrote in terms of precluding liability: 
“This is particularly true in those cases where an individual is authorized to sign onto and use a 
particular computer, but subsequently exceeds his authorized access by mistakenly entering another 
computer file or data that happens to be accessible from the same terminal.” 
Privacy was an important factor with respect to the subsection regarding financial institutions. 
“Because the premise of this subsection is privacy protection, the Committee wishes to make clear 
that „obtaining information‟ in this context includes mere observation of the data.”
690
 
Specifically with regard to the subsection on government computers, the Committee wanted to be 
very clear that government employees who were authorized to access and use a computer would not 
face prosecution for acts that were technically wrong, but did not “rise to the level of criminal 
conduct.”
691
 The Committee needed to balance the concerns for authorized users against “the 
legitimate need to protect government computers against abuse by „outsiders‟.”
692
 The balance was 
struck by not making criminals of employees who exceeded their authorized access to computers in 
the same department as they worked in. The Committee envisaged an employee who “briefly 
exceeds his authorized access and peruses data belonging to the department that he is not supposed 
to look at.”
693
The Committee added that “[t]his is especially true where the department in question 
lacks a clear method of delineating which individuals are authorized to access certain data.”
694
 The 
Committee proposed administrative sanctions for such cases rather than criminal sanctions. Thus 
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 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2483 
690
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2484 
691
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2485 
692
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2485 
693
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2485 
694
 S. Rep. 99-432 at **2485 
 
162 
 
“exceeding authorized access” was excluded from the provision prohibiting unauthorized access to 
government computers and thus precluded liability in “purely „insider‟ cases”
695
. Only where an 
insider accesses other departments‟ computers, and is thus “directly analogous to an „outsider‟”
696
 
did that subsection apply to government employees or others with authorized access to any 
government computer. Generally, it was reserved for “outsiders”. 
Of great interest is the Committee‟s introduction of the language “exceeds authorized access” which 
replaced “or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access 
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend”.
697
 The Committee contended 
that this was a simplification of the previous “cumbersome” language. Later in the report it is 
explained by Senators Leahy and Mathias that replacing the “purpose” oriented language “removes 
from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a Federal 
employee‟s access to computerized data might be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in 
other (not clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to exceed his authorization.”
698
 
Administrative sanctions should suffice. This was supposed to give prosecutors “a clear, workable 
rule, regardless of the intricacies of a particular agency‟s computer access policies: absent a 
fraudulent motive, an employee could not be prosecuted for simple „trespass‟ into one of his 
agency‟s own computers.”
699
 
The Committee stays true to its use of the concepts insider and outsider, in that it states that (a)(5) 
(causing damages) is only applicable to “outsiders”.
700
 
 
9.2.3 1994 amendment 
The 1994 amendment
701
 included few changes to the CFAA, but at least one of them has arguably 
had rather dramatic effect on the subsequent construction of the CFAA.  
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§ 1030(a)(5) continues applying to outsiders, i.e. those lacking any authorization to access the 
computer, but now also applies to malicious insiders.
702
 In this context, the Committee, in the 1996 
Senate report whilst describing the 1994 amendments, specifically uses the words “integrity” and 
“availability”
703
 of information with respect to the interests protected under subsection (a)(5) and 
cites other provisions with respect to protection of “confidentiality”.
704
 Subsection (a)(5)(A) would 
target anyone who intentionally damages a computer without authorization – insiders and outsiders 
alike. Subsection (a)(5)(B) would apply to outsiders who access the computer without authorization 
and recklessly cause damage. Subsection (a)(5)(C) would invoke misdemeanor penalties for 
outsiders who access the computer without authorization and cause damage (accidentally or 
negligently). That is, insiders would have to cause the damage intentionally, whereas outsiders 
would incur liability under (a)(5) by causing the damage intentionally, recklessly or simply just 
causing the damage without any scientier requirement attached.
705
 
The 1994 amendment was the one that introduced the civil remedy. The civil remedy allows victims 
to state a claim in federal court where they can sue for compensatory damages, injunctive relief or 
other equitable relief.
706
 The civil remedy is provided in § 1030(g). The statute of limitations for 
civil claims would be two years; lower than that for criminal prosecution. A sponsor of the 
amendment expressly stated that the intention was not to “open the floodgates to frivolous 
litigation”.
707
 Granted, before the 1996 amendment, the number of possible plaintiffs was limited 
because prior to 1996, the CFAA only applied to so-called “Federal interest computers”.
708
 
At present, a plaintiff can state a civil claim under the CFAA, if one of five
709
 factors are present; 
where the offense caused loss to one or more persons during any 1-year period totaling at least 
$5,000 in value usually being the triggering factor for most civil claims. 
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9.2.4 1996 Report: S. Rep. 104-357 
In stating the purpose of the 1996 amendment
710
 to the CFAA the Committee stated that the 
amendment would strengthen the CFAA “by closing gaps in the law to protect better the 
confidentiality, integrity, and security of computer data and networks.”
711
 The IT security language, 
i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the mentioning of privacy (which arguably is a 
specific concern relating to confidentiality of information), is rife within the 1996 Committee 
report. The insider/outsider distinction also persists from earlier reports. 
Until the 1996 amendment, the CFAA had protected only unauthorized access to the types of 
computers that held classified or private financial record information. The Committee focused on 
gaps in coverage with respect to privacy protection. Namely, that the confidential and classified 
information was not protected from government employees “who abuse their computer access 
privileges to obtain Government information that may be sensitive and confidential.”
712
 
§ 1030(a)(2) was amended to increase the protection of privacy and confidentiality of information 
on computers.
713
 It furthermore extended the coverage to “computers used in interstate or foreign 
commerce or communications, if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.”
714
 
According to the Committee, the purpose of (a)(2)(C) is to protect against “interstate or foreign 
theft of information by computer.”
715
 At the center of (a)(2)(C) is “the abuse of a computer to obtain 
information.”
716
 That is, (a)(2)(C) targets breaches in confidentiality of information. The 
seriousness of the breach is primarily reflected in the value of the information and the intended 
future use of the information.
717
 However, it is of note that the future use and the value does not in 
itself make the access unauthorized, and as such, should only affect sentencing – not determination 
of guilt. The Committee took the seriousness of the breach into account when evaluating the 
severity of the punishment.
718
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When discussing the exception for “computer use”, i.e. use of computer time, in subsection (a)(4) 
(on computer fraud) the Committee averred that the blanket exception was too broad , and for 
example, hackers had gained access to supercomputers for the purposes of running password 
cracking programs.
719
 However, the Committee‟s inquiry into purpose for use of the computer in 
this instance is irrelevant in with respect to determination of guilt. The hackers had already gained 
access without authorization (since they lacked any and all authorization to access the computer); 
their purpose for doing so is irrelevant with respect to guilt. The reason the Committee is discussing 
purpose for hacking into a computer is in the context of revoking a blanket exception for stolen 
computer time the value of which could vastly exceed the $5,000 value requirement under 
subsection (a)(4). The purpose discussion does not relate to whether hacking into the supercomputer 
was unauthorized or not, just whether the use of time should be counted towards the value required 
to apply subsection (a)(4), a felony, rather than the being a violation of e.g. (a)(2)(C), a 
misdemeanor. 
One of the arguably most expansive amendments to the CFAA was replacing the term “Federal 
interest computer” with the term “protected computer”. The new term, “protected computer” 
expanded the statute‟s scope to include all computers “used in interstate or foreign commerce or 
communications”. 
 
9.2.5 2001 and 2008 amendments 
The 2001 and 2008 amendments
720
 both substantially expanded the scope in a more or less discreet 
way. In 2001 the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of “protected” computer to also 
covering computers located in foreign countries where the computer affects interstate or foreign 
commerce or communications.
721
 Additionally, the 2001 amendment adjusted the CFAA by 
explicitly excluding product liability claims – which appears to be the only case of Congress 
reacting to a very broad construction of the CFAA
722
; a Texas federal judge had construed the 
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statute quite creatively to allow such claims under the CFAA, generating .
723
 In 2008, the Identity 
Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act removed the requirement of interstate communication from 
§ 1030(a)(2) meaning that under subsection (a)(2)(C) “any unauthorized access to any protected 
computer that retrieves any information of any kind, interstate or intrastate, is punishable by the 
statute.”
724
 Furthermore, the definition of “protected computer” was again expanded by adding the 
language “or affecting” in terms of a computer‟s relationship with interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication. As explained by Orin Kerr, “affecting interstate commerce” is what he calls “a 
term of art” that means that Congress intended to push the Commerce Clause to its limits, in that 
this language allows Congress to regulate purely local issues normally regulated by the states. Thus, 
the 2008 amendment expanded the CFAA from applying “only” to all computers connected to the 
internet, to applying to all computers everywhere in the world, inside and outside the United 
States.
725
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
reforms by interest organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and others. See more on the broad 
construction of the CFAA in the chapters on authorization with respect to insiders and outsiders. 
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10 ACCESS 
The basic hacking provisions typically contain three elements: “without authorization”, “access” 
and “computers” (and/or “information” and “programs”) in order to prevent so-called hacking, and 
all of these elements have the potential to be applied very broadly, although “without 
authorization”, as will be shown, is the most ambiguous and leaves incredible room for creativity.  
Given that legislatures, such as the US and the Danish legislature, had a comparative eye on 
traditional trespass and other property-based law, it is not that odd that concepts such as 
authorization and access, followed by reference to the object in which there is a property interest, 
form the core of hacking statutes. However, with respect to computers, it is not so clear-cut when 
one has accessed a computer and information when compared to entering a building or other 
property. There are a few ways of perceiving access. In this chapter the problem related to 
construing “access” is first briefly introduced below by showing alternative ways of construing 
access. Then, in the following sections, it will be explored for which alternative, if any specific one, 
there is support in the legislative history and in case law of the various hacking provisions. 
Furthermore, a section is dedicated to showing the difference between “access” and “use” in terms 
of information, a distinction that has been made by many US courts to separate plaintiff claims of 
unauthorized access to information from claims ultimately do not relate to the act of “access” itself, 
but rather relates to subsequent unwanted “uses” of information that the defendant had authorization 
to access.  
 
10.1 Different perspectives on “access” 
I briefly introduced the system theory concepts used by Orin Kerr (and, to an extent, Mads Bryde 
Andersen) in the chapter on problems with description. Advocating a broad construction of 
“access”, Orin Kerr presents the concept of access from the external and the internal perspective.
726
 
From an internal perspective (which Kerr also referred to as the “virtual reality perspective”) we 
view the computer as the physical object it is that one would need to get “inside” in order to have 
“accessed” the computer. Thus, from the internal perspective, access would not have taken place if 
someone opens a password protected file and is then confronted with a password prompt – akin to 
                                                 
726
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facing a locked door – but does not try to enter or get past the password prompt.
727
 For the file to 
have been accessed, the file needs to be opened for the interaction with the file to constitute 
“access”. Similarly, as seen from the internal perspective, accessing a public website would be 
perceived as “viewing a shop window from a public street”.
728
 That is, the internal perspective is 
concerned with how the users perceive or interpret the visualization of the code (often by way of 
analogies to things and processes we have experienced in the physical world), how they experience 
the code of e.g. a website as they use the website. 
The external perspective is the perspective of the observer who is not himself a participant in the 
system. E.g. one observes the Internet as millions of interconnected computers, rather than how a 
user of the Internet may describe his experience of the Internet as a virtual reality. Thus, from the 
external perspective, any action that causes a computer to function
729
 constitutes access (“any 
successful interaction with a computer”
730
).
731
 That is, sending an email constitutes access to every 
single computer through which the email is routed as well as access to the computer that is the 
emails final destination.
732
 For example, if you use Google‟s email services – even if you never use 
Gmail‟s web interface to send an email but rather you send emails through an email client on your 
computer – you are accessing Google‟s computers every time you send an email, as well as 
accessing every other computer the email is routed through subsequently, including the destination 
computer. Sending a “ping” to another computer, causes the computer to respond by confirming its 
existence, and thus, form an external perspective constitutes accessing a computer. Similarly, this 
applies with respect to provisions prohibiting unauthorized access to information because the 
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information yielded from a ping can be viewed as accessing information.
733
 Under the Danish 
hacking provision, which prohibits unauthorized access to information and programs, sending an 
email through the Gmail service could constitute accessing a program belonging to another. That 
there are different ways of perceiving facts means that a choice must be made with respect to which 
perspective is the “applicable perspective” in a case. That choice will then affect the legal outcome 
of the case, because the legal rule is applied to facts as seen from the chosen perspective. For 
example, when considering whether someone has violated a hacking statute, should sending an 
email be considered “access” to every single computer that the email is routed through on its way 
across the Internet, or should sending an email not be considered “access” under a hacking statute? 
Orin Kerr argues that the broad construing of “access” – the external perspective – is the most 
logical choice, because the internal perspective yields arbitrary results as to whether a transmission 
to a computer, or interaction with a computer, constitutes access. For example, under the internal 
perspective accessing a public website would not qualify as access even though files were retrieved 
from the web server so that the website could be displayed on the user‟s computer – because under 
the internal perspective the public website, e.g. Amazon‟s website, is viewed as a shop window as 
seen from a public street. However, as noted by Jonathan Clough (who generally favors the broad 
reading proposed by Kerr), under Kerr‟s external perspective “access becomes synonymous with 
use in its broad sense”
734
 and that the broad reading would leave little if any room for conduct that 
constitutes “attempt to access”.
735
  Rather than opting for a narrow reading of access that conflicts 
with the technical reality (because retrieving a website from a server requires the user to establish a 
connection to the server, regardless of whether it “feels” like window-shopping) and that the narrow 
reading thus calls for judges to make arbitrary distinctions between what constitutes access and 
what does not, Orin Kerr argues instead that “authorization”, rather than “access”, should be 
construed narrowly to limit the scope of unauthorized access statutes.
736
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Another commentator, Patricia Bellia,
737
 conversely, argues in favor of a narrow construction of 
access. Bellia compares the broad reading (“transmitting electronic signals to a computer that the 
computer processes in some way”
738
) and the narrow reading (“conduct by which one is in a 
position to obtain privileges or information not available to the general public”
739
). She argues that 
adopting the broad reading of “access” opens hacking statutes up to contractual limitations on uses 
of a system and that violating such limitations would then trigger the application of unauthorized 
access statutes.
740
 Bella argues that the more natural reading of “access” is rooted in a code-based 
approach; only circumvention of code-based protection of the system would constitute “access”.
741
 
Under Bellia‟s theory, then “exceeds authorized access” in the US federal hacking statute could 
conceivably allow policy and contractual terms should be relevant in that respect.
742
 
743
 Bellia‟s 
point is, it appears, that publicly accessible information should be excluded from the scope of that 
which can be “accessed” in the legal sense that the word “access” is used in hacking statutes. Her 
argument has its appeal, because the policy issue she addresses (information that is publicly 
accessible, such as websites) has gone unaddressed by the legislature in terms of whether access to 
such information falls within the scope of hacking statutes or not. I will discuss hers and Orin‟s 
point in more detail in the below section on “access” in US law. However, now I will examine 
which approach – if any – the Convention on Cybercrime supports, as well as which approach – if 
any – is supported by the EU, Danish and US legislatures based on legislative history and the 
statutory text, and which approach has been adopted by the courts. 
 
10.2 The Convention on Cybercrime 
The Convention‟s article 2, which prohibits the intentional “access to the whole or any part of a 
computer system without right” does not define “access”; nor does the Convention‟s article 1, 
which does, however, provide definitions of other concepts used in the Convention, such as 
“computer system” and “computer data”. 
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The Explanatory Report provides an explanation, to an extent, of what is meant by “access” in the 
Convention‟s article 2: 
““Access” comprises the entering of the whole or any part of a computer system (hardware, components, stored data of 
the system installed, directories, traffic and content-related data). However, it does not include the mere sending of an e-
mail message or file to that system. “Access” includes the entering of another computer system, where it is connected 
via public telecommunication networks, or to a computer system on the same network, such as a LAN (local area 
network) or Intranet within an organisation. The method of communication (e.g. from a distance, including via wireless 
links or at a close range) does not matter.”
 744
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 The Explanatory Report para. 46 
 Hardware 
 Components 
 Stored data of the 
system installed 
 Directories 
 Traffic data 
 Content-related data
 
The Explanatory Report‟s description of what access comprises provides an outer limit; namely that 
the mere sending of an email message or file to the system does not constitute access. In other 
words, the Convention‟s Explanatory Report appears to support what Orin Kerr calls the internal 
perspective in the sense that the computer system, or any part of it, must be entered into; indicating 
something more must be done than simply causing a computer to function. However, the above 
listed parts of the computer system cited by the Report, leave some uncertainty with respect to 
whether e.g. simply playing with a keyboard when the computer is turned off constitutes access 
to/entering of “any part of a computer system”. Since article 2 is meant to protect against attacks on 
confidentiality, it not very plausible that simply fiddling with a keyboard where doing so cannot 
compromise confidentiality, because e.g. the computer is turned off or the keyboard is not 
connected to a computer, will lead to a criminal conviction, however, the plain language of the 
article requires construction to reach such a result, since it does not follow directly from the article‟s 
language as such. 
Article 2 of the Convention prohibits the unauthorized access to the whole or part of a computer 
system; the computer system being defined in article 1 as “any device or group of interconnected or 
related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of 
data [.]” As recalled, the Danish provision prohibits the unauthorized access to information and 
programs rather than systems or computers. The question is whether the language in the 
Convention‟s article 2, referring to systems, has any legal consequences regarding e.g. whether 
someone who already has authorized access to the system, but maybe not all of it, can violate such 
an “unauthorized access” statute? It is doubtful that article 2 could reach any acts committed by 
someone who had general authorization to use the system, but perhaps was unauthorized to access 
certain databases on that system, had it not been for the fact that the Explanatory Report defines 
“any part of a computer system” as including stored data on the system. In absence of words along 
the lines of “exceeding authorized access”, the initial authorized access to the computer system 
would be the only access authorization that mattered – not the subsequent unauthorized access to 
specific information contained on that computer; a computer to which the access was, after all, 
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authorized.
745
 That is, any access to information on a computer subsequent to the initial authorized 
access to that computer would necessarily be authorized as well – at least under a hacking provision 
forbidding unauthorized access to a computer in absence of the addition of the concept “exceeds 
authorized access” or “any part of a computer system”. 
In terms of the Convention, article 2 is thus capable of reaching both those who have no 
authorization to use the computer and thus no authorization to access any information on it, as well 
as those who have authorization to use the computer and access some information on it, but are 
unauthorized to access certain other information on the computer. The inquiry into whether access 
is authorized would be relevant not only with respect to the computer as a whole, but also whether 
access to specific information was authorized. However, the Explanatory Report appears to limits 
the meaning of “access” to something akin to the internal perspective by rejecting that sending 
emails constitutes “access”. “Accesses” to computers through which packets are routed in the 
course of connecting to another computer over the internet would likely similarly be excluded from 
the scope. 
 
 
10.3 The EU Framework Decision and EU Directive 
Neither the Framework Decision nor the Directive define “access”. Furthermore, the Commission‟s 
reports preceding the adoption of both the Framework Decision and the Directive leave the term 
undefined and undiscussed. Perhaps one may assume that the definition of access follows that of the 
Convention‟s Explanatory Report, since both the Framework Decision and the Directive are based 
on the Convention and largely mirror the substantive articles therein. There is, however, no concrete 
evidence for or against such a presumption being made by the Commission with respect to whether 
definitions provided in the Explanatory Report are carried over into the interpretation of either the 
Framework Decision or the Directive. 
It is uncertain whether the Framework Decision is based on the broad or narrow reading of access, 
but a narrower approach may be likely given the intended alignment with the Convention on 
Cybercrime. 
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The Directive makes the distinction, and thus also the choice, between broad and narrow readings 
of “access” largely irrelevant, since infringement of security measures is a mandatory element of 
illegal access offenses. The directive seemingly draws the line of relevant access at the system‟s 
security perimeter; the directive, however, does not specify whether the security measure needs to 
be a technical/logical one as opposed to physical security, and what form such security could 
hypothetically take. This new element effectively excludes, largely but not entirely, from the scope 
of “illegal access” acts such as portscanning (which could trigger liability under a broad 
construction of “access” if authorization is absent), access to publicly accessible websites where 
such access is unauthorized due to contractual obligations, as well as other acts that exist in the 
penumbra of broader illegal access provisions. Essentially though, the limiting effect of restricting 
illegal access provisions to those cases that involve infringement of security measures, hinges 
entirely on what is meant by “security measures”. A naïve user might for example think that not 
linking to a webpage on his webserver (a form of “security through obscurity”) means that the 
absence of that link constitutes a security measure or he may think the webserver is 
“undiscoverable” because he has told no one about it (not that subjective perceptions of what is a 
security measures should ever determine what does and does not trigger criminal liability). What is 
meant by “security measure” in the context of directive, such that a circumvention of the security 
measure triggers criminal liability under the relevant implementing national provision, is regrettably 
unclear.
746
 This is an important question that concerns the standard of security that a company, for 
example, must live up to in order to obtain protection under criminal law, as well as signaling to 
those regulated by the law whether e.g. symbolic “security measures”, for example those that rely 
on “security through obscurity” in form of simply not sharing the location of a website, constitute 
security measures in the context of the directive. Similarly, there is the question whether certain 
people can be selectively excluded from visiting public websites, e.g. by blocking their IP-address, 
and their circumvention of that block thereby triggers application of illegal access provisions. 
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Although the requirement of infringement of security measures excludes the most problematic of 
the possible readings of broader illegal access provisions, it raises a new question, albeit perhaps a 
narrower one: What is a security measure? 
 
 
10.4 Danish law 
The Danish criminal code § 263(2) prohibiting unauthorized access reads as follows: 
Subsection 2: “Any person who unlawfully obtains access to another person‟s information or programmes designated 
for use in an information system shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding one year and six 
months.”
747
 
748
 
The provision defines neither “without right” (or unlawfully, as Greve et al. translated it) nor 
“access”, nor does it contain any additional requirements
749
, like intent to defraud or infringement 
of security measures, to limit the scope of the provision. The concepts are not defined anywhere 
else in the criminal code either. Thus, the concept of “access”, in and of itself, does not establish 
any critical limit to the scope. The provision does not allude to what access is and when something 
constitutes access. Is any interaction sufficient, such as pinging a computer, for the simple reason 
that “some” information is obtained in the form of knowledge that the computer exists at a certain 
IP address?  
As far as § 263(2) goes, the Committee who drafted the provision, observed the novel context in 
which the rule would apply and therefore may have given consideration to the meaning of access in 
the context of computers.  
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§ 263(2) was passed into law in 1985. Its raison d‟être was, and still is, to cover unauthorized access 
to information and programs intended to be used in an information system, to which the older § 
263(1) was only tentatively applicable.
750
  
Committee report 1985 no. 1032 reveals a few things about the legislative intent, or at least what 
the legislator may have understood by “access”. First of all, the report leads with a short and 
superficial description of how networks and computers work from a technological point of view, 
which could, however tentatively, indicate a preference for a broad reading of access. In terms of 
providing clues to how the term “access” should be interpreted the report provides only a short, 
vague description as part of a summary of how to interpret § 263(2): 
“[…] [T]he person in question, by connecting to and operating the computer, shall have succeeded in connecting to its 
contents, while conversely it is not required proven that he has gained knowledge of anything. It is not of any great 
importance to lay down a precise boundary between attempt and completed crime. Situations where a person with the 
intent to obtain information, but who is unfamiliar with the password, during his operating of the system manages only 
to determine that a screen display shows an access restriction to the system‟s content, must be counted as criminal 
attempt. On the other hand, it is a completed offense that the person in question has gained access to other information 
than that in which he is interested.”
751
 
This explanation appears to militate in favor of the narrow reading of access, because the reference 
to a success in connecting to contents on the computer. However, that just raises the question of 
what the Committee understood by “content”. Is information from a portscan “content”? If yes, then 
the Committee‟s explanation supports a broad reading of access. However, what to provide strong 
support for a narrow reading, is the Committee‟s view that viewing a password prompt constitutes 
attempted unauthorized access rather than a completed offense (insofar as the offender actually 
intended to obtain information protected by the access restrictions).  
Although the quote from the 1985 Committee report largely seems to suggest a narrow 
interpretation of “access”, the ostensible narrow approach could also hinge on what a court deems 
to be “content” (presumably, information and programs, which are the intangible material protected 
by § 263(2)). Two Danish district courts indicate that portscanning is not covered by the scope of § 
263(2), unless the portscan is a preparatory act carried out by a defendant who has the intent to gain 
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unauthorized access to the computer.
752
 These constructions of “access” are more in line with the 
narrower reading, requiring the “entering into” a computer, rather than the broader “causing a 
computer to function”, as well as being in line with the statement in the Committee report that 
simply viewing a password prompt is only an offense if there is intent to obtain information from 
the computer (indicating that the password prompt itself does not constitute information in that 
sense). 
However, § 263(2) lacks a limitation on its scope, which the American CFAA, EU Framework 
Decision, EU Directive and the Convention do not. The Danish statutory language does not require 
that the information or the program actually reside on a computer when it is accessed. More 
specifically, information or a program can theoretically be “accessed” in the strict meaning of 
statutory language of  § 263(2) where the information or program, existing only on regular paper, is 
intended for later use on a computer, but has not yet been so used at the time it is “accessed”. In 
other words, the statutory language does not in itself require that the information or program 
“accessed” actually resides on a computer
753
 and could strictly speaking be a piece of paper lying on 
a desk in an office building. Furthermore, the statutory language does not itself reasonably support a 
narrower reading that requires the information or program to reside on a computer.
754
  
However, the language in the Committee‟s report and the comments on the bill provided by the 
Ministry of Justice, overwhelmingly suggests that a closer connection between the information or 
program and the computer is required. This is because both texts exclusively refer to use of a 
computer in order to access information or programs; i.e. that the information or program resides on 
a computer or its peripherals – not for example on paper for later use on a computer.
755
 
Should the courts decide to give § 263(2) its “ordinary meaning” and thus depart from the implied 
presumption in the legislative history that the information or program resides on a computer, by 
construing the provision to include e.g. information on paper that is intended for later use on a 
computer, § 263(2) would at least match, if not greatly surpass, the reach of the unconstitutional 
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definition of “access” (i.e. approaching a computer) in the Kansas state computer crime statute that 
was deemed void for vagueness by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Allen. Such an expansive 
reading of § 263(2) arguably exceeds the Kansas statute‟s reach because § 263(2) does not require 
that the information is observed, altered, damaged or obtained by the offender; it merely requires 
that “access” has been gained to the information. Thus, a literal reading of § 263(2) would 
essentially mirror the Kansas computer crime statute‟s “approach a computer” definition of 
“access”, albeit in relation to information in physical format. Construing “access” in that manner 
would likely violate article 7 ECHR, which prohibits both retroactive criminalization by the 
legislature and expansive judicial statutory constructions that are not reasonably foreseeable.
756
 
Approaching a piece of paper knowing or believing it contains information could theoretically 
trigger criminal liability if the information on the paper is meant to be used later on a computer. 
However, it is unlikely that Danish courts would construe § 263(2) that broadly. 
 
 
10.5 US law 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not define access, either. There is nothing in the 
legislative history that definitively points one way or the other in terms of whether the legislature 
supported a narrow or broad reading of access. The Committee reports for example are sufficiently 
vague so that one could find support for whatever approach one prefers; the same applying to the 
interpretation of authorization.
757
 
In favor of a narrower approach to construing “access” is that it is arguably the approach most 
consistent with the general purpose of the CFAA. The CFAA started out with a fairly narrow scope; 
not in the sense that “authorization” and “access” were somehow clearer concepts, but because the 
act, in 1986 (and its 1984 predecessor as well), only protected certain very specific types of 
confidential and/or classified information residing on federal interest computers against 
unauthorized access. Specifically subsection (a)(2), the broadest subsection today, was supposed to 
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safeguard privacy.
758
 Because (a)(2) guarded privacy, the Committee emphasized that for that 
reason the term “obtaining information” included merely observing the data. The prosecution would 
not be required to show actual moving of the data to show that information had been obtained.
759
 
Furthermore, until 1996 the act focused only on Federal interest computers; not computers in 
general. In the later 1996 report, the Committee makes many references to the terms 
“confidentiality”, “integrity” and “availability”; that is, computer security concepts used in the 
context of a report on a computer-related statute. In other words, such terms tend to indicate the 
existence of a security perimeter, since nothing that is accessible to the public is “confidential”. 
Thus, in that sense, surely crossing a perimeter of some kind in the sense that a computer is entered 
and information obtained that is not publicly available. 
The other side of the coin is that the CFAA, like most hacking statutes, is also based on the 
traditional idea of trespass. “Computer trespass” invokes concepts like “property” and “right to 
exclude”. Thus, an owner exercises proprietary control over the computer and can choose who he 
lets interact with the computer. Such a concept, although arguably less problematic in 1986 where 
most computers were not reachable by every other computer by virtue of the Internet, is somewhat 
at odds with the state of things in the internet age. Delineating the perimeter of land property, which 
is necessarily connected to the rest of the world and cannot be “disconnected” from the world, is 
much easier and more obvious than trying to artificially draw a contrived line with respect to a 
“cyberproperty” that the owner, through his own volition, decided to make publicly accessible. If 
for example a computer running webserver software is connected to the internet, its existence will 
be discovered by other computers – likely within seconds.
760
 Since scanning an IP address 
necessarily means eliciting a response from the computer with that address, the scanning will cause 
the computer to function. The trespass analogy makes more sense in a 1986-world than in a 2015-
world. However, the trespass analogy, arguably, is arguably equally consistently referenced 
throughout the committee reports as are concepts of privacy, confidentiality, integrity and 
availability that support a narrower approach. 
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Construing “access” has typically not been the pivotal issue, and mostly not an issue at all, of the 
courts‟ inquiry into the CFAA. The cases typically involve confusion as to the meaning of 
“authorization” rather than the meaning of “access”. The cases that Kerr
761
 and Clough
762
 use to 
contrast different readings of the term “access” involve two federal cases and a single state case. 
The narrower reading of “access” persuaded the court in State v. Allen
763
. In Allen, the defendant 
had repeatedly dialed up a computer belonging to Southwestern Bell Telephone that controlled 
long-distance telephone switches. Each time the defendant was confronted with a password prompt. 
For that conduct, the defendant was charged with unauthorized access in violation of the Kansas 
state computer crime statute. The state computer crime statute defined access in a broad manner that 
included even “approaching” a computer. The court refused to rely on the statute definition due to 
vagueness issues, and reasoned that the ordinary meaning of access was preferable. Under the 
ordinary meaning of access, the court held that Allen had not “accessed” the computer unless he 
managed to get past the password prompt. Just viewing the password prompt did not allow Allen to 
actually use or obtain anything from the computer.
764
 Similarly, a federal district court in Moulton v. 
VC3
765
 concluded that a portscan carried out against a company‟s computers did not constitute 
“access”.
766
 
A broader approach was adopted by the district court in AOL v. NHCD
767
. The case involved 
spammers who had harvested AOL email addresses and proceeded to send spam email to AOL 
email addresses in violation of AOL‟s terms of service. The court held that NHCD had accessed 
AOL‟s computers by sending emails that would be transmitted through AOL‟s computers. That is, 
the court argued that sending an email constituted access.
768
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Generally, however, very few cases involve a dispute over the meaning of access. Most CFAA 
cases revolve around how to construe the term “authorization”. Reading access narrowly makes it 
possible for judges to reach a desired result, e.g. in cases where a computer is publicly accessible 
and the defendant has not actually had any way of using the computer in a meaningful sense 
because the defendant has only been able to view a password prompt. Excluding such acts from 
unauthorized access statutes by relying on “authorization” triggers the more difficult, and arguably 
more contentious, inquiry into what the owner did or did not authorize or consent to; rather than the 
simpler approach of excluding the act from scope, because the act did not constitute “access”. 
However, the easier solution comes at the cost of the arbitrariness connected with determining what 
interaction with a computer constitutes access and what does not (as pointed out by Kerr and 
Clough), since all interaction is access in the technical sense. The question is whether every 
technical access corresponds with the concept of access in legislation, and the answer is that it 
depends on what perspective the court opts for in any given case. 
 
 
10.6 The difference between “access” and “use” 
As noted above, “access” seen from the external perspective is largely synonymous with “use”, 
however, that is in the context of access to a computer; not access to information, since access to 
information does not imply use of information, whereas accessing a computer necessarily means 
using the computer. However, unwanted use of information obtained from a computer to which 
access is authorized has resulted in policies and terms that state for which “purpose” one may 
“access” a computer or information in order to try to craft an unauthorized access claim where the 
person was otherwise authorized to access the information, but did so for purposes incompatible 
with the interests of the owner.
769
 For example, as will be discussed further in the chapter on the 
scope of the authorization with respect to so-called insiders, the access can be made contingent on 
that the access is for a specific purpose and no other, thereby obfuscating that the person in fact was 
authorized, but the information was used for unwanted purposes. 
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For example, where employers forbid employees to access a computer for non-business reasons, 
means that the employer is really not interested in limiting the employee‟s access to the computer as 
such, but wants to control how the employee uses the computer and information once it has been 
accessed. Similarly, websites‟ Terms of Use (ToU) or Terms of Service (ToS) could be read to do 
the same. That is, employers and other computer owners try to make access contingent on the 
person‟s future adherence to a set of rules that do not regulate the access as such. Access has 
already been granted. 
Although an inquiry into “purpose for access” or “use” of a computer may seem appropriate given 
that our minds tend to go to the more nefarious reasons for accessing a computer one generally has 
authorization to access, the Ninth Circuit in US v. Nosal
770
 (concerning theft of trade secrets) did a 
very good job explaining why conditions for access, or purpose of access, which typically relate to 
later undesirable use of information obtained or use of a service for reprehensible purposes, should 
not trigger the application of hacking statutes. 
Nosal had encouraged former colleagues to transfer confidential information to him in breach of 
their employer‟s policy, which prohibiting accessing company computers for nonbusiness reasons. 
The question at the center of Nosal was whether the defendant had violated the CFAA by aiding 
and abetting the employees in exceeding authorized access with intent to defraud. Simplified, it was 
a question of whether an employee with authorization to access a database exceeded authorization 
when their purpose for accessing the computer was not business-related as required by company 
policy. The government‟s theory was that “exceeds authorized access” in the CFAA should be 
construed so as to mean “access for an unauthorized purpose”. The court disagreed, because the 
government‟s construction would make “every violation of a private computer use policy a federal 
crime.”
771
 Checking personal email, using Facebook, playing solitaire and so on, also fall under 
nonbusiness use of an employer‟s computer. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, doing Sudoku 
puzzles on paper during work hours would be fine, but doing Sudoku puzzles on the computer 
would be a crime.
772
 Furthermore, construing “exceeds authorized access” to include use policies 
would also mean that violations of websites‟ Terms of Use could trigger criminal liability. Thus, the 
court held that “exceeds authorized access” is limited to violating restrictions on access to 
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information, not use of information.
773
 Consider also the case Koch v. John Does
774
, where the 
plaintiff claimed that access to a public website was unauthorized because the defendants had later 
used information from the website in an undesirable manner. By simply asking for what the purpose 
of the access is, one can attempt to conflate the concept of access to and obtaining of information 
with the intended later use of the information. This will be discussed further in connection with 
authorization as well. 
In the Danish context, this distinction between access to information and use of information makes 
sense as well. Although the Danish hacking provision, § 263(2), relies only on “without right” for 
both employees and outside hackers (instead of having an additional “or exceeds authorized access” 
to regulate insiders), the focus of § 263(2) is access to information and programs, not access to the 
computer as a “thing”. Later use of information that was accessed with right is not covered by the 
language of § 263(2).
775
 Another person, who did not participate in the crime nor aided or abetted 
the offender, but later acquires or uses information accessed in violation of § 263(2), incurs criminal 
liability independently under the criminal code‟s § 264c. Misuse or misappropriation of specific 
types of information may be subject to other laws, such as trade secret statutes or data protection 
statutes. § 263(3) enhances the penalty for unauthorized access violations if the offender has the 
intent to obtain trade secrets or if the conduct is organized or systematic in nature. However, such 
aggravating circumstances are still hinged on a lack of authorization to access the trade secrets. 
Insiders are also independently criminalized in the Marketing Act § 19, which criminalizes the 
misappropriation of trade secrets (both acquiring trade secrets in an improper manner, use and 
disclosing trade secrets). There is some overlap between the Marketing Act‟s § 19 and the criminal 
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code‟s § 263(2) and (3), but it is only unauthorized access to the information that is covered by the 
latter – not the unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized use of information. There is no language in 
the legislative history that indicates that unwanted use of information makes the initial access to the 
information unauthorized. Use and disclosure fall outside the scope of the “access” language of § 
263(2) as well.
776
 
Unauthorized use of things, including a computer, is covered by the criminal code‟s § 293(1). The 1985 Committee 
report clearly states that “use” of information is not covered by § 293(1) – only use of things.
777
 Use of a computer for 
private purposes, such as maintaining a membership roster on a work computer, or even programs where a program is 
used to process information belonging to the user for private purposes, or where a disc with a computer program is 
taken home to use the program for private purposes. However, the Committee was clear in stating that it was uncertain 
to which extent employers tolerated such private use at the time (in 1985), and that not all private use may be 
prohibited. However, the Committee made it very clear that later use of information is not covered by § 293(1), noting 
that due to the fact that § 293(1) prohibits unauthorized use of “things”, it is necessary to distinguish between use of 
information or programs where they are an integral part of the thing, and use of information or programs viewed as 
conceptual ideas.
778
 In other words, use of information that one has access to through one‟s work does not appear to be 
covered by § 293(1), whereas use of the hardware and software to store or process information belonging to the 
employee, such as storing family photos, hobby club roster, etc. may be covered – at least by 1985‟s standards. 
However, processing and storage power today would make such things trivial, and personal use is widely accepted to 
some limited degree. One case where there appears to have been little room for personal use and which does not relate 
excessive storage or processing power usage, is a case where the possession of the privately owned data was illegal. In a 
Danish case, U 2003.585/1Ø, a police employee (an assistant police prosecutor with a local police department) was 
convicted of possession of child pornography on home computers and of unauthorized use of a thing for having stored 
thousands of pornographic images, including child pornography, on police servers. Regrettably, there is no reasoning at 
all in the court‟s decision as to how the court reached that decision under § 293(1); the only “reasoning” for the 
conviction is a restatement of the prosecution‟s indictment in a single sentence. Therefore, there is not much to learn 
about the scope of § 293(1) from that case alone in terms of unauthorized use of computers, since the particular factual 
circumstances of the case are somewhat unclear. The criminal code § 293(1) and its use against the police prosecutor 
may serve as an “unauthorized access to computers” provision (that does not require that information was obtained), in 
that the difference between access and use of a computer is ostensibly non-existent, whereas there is considerable 
difference between access to and use of information. However, if the defendant had authorized access to use the 
computer, and he uses the computer contrary to policy or stores illegal material on it, should not as such result in a 
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revocation of authorization based on purpose of use. The illegality of the materials stored was already criminalized. 
Breach of internal policy – as explained in the chapter on insiders – should not automatically revoke authorization, but 
should rely on contract law and labor law remedies, and the criminal law with respect to the possession of the illegal 
content. This avoids the need to create a strategy for how to get past the fact that the person was authorized to use the 
computer.
779
 
 
 
10.7 Summary 
Although “without right” places the primary limitation on the reach of the scope of hacking statutes, 
how “access” is construed is not unimportant, either. Because the conduct must fit every element of 
the hacking statute for the conduct to trigger the statute‟s application, the construction of “access” 
to an extent controls the relevance of “without right” in certain cases. For example, if “access” is 
construed narrowly so as to mean that a computer must be entered, then portscanning, pinging and 
the likes (maybe even access to public websites) regardless of whether the act was done without the 
authorization of the owner, falls outside the scope of the hacking statute. How “access” is construed 
is thus important, because it impacts the extent of the relevance of whether an act was done with or 
without right. 
The Convention on Cybercrime, according to the Explanatory Report, also indicates that the 
appropriate approach is a middle ground between Kerr‟s narrow and broad constructions of 
“access”. However, as pointed out in the chapter on authorization with respect to outsiders, the 
Explanatory Report exempts from the scope of illegal access, the access to publicly accessible 
systems, e.g. webservers that allow free and open access by the public. The drafters of the 
Convention and the Report do not exempt such access from the scope because it does not constitute 
“access” (and such an approach would, like Kerr and Clough point out, be rather arbitrary), but 
because such access is considered to always be “with right”. 
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The Council‟s Framework Decision and the Directive do not define “access”. Therefore, there is not 
much to say about how a court might construe illegal access under either legislative act. However, 
by requiring that a security measure must be infringed for the access to trigger criminal liability (as 
well as the access being without right), the Directive implicitly excludes access to e.g. webservers 
that allow free and open access by the public. This may not be true in all cases of publicly 
accessible webservers, since it is regrettably unclear what is considered a security measure under 
the Directive.
780
 However, under the Framework Decision, which ostensibly only Denmark is still 
bound by, it is not mandatory to restrict illegal access to only cover those acts that involve 
infringement of security measures. 
So far, the few Danish decisions that touch upon the meaning of “access” have resulted in a 
construction that requires more than just causing the computer to function, which is in accordance 
with the explanation of “access” found in the Committee Report of 1985. However, there is 
insufficient data to suggest that the Danish courts or Danish legislature have adopted what Orin 
Kerr dubs the narrow reading, because there is, so far, no case that has excluded application of the 
hacking provision solely on the grounds that what was “accessed” was e.g. a public website. The 
Danish approach appears to be a middle ground between Kerr‟s broad construction of access and 
his narrow construction of access, because the Danish courts require the computer to have been 
entered, or that the person causing the computer to function did so with intent to gain entry 
(attempt). Under that logic, computers through which an email is routed are hardly “accessed” in a 
way relevant to an “unauthorized access” provision, such that it would trigger criminal liability 
absent authorization. However, since the Danish provision prohibits unauthorized access to 
programs and information, the statutory language does not strictly dictate such a result, nor is there 
support in the language for the result. The support for the courts‟ construction of “access” is found 
in the 1985 Committee Report, which still leaves some room for discussion where a creative and 
aggressive prosecutor or plaintiff desires to challenge the current construction, which ostensibly 
rests only on two unreported district court decisions on portscanning. 
Construing “access” narrowly is tempting in order to exclude conduct that does not resemble 
“hacking” much; especially in light of the problems presented by “without right” that indicate that 
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“without right” / “without authorization” actually places very few limitations on the scope of 
hacking statutes. US courts have often implicitly accepted a broad construction of “access” whilst 
interpreting “without authorization” either very broadly or relatively narrowly (compared to the 
broader options), leading to the CFAA being applied quite differently in similar cases where the 
conduct differs only as to in which jurisdiction it took place. The chapter on authorization with 
respect to outsiders will show that there are numerous CFAA cases involving access to publicly 
accessible websites in addition to the case cited above involving the sending of email constituting 
access to the AOL servers through which the emails passed. 
Finally, there is the important distinction between “access” and “use”. The distinction is not 
important with respect to access to and use of a computer, but it is extremely important with respect 
to access to information. There is an obvious difference between authorized access to information 
and authorized use of information. Whereas access merely means that the information can be 
obtained, use relates to what one does with the information later on. Use of information is already 
regulated by several areas of law, for example, data privacy law, trade secret law, copyright law, 
trademark law, and so on. For example, the Koch case mentioned above illustrates the difference 
between access and use, in that the defendants‟ undesirable later use of information from a public 
website did not mean that the access to the website was unauthorized. 
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11 AUTHORIZATION - OUTSIDERS 
Outsiders are those lacking any authorization to access the computer (US law), or information or 
program (Danish law). The legislative history of the CFAA and the legislative history of the Danish 
hacking provision both distinguish between the situations of 1) persons who have no authorization 
(outsiders) and 2) those that have some authorization (insiders). The distinction, which was perhaps 
quite useful as a legal distinction before internet access became commonplace, has become a 
murkier one in a networked world where everyone in the world has some authorization of sorts to 
access a myriad of publicly accessible systems, be it webservers, file-sharing servers, email servers 
and so on. This chapter deals with the concept of (lack of) authorization as it applies to “outsiders”. 
Nevertheless, the insider-outsider distinction is still relevant in terms of IT security, despite there 
not being a clear consensus about how to e.g. define “insider”. Thus, the core problems related to 
“true” insiders, such as employees, who have privileged access to systems or information not 
available to the public, are still relevant. But that relationship substantially differs from the 
relationship between a website owner and a member of the public who happens to visit the website.  
In the US, the distinction between insiders and outsiders has manifested itself in the statutory text of 
the CFAA; “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”. In Denmark, “without right” 
applies to both insiders and outsiders, i.e. both to those that have some authorization to use the 
computer and those that have no authorization. Additional language such as “exceeds authorization” 
is not needed in the Danish hacking provision, but it is pointed out in the 1985 Committee Report 
that employees who exceed their authorization by accessing information that lie outside the scope of 
authorization have accessed the information “without authorization”.
781
 It is important to note that 
the Committee stated that not all employees who exceed their authorization are necessarily subject 
to criminal liability; whether the employee‟s act falls within our outside the scope of § 263(2) ought 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
782
 The question of whether acts “exceed authorization” is 
necessarily dependent on the definition of “authorization”, which is why authorization with respect 
to outsiders is taken on first. 
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11.1 Sources of “authorization” 
Authorization, in its traditional legal meaning, manifests itself mainly in consent (be it implied, 
express, written, oral, etc.), but authorization may in some instances also follow from statutory 
rights and obligations
783
. It is, however, unclear to which extent consent, or the absence of consent, 
and the multitude of ways consent may manifest itself is intended to regulate the scopes of criminal 
statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to computers, and information and programs. Several 
problems arise if the consent paradigm is applied unchecked in a way that allows a computer, 
information or program owners to exercise complete and absolute control over any and all rights to 
interact with the computer etc., even where the computer runs servers that allow free and open 
access by the public to the information. 
The American “without authorization” / “without right” are not defined in the CFAA, the Danish 
criminal code or Convention on Cybercrime. In an attempt to shed some light on the matter, I will 
first analyze “without right” in the context of the Convention, since both Denmark and the United 
States have ratified the Convention, and furthermore, because the EU cybercrime legislation is 
based on the Convention. Then, I will examine what “without right” means in the EU cybercrime 
context, since Denmark has implemented the 2005 Framework Decision on attacks against 
information systems, which does define “without right”. The EU Directive that repealed and 
amended the Framework Decision for all member states except for Denmark provides, in some 
respects, some significant improvements to the Framework Decision, which Denmark may or may 
not benefit from implementing despite not being obligated to do so. Finally, I will use US courts‟ 
interpretation and construction of “authorization” in the CFAA and the factual circumstances of the 
CFAA cases to show the possible reach of the Danish criminal code § 263(2). There are rather few 
reported § 263(2) cases and thus it is interesting to explore how broad the scope could and should 
be pushed as Danish court start seeing more hacking cases. “Without right” is intended to be the 
limiting factor of a very broadly phrased provision, but as will be shown, if the scope will be limited 
by “without right” depends on the courts construction of language that otherwise provides rather 
little guidance to those enforcing such a broad statute of what is illegal and what is not; especially, 
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as the scope continues to expand into new contexts in tandem with information systems being 
integrated in every aspect of our lives. 
The subject of the following sections is therefore the source and extent of authorization based on 
legislative history, statutory language and case law. It will be shown that the Convention‟s and EU 
law‟s aspirations of harmonization of domestic substantive criminal law arguably fails to be 
meaningful, because the meaning of the broad key elements of the crimes have been left to the 
domestic legal system (in addition to the lack of harmonization of general principles of criminal 
law, such as mens rea, which also affects the extent of the criminalization). Leaving these core 
concepts to be construed differently by each signatory leads to numerous different applications of 
hacking statutes, even though the statutes are implementing the same Convention. 
 
11.2 “Without right” in the Convention on Cybercrime 
The 2001 Convention was created and signed after the invention of the Web and commercialization 
of the internet; unlike the American CFAA and the Danish provisions on computer crime
784
. The 
drafters of the Convention, thus, had ample opportunity to consider the implications of applying 
traditional trespass inspired computer crime law to a networked world where shared computers are a 
norm and not an exception as was the case in the 1980s. As stated before, the US had vast influence 
on the drafting of the Convention and the Explanatory Report due to its experience with computer 
crime, and according to the Department of Justice, succeeded in drafting a Convention that 
essentially mirrored existing US law. Denmark, like the US, has also ratified the Convention
785
, and 
the Danish government made numerous references
786
 to the text of the Convention and the 
Explanatory Report when commenting on the amendments to the Criminal Code and the 
Administration of Justice Act
787
 in preparation for the ratification of the Convention, creating at 
least a tentative presumption that the Danish government and the legislature had some regard for the 
Explanatory Report as an interpretational aid. It is prudent to look at how the Explanatory report 
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defines without right
788
, because the Convention does not itself provide such a definition. The 
Explanatory Report paragraph 38, states the following about “without right”: 
“A specificity of the offences included is the express requirement that the conduct involved is done “without right”. It 
reflects the insight that the conduct described is not always punishable per se, but may be legal or justified not only in 
cases where classical legal defences are applicable, like consent, self-defence or necessity, but where other principles or 
interests lead to the exclusion of criminal liability. The expression „without right‟ derives its meaning from the context 
in which it is used. Thus, without restricting how Parties may implement the concept in their domestic law, it may refer 
to conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or 
consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not covered by established legal defences, excuses, justifications or relevant 
principles under domestic law.” 
This excerpt from the Explanatory Report explains exceptionally little. Consent, self-defense, 
necessity, other principles or interests, contract, and so on. Complete deference to domestic law 
with respect to defining the meaning of the concept that places the primary “limitation” on the 
scope. Nothing is excluded; everything is made possible. How differently “authorization” or “right” 
can be construed, is evident in CFAA cases in US law. 
However, the drafters seemingly agreed, in the Explanatory Report, that not everything falls within 
the scope of article 2. They specifically exempted publicly accessible systems: 
“The act must also be committed „without right‟. In addition to the explanation given above on this expression, it means 
that there is no criminalisation of the access authorised by the owner or other right holder of the system or part of it 
(such as for the purpose of authorised testing or protection of the computer system concerned). Moreover, there is no 
criminalisation for accessing a computer system that permits free and open access by the public, as such access is 
“with right”.”
789
 
The language of the last sentence references not what the owner allows, but what the system allows. 
Arguably, here it is the system that acts as a kind of proxy for the owner. If the system grants 
access, the access is authorized; however, whether what the system technically allows is controlling 
in cases where the owner has forbidden a particular user to access his publicly accessible system is 
unclear. 
This question of man versus machine in terms of whose authorization counts is complicated by the 
next paragraph of the Explanatory Report. The Explanatory Report paragraph 48 addresses issues of 
consent with respect to one type of publicly accessible system, a webserver: 
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“The maintenance of a public web site implies consent by the web site-owner that it can be accessed by any other 
web-user. The application of standard tools provided for in the commonly applied communication protocols and 
programs, is not in itself „without right‟, in particular where the right holder of the accessed system can be considered to 
have accepted its application, e.g. in the case of „cookies‟ by not rejecting the initial instalment or not removing it.”
790
 
791
 
The basis for authorization to access publicly accessible webservers is thus implied consent.
792
 The 
text furthermore impliedly excludes hypothetical consent, which is generally, at least in Danish law, 
considered to have no exculpatory effect anyway. This follows from the part of the text that 
ostensibly requires an owner to have considered the possibility of a tool‟s application and arguably 
at least implicitly accepted the possibility of the tool‟s application. Nevertheless, does that 
necessarily mean that unexpected access to a website, or any other publicly accessible resource, is 
criminal just because consent cannot cover, with exculpatory effect, that which the owner has not 
considered and accepted as a possibility before the fact? 
It is the implied authorization (consent) to access mentioned in the Explanatory Report‟s paragraph 
48, although almost never articulated in legislation or by courts, that is taken for granted by most, 
and unless met with access restrictions, few people, if any at all, would think of contacting a 
website owner in order to acquire explicit authorization to access prior to any visit to the website.
793
 
However, that is not to say that consent necessarily is the appropriate basis for authorization to 
access public websites. The Explanatory Report‟s paragraph 43 lays the groundwork for the 
Report‟s subsequent discussions of the Convention‟s article 2 to 6, by stating the following: 
“The criminal offences defined under (Articles 2-6) are intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of computer systems or data and not to criminalise legitimate and common activities inherent in the design of networks, 
or legitimate and common operating or commercial practices.” 
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The Explanatory Report paragraphs cited above expressly state that publicly accessible systems and 
resources are not protected by article 2 of the Budapest Convention, because, as paragraph 47 
clearly asserts, there is no criminal act if the computer system allows free and open access by the 
public. Furthermore, paragraphs 44 and 48 strongly indicate that any interests beyond 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems or data, fall outside the intended 
scope of article 2. That which is publicly accessible is inherently not confidential. Thus, the 
computer system‟s access controls, as opposed to the website owner‟s subjective wishes or hopes, 
appear to be the deciding factor with respect to publicly accessible systems. Under the Convention, 
as interpreted in light of the Explanatory Report, contractual agreements are, arguably, relegated to 
governing access authorization that requires prior negotiation for authorization; that is, for access to 
a non-public website or other service that does not allow free and open access by the public in the 
sense that accessing the website grants access to something more than that which is accessible by 
the public. This is a reasonable result, because where the owner places his information out in public, 
the access by the public carries with it no implications for any of the protected interests at the heart 
of hacking provisions, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
 
 
11.3 “Without right” in the EU Framework Decision and the EU Directive 
The 2005 Framework Decision defines “without right” in article 1(d): 
“„[W]ithout right‟ means access or interference not authorised by the owner, other right holder of the system or part of 
it, or not permitted under the national legislation.” 
The 2002 proposal for the Framework Decision emphasized that it was important that certain 
activities, such as ordinary actions of users and legitimate scientific research, would not be 
criminalized when the Framework Decision is transposed into national law.
794
 None of those 
exceptions from the scope made it into the 2005 Framework Decision.
795
 Similarly, in the same 
proposal, the Commission concedes that “without right” is a broad notion, and it recognizes that it 
leaves flexibility to the member states. However, the Commission also noted that that flexibility 
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should be tempered by exemption of certain activities from the scope; namely, those activities and 
persons defined as “autorised person”, a definition which did not make it into the final version of 
the Framework Decision, and thus, nor did the exceptions from criminalization contained in it that 
were supposed to temper the flexibility given to member states to define the scope of the offenses. 
In other words, the meaning of “without right” in the context of the Framework Decision is broader 
than that of the Convention‟s as interpreted in light of the Explanatory Report. This is because, as 
opposed to the Explanatory Report, which was adopted alongside the Convention (although it is not 
binding), the 2002 proposal is just a proposal, many parts of which were not adopted and its value 
as an interpretative aid is questionable at best. “Without right” is essentially, again, just a reference 
back to national law. 
Article 2(d) of the Directive defines “without right” in the following way: 
“„[W]ithout right‟ means conduct referred to in this Directive, including access, interference, or interception, which is 
not authorised by the owner or by another right holder of the system or of part of it, or not permitted under national 
law.” 
The language is slightly odd, again, because it equates “without right” also with the conduct that is 
not permitted, rather than just equating “without right” with lack of permission (be it the owner‟s or 
permission derived from law). The proposal for the Directive does not differ significantly from the 
language in the final Directive. Although the language is peculiar, in that it could be read as making 
“without right” redundant in an article prohibiting “access without right” because, as the definition 
alludes to: without right = unauthorized conduct. That reading makes little sense, and there is no 
reason given in the proposal for the Directive as to why the definition is phrased in such an odd 
manner. Reading the definition of “without right” in a way that makes redundant the usage of 
“without right” in the remainder of the Directive is nonsensical. Thus, for the purposes of this 
dissertation – and because it is arguably the way it is supposed to be understood – “without right” is 
read as “lack of permission under national law, or lack of authorization from the owner or other 
right holder” rather than being read as meaning “conduct that is unauthorized”. 
However, the definitions of “without right” in both the Framework Decision and Directive simply 
do what the Convention did (minus an explanatory report to clear things up); “without right” refers 
back to the national law for possible source of permission, and also so with respect to 
consent/permission of the owner, since what qualifies as exculpatory consent in criminal law or 
permission under other laws, is a question of national law, not EU law. 
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As discussed in the chapter on “access” in terms of the Directive, the additional requirement that a 
security measure must have been circumvented for the unauthorized access to fall within the scope 
of the Directive‟s unauthorized access prohibition, limits which accesses to information systems are 
capable of triggering the domestic implementation of the Directive‟s article 3 (Framework 
Decision‟s article 2). The Directive should invariably be interpreted in light of the preamble. The 
preamble of the Directive states the purpose of this particular legislative act. Thus, when the 
Directive‟s preamble recital 17 further excludes a variety of factual constellations, for example, if 
the lack of authorization is derived solely from a contractual violation (e.g. violation of terms of 
service, use policies, including use of an employer‟s computers for private purposes)
 796
 this places 
some limits on how national courts can construe the implementing provision as they are obligated 
by the principle of consistent interpretation to construe the implementing provision in light of the 
Directive‟s preamble as far as possible under national law (interpreting the implementing provision 
in light of the Directive‟s object and purpose as derived from i.e. the preamble). However, as noted 
before, Denmark is not bound by the Directive and Danish courts are not obligated to construe any 
provisions in light of the Directive‟s preamble or the Directive itself. Even so, in light of the 
problematic constructions of the CFAA in absence of boundaries such as those placed by the 
Directive‟s preamble, Danish courts could get ample insight into the consequences of not placing 
such boundaries on the scope of § 263(2), which is in some ways even broader than the broadest, 
often criticized unauthorized access provision in the CFAA, 18 § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
 
 
11.4  “Without right” in the Danish Criminal Code § 263(2) 
“Without right” in the context of the Danish criminal code § 263(2) appears to be three-faceted. 
First, it is a reference to an important principle of statutory construction. Second, where the owner 
or other right holder has consented to the access there is no crime. Finally, the Committee report 
alludes to a possible third facet, a reasonable expectations test to determine whether access was or 
was not with right. Additionally, due to the placement of § 263(2) in the chapter on privacy 
violations, not all information or programs are necessary protected if they are not kept private. 
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11.4.1 “Without right” as a reference to a principle of statutory construction 
As with the concept of “access”, there is no definition of “without right” in the Danish criminal 
code section 263(2) or anywhere else in the criminal code for that matter. Yet, this is not the only 
provision in the Danish criminal code where the words “without right”, or similar variants, 
appear.
797
 Trine Baumbach determined in her dissertation “Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip” 
(translated: “The principle of legality in criminal law”) that “unauthorized”, “unlawfully”, “without 
right” and the likes, can differ in their legal substance. For example, sometimes these terms are a 
reference to a legal standard in another statute or doctrine
798
, and, sometimes, they are a reference to 
the principle of statutory construction called material atypicality.
799
 There is no doubt whatsoever, 
in the case of § 263(2), that “without right” is a specific reference to the aforementioned principle of 
statutory construction, because the Committee that drafted subsection (2) stated so explicitly in its 
report
800
. It should be noted though that this principle of statutory construction applies to all 
substantive criminal law provisions, regardless of whether a Committee or the legislature states so 
explicitly or not. 
The Committee added in relation to the above quote from the 1985 report regarding reasonable 
expectations, that the provision, meaning also the term “without right”, both covers situations where 
the person in question has no authorization and where the person has some authorization but 
exceeds his authorization. In a somewhat more concrete manner, the Committee explains the 
interpretation of “without right”. The Committee explains the first facet of the use of the term 
“without right” in § 263(2): 
“As with the other privacy violations it is deemed necessary to add the word[s] “without right” as a part of the criminal 
elements. Thereby it is indicated that situations may arise where one only on a case-by-case basis can determine 
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 E.g. the term unauthorized/without right also appears in the trespass provision in the Danish criminal code § 264. 
798
 In Denmark the legislative history does not support interpreting “without right” in light of another legal standard or 
doctrine because first of all, any clear reference to another standard is absent, and secondly, the legislator has clearly 
stated in legislative history that “without right” is a reference to a principle of statutory construction. The US legislator 
was not as clear as to how the courts ought to interpret “without authorization” nor did it specifically point to any 
specific standard or doctrine, but a couple of Circuits have relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 in their 
interpretation of “authorization” (“Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of the agent terminates if, without knowledge 
of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the 
principle.”). See Shurgard v. Safeguard, 119 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125 (W.D.Wash. 2000) and Int’l Airport Centers v. 
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-421 (7
th
 Cir. 2006)(relying on Shurgard). It is important to note though that this cessation-of-
agency approach has been rejected by most circuits, but to name a few specific cases for further reading, see for 
instance discussion in Dresser-Rand v. Jones, 2013 WL 3810859 (E.D.Pa.) and the 9
th
 Circuit‟s explicit rejection of the 
approach in US v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-863 (9
th
 Cir. 2012)(en banc).  
799
 Trine Baumbach, Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip, 466 et seq. 
800
 Committee Report 1985 no. 1032 at 26 
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whether an act, which technically falls within the scope of the provision‟s language, is punishable. The aforementioned 
reservation will not have any practical relevance when the acts are committed by persons lacking any authorization to 
access the system. As far as employees are concerned the result will be the same where the employee in question has 
used a personal access code, which does not belong to him, and done so to gain access to information that falls outside 
his authorization. But there may be borderline cases where the employee has acted outside his job description, but not in 
such manner that he must be penalized. In such situations the word[s] “without right” indicate[] that a concrete 
evaluation of the situation is appropriate.”
801
 
When the Committee writes that it is necessary to add the term “without right” as an element of the 
crime, it is referring to a principle of statutory construction in Danish law called “the principle of 
material atypicality”
802
. The principle plays an important role in Danish criminal law. Material 
atypicality refers to conduct that is atypical in terms of the type of conduct the legislature intended 
to criminalize through a particular provision.
803
 A popular example is that related to surgeons. 
Under Danish law, a person cannot legally consent to infliction of serious bodily harm and so even 
if a person has consented to such harm, the person inflicting the harm would still face criminal 
liability regardless of the consent. In those situations, a surgeon carrying out an invasive procedure 
would not and could not be exempted from criminal liability under the aggravated assault statute 
due to the patient‟s consent. Even though the surgeon‟s conduct constitutes infliction of serious 
bodily harm, his conduct is very different from that of the typical concept of aggravated assault. 
Because the surgeon‟s conduct is atypical with respect to the conduct intended to be criminalized, 
material atypicality removes the surgeon‟s conduct from the scope of the aggravated assault 
provision (assuming of course the operation served a legitimate purpose, the patient did consent if 
capable of doing so, and thus, is not actually an assault).
804
 Like consent is a manifestation of the 
victim‟s will that can in some instances absolve the perpetrator from criminal liability, material 
atypicality can be thought of as a manifestation of the legislature‟s will to exempt the act from the 
material scope of a provision.
805
 
806
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 Committee Report 1985 no. 1032 at 26 
802
 The principle has evolved in Scandinavian criminal law over many decades. Its history will not be the subject of this 
article. See more Trine Baumbach, Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip. 
803
 The act does not have to be explicitly exempted from criminal liability in the preparatory works. See U 1970.680/1V 
where the stepson was acquitted of the charge of „unauthorised use‟ of a vehicle belonging to his stepfather, even 
though the act clearly fell within the scope of the Danish criminal code section 293. 
804
 See more detailed discussion in Malene Bechmann Christensen: Det strafferetlige samtykke (2008), pp. 56 et seq. 
There is not complete agreement among academics whether it is consent or material atypicality that results in the 
surgeon‟s conduct not being criminal. 
805
 The principle can be seen as a “not a crime because of the will of the legislator” whereas consent can be seen as “not 
a crime because of the will of the victim”. Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 535, note 210 
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Vague and broad criminal provisions, although never preferable, especially in terms of reasonable 
foreseeability, are sometimes necessary to criminalize acts, which are not easily defined using 
precise terminology. The Danish hacking provision, just like its Convention and US counterparts, is 
a prime example of such a broad and unclear provision, characterized by its ability to catch all sorts 
of acts, many of which the legislature, in 1985, could not have predicted and may not necessarily 
have intended to criminalize. The Danish Committee‟s choice to include the words “without right” 
in section 263 (2) signals both the acknowledgment of the lack of clarity of the provision and serves 
as a special notice to the judiciary that whether conduct is “without right” should be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, because acts that are covered by the statutory language may sometimes lack 
the characteristics of the type of crime intended to be criminalized
807
.
808
 
 
11.4.2 “Without right” as a reference to lack of consent 
There is little mention in the Committee report of consent as a source of “right”. However, that is 
not required as such because the words “without right” in the context of section 263(2) (and 
similarly in the trespass provision in § 264) imply that the owner can authorize others to access her 
information and/or programs – making their access authorized. Generally, consent is a defense to 
many privacy violations. Therefore, both consent and material atypicality act as limitations to the 
broad scope of the Danish hacking provision; one representing the victim‟s will and the other the 
will of the legislature. 
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 Sometimes the Ministry proposing the bill gives examples of such situations in the bill or a Committee does so in its 
reports. 
807
 Trine Baumbach: Det strafferetlige legalitetsprincip (2008), p. 468 
808
 Generally speaking, for an act to incur criminal liability under any given criminal provision the act must fall within 
the scope of the description of the actus reus, mens rea and additionally the act must be unlawful (absence of any 
defence, excuse or justification that alleviates criminal liability for an otherwise criminal act). In Danish law it has both 
been argued that, systematically, the material atypicality principle is associated with the actus reus requirement and also 
that it is associated with the „unlawful‟ requirement.  Baumbach argues in her dissertation “The principle of legality in 
criminal law”, and I agree, that it is not immaterial whether the principle concerns the former or the latter. On the one 
hand, if the principle came into play as part of the “unlawful” analysis, it has already been legally concluded that the 
defendant committed a crime, and the “unlawful” analysis serves only to determine whether the defendant had a legally 
relevant excuse for committing the act that may exempt her from penalty. On the other hand, if the principle is 
associated with the actus reus analysis, “material atypicality” is not treated as a legal excuse for committing a crime, but 
as a reason for the absence of actus reus – meaning there was no criminal act. 
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11.4.3 A “reasonable expectations test” as a construction of “without right” 
As mentioned, § 263(2) is placed in the Danish criminal code‟s chapter on privacy violations. The 
chapter consists of rules addressing prohibited acts such as criminal trespass (§ 264), defamation (§ 
268), and the unauthorized photographing of persons on non-public property (§ 264a). In the 
Committee‟s 1985 report, the Committee states the following in relation to § 263(2) and its 
placement in the chapter on privacy violations: 
“As with the other privacy violations, violations of the suggested provision will comprise a person gaining access to 
something, which with respect to them can reasonably be expected to be a restricted area, that is, inaccessible.”
809
 
The concept of reasonable expectations, although in many ways appropriate as a test in privacy 
contexts in the physical world where we have had hundreds of years to figure out the line between 
the acceptable and unacceptable with regards to trespass, is problematic in a highly interconnected 
world where sharing computers is the norm and information is often made publicly accessible, e.g. 
on the web. Conceptually, the reasonable expectations test is a question of social norms and the 
ability and possibility of observing and deducing limitations on conduct in a given context. Those 
norms have not been created or discovered yet with respect to the law in a computer context. There 
is no Danish case law that could clarify how such a reasonable expectations test would work in 
practice in a computer context or in the broader internet context. An American federal appellate 
court, however, has addressed a question of viability of a reasonable expectations test in a computer 
and internet context, and the case shows that reasonable expectations in a computer context, 
especially an Internet context, is far from being a settled matter, or even an easy matter to resolve. 
In EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer
810
, the First Circuit rejected a “reasonable expectations” test that had 
been applied by the district court stating amongst other things that such a test would be a “highly 
imprecise, litigation-spawning standard”
811
. The district court‟s test of “reasonable expectations” 
entailed, essentially, that the lack of authorization to access could be inferred from the 
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 Committee report 1985 no. 1032, p. 25. Emphasis added. 
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 EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1
st
 Cir 2003). The test which was proposed by the district court was 
based on the following factors that the district court found to be circumstances from which “lack of authorization could 
be inferred”: “the copyright notice on EF‟s homepage with a link directing users to contact the company with questions; 
EF‟s provision to Zefer of confidential information obtained in breach of the employee confidentiality agreements; and 
the fact that the website was configured to allow ordinary visitors to the site to view only one page at a time.” 
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 EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1
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circumstances.
 812
 This may be true in certain situations as will become apparent in the section on 
“without authorization” in US law. Social norms do affect the analysis of authorization, but the 
analysis of the connected cases Zefer and Explorica shows that a reasonable expectations test is far 
from appropriate where there is no norm to tie into the reasonable expectation. The EF v. Zefer case 
concerned the scope of an injunction against EF‟s competitor Explorica regarding Explorica‟s use 
of EF‟s public website to obtain price information. Zefer had designed a “scraper” (or “bot”) for 
Explorica, the purpose of which was to scrape
813
 price information from EF‟s website so Explorica 
could compete more efficiently with EF‟s student tour prices. Zefer had used “codes” for 
destinations and departure locations, which were an element of the URL, to accumulate the price 
information automatically and more quickly than if done by manual browsing of the website. EF 
contended that these “codes” were proprietary confidential information obtained by Explorica from 
a person bound by a confidentiality agreement with EF. The “codes”, however, were easily visible 
to anyone paying attention to the URL (for example, “BOS” for Boston as the city of departure or 
destination). Thus, some manual browsing whilst observing the URL could easily have enabled a 
person, given they had the sufficient interest in doing so, to decipher and generate a list of those 
“codes”, because the “codes” were visible to anyone, and then interpret their meaning based on the 
surrounding information. When finding in favor of EF and granting the injunction against 
Explorica, the district court (whose decision was being appealed) argued that lack of authorization 
could have been deduced from the three circumstances in the case. First, the copyright notice on 
EF‟s website that referred users to contact EF with questions. Second, Zefer, who made the scraper, 
had constructed the scraper with the help of supposedly confidential “codes”. Third, that ordinary 
users of the website would have to click through it one page at a time.
814
 From those circumstances 
Explorica and Zefer should have deduced that their manner of access was unauthorized and their 
subsequent use of the information was unauthorized. The court never really asked whether the 
defendants were authorized to access the public website, but just considered how and why they 
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 EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1
st
 Cir. 2003). E.g. that because dropdown menus were present 
on the website, changing the URL to navigate would be unauthorized access because the user should expect to be bound 
to use hyperlinks and dropdown menus when provided and thus not use any other method of browsing the website. 
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 In order to understand what the act of scraping price information entails in this case, imagine, for the sake of 
convenience, the more relatable action of copying prices from a publicly accessible website and pasting them into a file 
on your local machine. The scraping in the EF cases was simply automated. Automation of redundant tasks does not 
indicate “malice” or something of the sort; an integral part of the purpose and art of programming is to avoid the 
redundancy of manual operations. 
814
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st
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accessed the public website, regardless of the fact that anyone in the world could access the price 
information Explorica and Zefer obtained from the website. 
The First Circuit upheld the injunction on the grounds that Explorica had misused the supposed 
confidential “codes” and, thus, Zefer was prohibited from assisting Explorica in violating the 
injunction. But the First Circuit very explicitly rejected the reasonable expectation test applied by 
the trial court because the test had no support in the legislative history and, furthermore, that such a 
test would not be “prudentially sound”.
815
 First, the copyright symbol did not protect the 
information in question, and thus, had not, like the district court argued, dispelled any notion of 
presumption of open access to the website and the information. Second, the presence of hyperlinks 
and dropdown menus, which of course the scraper did not use since it accessed the website by 
supplying URLs, were not technical restraints that suggested that a website could not be accessed at 
higher speed by not using hyperlinks and dropdown menus provided by the website owner.
816
 
Incorporating such a reasonable expectation test, at least in the form proposed by the district court 
in Explorica, in a context where a norm is non-existent, would truly make anyone criminally liable, 
because any plaintiff, or the prosecution for that matter, can argue that hyperlinks ought to have 
been used, or that a defendant was obligated to ask permission regarding subsequent use of 
information because of the presence of a copyright symbol, even where the information that the 
defendant used was not protected by copyright law. Combined with the website owner‟s objection 
to the manner of access and the purpose of the access, there would be no way for anyone to avoid 
incurring criminal liability, even where the open web creates a strong presumption for authorization 
to access information on public website. The court, however, explicitly stated that its opinion was 
not based on a “presumption of open access to Internet information”
817
, but merely on the fact that 
EF could have banned scrapers in its terms, but did not.
818
 That is, the First Circuit, in dicta, 
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 EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp. at 63 („We agree with the district court that lack of authorization may be implicit, 
rather than explicit. After all, password protection itself normally limits authorization by implication (and technology), 
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 Cir. 2003) and EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 
577, 580-581 (1
st
 Cir. 2001) 
817
 EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 577, 580 (1
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indicated that EF could have restricted authorization to access the website by automatic means, by 
writing in its terms that it banned the use of scrapers (a manner of accessing otherwise publicly 
accessible information). Were the reasonable expectation test applicable to Explorica, Explorica 
would be liable under the CFAA regardless of their use of a scraper; EF would have resented the 
purpose of Explorica‟s visits to the website, regardless of how the information was accessed.
819
 
Ultimately, the injunction stood only because the codes were obtained from a person, seemingly, in 
violation of their confidentiality agreement with EF. 
The First Circuit‟s rationale behind the decision to reject a reasonable expectation test, at least in 
that context, is valuable also in the Danish legal context, because it exposes the problems that such 
a test would pose in the context of public websites where the information is freely accessible to 
anyone. However, the district court applied their reasonable expectations test in a way that was not 
reasonably foreseeable at all given the context, because there was, as the First Circuit noted in 
Zefer, no common understanding underpinning the notion; that is, there was, and still is, no social 
norm that morally obligates anyone to ask for permission to use information that is publicly 
accessible and not protected by e.g. copyright law. Similarly there is still no social norm to the 
effect that a person is obligated to use dropdown menus and hyperlinks unless specifically 
authorized to navigate differently. If a person is obligated to adhere to social norms under the threat 
of criminal law, then those norms must actually exist and not be tortuously created on a case-by-
case basis to extend criminal law coverage to any and all conduct that is subjectively undesirable, 
annoying or inconvenient, to the website owner. There is no reason to assume that such a reasonable 
expectations test will fare any better or would prove any more applicable, appropriate or 
prudentially sound in the same context in Danish criminal law than in US law. There still would be 
“no common understanding underpinning the notion”
820
.
821
 The key to a reasonable expectations 
                                                                                                                                                                  
449 (C.D. Cali. 2009) declining to impose criminal liability for intentional breach of terms of service of a website under 
18 USC § 1030 (a)(2)(C), e.g. at 467 (“if any conscious breach of a website's terms of service is held to be sufficient by 
itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will 
be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law “that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to 
citizens who wish to use the [Internet].” City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 64, 119 S.Ct. 1849.”) 
819
 At 63 (“Needless to say, Zefer can have been in no doubt that EF would dislike the use of the scraper to construct a 
database for Explorica to undercut EF's prices; but EF would equally have disliked the compilation of such a database 
manually without the use of a scraper tool. EF did not purport to exclude competitors from looking at its website and 
any such limitation would raise serious public policy concerns.”) 
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 EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp. at 63 
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 Arguably, a reasonable expectation test has already been rejected by Danish courts in a context closely resembling 
the American cessation-of-agency cases, namely the case U 1996.979Ø (see note 24 above) from which it could 
tentatively be inferred that because the court held that the employee was authorized to access, and that the court did not 
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test is the existence of social norms. Absent social norms (that is, absent a common understanding 
amongst those regulated by a law criminalizing violation of some social norms), a conviction based 
on a “reasonable expectations” test is necessarily based only on arbitrary criteria that would offend 
a principle of foreseeability of application of criminal law. If the social norms do not exist, then the 
criteria for conviction do not, either, and thus, any criteria the court comes up with, and labels as 
“reasonable expectations” without those expectations being recognized by society, is arbitrary. 
Furthermore, especially involving publicly accessible internet resources, and also in other contexts 
where access is not restricted in a meaningful way, the reasonable expectations test would not really 
promote the general purpose of the statute; protecting privacy and supplement the security of 
computers. This is because privacy and confidentiality are inherently lost when information is made 
publicly accessible. Under other privacy provisions in the same chapter, leaving communication, 
such as letters, in an area which is travelled through by other people, protection of privacy under the 
criminal law is lost, because this could indicate that the owner of the letter no longer cares to keep 
the letters to himself.
822
 Thus, the protection of criminal law can be forfeited under certain 
circumstances where a person acts in a manner that is in contradiction to a desire to keep the 
information private. If the privacy protection in criminal law can be forfeited for private letters left 
in public where, in comparison to the Internet, a limited number of people will pass through, 
certainly, information made publicly accessible on the Internet equally causes a forfeiture of the 
privacy protection in criminal law. The presence of a copyright symbol, hyperlinks and dropdown 
menus cannot resurrect criminal law privacy protection against unauthorized access to the 
information that is publicly accessible. 
It is, then, not unreasonably to consider whether lack of security perhaps influences the outcome, if 
the absence of security is found to indicate forfeiture of criminal law protection or that its absence 
leaves the material freely accessible to the public; also the absence of security may at least make for 
a more lenient sentence for a defendant.
823
 As has been the case with every Danish committee 
                                                                                                                                                                  
address, much less accept, the prosecution‟s argument that the employee probably could reasonably expect that his 
authority to access would be revoked immediately upon his resignation (presumably due to it being a general policy to 
revoke such authorization when dealing with employees with access to confidential information). The court had an open 
invitation to employ a kind of reasonable expectations test but it did not accept that invitation in this context – which 
makes it that much more unlikely that Danish courts would be tempted to introduce a reasonable expectations test in the 
context of publicly accessible websites where there is far less probability of consensus as to what to reasonably expect. 
822
 See Committee Report on privacy 1971 no. 1601, pp. 26-27 
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 Committee Report 2002 no. 1417, pp. 25-26 (The ad hoc Committee argues that it is best if criminal law protection 
only plays a role where implemented security measures proved to be insufficient. At the sentencing phase, the courts 
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report relating to cybercrime, the Committee emphasizes in its report, 1985 no. 1032, that ensuring 
that effective security measures are in place undoubtedly has a far greater preventative effect than 
merely changing the criminal code to cover computer crimes.
824825
 These considerations imply that 
in the absence of security measures, the preventative effect of criminalization is little
826
; 
criminalization may arguably have some deterring effect
827
, but it does not in any way provide or 
increase the actual technical security. The law is reactionary and not directly preventative in its 
nature compared to computer system owners‟ implementation of security measures. However, as is 
evident from the statutory language, circumvention of a security measure is not an element of the 
crime. But under certain circumstances, arguably, primarily where the information is publicly 
accessible, the owner may lose his right to protection under criminal law, because there is no longer 
any privacy to protect. 
To summarize, very little is known about the scope of “without right” in the context of § 263(2) 
other than how it applies to classic instances of hacking, where an outsider, with no authorization to 
access the information in question, has attempted or succeeded in infringing security measures 
protecting information that the system does not make publicly accessible.
828
 Danish hacking cases 
                                                                                                                                                                  
then take into consideration whether there was adequate security and monitoring, or whether the lack of the same 
increased temptation due to lower risk of discovery, and enabled the offense to become especially serious. Of course, as 
noted by the Committee in the same report, organizations are not expected to be able to foresee and prevent exploitation 
of unknown security vulnerabilities.) 
824
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99-432 considering the amendments to the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 
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are few, and the courts almost without exception do not give much insight into their reasoning for 
the particular result other than by simply restating the facts. 
I will return to the subject of reasonable expectations as an approach to construe “without right” 
after I have used US case law to show why such an approach is preferable in comparison to several 
alternative approaches, all of which will be explained below in the sections on authorization with 
respect to insiders and outsiders. 
 
 
11.5 “Without authorization” in the CFAA 
Although the circuit split is most prominent with regard to when and whether misbehaving 
employees‟ conduct should trigger CFAA liability, there is not total disagreement as to how to deal 
with outsiders. However, that is not to say that US federal courts interpret the CFAA the same with 
respect to outsiders. There is no definition of authorization in the CFAA. There is only a definition 
of “exceeds authorized access”, which inherently relies on the meaning of the concept of 
“authorization” in the first place. 
In terms of the wide variety of situations the CFAA is applied to now, at least one commentator has suggested that the 
extensive application of the CFAA in civil cases may have led to a far more expansive interpretation of the provision 
than intended since it is primarily a criminal statute.
829
 As a criminal statute, the interpretation and construction of the 
CFAA should have been subject to the rule of lenity even when applied in civil cases, because the construction in civil 
cases applies equally in criminal cases. That is, the facts that are found legally relevant to determine whether 
unauthorized access incurs civil liability, will also become legally relevant to determine whether access was 
unauthorized in criminal cases. Seeing as the fair notice requirement is stricter with respect to criminal statutes than 
civil statutes, this complicates the applicability of the broad constructions, such as that allowed under the contract-based 
approach and agency-based approach. 
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There are some competing approaches to construing authorization that will be analyzed in the next 
few sections. 
 
11.5.1 A code-based approach 
Circumvention of code restrictions, e.g. in the form of password prompts, is arguably at the core of 
the provision, because circumventions of password prompts are the examples that were used in 
legislative history. The Committee reports, relating to the CFAA, discuss employees who use the 
password of another to gain access to information or computers that they do not have authorization 
to access themselves. 
 Although the legislative history does not explicitly reject broader readings, as such, this section 
will show that a purely code-based approach, the very core of the CFAA, regardless of whether 
other approaches exist in the penumbra, is itself unclear and calls for arbitrary decision-making, as 
well as that the code-based approach does not account for convictions for accesses that society 
would normally view as unauthorized, but which are not prohibited through code. 
Orin Kerr
830
 and Patricia Bellia advocate for a code-based approach in construing authorization in 
the CFAA. However, even though Kerr and Bellia seem to refer to access restrictions and 
exploitation of vulnerabilities, many things can be viewed or construed as code restrictions and not 
all alleged code restrictions are remotely effective as security measures. Recall the argument of the 
plaintiff in EF v. Explorica that manipulating the URL instead of using the hyperlinks and 
dropdown menus was circumventing technical restrictions. However, no one would perceive 
hyperlinks and dropdown menus as access restrictions, because they are inherently ineffective as 
such and not recognized as such. Construing “code restrictions” in a broad manner, as some courts 
seem to have done
831
, dissipates the need to inquire whether the code restrictions are really effective 
and meaningful as access controls. Whether Kerr means that the code-based approach for which he 
advocated means that code restrictions need only be more or less symbolic to resolve a notice issue, 
or whether the code restrictions need to constitute effective and recognized security measures is 
unclear. As will be shown below, relying on a broad understanding of a code-based approach for 
construing authorization calls for arbitrary inclusions and exclusions from the scope of unauthorized 
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access statutes that do not require e.g. circumventions of effective security measures. That is, a 
code-based approach for construing authorization narrowly, suffers from the same arbitrariness that 
Kerr argues makes reading “access” narrowly unviable. Code-based approaches could in many 
circumstances call for reliance on a form of “social norms” that do not really exist (cf. the section 
above on “reasonable expectations”). Similarly, a narrower view of the code-based approach to 
construing authorization – i.e. requiring that the code restrictions are bona fide security measures – 
misses some instances of unauthorized access that are not prohibited through code, but nonetheless 
should still be considered unauthorized even though “code allowed the access”. 
 
11.5.1.1 Unexpected and undesired access 
The beginning of what is ostensibly, but not entirely, a code-based approach appeared in 1991 in the 
Second Circuit with US v. Morris
832
. Morris had been charged with violation of § 1030(a)(5)(A) 
(intentionally accessing federal interest computers without authorization and damaging or 
preventing authorized use of information on such computers). Morris released a “worm”
833
 onto the 
embryonic internet. The worm was coded to self-propagate and caused computers on the internet (in 
1991 the internet consisted mostly of educational institution and military computers) to crash. 
Morris had exploited security vulnerabilities to prove that security on the internet was insufficient. 
The defendant knew that if multiple copies of the worm infected the same computer it would cause 
the computer to crash. Therefore, he had programmed the worm to determine whether the computer 
was already infected. In case of the worm being discovered and computers being programmed to 
indicate that the computer was already infected with the worm, Morris programmed the worm to 
infect a computer every seventh time the computer would signal that it was already infected. 
However, the number of times the worm would check for an existing infection greatly exceeded 
what Morris had expected, and computers crashed on a nation-wide scale.
834
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Morris had exploited vulnerabilities in the early email client “SEND MAIL”, in the finger daemon, 
and in the trusted host feature, as well as having brute-forced password restrictions (roughly 
describable as high-speed password guessing). 
Since Morris had authorization to access and use internet-connected computers at Cornell, Harvard 
and Berkeley, and since he was authorized to send emails to other computers on the internet through 
the SEND MAIL client and inquire about other users through the finger daemon, the court asserted 
that it needed to determine whether dissemination of the worm was “without authorization” or in 
“excess of authorization”. The court concluded that Morris‟ conduct was “without authorization”, 
because he did not use the SEND MAIL client or the finger daemon “in any way related to their 
intended function”. He had exploited security vulnerabilities that gave him greater privileges on 
other computers, some of which he had no authorization to access.
835
 
As Kerr argues, the intended function test applied by the Second Circuit “appears to derive largely 
from a sense of social norms in the community of computer users. Under these norms, software 
designers design programs to perform certain tasks, and network providers enable the programs to 
allow users to perform those tasks.”
836
 Kerr furthermore notes that the test ostensibly focuses on 
“objective rather than subjective concerns”. The intended function seems to be “what the program 
itself (and its supporting literature) claims that the program does.”
837
 However, other circuit courts 
have relied on, what appears to be a distorted version of the Second Circuit‟s objective intended 
function test; namely, a more subjective version of the intended function test in order to conclude 
that the conduct that the owner views as undesirable goes against the computers intended use, or to 
argue that the subjective motives of an employee when he accesses his employer‟s information can 
contravene the “intended use” of the computer (the latter being an approach discussed separately in 
the chapter on insiders). See more below and in the chapter on insiders. 
Although the Second Circuit‟s use of the intended function test to include exploitation of 
vulnerabilities to propagate a worm, which is an objective inquiry of sorts, the “intended function 
test” is not necessarily useful or consistent if it is “misapplied” as a subjective “intended use test”. 
For example, consider EF‟s argument in its case against Explorica that hyperlinks and drowdown 
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menus were technical restrictions, and that using a scraper to “bypass” those restrictions 
contravened the intended purpose of websites, because a person could not manually click through 
the site with the speed of a scraper. Most commercial websites are not created for the benefit of 
programs accessing the website automatically, but for people using the site manually. Is scraping 
illegal access then because most websites are not “intended” to serve bots, but to serve humans? 
Technology can be used in many unexpected ways without it always being undesirable to a 
particular owner. 
US v. Phillips, a case from the Fifth Circuit, is not really a pure code-based approach, either. Rather 
it seems to be a curious blend of code-based, contract-based and a social norms approach. Phillips 
was charged with violating §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) and (B)(i). The Court relied, it seems, on both 
Morris and EF v. Explorica. Phillips, a computer science student at the University of Texas at 
Austin (UT), had upon his admission to the university, signed an “acceptable use” computer policy, 
in which Phillips agreed not to conduct port scanning using his university account. He violated the 
computer use policy by running port scans against various computers. 
The UT maintained a system called TXClass Learning Central, used by faculty and staff for 
enrollment related matters. Authorized users needed only enter their social security number (SSN) 
into a field on the login website to gain access to the site. Phillips wrote a Java program that would 
enter a number from a range of SSNs that is used to assign SSNs to people born in Texas (later he 
refined it to SSNs assigned to people born in the ten most populous counties in Texas) 
sequentially
838
, and then retrieve the personal information associated with the SSN (if the SSN 
existed in the database). That way, over a period of fourteen months, Phillips obtained data related 
to 45,000 people.
839
 Because Phillips‟ program queried the server rather rapidly, the UT computer 
system crashed several times. 
Phillips argued on appeal that his access to the TXClass login page was authorized, and as a 
subsidiary argument that he was authorized to access TXClass‟ login page as an ordinary user of the 
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web, and that his retrieval of information from the database was thus merely “exceeding authorized 
access”. The court rejected both arguments. 
First, the court argued that the scope of authorization to access on the basis of “the expected norms 
of intended use or the nature of the relationship established between the computer owner and the 
user”.
840
 The court cited US v. Morris, Theofel v. Farey-Jones
841
, and EF v. Explorica as support. 
The court used Morris to show that exploiting vulnerabilities and password guessing was not 
related to the intended use “of computer systems” (the Morris court argued “intended function” in 
relation to Morris‟ exploitations of vulnerabilities in programs and protocols, not the use of the 
“computer system” as a whole, a concept much broader than “program”). Of course, only requiring 
a user to login with their SSN, the formula for which is publicly available, is a vulnerability – but it 
is not the kind of vulnerability like the security vulnerabilities exploited by Morris, because 
guessing a password does not contradict the intended function of a password prompt, per se. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit in Morris did not apply the “intended function” test in the context 
of the brute-force attack aspect (password-guessing) built into Morris‟ worm; it did so with respect 
to the exploitation of the security vulnerabilities in SEND MAIL and the finger daemon. Entering 
login credentials, even if the credentials are ill-gotten, is still in line with the intended function of a 
login screen; namely, the entering of login credentials. Thus, the Fifth Circuit‟s “intended use” test 
is not an application of the more objective “intended function” test in Morris, because the Fifth 
Circuit focuses on subjective illegitimacy of access. The login page and protocol did exactly as they 
were designed to do (even if the system owner has chosen easily obtainable access credentials), 
regardless of whether the access credentials were legitimately obtained or not. The Fifth Circuit 
then used Theofel to argue that use of a third-party‟s password by an outside hacker was a type of 
conduct the CFAA covered; this reference makes the Fifth Circuit‟s misapplication of the Second 
Circuit‟s “intended function” test essentially superfluous, since it also provides support for 
concluding that password-guessing is in violation of the CFAA. Furthermore, the part of the Ninth 
Circuit‟s Theofel decision that the Fifth Circuit relies on, refers back to the Second Circuit‟s 
discussion of password-guessing in Morris, which is unrelated to the “intended function test”. 
Finally, and perhaps most curiously, the court cited the First Circuit‟s decision in EF v. Explorica as 
support for a “reasonable expectation test”, which, as may be recalled, merely provided a summary 
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of the district court‟s decision in the First Circuit Explorica decision; the First Circuit did not 
actually ever apply the test in Explorica. The injunction against Explorica rested on the use of 
supposedly “confidential codes”, and the summary of the district court‟s test is dicta. Rather, and 
importantly, the First Circuit expressly rejected the district court‟s particular application of the test a 
couple of years later in EF v. Zefer (Zefer was the company that created the scraper for Explorica), 
which was decided three years before the Fifth Circuit‟s decision in Phillips. It is impossible to 
know whether the Fifth Circuit simply missed the Zefer decision. The First Circuit rejected the 
“reasonable expectations test” in the specific context before it, but it did not technically rule out the 
possibility that a reasonable expectations test could be appropriate in other contexts insofar as there 
is a common understanding underpinning the notion; i.e. that a social norm exists. This will be 
discussed in the section on social norms below. 
The Fifth Circuit thus concluded that Phillip‟s “brute-force” Java program “was not an intended use 
of the UT network within the understanding of any reasonable computer user and constitutes a 
method of obtaining unauthorized access to computer data that he was not permitted to view or 
use.”
842
 The Fifth Circuit thus combines the Morris “intended function” test with the “reasonable 
expectations” test proposed by the Explorica district court that was expressly rejected by the First 
Circuit on appeal in Zefer in the context the district court had applied it. The first test was, arguably, 
misapplied and the latter test‟s application rejected by the circuit court in the circuit where the test 
was proposed by a lower court. When reading the decisions that the Fifth Circuit relied on and 
comparing those to the court‟s argument in Phillips, there is an unexplained and rather confusing 
incoherence in the court‟s reasoning for the outcome, although the outcome appears correct. 
Regarding Phillips‟ subsidiary argument, the court rejected that Phillips had merely exceeded his 
authorized access as an ordinary internet user. The court argued that authorization typically arises 
out of contractual or agency relationships,
843
 and since Phillips was never granted access to 
TXClass, but only those UT services mentioned in the use policy that he signed upon his admission 
to UT, then his access was unauthorized, and not in excess of authorization. In other words, even 
though Phillips had access to the TXClass login page like any other web user, he had never been 
granted authorization to access TXClass. He was an outsider, not an insider with respect to 
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TXClass. Recall that the First Circuit in Explorica, basing its decision on use of confidential 
information, held that it was “exceeding authorized access”, not access “without authorization”. 
However, Explorica involved publicly accessible information that was obtained more efficiently 
than users would be able to obtain manually, whilst the information obtained by Phillips were not 
publicly accessible on the website (Explorica was about undesirable efficiency of access, and in 
Phillips there was no authorization to access at all). It makes the Fifth Circuit‟s reliance on 
Explorica a little confusing, since the facts are easily distinguishable (and in fact very different) 
from the facts in Phillips; faster browsing than other users vs. access to information that the 
defendant clearly had no authorization to access. 
The case illustrates fairly well the absence of a consistent method of explaining why conduct is in 
violation of a hacking statute. Given the facts of the case, Phillips did violate the CFAA, at least 
with respect to his access to TXClass, but the court‟s reasoning for its conclusion is not entirely 
sound. Rather, the Fifth Circuit‟s reasoning would have been vastly more persuasive, and coherent, 
if it had simply relied on the Second Circuit‟s discussion of password-guessing in Morris and 
sought additional support in the Ninth Circuit‟s adoption in Theofel of the Second Circuit‟s 
reasoning, rather than entangling itself in the use of borrowed tests that had been applied in other 
contexts. 
The Third Circuit faced a similar, but not entirely identical, factual situation to Phillips‟ in US v. 
Auernheimer. The cases are not really technically distinguishable as such, but their end results differ 
substantially for reasons that a code-based approach cannot explain. 
In 2010, AT & T was the exclusive provider of data contracts to iPads with 3G capabilities.  The 
customers registered their accounts on AT & T‟s website and in the process they were assigned a 
user ID as well as they would choose a password, both of which the customers would need for 
future access to the accounts. The user ID assigned was the customer‟s email address. In order to 
make logins easier, AT & T configured their server to pre-populate (automatically fill out) the user 
ID field on the login page with the customer‟s email address. This pre-population was possible 
because the customer‟s email address was associated with the iPad‟s SIM-card ICC-ID
844
. The 
server would detect the ICC-ID, and if it belonged to a customer, it would redirect the customer 
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away from the general login page to a specific login page, the URL of which would be “unique” in 
the sense that the ICC-ID would appear as an element of the URL. The email address of the 
customer would automatically appear in the user ID field on this specific login page.
845
 
Spitler, an online acquaintance of Auernheimer, had an AT & T account but did not own an iPad 
(he had purchased an iPad SIM Card to try to use it on another device). In his endeavor to register 
the SIM Card in absence of an iPad he had researched the iPad‟s operating system and found the 
AT & T registration URL, and realized that one of the variables of the URL was the ICC-ID 
assigned to the iPad‟s SIM-card. Spitler then entered the URL into his browser, which he had 
configured to identify itself as an iPad using a Safari browser
846
, along with his ICC-ID typed into 
the URL. He then noticed his email address was pre-populated in the user ID field on the login 
page, and he correctly deduced that the server associated his SIM-card‟s ICC-ID with his email 
address. He tested his theory a few times by manually changing the ICC-ID in the URL and found 
that the server pre-populated the user ID field with different email addresses.
847
 Thus, the server 
was coded in a way that it would leak the email addresses and ICC-IDs to anyone visiting the 
publicly accessible website who also got the idea to change a single digit in the URL (although only 
users with AT & T accounts would be likely to discover the relevance of the ICC-ID). 
Auernheimer, who perhaps best can be described as a somewhat infamous self-described troll and 
grey hat hacker
848
, was approached by Spitler online, who shared his discovery with Auernheimer. 
Auernheimer then assisted Spitler in refining a program called “account slurper”. The “account 
slurper” was designed to automatically change the ICC-ID in the URL and collect the email 
addresses that appeared on the website.
849
 Auernheimer notified the media of the vulnerability, who 
in turn notified AT & T. After AT & T fixed the vulnerability, the online magazine Gawker showed 
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interest in publishing a story on the incident. In order to prove the veracity of his story, 
Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with the reporter. Subsequently, a Gawker article 
detailing the vulnerability and a few redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs were published.
850
AT & 
T apparently never pressed charges, but the FBI took an interest in the incident and began 
investigating.
851
 
The district court‟s decision in Auernheimer is particularly interesting for a few reasons. First, the 
district court, in effect, deemed the access to a publicly accessible website “unauthorized”. It did so 
partially because the access was not gained via the physical device AT&T expected to be used, but 
via a browser identifying itself as the expected device; something, which is very common although 
the average user may not be aware of this behind-the-scenes activity or make any changes to the 
default settings.
852
 Moreover, the court did so partially because the court seemingly accepted the 
government‟s theory that the ICC-ID numbers were for all intents and purposes “passwords”. That 
is, the government claimed that the ICC-ID was “secret” despite the fact that the ICC-ID was, and 
still is, an open, documented, publicly available standard
853
; and therefore neither “proprietary” nor 
actually “secret”, which is without doubt the fundamental attribute of a password, because without 
secrecy the password inherently has no value. Also, the ICC-ID was clearly displayed in the URL 
itself. The fact of the matter is that the website was accessed in a manner that was unintended, by an 
unexpected person, and the information revealed on the website was unintentionally publicly 
accessible. Both these elements were used to infer that the access must thus have been 
unauthorized.
854
 In Auernheimer the accessibility of the information was unexpected in the sense 
                                                 
850
 US v. Auernheimer, 2014 WL 1395670 (C.A.3 (N.J.)), at *2 
851
 http://www.livescience.com/25020-ipad-hacker-guilty-security-research.html 
852
 A user-agent-string is sent from the device to the web server telling it what kind of user-agent and operating system 
the device is using. This string is commonly and easily changed in order to, eg, optimize the displaying of websites in a 
browser not fully compatible with a website. See US v. Auernheimer, Brief of amici curiae Mozilla Foundation et al., p. 
7-8. If you own an Android device, try visiting whatsmyuseragent.com (accessed June 23
rd
 2014) and notice how your 
device sends a user-agent-string that includes Safari, Mozilla and Chrome even though you are using the Chrome 
browser. This is done because web servers sometimes deny sending all or part of the webpage content to browsers that 
have been deemed incompatible by the administrators of the web server. 
853
 ISO standard: ISO/IEC 7812 available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=39698 accessed June 23
rd
 2014 
854
 It was extensively argued in amici curiae briefs by the Mozilla Foundation, computer scientists and others, handed in 
to support the defendant‟s appeal, that constituting access to such unintentionally accessible information would be 
detrimental to the IT security research community, since most of the research conducted both implements automated 
tools to alter URLs as the defendant had done, as well as not explicitly asking the website owner‟s permission when 
locating publicly available information that is not intended to be publicly available, nor asking themselves whether the 
owner would consent to such access, because it is clear that the owner would not consent to exposure of critical 
vulnerabilities that have gone unfixed or negligently created and thus leaking eg customer information. It would first of 
all mean that the vulnerabilities would have to be fixed (incurring a cost) and also that the owner‟s reputation might be 
 
215 
 
that the owner had at least hoped that only customers accessed the server, and the government 
argued that the access to the webserver was unauthorized because Auernheimer and Spitler changed 
the “user-agent” of their web browser, so that when the web browser communicated with the 
webserver, it would report to the webserver that it was a Safari browser running on an iPad, even 
though it was in fact a different browser running on a different system. The government‟s theory 
was, essentially, that the server, which would only accept connections from browsers running on an 
iPad, was a server to which access was restricted. However, user-agents are completely within the 
user‟s control; it is a setting in the web browser, and as explained above, many web browsers 
“pretend” to be something they are not, i.e. “lie” about what they are. Internet Explorer “pretends” 
to be a Mozilla Firefox browser.
855
 Almost all web browsers “lie” in that sense by default, and the 
user can freely change the user-agent through browser settings if they so desire. For example, a 
person may, for whatever reason, want to load the mobile version of websites by default (where 
such versions exist) on a desktop computer instead of the desktop versions. This can be 
accomplished by changing the user-agent of the browser. It is not an access control mechanism; it is 
an issue of web browser and website compatibility. The question is whether the fact that a server 
that only accepts connections from computers or devices with certain settings is a fact that makes it 
justifiable to expect a user to be on notice that access with any other device is unauthorized. 
However, such an expectation would be highly dependent on a website owner‟s subjective hopes 
and wishes with respect to the function, of e.g. user-agents, that are outside the norm or are not 
realistic. 
Auernheimer‟s trial initially
856
 culminated in a guilty verdict and a 41-month prison sentence, even 
though the “account slurper” program‟s functions are common practice in the world of IT security 
                                                                                                                                                                  
damaged. However, justifying keeping vulnerabilities in place to avoid immediate costs related to fixing them, hoping 
that no one will know, and condemning the persons who may report on the vulnerability to the public, is unlikely to be 
productive in the long run, since odds are that “worse” people have already found the vulnerability. Regardless of the 
owner‟s motive to keep damaging vulnerabilities quiet, this is not an argument to simply start excusing criminal 
behavior because there was also a benefit to the community involved, but rather an argument, the one discussed earlier, 
for a paradigm where publicly accessible information is “free” and consent therefore plays no role. It not only alleviates 
the burden (that of being subject to arbitrary, anti-competitive, unfair terms changeable at the whim of the owner) put 
on users under the property paradigm, but also places the responsibility where it is most suitable, namely with the owner 
who is best equipped to introduce security measures to prevent accidental exposure via public accessibility. 
855
 Microsoft explains that Internet Explorer identifies itself as Mozilla Firefox for historical reasons. See article at 
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537503%28v=vs.85%29.aspx. Last visited on 5 July 2015. 
856
 Auernheimer‟s conviction was vacated on appeal due to improper forum in New Jersey. The interpretation of the 
CFAA was not broached by the court, except for perhaps a few comments in dicta. See US v. Auernheimer, 2014 WL 
1395670 (C.A.3 (N.J.)) 
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research, and are no more than automated ordinary user behavior
857
, similar to the automated 
browsing in Explorica. Although Auernheimer‟s conviction was eventually vacated by the Third 
Circuit, it was vacated because the venue was improper. However, the Third Circuit did say in dicta 
that “[t]he account slurper simply accessed the publicly facing portion of the login screen and 
scraped information that AT & T unintentionally published.”
858
 This, at least, indicates that the 
Third Circuit did not consider the URLs to be passwords and that no unauthorized access had 
occurred, even though it did not rule on the issue as such. 
Cases like Auernheimer provoke a debate that has arguments with merits on both sides. It would be 
clear to most people that the information accessed by Spitler was not intended to be publicly 
accessible, even though it was accessible. However, regardless of whether the information was or 
was not intended to be publicly accessible, the server was configured to be publicly accessible, even 
though only AT & T account holders could proceed beyond the login page. The owner just did not 
realize to how much information it had given access. However, determining on the basis of the 
information itself whether access to it is unauthorized or not, presupposes either knowledge that the 
certain resources on the web server are restricted from public access, even though they are 
technically publicly accessible, or alternatively, that the information has already been accessed by 
mistake and suspected to be unintentionally accessible based on appearance or substance. The 
question is whether a user‟s mere suspicion of a website owner‟s lack of intent as to the 
accessibility of the information is enough to make an accessing user criminally liable. One would 
hope not. 
When comparing Phillips and Auernheimer the facts are strikingly similar.
859
 The only apparent 
difference – a difference that is meaningless from a technical perspective – is that Phillips‟ Java 
program operated by sending requests to the server using a number based on a publicly available 
formula into a field on the webpage whilst Auernheimer‟s program sent requests to the server 
through the URL where the value was also based on a number derived from a publicly available 
                                                 
857
 See the above quote from the brief amici curiae filed in support of the defendant-appellant and reversal. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that anyone with minimal programming knowledge could write a script like the one in question. Even 
one of the first and easier tasks in the Python Challenge (www.pythonchallenge.com accessed June 23
rd
 2014) 
incorporates writing such a script similarly aimed at changing parts of URLs automatically and retrieving information 
from the automatically retrieved webpages. 
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 Discussing whether the access was unauthorized under New Jersey law which requires circumventing code or – 
password based barrier to access. US v. Auernheimer, 2014 WL 1395670 (C.A.3 (N.J.)), at FN5 
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 Phillips‟ program did cause UT systems to crash several times, but that in itself has no bearing on whether his access 
was authorized or not. 
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standard. Technically, whether the request is submitted through a field on the webpage or more 
directly through the URL is inconsequential from a technical “code” aspect. The difference lies in 
our perception of what happened and what the defendants could access. Whereas Phillips‟ action 
could be seen as “entering” the system, because the SSN was used as a “password” that gave access 
to all information on the person in the database, Auernheimer‟s actions did not allow him to gain 
control of any user‟s account, because the ICC-ID and the email associated with it, did not actually 
give him access to the user‟s account. An “actual” password was needed, in addition to the email 
address, to move beyond the login page; the manipulation of the URL merely changed the 
information displayed on the login page. Yet, Auernheimer clearly obtained information from a 
database in a way not expected by AT & T. The cases appear to differ on another point though, 
which is, however, inconsequential with respect to determination of guilt under an unauthorized 
access statute; Auernheimer did not exploit the information he obtained, but notified the media. 
Granted he could have notified AT & T directly, and he could have refrained from displaying his 
apparent sense of “schadenfreude”; but what Auernheimer did afterwards has no bearing on 
whether the actual access was unauthorized. Phillips claimed that he did not intend to exploit or 
misuse the information he obtained, but he did not notify UT of the vulnerability, either; even 
though, arguably, the vulnerability inherent in requiring only the entering of a social security 
number to gain access, is so self-evident that UT probably knew about it, but chose not to invest in 
better security at that time. Again, what Phillips did afterwards has no bearing on determination of 
guilt under an unauthorized access statute. 
It can be said that whilst Phillips stepped inside the security perimeter and masqueraded as a 
specific legitimate user, Auernheimer can be said to have stayed at its border and the information he 
obtained from the login page did not allow him to step inside the security perimeter in such a way 
that he could masquerade as a legitimate user in a meaningful way. However, the AT & T login 
page customized the content on it, that is, it pre-populated a field dependent on the ICC-ID provided 
by a device in the URL, and the ICC-ID was unique to a SIM-card, which in turn was linked to a 
specific person‟s email address. Then it can also be said that Auernheimer masqueraded as a 
specific legitimate user. Auernheimer was never meant to see the email addresses, just like Phillips 
was never meant to see the information that entering a valid SSN in a login field would yield. 
The point is that what appear to be factual differences are not actually factual differences. They are 
differences in perception. The prosecution is bound to adopt the perspective that argues in favor of 
guilt, whilst the defendant is bound to adopt the perspective that argues in favor of acquittal. It 
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raises the question whether the Fifth Circuit would have viewed Phillips‟ access authorization 
differently had he entered the SSNs in the URL rather than the login field on the webpage. 
Something else is happening in these cases other than a pure code-based approach, and it appears to 
relate to a common understanding of what constitutes a password and a common understanding that 
use of a password not belonging to you is not authorized. There are no such common 
understandings with respect to URLs. That is, the norms attached to passwords make it clear that 
Phillips‟ access was unauthorized. There are no norms attached to URLs (insofar as they are just 
used as resource locators, and not to pass malicious code), so it is far less than clear that 
Auernheimer necessarily did anything wrong; but by using a code-based approach – which at first 
glance appears reasonable – one can argue that any technical restriction is an access restriction and 
any value in the URL is password-like because there is no social norm to say otherwise. Code is not 
irrelevant, but code requires interpreting for its function to be understood, and in this context it is 
important that it is irrelevant how an owner subjectively intended a program to be used (i.e. for 
what specific purposes). What is relevant is what the program was designed to do and whether the 
defendant used the program according to its intended function. 
However, there are also cases where the unintended code-based accessibility occurs, not due to the 
owner‟s mistake, malfunction in, or lack of, security, but due to accessibility via a third party with a 
copy of the information. 
In Healthcare Advocates v Harding
860
, a district court decision, a server malfunction caused images 
to be accessible that previously had been removed from the website, but the server malfunction 
occurred not with Healthcare Advocates, but with the Internet Archive that hosts the Wayback 
Machine
861
. The Wayback Machine allows its users to view a website the way it looked at some 
point in the past. The Internet Archive had designed the crawlers only to make publicly accessible 
the pages that were not subject to requests set forth in a file called “robots.txt”. Therefore, a website 
owner could prevent the public from viewing (via the Wayback Machine) select pages the way they 
looked in the past. Healthcare Advocates‟ webserver supplied such instructions to visiting crawlers. 
However, when Harding, a law firm involved in litigation against Healthcare Advocates, accessed 
the screenshots of Healthcare Advocates‟ website via the Wayback Machine, the Internet Archive 
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servers were malfunctioning that day and allowed public access to all screenshots regardless of the 
robot protocol. In this case, the judge concluded that Harding could not be held liable for “luck”.
862
 
Was Phillips lucky when he managed to retrieve information from TXClass? Were Auernheimer 
and Spitler lucky when they discovered the association between ICC-IDs and email addresses on 
AT & T‟s login page? What seems to matter is not so much supposed code barriers, or their 
circumvention, but whether it was in a publicly accessible space or closed space, the context in 
which it occurs and the manner in which the alleged circumvention takes place. In Morris, Phillips, 
Auernheimer and Harding, the accessibility was unexpected and undesired by the owners or right 
holders. Morris and Phillips were convicted, but Auernheimer‟s conviction was vacated (although 
the matter of authorization was only addressed in dicta) and the claim against Harding was 
dismissed. 
So far, it appears that code cannot stand alone. 
 
11.5.1.2 Expected but undesired access 
Whereas the accessibility in the above cases was unexpected, code restrictions and their violation 
also matter in cases where the defendant has been blocked from accessing a website that is available 
to everyone else but him; that is, access to publicly accessible websites and services. 
One such case is Craigslist v. 3Taps
863
 where the plaintiff had selectively excluded the defendant 
from accessing Craigslist‟s otherwise public website. 
Craigslist is an American online service provider that through its publicly accessible website allows 
users to browse classified advertisements posted by other users. 3Taps is a company that offers an 
API
864
 to Craigslist in order for its users to access data in bulk. 3Taps also maintains the website 
craiggers.com that essentially replicates craigslist.com. To achieve this, 3Taps automatically copies 
posts from craigslist.com in real-time; that is, 3Taps scrapes the Craigslist website. In order to stop 
3Taps undesired use of the website, Craigslist sent a cease-and-desist letter to 3Taps in which it 
essentially revoked 3Taps‟ (implicitly granted) authorization to access craiglist.com for any 
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 One could argue that this is because Harding did not use the Wayback Machine contrary to its intended function 
(reference to the intended function test developed by the 1
st
 Circuit in US v. Morris (1991)) and the access to the 
Wayback machine was therefore not unauthorized and the defendant never accessed the plaintiff‟s computers. 
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 Craigslist v. 3Taps, 2013 WL 4447520 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
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purposes. Furthermore, Craigslist also blocked access from IP-addresses belonging to 3Taps. In 
order to continue accessing craigslist.com, 3Taps acquired new IP-addresses and used proxy servers 
with non-blocked IP-addresses, and continued scraping the website.
865
 
The case thus revolved around the question whether the owner of a publicly available website could 
selectively exclude a person; that is, whether the implicit authorization granted to members of the 
public to access public websites could be revoked with effect for just a select undesirable. 
The court answered in the affirmative, because 3Taps had been put on direct notice that it had no 
authorization to access Craigslist‟s website anymore both through a cease-and-desist letter and by 
way of IP-address blocking. 3Taps‟ circumvention of the IP-address blocking, which the court 
stated was a technical barrier, albeit an imperfect one,
866
 constituted unauthorized access.
867
 
3Taps attempted to defend the legality of its conduct by referencing the public accessibility of the 
website. When addressing 3Taps‟ argument that the information was public, the court argued that 
Congress could have specified, but did not, the information it sought to protect by differentiating 
between non-public and public information. However, the court firmly concluded that there was no 
persuasive evidence of such a limitation or differentiation in the legislative history.
868
 On this basis, 
the court concluded that an interpretation of “unauthorized” clearly implies the existence of a 
proprietor‟s right to selectively revoke authorization to access public websites on a case-by-case 
basis even when the website is publicly accessible. It seems to be the court‟s rationale that the 
proprietor is the authority that can grant authorization and therefore must also be capable of 
revoking such authorization; even when the authorization is impliedly granted to the entire world, 
and the revocation aimed at only one or a few select. 
                                                 
865
 Craigslist had previously tried to state a CFAA claim based on 3Taps‟ alleged violation of Craigslist‟s “Terms of 
Use”. That attempt failed. See Craigslist v. 3Taps, 2013 WL 4447520 (N.D. Cal. 2013) at *2, FN3 
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 Craigslist v. 3Taps, 2013 WL 4447520 (N.D. Cal. 2013), at *6, FN7 
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 The legislative history, as mentioned above, dates back to 1986; a time where there was no such thing as the World 
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It is worth noting that Craigslist does not mind people accessing the information on craigslist.com, 
as such; it does, however, mind why the website is accessed, that is, how the information is used 
subsequently. As several courts have noted so far, including the Ninth Circuit in Nosal (discussed 
above in the section on use vs. access), the CFAA does not prohibit unauthorized use of 
information; it prohibits unauthorized access to information and computers. However, it is 
imperative to note that Craigslist was strategic enough to revoke directly 3Taps‟ authorization to 
access the website in its entirety, for any purpose. The question of why the authorization was 
revoked becomes immaterial as a matter of law, because as the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the 
CFAA, the CFAA does not ask why a defendant accessed the site, nor does it ask why a plaintiff has 
revoked the defendant‟s authorization. Craiglist revocation of authorization strategy allowed the 
court to distinguish the case from Nosal
869
, a Ninth Circuit precedent that otherwise would have 
essentially prevented the Craigslist court from considering terms of service or use involving use 
restrictions disguised as access restrictions. Remember, Craigslist had already tried to rely on its 
website‟s Terms of Use in order to get an injunction before it progressed to direct revocation as a 
basis for getting the injunction. 
Although the Craigslist court has, from a strict legal point of view, distinguished the Craigslist case 
from Nosal, the distinction lies “only” in the blocking of IP-addresses and a cease-and-desist letter. 
In other words, although the case was correctly distinguished from Nosal, per se, it perhaps 
finalized the formation of a whole new trial strategy that allows plaintiffs in cases that involve 
public websites to “circumvent” Nosal altogether, since it can be clearly inferred from Craigslist 
that even though the de-authorization is motivated by and based solely on use restrictions, this 
cannot be questioned by the courts as long as the plaintiff is not relying on terms of service or use, 
but instead relies on a direct notification of revocation sent to the defendant. Although this may 
prima facie strike one as an important difference, the blocking of IP-addresses and the cease-and-
desist letter are just different means (as opposed to citing use restrictions disguised as de-
authorizations and generally banning competitors from visiting through such terms) to achieve the 
exact same effect as a general ban on competitors‟ visits to or use of the website, or any other visits 
or use by unwanted visitors. In other words, the notice issues may have been addressed, but the 
breadth issue has certainly not because the owner is free to revoke authorization for any reason, at 
any time – and perhaps that is a matter for Congress to address rather than the courts, as long as the 
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courts will not depart from relying solely on a website owner‟s consent as a source for 
authorization
870
 with or absent symbolic technical barriers. 
The Craigslist court chose to interpret “without authorization” in accordance with a trespass 
analogy/property paradigm, albeit acknowledging it is imperfect, also recognized the problematic 
breadth of the statute. The court recognized the implications this may have for “innovation, 
competition and general “openness” of the internet”
871
, but concluded that this was a matter of 
policy for Congress to resolve.
872
  
In US v. Lowson
873
, a case that predates Craigslist v. 3Taps but further shows that contract and code 
is inextricably linked in some cases, the government proceeded to prosecute individuals who had 
become subject to an investigation after Ticketmaster had failed to state a CFAA claim against a 
software developer (Ticketmaster had not shown damage or loss as required to maintain a civil 
action).
874
 The defendants had, through the use of software, automated purchases of large blocks of 
event tickets on the website of the ticket vendor, Ticketmaster, and the defendants then resold the 
tickets at a profit. Ticketmaster had implemented CAPTCHA (“Completely Automated Public 
Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart”) on the website and written in its terms that use 
of the website for commercial purposes was prohibited, as well as prohibiting access by bots. The 
government‟s theory was that the defendants had circumvented a security measure which rendered 
the defendants‟ access to the website unauthorized. Additionally, the defendants had received cease-
and-desist letters from Ticketmaster. The CAPTCHA was not implemented to keep anyone out per 
se, and thus, did not restrict anyone from accessing the contents of the site; it was implemented to 
prevent or deter a certain manner of access, that is, automatic access. The crux of the matter is, that 
CAPTCHA does not protect information from intruders, nor is that its purpose. CAPTCHA‟s 
function is to keep out bots, which are typically employed for commercial reasons. The defendants 
paid the price set by Ticketmaster; they did not steal the tickets because they paid the asked-for 
price. The government contended that the information obtained by the defendants was “confidential 
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in the aggregate”, ostensibly because repeated accesses to the site‟s publicly available information 
made it possible for the defendants to “reveal” a map of available premium seats that normal users 
would not be able to obtain through normal use.
875
 Furthermore, the government argued that the 
defendants knew their conduct was wrongful because they used numerous non-sequential IP-
addresses when purchasing the tickets, which defeated Ticketmaster‟s IP blocking; the government 
also alleged that circumventing the IP blocking was a circumvention of code restrictions that made 
the access unauthorized. 
US v. Lowson is a case that exemplifies very well that not only is it difficult to discern which types 
of code restrictions are actually relevant under an unauthorized access statute, but the case shows 
that contract and code melt together. The code restriction in Lowson was not a restriction that 
prohibited anyone from accessing the website; the restriction served to weed out those who access 
the site in an undesirable manner (and in fact weeds out the visually impaired, which CAPTCHA 
also keeps out in the absence of audio aid). Ticketmaster objected to the how and the why of the 
defendants‟ access as stated in their terms, but neither the terms nor the code kept anyone from 
accessing the website or the information on it. It appears from an amici brief in support of Lowson 
that Ticketmaster‟s terms were quite restrictive.
876
 The terms for example prohibit anyone from 
taking notes during events and the terms tie the authorization to access the website to those terms, 
such that a reviewer/critic attending the concert could be held criminally liable under the CFAA. If 
Ticketmaster chose to restrict IP addresses belonging to newspapers, bloggers and others who might 
criticize events or Ticketmaster‟s services in addition to stating in the terms, as they in fact did, that 
note-taking was prohibited, should that make the critics criminally liable under an unauthorized 
access statute? The point is that Ticketmaster wants to remain open to the world and yet closed to 
those who do not bend to their will; enforced by the threat of criminal law. The defendants may or 
may not have committed a civil wrong, but enforcing arbitrary terms infused with code through 
criminal law in a way that would arguably render it illegal for a blind person to use similar software 
to defeat CAPTCHA in order to buy a concert ticket. If CAPTCHA is a security measure in the 
sense that defeating it constitutes unauthorized access in US v. Lowson, it would equally make a 
criminal of the blind person; the difference between the actions of Lowson and the blind person lies 
not in the criminality of the conduct then because both circumvented a code restriction, but rather 
                                                 
875
 See generally United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. 2010) at *7 
876
 See EFF‟s amici brief in support of the defendant, p. 20. Available at https://www.eff.org/node/57989. Last visited 5 
July 2015. 
 
224 
 
the difference is merely that the government would hardly pursue a prosecution against a blind 
person for circumventing CAPTCHA challenges (unless perhaps the blind person became an 
interesting target for the prosecution for other reasons. See analysis of US v. Drew in the next 
section.
877
).  
However, plaintiffs are implementing “code restrictions” that are unrelated to genuine access 
control, and try to exclude “undesirables” whose conduct may or may not be prohibited by website 
terms, but somehow offend the owner or whose purposes of accessing a publicly accessible website 
go against the subjective interests of the owner. They do so whilst keeping the website open to 
everyone else. 
 
11.5.2 A contract-based approach 
This section both analyzes some CFAA claims that have failed as well as those that have succeeded 
based on contract-related arguments. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the evolution in plaintiff 
strategy to exclude competitors and other unwanted persons. Although it is called the “contract-
based approach”, the approach does not solely involve situations where a legally binding contract 
has been entered into, but rather all cases where the restrictions are based on written terms 
regarding the use of or access to a computer or information; that is, it appears to be a mix of 
contracts and what appears to be written expressions of an owner‟s ostensibly absolute right to 
exclude others from using their publicly accessible websites and thus computers.
878
 A breach of 
contract may be a separate claim in some cases; however, some courts applying the CFAA in cases 
where the plaintiff has alleged that authorization was lacking due to violation of Terms of Service 
or Terms of Use, appear to focus on whether the defendant was on notice regarding the restrictions, 
regardless of whether the defendant has accepted the terms. The criticism of the contract-based 
approach has been rooted primarily in that it gives computer owners too much power over the users 
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of the computers
879
 in that the contract-based approach can transform even trivial matters and 
disagreements into a criminal act at the whim of the owner. 
According to a 2013 article on BBC‟s website, if we were to read the policies related to every 
website we use, odds are we would have to take an unacceptable amount of time off work; 76 
workdays to read all the applicable policies that may affect our authorization to access websites.
880
 
Terms of Service, Terms of Use, use policies etc. often describe the rules applicable to the user who 
is allowed to access and use the service, and these terms are sometimes considered contractually 
binding upon the user.
881
 (Admittedly, the author had – prior to getting acquainted with CFAA case 
law – always understood such policies and terms to be liability waivers of sorts that would prevent 
the website owner from being held liable for whatever the user does on the website, or being sued 
by their users.
882
 Orin Kerr expresses a similar understanding in a recent draft essay; that is, that the 
owner waives liability through those terms and indicate the “right to suspend, block, or otherwise 
limit access by a user”.
883
) Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the service provider to reserve the 
right to make modifications to the terms without any notice to the user
884
, in addition to the user 
being bound by any additional guidelines posted in relation to the various supplementary/additional 
services provided by the service provider. In other words, there is an extraordinary amount of 
reading involved if one wants to be sure not to violate such terms. Acts such as providing false 
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plaintiff/prosecution has alleged violation of 18 USC § 1030. See for example US v. Drew, Koch Industries v. John 
Does and Cvent v. Eventbrite. 
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information on the account registration form can result in a “ban” from using the service, as can be 
seen in the Yahoo! Terms of Service, section 3: 
“In consideration of your use of the Yahoo Services, you represent that you are of legal age to form a binding contract 
and are not a person barred from receiving the Yahoo Services under the laws of the United States or other applicable 
jurisdiction. You also agree to: (a) provide true, accurate, current and complete information about yourself as prompted 
by the Yahoo Service's registration form (the "Registration Data") and (b) maintain and promptly update the 
Registration Data to keep it true, accurate, current and complete. If you provide any information that is untrue, 
inaccurate, not current or incomplete, or Yahoo has reasonable grounds to suspect that such information is untrue, 
inaccurate, not current or incomplete, Yahoo has the right to suspend or terminate your account and refuse any and all 
current or future use of the Yahoo Services (or any portion thereof).” 
If such a ban on using the Yahoo services were issued, it would clearly be contrary to the Terms of 
Service if one would access the service in spite of the ban. The question is whether visiting a 
website with disregard for such a ban falls within the scope of hacking statutes prohibiting 
unauthorized access so that a breach of Terms of Service, be it contractually binding or not, 
becomes a criminal act. 
CFAA claims based solely on “de-authorizations” found in website terms of service or use have 
generally been unsuccessful in US case law. The language of the terms relied on by the plaintiffs 
have varied; some phrasing their terms to describe “unwanted use” as a “de-authorization” (an 
approach that has been rejected by most courts), some prohibiting automatic access, e.g. by bots, 
spiders, scrapers etc., and at least one that just directly in its terms prohibits access to the website by 
competitors
885
. 
One of the earliest contract-based cases was AOL v. LCGM.
886
 AOL, an ISP (Internet Service 
Provider) provided internet access, chat room services, email services and more to its members. 
LCGM was an online business that offered pornographic websites. AOL filed a CFAA complaint 
against LCGM, alleging that LCGM had exceeded its authorized access to AOL computers by using 
their AOL account to harvest email addresses of other AOL members in adult chat rooms in 
violation of AOL‟s Terms of Service. Afterwards, LCGM had sent bulk email to the email 
addresses that it had obtained; the emails were necessarily routed through AOL‟s computers to be 
delivered to AOL member‟s email inboxes. Sending of bulk email was also in violation of AOL‟s 
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Terms of Service and AOL‟s Unsolicited Bulk Email Policy. The AOL court did not discuss at any 
length what authorization means in the context of the CFAA. The court concluded laconically that 
“[d]efendants‟ actions violated AOL‟s Terms of Service, and as such was unauthorized.”
887
 The 
court concluded the same with respect to AOL‟s claim that LCGM violated the CFAA when 
sending bulk email through AOL computers.
888
 
Another court went further. In Register.com v. Verio
889
, Register, a domain name registrar, sued 
Verio, a website design service for unauthorized access to WHOIS information provided by 
Register. Register was appointed as a domain name register by ICANN (Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers). According to Register‟s contract with ICANN, Register was 
obligated to, among other things, provide free public access through the Internet to WHOIS 
information. The ICANN agreement also required that the registrar “not impose terms and 
conditions on the use made by others of its WHOIS data except as permitted by ICANN-adopted 
policy”
890
. ICANN had then specified that “[…] the ICANN Agreement requires the registrar to 
permit use of its WHOIS data “for any lawful purpose except to: … support the transmission of 
mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via email (spam) […]””.
891
 The ICANN 
agreement that bound Register, instructed Registrar as to in which way it could restrict the use of 
WHOIS information. Register therefore attached the following terms to the response to each 
WHOIS query: “By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this data only for 
lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this data to … support the 
transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitation via email.”
892
 
Before the district court, Register argued that Verio‟s method of accessing the WHOIS information 
and Verio‟s end use of the WHOIS information violated the CFAA. The district court agreed. Like 
the district court had held in terms of Register‟s trespass to chattels claim, the mere fact that 
Register had objected to Verio‟s use of robots to retrieve the WHOIS information meant that the 
access to the information was unauthorized. As also noted by Kerr, this is perhaps one of the 
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broadest readings of the CFAA to date.
893
 The fact that Register filed suit against Verio, was 
Verio‟s notice that the access was unauthorized under a primarily criminal statute.
894
 Furthermore, 
the court held that even if Register had not prohibited access by robots, Verio‟s “access would be 
rendered unauthorized ab initio by virtue of the fact that prior to entry Verio [knew] that the data 
obtained will be later used for an unauthorized purpose.”
895
 Thus, even though Register was only 
allowed to restrict the use of the WHOIS information as provided for in its contract with ICANN, 
Register went beyond those allowed restrictions, and furthermore, managed to convince a court that 
later unwanted use of data was generally relevant under the CFAA, which regulates access, and to 
use a primarily criminal statute to enforce these use restrictions that were in violation of their own 
contract with ICANN. 
Because the district court‟s CFAA reasoning was based on its trespass to chattels reasoning it is 
worth taking a brief look at what the Second Circuit said about the trespass to chattels claim on 
appeal. The Second Circuit argued, in terms of trespass to chattels, that because Verio admitted to 
knowing the terms, and because the terms were attached to the responses to WHOIS queries
896
, the 
court held that Verio had assented to the terms, describing it through an apple stand analogy. The 
court argued, in regards to terms of use, that when walking up to a stand where apples are sold, one 
cannot simply take an apple and not pay for it just because one has not read the price sign or 
chooses to ignore it. This is a rather odd and fundamentally inaccurate analogy that serves to further 
a misplaced argument that confusing the terms “use” and “access”. There is a fundamental 
difference between goods that are taken because they are free and goods that are for sale but are 
taken without payment. Let us say for instance that the apple stand sign stated that the apples were 
free, but you could only take some if you took at least two and also you would have to share the 
other apple with another person in your household. One could more validly argue that since the 
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apples were free and made accessible to the public, the best the stand owner could achieve is the 
hope that people would do as the sign suggested, but he has in fact effectively relinquished any 
proprietary right and ability to state any terms regarding the use of the apples and enforce such 
terms. Equally, the owner could not require a person to consume the apples raw in his home and not 
bake an apple pie at his grandmother‟s house.  The owner would have no claim as to the subsequent 
use of the apples, but only insofar as he limits the number of apples that are free per customer 
(meaning that for example, only the first three apples are free and payment is expected for any 
apples taken subsequent to that). For the same reasons, a website owner should not be able to 
enforce restriction on the use of information publicly available for free on websites through an 
access provision. Therefore, he cannot turn the access unauthorized just because the information 
was not used in the way the owner wanted, nor could he claim that using the information in an 
unwanted way (e.g. for an unwanted purpose) was exceeding authorized access; at least not under a 
„hacking‟ provision that prohibits unauthorized access; but maybe more appropriately under e.g. 
copyright laws insofar as the information is protected by such laws.
897
 
In Southwest v. Farechase
898
, the plaintiff, the low-fare airline Southwest, filed a CFAA 
unauthorized access claim against Outtask and Farechase, a software company that licensed 
scraping software to Outtask, who in turn used the Farechase software in a software product that 
allowed corporate travelers to search for air fares. Since Farechase‟s software scraped information 
from Southwest‟s website in violation of the website‟s use agreement, Southwest claimed that 
Farechase and Outtask had accessed the website without information in violation of the CFAA.
899
 
Although Outtask argued that the use agreement did not constitute a contract, the court stated that 
“[r]egardless of whether the Use Agreement creates an enforceable contract for purposes of a 
breach of contract claim pursuant to state law, Outtask knew that Southwest prohibited the use of 
“any deep-link, page-scrape, robot, spider or other automatic device, program, algorithm or 
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methodology which does the same things.” Southwest had also notified Outtask directly that their 
access to the website was unauthorized. This is the extent of the court‟s analysis of authorization; 
the lack of analysis is reminiscent of AOL v. LCGM. Like AOL in AOL v. LCGM, it is not the 
principle of access, as such, that Southwest is concerned with; it is the purposes of the access and 
purposes of obtaining the information. That is, it is a question of what the defendant is going to do 
with the information later on and whether that is in the plaintiff‟s interest. 
The same district court decided another case involving Southwest Airlines a few years later in 
Southwest v. BoardFirst
900
. However, since the last Southwest case, the Fifth Circuit had rendered a 
decision in Phillips (discussed above in the section on code-based approach). Southwest again cited 
a violation of its website‟s terms of use as a basis for a CFAA violation, in addition to cease-and-
desist letters. Southwest‟s seating policy on the airplanes was based on a “first come first served” 
basis, such that those first 45 customers who first check in within the first 24 hours before departure 
get an “A” boarding pass and get to board before other those passengers who get “B” or “C” 
boarding passes. BoardFirst‟s reason for being was to serve Southwest customers, for a fee, by 
logging onto the website for them and get the desirable “A” boarding pass. The customer would 
supply BoardFirst with the information needed to log onto the website on their behalf. However, the 
website‟s terms of use prohibited use of the website for commercial purposes. Southwest later 
added language to the effect that excluded BoardFirst‟s practices explicitly, as well as sending 
cease-and-desist letters to BoardFirst. Therefore Southwest claimed that BoardFirst had violated the 
terms of use, and thus the CFAA. Although the court found that BoardFirst had breached a contract 
when it violated the terms of use, the court was hesitant when it came to the question of whether 
violation of terms of use triggered the application of the CFAA. The court left it an open question, 
allowing the parties to submit trial briefs on the question of “authorization” in the context of the 
CFAA, but emphasized that Zefer, Farechase, Explorica, Register, and AOL v. LCGM had received 
criticism from commentators. Furthermore, the court cited Phillips and the “intended function” test 
(the objective version), and noted that the defendant had used the website according to its intended 
function regardless of whether the terms of use did not sanction the purpose for which BoardFirst 
used the website (for financial gain); the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to computers, not 
using a computer for a prohibited purpose.
901
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What is perhaps one of the more insidious of attempted applications of the CFAA occurred in US v. 
Drew.
902
 Recall that although the cases analyzed so far where the basis for the CFAA claim has 
been a violation of terms have been civil cases, the interpretation of civil cases applies in criminal 
cases as well, since the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute. Thus, it was arguably inevitable that 
the government pursued a similar strategy in a criminal case. Lori Drew was found guilty by a jury 
for a misdemeanor
903
 violation of the CFAA based on her having lied about her name, age and 
gender on MySpace and posting a picture of someone other than herself without that person‟s 
consent in violation of MySpace‟s Terms of Service. Drew had been masquerading as a fictitious 
16-year old boy on MySpace. She used the profile to cyberbully a 13-year old girl, Megan, over the 
course of roughly a month. Megan ended up committing suicide the same day as Drew, pretending 
to be the 16-year old boy, told her that “the world would be a better place without her in it.”
904
 
Upon learning of Megan‟s death, Drew deleted the fictitious boy‟s MySpace profile. The 
government‟s theory was that Drew‟s intentional violation of MySpace‟s Terms of Service 
constituted unauthorized access to the service and thus triggered criminal liability under the CFAA. 
Drew argued that such a construction of the CFAA would render it unconstitutionally vague. The 
court agreed with Drew and granted her motion for acquittal. 
According to the court, the government‟s theory failed both prongs of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, because (a)(2)(C) would become a law “that affords too much discretion to the police and 
too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].”
905
 
Intentional violation of website terms of service failed the notice requirement for several reasons. 
(1) A contract breach is normally not subject of criminal prosecutions; especially, so where the 
service is provided for free, as was the case with MySpace. Ordinary users would not expect 
criminal prosecution for violating such terms.
906
 (2) If terms of service and the likes really control 
authorization to access and thus control the criminality of any given access, (a)(2)(C) would be void 
for vagueness, because “it is unclear whether any or all violations of terms of service will render the 
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access unauthorized, or whether only certain ones will.”
907
 Although stating that any and all 
violations would be criminal would solve this specific notice problem, doing so would render the 
statute overbroad and violate the second prong of the void-for-vagueness doctrine (sufficient 
guidelines to those enforcing the law).
908
 (3) Allowing violations of terms of service to form the 
basis of a CFAA violation delegates to the website owner to define what conduct the CFAA 
criminalizes, and thus compounds the vagueness problems.
909
 (4) Application of contract law and 
contract clauses invite other problems, such as where a dispute is subject to arbitration (a question 
of whether the court can make a finding as to authorization when the contract requires resolution of 
disputes through arbitration). Lastly, the court notes that under California law, a breach of terms of 
service “does not automatically discharge the contract, but merely “excuses the injured party‟s 
performance, and gives him or her the election of certain remedies.””
910
 
The second prong of the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires, as may be recalled from the chapter 
on nullum crimen sine lege, that statute provides sufficient guidelines to those enforcing the law. 
The Drew court stated that the government‟s theory failed that prong as well. If any violation of 
terms would incur criminal liability, the range of behavior that would be rendered criminal is 
infinite. For example, Facebook‟s terms of service prohibit violating the spirit of the terms.
911
 
Putting that together with section 3.11 of the terms that essentially prohibits aiding and abetting 
others in violating any part of the terms or Facebook‟s other policies, there is no limit to criminal 
liability. As pointed out by the Drew court, prosecutors could pick and choose who to prosecute 
because lying about your age, weight or other information about yourself would constitute a breach 
of MySpace‟s terms. Such staggering breadth in addition to the fact that the prosecution need not 
await a complaint from the service provider. In both Drew and Auernheimer the service providers 
did not file complaints against the defendants. Anything and everything could be prosecuted. The 
government‟s theory, given that the statute does not require there be any harm done nor that there 
has been a violation of privacy interests
912
, would result in a “standardless sweep” that would leave 
“federal law enforcement entities […] improperly free “to pursue their personal predilections.””
913
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Even though other courts had previously held that breach of terms of service would suffice to 
trigger liability under the CFAA they had only ever done so in civil cases. As noted by several 
commentators, the fact that the CFAA has been primarily interpreted in civil contexts is likely the 
root cause of its current expansive scope, which applies equally in criminal cases. Conduct that 
violates the CFAA in a civil case is criminal conduct under the CFAA.
914
 
In Cvent v. Eventbrite
915
, Cvent, a company that, among other things, maintained an online database 
of venues for large events, had written in the website‟s terms of use that “[n]o competitors or future 
competitors are permitted access to our site or information, and any such access by third parties is 
unauthorized…”.
916
 Eventbrite, a company also in the event planning business, had scraped venue 
information from the Cvent web-based database, which was publicly accessible via Cvent‟s website 
and later posted the information on its own website. Cvent proffered only one argument in support 
of the CFAA claim; the terms of use prohibiting competitors from accessing the site and 
information on the site. The court did not comment on the language of the terms, but dismissed 
Cvent‟s claim (1) because the terms were difficult to find on the website, and, (2) because Cvent 
had not taken any affirmative steps to screen competitors from accessing the information.
917
 For 
those reasons the court found that the website and the database were not protected in any 
meaningful way.
918
 
The CFAA does not ask why information was accessed, it just asks whether the access was 
authorized.  
 
11.5.3 A social norms approach? 
The social norms approach has not really been articulated in US case law as an independent 
approach. The Fifth Circuit in Phillips stated that courts typically analyze authorization from the 
point of “expected norms of intended use or the nature of the relationship established between the 
computer owner and the user.”
919
 However, as noted before, the Fifth Circuit followed a subjective 
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approach rather than an objective one as in Morris, which it nonetheless cited as support; the Fifth 
Circuit arguably follows a less “random” approach than the application of a “reasonable 
expectations test” rejected by the First Circuit in Explorica, a test that made even the presence of 
hyperlinks a sign that a certain manner of access was unauthorized. But as will be shown, a 
subjective approach is indicative of a lack of a social norm. The CFAA does not provide answers to 
the question of what authorization means, and thus courts must figure out what that is, and in doing 
so have hooked into the traditional trespass doctrine, agency law and so on, to find legal arguments 
for liability where the behavior is socially unacceptable and could under creative theories be 
squeezed within the concept of unauthorized access even where the objectionable conduct is not 
related to the principle of the access itself, but rather later use of information gained through an 
otherwise authorized access. What does “code” mean, anyway? Should terms of service, or 
contracts unrelated to the access, matter? 
It was argued in the section on the code-based approach that there is no technical difference 
between what Auernheimer did (changed digits in the URL) and what Phillips did (changed the 
SSN number submitted to a field on the page). In both cases information was extracted that was not 
meant to be extracted, and code technically allowed both defendants to proceed. In Auernheimer‟s 
case one would be hard-pressed to call the value in the URL a password, where the login page 
requested a password independently of the changed value in the URL. Although Auernheimer was 
convicted in the district court, his conviction was vacated on appeal due to venue issues. The Third 
Circuit stated, in dicta, that Auernheimer had only viewed the public facing portion of the website, 
indicating that it was the court‟s opinion that Auernheimer had not violated the CFAA. However, 
Phillips was convicted as well, and his conviction was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. But in Phillips‟ 
case, the webpage made the entering of a social security number fit our collective perception of a 
password, regardless of how inherently insecure this technical barrier was due to the authentication 
being based only on supplying an SSN and nothing else. Furthermore, Auernheimer never 
attempted to proceed beyond what is perceived as the security perimeter (he remained on the login 
screen), whereas Phillips did proceed beyond what is perceived as the security perimeter, regardless 
of its efficacy. 
If there is no real technical difference, then the differences must lie elsewhere. Of course there is the 
possibility that the Fifth and Third Circuits simply disagree on the matter. It is more likely, 
however, especially granted the Fifth Circuits references to Morris‟ “intended function” test 
(although the Fifth Circuit gives the Second Circuit‟s test a subjective spin) and the district court‟s 
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“reasonable expectations” test in EF v. Explorica, that the Fifth Circuit was relying on how people 
perceive password prompts on webpages and what password prompts are intended for. The Fifth 
Circuit‟s reference to the rejected “reasonable expectations” test is perhaps a bit misplaced, because 
the district court went too far in the Explorica case by arguing that the presence of hyperlinks and 
dropdown menus indicated a restriction on how information may be accessed that is otherwise 
publicly accessible, and that the copyright symbol meant that there could be restrictions on use of 
information that was not actually capable of being protected by copyright law. However, the Fifth 
Circuit was right on the money in terms of people understanding what a password prompt 
represents. Everyone inherently knows that guessing passwords is wrong – at least when it is not 
your own account to which you have simply forgotten your password. The question is, should that 
affect how other cases are decided that do not involve passwords, where the plaintiff simply calls 
something a “secret” or a “password” without that something being perceived by society as such? 
Arguably, the answer is no, because where intersubjectivity is lacking – which most certainly was 
the case in the district court‟s test in Explorica – there is no norm; no common understanding. 
The social norms approach does not appear to render code restrictions meaningless. The social 
norms approach ties directly into code in some cases, such as Morris, which will be revisited briefly 
below. 
The problem with the code-based approach is that it does not appropriately solve cases where the 
machine authorized the access, but the offender clearly knew he had no authorization to access the 
machine. Peter Winn used an Australian case to exemplify such a situation.
920
 In the Australian 
case, the defendant had opened a bank account and gotten a bank card so he could withdraw money 
from his account from ATMs. The ATMs were setup in such a way that when an ATM was 
“online” it would check the available funds in the customer‟s account. However, when it was 
“offline” an ATM would allow the customer to withdraw up to $200, without checking whether 
there were sufficient funds in the account. The defendant had closed his account and then used his 
bank card to withdraw money from an “offline” ATM. Of course, anyone knows that if you have no 
account with the bank anymore, then withdrawing money from an “offline” ATM using the old 
bank card is clearly not authorized, regardless of whether the  ATM allows the withdrawal or not. 
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The Australian High Court made a point out of noting that the machine cannot give consent on 
behalf of the bank where the customer has no account with the bank.
921
 
For those advocating a pure code-based approach, the approach will break down, because code 
means something to us in some contexts and something else or nothing specific in others contexts. 
For example, if we compare the Australian ATM case with Auernheimer; the ATM allowed the 
withdrawal to occur even though the authorization to withdraw from the bank account cannot 
persist beyond the closing of the account, whereas the AT & T servers allowed Auernheimer and 
Spitler to extract information that AT & T would not have allowed them to extract had they been 
asked. Both the defendant in the Australian case and Auernheimer and Spitler exploited perceived 
vulnerabilities. Then why is the Australian defendant so clearly culpable whilst Auernheimer and 
Spitler are less so? 
There are several possible answers. One answer could be that the Australian defendant caused harm 
in that the bank sustained a monetary loss; he took money that he knew did not belong to him. A 
second answer, which includes the former, could be social norms. The involvement of the concept 
of authorization in the Australian case seems to stem from the defendant‟s analogy to Australian 
common law. The defendant would not have incurred liability had a bank teller mistakenly given 
him the $200 because they did not know the defendant did not have an account with the bank 
anymore. Then why would the defendant incur liability when the same mistake is made by a 
machine? The Australian court answered that a machine cannot consent to anything. That is, the 
Australian High Court stated that only a human being can give consent. Peter Winn then argues on 
the basis of the Australian case that what machines authorize or allow has no bearing on whether 
there is authorization to access a computer.
922
 
However, Winn‟s argument does not sound reasonable or practical either, because code and the 
perception of the code‟s purpose affects how the user perceives authorization. Those arguing in 
favor of a pure code-based approach and those more inclined to accept Winn‟s approach that favors 
a person‟s consent regardless of code arguably under- and overcriminalize (depending on a narrow 
or broad understanding of code restrictions) and overcriminalize, respectively. A code-based 
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approach would let the Australian defendant off the hook for withdrawing money he knew he was 
not authorized to withdraw. Winn‟s approach would be highly problematic in cases like 
Auernheimer involving the web where access to public websites is implicitly authorized because the 
servers allow access to the websites subject to the owner‟s server setup but where the owner failed 
to foresee the way the server would leak information or how it would be accessed and could thus 
not have agreed to an unexpected scenario. Auernheimer and Spitler knew that AT & T did not 
intend to make the email addresses publicly accessible, but AT & T left the information in a public 
space outside the “perimeter” so to speak. 
Perhaps the answer to the question regarding culpability is a mix of social norms, code and harm. 
Where harm is caused, we usually find it socially unacceptable, whereas where no harm was caused 
because the defendants did not maliciously exploit what they obtained, we are more forgiving. The 
point is merely that code and owner consent are interlinked; in some contexts we may think it fair to 
let code be decisive and in others let the owner‟s consent be decisive. Code-based approaches are 
arbitrary if applied broadly without regard for the objective intended function of the code. Code is 
often reusable in various contexts, but password prompts we understand as access restrictions, 
whereas hyperlinks we do not understand to be access restrictions regardless of whether a website 
owner may construe them that way on his website. We can similarly agree that for the rest of this 
dissertation the word “fork” refers to a “knife” and we agree to use knives as forks, but our new 
shared understanding of the word “fork” and the redefined common understanding of how one uses 
a knife, has no bearing on how the world around us understands the word and how they choose to 
use cutlery. The code-based approach is, or can be, arbitrary without an interpretation of what the 
code is meant to do and not what a specific owner wanted to use the code to accomplish. The code 
could be interpreted more or less objectively and it could be interpreted subjectively; more 
objectively, as in the Second Circuit‟s “intended function” test, or subjectively, as in the Fifth 
Circuit‟s more subjective version, the “intended use” test. The Second Circuit did not ask what the 
specific computer owners how they intended the programs to be used, but what the program‟s 
intended function was. The Fifth Circuit, however, focused on how the University of Texas 
subjectively intended their computers and networks to be used in light of a computer use policy in 
order to find that conducting port scanning constituted unauthorized access because port scanning 
did not comport with the university‟s intended use of the computers and networks. 
Professor Kerr has very recently published a draft of a forthcoming essay called “Norms of 
Computer Trespass”. As may be recalled, it was Kerr who argued that authorization could be 
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analyzed from two approaches, which he divided into code-based and contract-based. At the time of 
his 2003 article that described this distinction there existed some case law that supported such a 
distinction, and at the time it was also clear that the uncertainty and vagueness imposed by the 
contract-based approach made the narrower code-based approach more reasonable. However, as 
will become clear, especially in the light of the below chapter on insiders, the code-based approach 
does not and never has been capable of providing a comprehensive framework for analyzing 
authorization; it has its faults. The approach fails to cover e.g. a random visitor‟s or a janitor‟s 
unauthorized access to an unprotected computer, because code did not prevent them from accessing 
the computer, and thus, under a strict application of the code-based approach they would be 
authorized to access the computer. But such a conclusion is immediately recognizable as being 
erroneous, because it goes against our social norms. We all know that when we go to a store, we 
cannot go to an employee‟s computer and start using it to check inventory or payroll just because 
there was no meaningful code-based restriction to keep us out. Lack of authorization is obvious in 
this particular context. 
 
11.5.3.1 Social norms dimensions of trespass 
Kerr has recognized in his draft essay that the code-based approach he favored fails to appropriately 
address access that is clearly unauthorized based on clear social norms, and furthermore, that the 
code-based restrictions are hard to separate from the contract-based restrictions in some cases,
923
 
since code and contract may be more interlinked than previously anticipated. Kerr then argues in 
favor of a social norms approach to analyzing authorization that appears to be based on the Second 
Circuit‟s analysis in Morris as well as using traditional trespass theories as a doctrinal hook. 
Kerr‟s amended proposal for analyzing authorization focuses on social norms associated with 
traditional trespass concepts; the social norms associated with (1) the nature of the space, (2) the 
means of access, and (3) the context of the access.
924
 
(1) The nature of space is inherently linked to our perceptions of “perimeters”. The walls of a 
residential house indicates a perimeter in physical space. We know from the appearance of that 
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house that we are not allowed to enter it unless we have been invited in or specific circumstances 
indicate that normal rules do not apply, such as a real estate agent‟s open house.
925
 The walls of a 
supermarket also indicate a perimeter in physical space, but different social norms apply with 
respect to a supermarket compared to the social norms that apply to residential houses.
926
 
Supermarkets we can enter – during opening hours – without asking permission or knocking on the 
door, ringing doorbells or the likes to explicitly illicit our authorization to access. The appearance of 
the space itself in combination with social norms guide our perception of authorization. 
(2) As to the means of access, we know not to enter a house through a window, a chimney, a pet 
door or entering the house by breaking down the wall. None of these methods of entering a house 
comport with the “intended function” of a window, chimney, pet door or a wall.
927
 
(3) Norms associated with the context of entry are relevant to authorization to entry. As Kerr 
explains, locks are a form of access control. Only a select few have keys to our personal homes. The 
lock‟s function is to keep those out who do not have a key, and let those in who do. But at the same 
time, if you lose your key and someone finds it, the person finding the key is obviously not entitled 
to enter your house solely based on possession of the lost key. 
However, although the framework of traditional trespass analysis may be useful in a computer 
context, analogies to social norms governing access to private residences and other buildings or 
areas are not as transferrable because the nature of the space is quite different. 
Kerr points out that without experience with the norms, a person observing the norms from the 
outside may perceive the social norms as arbitrary rules.
928
 Although judges may be as familiar as 
any other person with the social norms that control the authorization to enter physical spaces, they 
are not necessarily familiar with computers or common practice in the computer context. Peter 
Winn, for examples, appears to reject any notion suggesting that “computer nerds” should dictate 
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norms in a computer context.
929
 However, those “computer nerds” are those that are most familiar 
with existing norms and those most in touch with ongoing developments and practices. To judges 
any given conduct may appear entirely alien even though it is a norm in the context of computers 
and networks. If judges know enough about the technology and how it is used they are better 
equipped to recognize norms,
930
 and will thus also be better equipped to reject suggested or 
developing norms that are undesirable or harmful.   
Kerr cites Morris as an example of a case that incorporates the three questions of network access: 
the nature of the space, the means of the access and the context of the access. Nature of the space: 
Morris‟ conduct took place in a pre-web environment where access to a machine was password-
controlled. Access was not open, but dependent on the user having an account on the computer.
931
 
Means of access: Morris exploited vulnerabilities in the finger daemon and the SEND MAIL 
program (he used the programs against their “intended function”) and gained “special access”.
932
 As 
discussed before, in the section on code-based approach, the Second Circuit‟s “intended function” 
test relies on a more objective perspective rather than subjective; this is further emphasized by Kerr, 
who points out that it is important to point out that “the difference between bug and feature boils 
down to social norms rather than subjective intent.”
933
 If the means of gaining access is a feature it 
points towards the access being authorized, whereas if the means of gaining access is exploitation of 
a bug it points towards the access being unauthorized. Finally, the context of the entry: Morris‟ 
worm guessed passwords. As also pointed out earlier in the section on the code-based approach in 
connection with US v. Phillips, entering a password into a password field is the exact intended 
function of that field. Whether the password turns out to be ill-gotten and the person using it is not 
the person authorized to access is immaterial to the “intended function” of a password prompt. 
However, it flows from the context of the access (i.e. the person is using a password not belonging 
to them) that the person is unauthorized to use that password. Authorization to access has not been 
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delegated to the person illegitimately using the otherwise valid password.
934
 It goes against social 
norms to guess other people‟s passwords. This would apply regardless of whether one favors a strict 
code-based theory that asks whether code prohibited the entry or whether one favors a contract-
based theory where the terms of service prohibit guessing other people‟s passwords. No code or 
contract needs to tell us that password-guessing is wrong; we know from experience. It is perhaps 
one of the clearest examples of unauthorized access and the use of other people‟s passwords to 
obtain information from a computer that one is not entitled to obtain is specifically mentioned as an 
example in both the Danish and US legislative history. 
In order to figure out whether accessing a computer is authorized it is important to understand the 
nature of the space. With respect to computers, the space can be physical in the sense that a janitor 
may have physical access to a computer because he is allowed to do maintenance in the room where 
the computer is located, or a library computer that is made available to anyone visiting the library. 
The space can also be virtual; closed networks or services where a person needs to be registered 
user (i.e. have an account) to be authorized to access, and open networks or services where anyone 
can freely access some parts of or the entire computer. Open networks and services, such as the 
internet, the web, public websites on the web, are left open and publicly accessible by default; in 
there lies the value of the internet and the web – the more people who use these publicly accessible 
entities, the larger the audience the content and service providers have. However, different services 
or applications may have different norms
935
, because the perception of the space is different; that is, 
the perception of the perimeter and thus the rules for traversing the perimeter may differ.  
Since many of the problems discussed in this thesis relate to the web, an examination of the web is 
pertinent. The web is a “global computer networked information system.”
936
 The nature of the space 
is suggested by the adjective of that quote, namely, “global”. Of course, that does not mean that 
anyone with a webserver has to make its content available to anyone (this is not an advocacy for 
mandatory open access!), but on the other hand, a person who publishes information on a public 
website cannot claim that they expected the information to be anything but globally accessible; just 
like a published author cannot expect that his published book is not publicly accessible, or publish 
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and hope that no one will read the book.
937
 You cannot have it both ways. That is, expectations of 
retaining control over information published on a global network is contradictory
938
 to the nature of 
the space in which the information was published, where users expect that publicly accessible 
information is just that – publicly accessible – because the nature of the space is open. No one 
expects to be obligated to contact a website administrator or owner of a public website ahead of 
time to secure authorization, and making the information publicly accessible relieves the owner of 
having to grant individualized access authorization to perhaps thousands or millions of users to the 
exact same information on a case-by-case basis. The owners relinquish control in return for more 
efficient, easier access to the information they want to disseminate. For example, arguably much 
fewer people would use Amazon‟s services if Amazon tried to retain control of price information by 
requiring users, every time they were looking to buy a book, to write an email to Amazon to inquire 
about the price of a book and then await a reply from an Amazon representative that granted them 
special access to the price information. In this case, it makes good business sense to cut such a 
redundant and unnecessary time and money cost. Rather, social norms dictate that if you do not 
want to reveal the information to anyone and everyone you do not publish the information on a 
public website because you are addressing a global audience when doing so. It is common sense. If 
the information is published on a public website, it is inherently open.
939
 The computer security 
aspect supports the difference in the nature of the space between open and closed spaces. The 
security perimeter is a logical perimeter within which all controlled and protected resources are 
kept. Within the perimeter there may be various domains (protected resources) where the innermost 
domain is the best protected because it consists of the most sensitive resources. The perimeter of 
each domain is guarded by access controls, authentication, identification, etc. Those resources that 
are intended for general public access are placed outside the domain (outside the perimeter) and are 
expected to be and acknowledged as exposed. The publicly accessible resources are placed outside 
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the perimeter so that the resources inside the perimeter (within the various domains) are not 
exposed.
940
 Thus, public websites are open spaces
941
, not only as a result of social norms, but 
because they are treated as such for security purposes. This view is arguably supported by 
legislative history because the committee reports point to computer security as the primary 
prevention. When resources are placed outside the security perimeter the owner has opted to expose 
the resources and thus opted out of security (at least with respect to confidentiality), and if an owner 
has opted out of the primary, most effective method of preventing access, the question is whether 
mere access, absent damage to the resource, should be protected by criminal law, because 
authorization and access control is only relevant at the perimeter with respect to entering the 
perimeter; it is not relevant outside it. 
As explained above, companies will implement code-based “restrictions”, or “speed bumps”
942
 as 
Kerr calls them, that in combination with terms and cease-and-desist letters that legally (albeit not 
technically) serve to exclude competitors and their bots, and others, for example those whose 
business is based on supplementing a service provided by the owner of the website; recall for 
example the case Southwest v. BoardFirst, where BoardFirst‟s business essentially was spawned 
from Southwest‟s way of doing business in that Southwest made their customers compete for the 
coveted priority boarding passes based on a first-come first-serve principle, and BoardFirst served 
those Southwest customers who were willing to pay a third-party (BoardFirst) to compete for those 
boarding passes on their behalf. 
If the default status of public websites is “open” and access is authorized, the question is whether 
owners can construct a “legal fiction” that allows them to selectively exclude whomever they want 
by implementing easily circumvented code “restrictions”, by publishing written restrictions (e.g. 
Terms of Service), and/or directly revoking the authorization that inherently flows from the 
technically enabled public accessibility. That is, can website owners transform what is and appears 
open, to being “closed” by just saying so or by implementing essentially symbolic barriers, not 
because the barriers are effective, but because their presence, no matter how ineffective, can form 
the needed thrust of an argument of unauthorized access that terms of service and the likes might 
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not be able to support by themselves. Kerr argues that easily circumvented code “restrictions” such 
as IP blocking, cookies, CAPTCHA, user agent detection, etc. and terms of service and the likes 
should not render the access unauthorized.
943
 The argument is inherently based on code in the sense 
that the foundation is the openness of the web, but coupled with the sensibility of questioning 
whether even symbolic, multi-purpose or easily circumvented code restrictions are perceived as 
actual, meaningful access restrictions that turns otherwise authorized access into criminal 
unauthorized access. I agree that the inherent openness of the web should make symbolic attempts 
to filter out certain people from visiting otherwise entirely public websites irrelevant in the legal 
sense. However, I am not sure that argument is going to convince judges that a fairly clear notice 
not to access a website, even a public one, does not override the open norm of the web. 
Supermarkets can ban a person, libraries can likely ban a person as well from entering. If you have 
been specifically told not to enter, will a social norm of openness negate the specific ban directed at 
you? Whereas people cannot disconnect their property from the physical world, people can 
disconnect servers from the web as a virtual space. Accessibility in virtual space is a choice that 
requires positive action by the owner. 
IP blocking, cookies, user agent detection, CAPTCHA, hard-to-guess URLs and other measures can 
frustrate access but will not restrict it. 
 
11.5.3.2 IP blocking 
For example IP blocking could be aimed at specific people or could be aimed at a range of IP 
addresses. Most people get assigned dynamic IP addresses that change every so often and thus an IP 
address would only be effective and noticeable by those who have static IP addresses. But if a new 
static IP address is requested to a customer upon his request, the IP block – the code restriction – 
does not exist anymore. A person cannot be forced to retain a specific static IP address (with the 
associated added costs related to obtaining and maintaining a static IP address), so that a website 
owner‟s IP block remains in “effect”. Not only would that place an odd obligation on a person, but 
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could obligate the ISP to reserve that IP address for that customer despite the depletion of IPv4 
addresses that necessitates dynamically assigning IP addresses.
944
 
 
11.5.3.3 User-agent string 
A user agent is essentially the program through which the user contacts a webserver. It could be a 
browser, iTunes, or any other program that retrieves resources using HTTP. The user-agent string is 
sent to the webserver and identifies the software your device is running. The version of the website 
you are requesting may differ depending on which browser you are using, because of compatibility 
issues. For example mobile devices will get served a mobile version of the website (if one exists). 
 
Figure 2 "Server Attention Span". Available at https://xkcd.com/869/. 
Here is an example of how to restrict access depending on arbitrary environmental attributes on an 
Apache webserver as provided in the Apache webserver documentation: 
SetEnvIf User-Agent BadBot GoAway=1 
Order allow,deny 
Allow from all 
Deny from env=GoAway  
Warning: Access control by User-Agent is an unreliable technique, since the User-Agent header can be set to 
anything at all, at the whim of the end user. 
In the above example, the environment variable GoAway is set to 1 if the User-Agent matches the string BadBot. 
Then we deny access for any request when this variable is set. This blocks that particular user agent from the site.
945
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As noted in the Apache documentation, access control by user-agent is unreliable, because browser 
settings are entirely within the control of the user. Switching user agents is commonplace and is 
done for a variety of reasons, including research, privacy, and improving compatibility. 
Furthermore, and perhaps importantly, the user-agent string is optional.
946
 
A webserver can be configured to restrict access by certain user agents but allow access for others, 
such as was the case in US v. Auernheimer. AT & T had configured the server to be open to iPads, 
but closed to other devices. Thus, in order to access the website, Auernheimer and Spitler had 
configured their browser‟s user-agent string to reflect what AT & T‟s server allowed, namely, an 
iPad. As discussed above, almost all of the major browsers “pretend” to be something they are not. 
Moreover, the user is free to insert custom strings in the user-agent field and can easily do so.
947
 If a 
website is only compatible with an older version of Internet Explorer, is it wrong to change the 
user-agent to reflect that older version when the browser requests the website? Or should the 
compatibility problem be understood as an access control aimed at newer versions of Internet 
Explorer? 
Browser fingerprinting has also become a privacy concern, because the user-agent string can 
uniquely identify users based on their browser‟s configuration, and thus can be used to track the 
user. The user-agent string has also been used for the purposes of price discrimination. Because 
those using the Safari browser on a Mac computer (which is considered a luxury product) are 
willing to spend more money to obtain a luxury product, they might also be willing to pay more for 
e.g. hotel stays or trips, or if you are using a mobile device you might get better deals. But is it a 
crime to change the user agent to check for better deals or to investigate price discrimination? It is 
doubtful that if price discrimination is based on user agents that a website owner would want that to 
become public knowledge, or they may construe your access as unauthorized because you gained 
access to a price that, based on your actual device, you were not supposed to be offered.
948
 Should a 
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website owner‟s choice of (unreliable) access control force you, with the backing of criminal law, to 
reveal information about yourself? A similar problem presents itself in terms of cookies, which can 
also make the user uniquely identifiable, but the deletion of which could potentially incur criminal 
liability for the user. In any case, it is not against the “intended function” of the browser to change 
the user agent. 
 
11.5.3.4 Cookies 
Cookies can be used to erect a rather flimsy “wall”. For example, many online newspapers put a 
pressure on the user to purchase a subscription after the user has read ten articles for free (perhaps 
within the course of a month). Some of you may have noticed this “barrier” and others almost never 
encounter the barrier. The difference lies in your stance towards browser cookies. Browser cookies 
are tiny bits of data that are sent from a website you visit and stored by your browser.
949
 The 
protocol the web uses is HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). HTTP is designed to be simple in 
that a web of information should be accessible to any system regardless of design differences. 
HTTP, in its simplicity, is stateless,
950
 which means that a website will not remember you from 
page to page on the site unless something makes the session “stateful”. Thus, the website sends a 
cookie containing state information to be stored in the browser. The cookie allows the website to 
track you as you surf the site, for example, so that it does not forget the contents of your shopping 
cart as you browse other products, or so that you remain logged into your account as you browse 
pages on the website. However, you remain in control of the browser and thus the cookies that the 
website sends to your browser for storage. Those concerned with online privacy and the use of 
cookies to track their movements e.g. for the purposes of targeted advertising
951
, may be familiar 
with browser features that let you delete cookies manually, let you direct the browser to delete all 
cookies upon exiting the browser, or for example let you configure your browser to not accept 
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cookies at all. The cookie set by a newspaper website when you visit the website, gets sent back to 
the website when you access it again and thus the cookie can keep track of how many articles you 
have read, given that the cookie has not expired. Those who clear the cookies in their browser for 
privacy reasons, or other reasons, may not ever or seldom be faced with the technical “barrier” that 
the cookie may present. 
Cookies can thus interfere with access to public websites e.g. when they are used keep track of the 
number of free articles read and create an obstacle for some users. The question is whether cookies 
can justify a deviation from the authorization to access that is inherent with regard to public 
websites, and whether a user who deletes the cookies in his browser and e.g. continues to read 
articles on a news website is circumventing a code restriction, such that he triggers the application 
of unauthorized access statutes. 
Kerr argues that cookies are just speedbumps and not barriers. “It‟s just trying to create enough of a 
hassle to push some users to buy a subscription to avoid it.”
952
 But ultimately, as Kerr also 
recognizes, the browser is controlled by the user, and the user decides whether to allow cookies, 
delete cookies or keep cookies.
953
 As with switching user agents, it is not against the “intended 
function” of a browser to delete cookies. 
What Kerr appears to argue is that a public website‟s
954
 code restrictions that are essentially 
implemented client-side (i.e. on the user‟s end) rather than server-side (i.e. on the website owner‟s 
end), and for that reason are within the user‟s control, are not code restrictions the circumvention of 
which ought to incur liability for the user under unauthorized access statutes. 
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 Orin S. Kerr: Norms of Computer Trespass (May 2015 draft) Columbia Law Review (Forthcoming 2016), p. 25. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601707 
953
 Recall the user-agent discussion in connection with US v. Auernheimer. Kerr also rejects a user‟s browser‟s user 
agent settings as a liability-triggering code restriction, since user agent settings, just like cookies, are completely within 
the user‟s control. 
954
 Note that e.g. stealing session cookies of an authenticated user or manipulating cookie values and thereby gaining 
access to someone else‟s closed account mirrors the concept of using someone else‟s password. That is, the nature of 
the space of an account that requires authentication differs from that of the open publicly accessible website. 
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11.5.3.5 CAPTCHA challenges 
CAPTCHA as an access control is, however, implemented server-side. The purpose of a 
CAPTCHA challenge is to hinder automatic access to a certain resource by a non-human actor.
955
 
However, as mentioned before, CAPTCHA also keeps out human actors, such as the visually 
impaired, dyslexic, etc., although that may not have been the website owner‟s intent when 
implementing CAPTCHA. Thus, if CAPTCHA circumvention is unauthorized access, then the 
CAPTCHA circumvention is criminal regardless of the website owner‟s subjective reason for 
implementing CAPTCHA and criminal regardless of the user‟s motive for circumventing it. For 
example, in US v. Lowson, Ticketmaster‟s primary concern seemed to be keeping out actors like 
Lowson who access the site for financial gain. Although Lowson‟s conduct may have been 
disruptive and perhaps triggers criminal liability under other provisions or subject to civil liability, 
his conduct would have been equally undesirable had he hired human actors to respond to the 
CAPTCHA challenges. A human actor responding to the CAPTCHA challenge would not 
constitute circumventing a code restriction solely based on the actor being human, and thus, it is 
clear that the issue is not with access to the site per se or information on the site, but the purpose for 
buying the tickets, namely, financial gain. The First Circuit noted, in terms of automated access, in 
EF v. Zefer: “Needless to say, Zefer can have been in no doubt that EF would dislike the use of the 
scraper to construct a database for Explorica to undercut EF‟s prices; but EF would equally have 
disliked the compilation of such a database manually without the use of a scraper tool. EF did not 
purport to exclude competitors from looking at its website and any such limitation would raise 
serious public policy concerns.”
956 957
 Although, Lowson was competing with Ticketmaster by 
buying blocks of tickets from Ticketmaster and selling them in the secondary market, the principle 
is the same; Ticketmaster would have disliked the conduct whether the access had occurred by way 
of non-human actors or human actors. 
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 See e.g. weakness definition of CAPTCHA guessing on MITRE‟s Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) website 
at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/804.html. Last visited on 11 July 2015. 
956
 EF v. Zefer, 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1
st
 Cir. 2003) 
957
 Note that in EF v. Explorica, Explorica was found to have violated the “exceeds authorized access” prong, not the 
“without authorization” prong. Thus, even though Explorica had authorization to access the website, the court found 
that they had exceeded their authorization by using a scraper to access. That is, the “means of access” meant that an 
otherwise authorized access was turned unauthorized, because the “context of the access” (the existence of a 
confidentiality agreement) enabled the “means of access”. 
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11.5.3.6 URL manipulation (“URL hacking”) 
URL hacking, or URL manipulation, refers to both criminal and innocuous user behavior, because 
all it entails is the manipulation of the URL. URL hacking sometimes may refer to e.g. SQL 
injection
958
, that is, the injection of malicious code into the URL string in order to interact directly 
with the SQL database. 
 
Figure 3 "Exploits of a mom"; available at https://xkcd.com/327/ 
The above comic strip from the website xkcd.com, is an example of SQL injection. By entering the 
boy‟s name Robert′); DROP TABLE Students;-- (SQL code) into the system, a database 
command was inadvertently allowed to be passed to the database from a field that should only 
accept text and not e.g. special symbols; that is, the person entering text into a field was 
inappropriately allowed to execute commands through a field that should only accept text. This is 
what the mom means when she says that the school failed to sanitize their database inputs; special 
symbols should not be allowed to be passed that enable execution of arbitrary code. There are few if 
any circumstances where it would be acceptable for a user to inject SQL code into queries since 
doing so can potentially allow the user to take over the server, delete tables in the database, access 
confidential information inside the security perimeter by bypassing access controls, etc. That is, it is 
                                                 
958
 SQL code injections into the URL. There are three types of SQL injection methods, (1) error based, which is the 
simplest – one gets the database to reveal information about itself and eventually dump the username and password 
columns into the browser window; the error windows reveal the information gradually as you probe the server through 
commands; (2) union based – based on the SQL union command; (3) blind based, which is the hardest method that 
usually would require a few days‟ work. Websites with weak security can be revealed simply by googleing 
“admin/login.asp?id=”, follow the link to the login page and type in admin as username (there is almost always a 
username called admin) and in the password type some SQL statement that the database will always recognize as true, 
such as “‟1 OR „1‟=‟1‟”, which means you are asking the server whether 1 = 1, which of course it will agree with you is 
correct and therefore grant you access, unless adequate precautions have been taken by the administrator and all 
database commands inputs have been filtered out from website forms. Sometimes the web administrator has only 
bothered to sanitize the password input for the 1 = 1 command, as this is first thing hackers will try. This means that a 
hacker can just ask it whether 2 = 2, and get past the filter. 
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not the intended function of the URL address bar and the user input fields on websites to be used as 
a means of bypassing password or other security mechanism that protect the database inside the 
perimeter, or to cause damage to the server or elevate the user‟s privileges on the server.
959
 SQL 
injection is akin to Morris‟ exploitation of vulnerabilities in the SEND MAIL program and the 
finger daemon; outside the social norms of means of access. But just because SQL injection through 
the URL address bar (or elsewhere) is malicious does not mean that any manipulation of the URL is 
criminal. 
URL hacking is also sometimes used to refer to simply adding to, changing or in some other way 
editing the URL string to browse a website, retrieve certain webpage content or resources, view a 
particular news article, change the language of a page, returning to the home page, and so on, 
instead of using the hyperlinks that may or may not be provided on the website.  
Criminal URL hacking could perhaps be defined as that involving the injection of code into the 
URL query strings in a way that departs from the intended function
960
 of URLs as resource locators 
rather than general command line interfaces.
961
 
Alternatively, a comparison to trade secret law principles perhaps casts some light on the viability of a concept of 
“secret URLs”; e.g. principles of reverse engineering
962
. Information is not a trade secret if it is publicly known, 
independently discovered (e.g. reverse engineered) or guessed.
963
 For example, where the components in the URL 
might follow open standards, such as was the case in US v. Auernheimer it is hard to argue that the component is secret 
or that the URL as a whole is secret because it was discoverable, guessable or capable of being reverse engineered. 
Furthermore, comparing it to a password is futile because the open standard necessarily implies the absence of secrecy. 
The purpose of bringing up trade secret law principles is not to import trade secret law principles into hacking statutes, 
because trade secret laws and hacking statutes protect different things (whereas trade secret law covers improper 
obtaining of information, unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized use of trade secrets, the CFAA covers unauthorized 
access to computers and information one is not authorized to access, but not disclosure or use of information). But the 
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 The same concluded in Orin S. Kerr: Norms of Computer Trespass (May 2015 draft) Columbia Law Review 
(Forthcoming 2016), p. 28. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601707 
960
 Akin to the “intended function” test employed by the Second Circuit in US v. Morris.  
961
 The intended function should never be derived from how the plaintiff intended the URL to function, because 
regardless of the plaintiff‟s influence on what components figure into the URL on the plaintiff‟s website, the plaintiff 
cannot redefine documented standards to suit his specific desire for legal consequences. Such ad hoc subjective 
redefinitions of the functions of URLs are clearly undesirable. The owner‟s sphere of control in terms of a website 
should not be extended to definitions of technical schemes and standards that concern the function of the Web and the 
Internet in general. 
962
 See more about reverse engineering in Danish law in Henrik Udsen: De informationsretlige grundsætninger (2009), 
p. 299 
963
 See e.g. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1995)(“[…] Independent discovery and analysis of 
publicly available products or information are not improper means of acquisition.”) 
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trade secret law analogy is useful in terms of showing that if a URL is guessed, a website‟s structure deduced, etc. it 
cannot be a secret. As soon as the URL is discovered, it is no longer secret and access is authorized. 
There is a difference in norms between guessing a URL and injecting malicious code into the URL 
and thus sending malicious code to a database. 
 
11.5.3.7 Summary 
IP blocking, restricting certain user-agents, cookies, CAPTCHA challenges and hard-to-guess (or 
generally guessable, deducible) URLs share a characteristic; in the context of public websites they 
are used to create fictional perimeters where the resources are already exposed to the general public. 
They are an illusion of security against access to the resource whilst they in reality provide none 
and the resource is as exposed as before. 
Where bots are purposely designed to affect the availability of the exposed resource, § 
1030(a)(5)(A) would still be applicable, since this subsection does not require that the access was 
unauthorized, but rather that the damage was caused intentionally and without authorization. 
However, subsections (a)(5)(B) and (C) do require that the access was unauthorized in order to 
cover damage that was caused recklessly and simply causing damage (without any scienter 
requirement as to the damage). Thus, if authorization to access to the exposed resource outside the 
perimeter (in the open space) is irrelevant, the CFAA would ostensibly fail to cover e.g. badly 
coded bots the use of which might recklessly cause damage to (affect the availability of) exposed 
resources such as public websites. 
Kerr‟s, and arguably, the Second Circuit‟s (in Morris) social norms-based approach (particularly 
nature of the space) is ostensibly a reflection of computer security in the sense that the concept of 
perimeters, the protected resources being domains that the perimeter encloses and the exposed 
resources being those outside the perimeter, i.e. out in the open. The means of access become 
relevant only when the means damage the exposed resources or enable entry into the perimeter 
(access to protected resources). The context of the access is also only relevant with respect to 
entering the perimeter. Where the means of access are not at odds with the program‟s or code‟s 
intended function (the social norms attached to means of access), the social norms governing the 
context of the access may still render the access unauthorized; for example in situations where 
access was gained by password-guessing, using known passwords, etc. where the authorization of 
the account owner is absent. Entering a password, regardless of delegation of authorization to 
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access using that password, does not violate social norms with regard to means of access, but it is 
captured by the norms governing the context of access. 
Switching IP addresses and user agents, deleting cookies, and deducing URL addresses from an 
observable context is so commonplace and trivial that considering those switches, the deletion or 
deduction as a trigger for criminal liability under hacking statutes appears to be a rather serious case 
of overcriminalization, when said conduct only leads to continued access and obtaining of an 
already exposed resource (i.e. a resource placed in an open, publicly accessible, space). 
 
 
11.6 A possible Danish interpretation: Revisiting the suggested “reasonable 
expectations” test in the Danish 1985 Committee Report 
The Danish committee, which proposed the hacking provision (§ 263(2)) in the criminal code, 
seems to have presumed that trespass norms would apply also with respect to analyzing when 
access under § 263(2) is with right. There is no further explanation of this in the committee report, 
but it is clearly a reference to social norms related to § 263(1) (privacy of communications, chattels, 
etc.) and § 264, both of which (including their subsections) concerned themselves with physical 
space.
964
 To revisit what the Committee stated in its 1985 report: 
“As with the other privacy violations, violations of the suggested provision will comprise a person gaining access to 
something, which with respect to them can reasonably be expected to be a restricted area, that is, inaccessible.”
965
 
966
 
                                                 
964
 It appears there has not been much written about the trespass provision in the Danish criminal code (§ 264) and the 
norms that determine when entry is unauthorized. At least there is not, to the author‟s knowledge, any Danish literature 
that explores a comprehensive analytical framework for analyzing authorization in trespass cases. There is a brief 
discussion in a 1971 Committee report on privacy violations that is useful. The discussion on trespass (§ 264) in 
Committee report 1971 no. 601, p. 34, does not explicitly use terms like “nature of the space”, but it does compare 
various types of locales and how standards of trespass differ between those locales; e.g. differences between residential 
houses, openly accessible hallways or stairwas in apartment buildings, building sites, etc. Similarly, the report discusses 
means of entry briefly and how that may affect whether entry was authorized. Context of entry is also briefly implicated 
in the discussion on residential houses. Thus, it may arguably be derived from the report that the Committee‟s thoughts 
on trespass analysis include (1) the nature of the space, (2) the means of access, and (3) the context of access, showing 
that these concepts of the traditional trespass doctrine are not common law or US law idiosyncrasies. 
965
 Committee report 1985 no. 1032, 25 
966
 Emphasis added 
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Given the language of this quote from the Committee report, the relevant reasonable expectations 
are those of a person accessing an area (in the objective sense), not the reasonable expectations of 
the owner of the space. 
As demonstrated via the prior analysis of EF v. Explorica and EF v. Zefer in the above section on 
“without right” in the Danish hacking provision, a reasonable expectations test is appropriate only 
where a social norm exists; i.e. a common understanding. The test, as carried out by the district 
court in Explorica, arguably, relies heavily on the fact that the court knew that EF disliked 
Explorica‟s use of the website and was seeking to prevent Explorica‟s use of the information on 
EF‟s public website. However, the circumstances that the court relied on to “deduce” lack of 
authorization was rooted in EF‟s subjective interpretation of the functioning and meaning of 
hyperlinks, dropdown menus, the copyright symbol, etc. That is, the court appears to have relied on 
what EF intended those things to mean, regardless of how society at large would interpret their 
function and meaning. Probably, the court used EF‟s subjective expectations as “indicators” that the 
access was unauthorized, because it was ostensibly clear to Explorica that EF would object to the 
purpose of Explorica‟s access to the website (i.e. Explorica‟s later use of the information to 
compete more efficiently with EF). Applying a reasonable expectations test rooted in the subjective 
expectations of the owner would render the application of hacking statues arbitrary and 
unforeseeable.  
Since it is a question of whether a user (presumably, objectively, a person in his position) could 
reasonably expect the access to be unauthorized, there is a tie to social norms associated with the 
nature of the space, the means of access and the context of the access. Recall that the Danish 
hacking provision is a subsection of a privacy provision; the open nature of the web should make an 
owner‟s objection to access to public websites irrelevant under the hacking provision, even if the 
user suspects that the owner, if asked, would not approve of the access or would not approve of 
access for certain purposes. 
However, as follows from the social norms governing the means of access, not every interaction 
with a public website is necessarily authorized just because it is open space. However, is it not the 
access to the website itself that is objectionable; rather, it is the access that could be gained through 
vulnerabilities on the website, such as would be the case with SQL injections, or by guessing 
passwords etc.; i.e. moving into a closed space. 
 
255 
 
Furthermore, in the physical realm, the code-based approach fails when code does not restrict 
access to a computer, but where the access is clearly contrary to social norms, a social norms 
approach would remedy the short-comings of the code-based approach. A pure code-based 
approach, furthermore, suffers from the flaw that code can be interpreted in many different ways. 
For example, under the code-based approach it was brought up that code restrictions can, and has 
been, interpreted quite widely; the widest perhaps being the district court in Explorica interpreting 
hyperlinks and dropdown menus as a restriction on any other method of browsing. The code-based 
approach is arbitrary, because it does not leave room for distinguishing between what code we 
perceive as actual restrictions and code that we do not perceive as actual restrictions. 
Criminal liability based solely on the breach of contract (terms of service, terms of use, etc.) should 
be rejected. A contract-based approach carries with it highly suspect foreseeability issues and issues 
related to arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore, under Danish law, contractual breach does not 
automatically discharge the contract
967
; instead remedies become available to the other party, one of 
which may be termination of the contract, but generally only if the breach is a fundamental one. 
Thus, even if there has been a breach of contract, not any and every breach necessarily triggers 
termination of the contract as a remedy.
968
 
As it stands, Danish law arguably supports Kerr‟s view that terms of use and terms of service 
merely state the owner‟s right to terminate access to a closed account (by blocking the account or 
deleting the account). It does not under any circumstances serve as an automatic trigger of criminal 
liability, since not even civil contractual breaches could normally lead to the automatic discharge of 
the contract and trigger civil liability without further action on part of the owner. 
The social norms approach is, in part, inherently built upon code, because code shapes what we see 
and what we can do online (and computers, generally). It is code that partially informs us of the 
intended function of a program, which is then further supplemented by social norms, i.e. what the 
intended function is generally understood to be. But make no mistake, the code does draw the initial 
boundaries of what is and is not possible. 
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A careful and informed application of an objective social norms approach corrects the arbitrariness 
inherent in both the code-based and contract-based approaches, and will likely, if applied 
objectively, put the user on sufficient notice of what is criminal and what is not. It would 
furthermore bar owners from implementing arbitrary and/or questionable code barriers that do not 
actually restrict access, although they might slow it. Such code barriers are often inextricably linked 
to terms of use or terms of service (which on their own are rarely enforceable in absence of a code 
barrier, regardless of its efficacy as such), which in themselves might be arbitrary and, as a policy 
matter, undesirable to enforce as a criminal offense. Contractual terms and trivial code restrictions 
would make criminals out of a vast number of the general public, for example those who use VPN 
servers to access entertainment services in other regions and those who delete their browser cookies 
for privacy reasons but continue to access newspaper websites who use cookies as “pay walls”. 
Surely, more is needed to convict and punish under a hacking provision. 
As to the social norms related to computers, it cannot be stressed enough that it is exceedingly 
important for the judge, the prosecution and the defense are well informed about the technical 
aspect of cases. Otherwise, what are common practices (norms) in computer circles could be 
misunderstood as being nefarious solely because the actors in the legal system do not understand 
the technology. Thus, the norms ought to be based on what is commonplace conduct to those who 
work in the IT industry, rather than what would be acceptable from the viewpoint of the average-
Joe who cannot relate to or does not understand commonplace practices that may sound nefarious or 
odd; it ought not be based on fear or suspicion of the unknown, but on knowledge and experience. 
Contrary to the prosecution‟s claim in its opening statement
969
 in the biggest and most complicated 
Danish hacking case to-date, understanding the technology is not irrelevant or inconsequential to 
the adjudication of the case, because anything that is unknown and complex may be approached 
with inapposite and unnecessary suspicion or apprehension. A juror‟s or judge‟s life experience 
cannot substitute or negate the need for knowledge about the technology that enables the juror or 
judge to understand the evidence and the norms in IT contexts. 
The Danish hacking provision in the criminal code‟s § 263(2), although its scope of its literal 
language is much broader than its US federal counterpart, has limited application with respect to 
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 See e.g. Version2‟s coverage of the district court trial. The prosecution‟s claims were noted by reporters covering the 
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publicly accessible resources. Given that the information on publicly accessible websites/servers is 
made technically accessible to anyone connected to the Internet, the owner‟s consent or subjective 
intentions related to any access to those publicly accessible websites is irrelevant to the evaluation 
of whether the access was without right – at least under Danish law and under the Convention. 
Neither the Danish hacking provision‟s language nor the language of the Convention‟s article 2 
excludes publicly accessible resources from their scopes, but it is patently clear from the legislative 
history of the Danish § 263 and Explanatory Report‟s explanation of the scope of the Convention‟s 
article 2 that access to publicly accessible resources such as websites must to fall outside the scope 
of the criminalization. The Danish provision already suffers from linguistic deficiencies that 
arguably bar its literal application, because the Danish provision does not require that the 
information resides on a computer; it can reside on paper for later use on a computer, which, if the 
provision were applied literally, would criminalize unauthorized access to information on paper.
970
  
In the Committee Report 1971 no. 601 on amendments to the chapter on privacy violations, the 
Committee explained in connection with privacy of communications (letters and such), which is 
another subsection under § 263
971
, that reading a letter that the owner has left open in an area where 
he could expect others to travel through, the owner renounces any right to protection under the 
provision. Therefore, even if no distinction is made between private and public websites, 
information or servers in connection with subsection 2, it would be counterintuitive to protect a 
public website (where more people, possibly in the thousands or more, are likely to “travel”) and 
not a private letter left out in the open where maybe only a handful of people travel – especially 
considering the provisions being placed in a chapter on privacy violations. So on this basis it can be 
concluded that, in Danish law, presumably there is a “scale” of sorts when it comes to imposing 
liability for accessing information that ranges from “public” to “private/non-public”. It would be 
odd to argue the “letter left out in the open” case as a case of the letter owner‟s consent for by-
passers to access its information, rather than simply seeing it as the owner losing the right to 
protection under the law in terms of that letter. 
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 Several US courts applying § 1030 have stated that there is nothing ambiguous about the statutory text that requires 
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Professor Henrik Udsen argues in his book De informationsretlige grundsætninger
972
 (“Doctrines of 
Information Law”), in the data privacy law context, that just because it is obvious that the website is 
only intended to be accessed by friends and family for example, and only those few people are 
familiar with the URL of the website does not negate that the possibility of others visiting the 
website, that being an acknowledged and accepted fact; regardless of whether others actually do 
visit the website or not. Udsen therefore concludes that the main rule must be that information made 
accessible from a website absent code-based restrictions with the consent of the “registered person”  
is published within the context of the Danish Data Privacy Act § 7 (2)(3).
973
 The “registered 
person‟s” consent would only be relevant in terms of whether the information was published with 
right – but the consent is not relevant when determining whether the information was or was not in 
fact actually published (made accessible) from a legal perspective. Udsen further argues that as 
opposed to newspapers, TV, and radio, where one can legitimately presume that the information has 
in fact been published to a large number of people, the same presumption cannot be transferred to 
the Internet where websites are technically accessible to any person in the world with an Internet 
connection, even though most web sites are rarely visited by a large number of people. That is, the 
possibility of widespread publication is in itself enough – the website need not be known or 
accessed by anyone for the information to be considered published within the context of data 
privacy law.
974
 This resonates well with the fact that within the context of the Internet, users request 
the web pages of interest from the web server, unlike TV, newspapers and radio where the user 
generally receives the information unprompted (apart from turning on the television and perhaps 
being contingent on being a subscriber for a signal to be delivered) and presented in a form and with 
such content as deemed fitting by the provider. The Internet users “pull” the information from the 
service providers rather than the service providers “push” it to the users. This should, however, not 
change the fact that the person receiving the information from a publicly accessible source is not 
responsible for it being publicly accessible in the first place. 
Two separate instances of the so-called “URL hacking” were carried out by Reuters journalists on websites belonging to 
the Danish company Topdanmark
975
 and the Swedish company Intentia.
976
 Both cases involved making minor changes 
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to the URL, e.g. that logically the year after 2004 is 2005, so the 4 would be changed to 5 in the URL. On October 24th 
2002 the Swedish software company Intentia planned an official release of the company‟s report on its third quarter 
results. The release was planned for „around‟ two o‟clock in the afternoon. Nevertheless, a couple of hours before the 
scheduled release, a journalist from Reuters had found the report by changing a few symbols in the URL address for the 
report from the previous quarter. The report had been placed, without access restrictions, on Intentia‟s web server. 
Intentia claimed that it was “hacked” by the Reuters journalist as no hyperlink had been provided to the report by 
Intentia. For that reason the journalist had, in Intentia‟s opinion, committed the crime of “dataintrång”, which 
essentially translates to unauthorized access. The Swedish prosecutor Håkan Roswall decided against prosecution of the 
Reuters journalist for several reasons. First, Intentia had announced a release of the report “around” two o‟clock in the 
afternoon. Since the time of release had not been precisely specified, the prosecutor claimed that this factor alone would 
be extremely problematic for establishing mens rea, as the reporter could not reasonably have known whether the access 
was unauthorized or not. Roswall did state that the situation may have been different had Intentia specifically 
announced the release of the report at precisely two o‟clock. Thus, a journalist accessing the report before the specified 
time would have the mens rea required, since the journalist would then have reason to suspect he or she was accessing 
the file illegally. Secondly, as stated by the prosecutor, the file was placed on an open web server granting public 
access. Thus, the information cannot be considered private without any further indications of it being private. Simply 
neglecting to provide an official link to the individual web pages did not change that default public status of the 
information, which followed its placement on an open web server. Therefore, the actions of the Reuters journalist could 
not reasonably be considered to fall within the scope of the actus reus of the crime, namely “unauthorized access”, since 
access by any and all members of the public was without any restrictions.  
In the Danish Topdanmark case, which is factually almost identical to the Intentia incident, the report‟s publication time 
given on the website was specific, a police report was filed, yet no charges were filed against the journalist nor did any 
prosecution official comment on the case. The company only seemed to claim hacking as a defense against the criminal 
charges it faced due to the inappropriate distribution of insider information that took place because of the absence of 
proper security measures. The journalist had simply changed the “year” value in the URL. 
It begs the question whether URLs can be claimed to be “secret” and constitute a password of some kind, and therefore 
be perceived as a “technical barrier” of sorts. Technically, speaking it is impossible to distinguish between a “secret” 
URL and a password
977
; therefore, one can only reach one rather inconvenient solution that if passwords are technical 
barriers then “secret” URLs must also be technical barriers. However, there are fundamental differences between how 
people generally perceive URLs and how they perceive passwords. 
In another case involving the retail store Harald Nyborg and a website security incident, the customer reported having 
been threatened by the company. The customer had reported the incident to an online magazine after allegedly having 
urged Harald Nyborg several times to fix the problem. According to the account given by the customer to the 
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newspaper, he had received a letter from Harald Nyborg threatening to file suit if the server or software was in any way 
damaged as a consequence of the customer‟s disclosure of the leak to the online magazine.
978
 
Although it is still uncertain whether Danish courts would consider URL hacking to be 
unauthorized access, an application of the social norms approach, discussed above, would result in 
URL hacking being authorized access due to the nature of the space being open and the means of 
access do not conflict with the intended function of URL addresses. This conclusion is furthermore 
supported by the fact that neither Topdanmark nor Intentia took precautions to that would change 
the nature of the space to closed by requiring special permission – thus, clearly indicating that the 
reports were not yet accessible to other users than those specifically authorized. 
A social norms approach, such as the one Kerr has derived from Morris, does not appear to be at 
odds with the Danish hacking provision or its legislative history. In fact it seems to fit quite well 
given the references to reasonable expectations depending on the nature of the space. The means of 
access and the context seem to be rather natural considerations, as well – regardless of the legal 
system. 
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11.7 Summary 
The above analysis of the code-based approach shows that although the approach successfully 
narrows the scope of hacking statutes (under the assumption that “authorization” puts the primary 
limitation on the scope) by asking whether the code allowed the user‟s conduct, the approach is too 
narrow in some respects and too broad in other respects. It appears to be overly accepting of even 
arbitrary ideas of code restrictions, and, particularly, it provides peculiar protection against the 
obtaining of information from public websites. The code-based approach is too narrow in the sense 
that it will fail to protect against clearly unauthorized access to computers which are not protected 
by code against those who have physical access to the computer (rather than remote access). The 
approach thus both over- and undercriminalizes. It could be argued that where arbitrary restrictions 
to access public websites are enforced, those restrictions may often be a translation into code of 
contractual terms, the breach of which is often not enforceable under hacking statutes (and the 
criminal enforcement of which would be unforeseeable). 
The contract-based approach essentially allows computer owners to define the scope of criminal 
conduct. Contractual restrictions can be entirely arbitrary in nature, ranging anywhere from 
violating the “spirit of the statement” (Facebook‟s terms of service) to more specific infractions 
such as lying about personal information such as name, age and gender, or failing to keep said 
personal information up-to-date.
979
 In other words, there are no limits to the scope of hacking 
statutes if the contract-based approach is followed. Keeping in mind that, as a rule, breaches of 
contract do not automatically trigger the discharge of the contract, but provide the aggrieved party 
with certain remedies, one of which may be the avoiding of the contract if the breach is a 
fundamental one. Even so, the aggrieved party must notify the party in breach of the contract that he 
intends to avoid the contract; it does not happen automatically. Thus, it would be particularly odd to 
allow a breach of contract, even a non-fundamental one, to trigger criminal liability where the 
authorization to access could not automatically be revoked civilly. The contract-based approach, 
due to its arbitrary nature and the discord with civil law remedies, leaves the definition of criminal 
conduct with computer owners and its criminal enforcement at the whim of prosecutors enabling 
them to pursue their personal agendas. In other words, the contract-based approach is sure to trigger 
the application of void-for-vagueness doctrines, such as that under article 7 ECHR, because the 
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approach leaves the scope highly unforeseeable and introduces a serious risk of arbitrary 
enforcement. 
The social norms-approach is a far more appealing approach than a pure code-based approach 
(since the approach arbitrarily provides protection) and the contract-based approach (unforeseeable 
and arbitrary). This approach entails the analysis of three factors; 1) the nature of the space, 2) the 
means of entry/access, and 3) the context of entry/access. For example, if the space is open, such as 
a public website, there is presumably no criminal protection against access to the public-facing parts 
of the website. The context of the entry should not be understood as an inquiry into the purpose of 
entry of a person who is authorized to access, but does so for objectionable reasons. Rather, the 
context can clarify the meaning of authorization where there person would generally be 
unauthorized to access, but does so for a socially recognized purpose, such as the mailman entering 
the property to deliver the mail, or where a person who is not authorized but does not gain access 
through objectionable means, e.g. a person guessing a password to access a closed space (without 
the means of access being suspect as such, i.e. against the intended function) under circumstances 
where no delegation of authority from the owner has taken place. The social norms-approach is not 
free from consideration of code. In fact, code inherently defines the nature of the (virtual) space, 
because the code provides the framework for the space (whether it is open or closed) and thus 
naturally influences the social norms that will later attach themselves to that particular space. 
Furthermore, code provides the framework for the means of access. However, code free from 
interpretation as a legal basis for a criminal conviction will produce absurd and arbitrary results and 
hence results that are irreconcilable with social norms; including both cases where the conduct was 
clearly unauthorized even though the code did not prevent the access, and cases where code 
(perhaps contract-inspired) arbitrarily triggers criminal protection of use of and access to publicly 
accessible information. The social norms approach can be said to correct and amend the code-based 
approach in that the social norms approach does not disregard code but injects some common sense 
and foreseeability into the analysis of authorization in a virtual environment as well as reducing, to 
some extent, the risk of arbitrary enforcement compared to the risks associated with a pure code-
based approach and the contract-based approach. However, a social norms approach, if construed 
too liberally, can drastically increase the risk of arbitrary enforcement and reduce foreseeability if 
social norms are construed to mean e.g. “courteous” conduct or construed as prohibiting “annoying” 
conduct. Therefore, it is important to remain focused on the three prongs related to the access; not 
on the purpose of the access where access is generally authorized or on the subsequent use of 
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information obtained through the otherwise authorized access etc. Thus, ultimately, what matters is 
whether society recognizes the computer owner‟s expectations of protection against trespass; hence, 
barring indiscriminate, surprising and/or arbitrary criminal enforcement of ambiguous, broad 
statutory language that may be at odds with the constitutional and/or human rights related to due 
process, clarity of criminal law provision, etc. The social norms in the computer context need time 
to develop; norms related to traditional trespass did not develop overnight. The space, particularly 
the virtual space, associated with computers and networks is different from physical space. Simply 
indiscriminately transferring traditional trespass rules into the computer context, by relying on 
(often inappropriate) analogies, ignores the differences between the spaces. 
Finally, as importantly noted by numerous US federal courts, Marco Gercke (in the context of the 
Convention on Cybercrime and several domestic legal systems), Orin Kerr, and others, it is 
imperative to separate the access from subsequent conduct (typically, this is accomplished by 
inquiring into the purpose of the access) that is either illegal and/or a breach of contract. This 
problem is ostensibly only relevant where the defendant had implicit or explicit authorization to 
access. Allowing other legal rules concerning subsequent acts to negate authorization opens up the 
scope of hacking statutes giving them enormous reach. For example, access to information for the 
purpose of violating any law would automatically also trigger liability under the hacking statute. 
This would make breaches of data protection law, copyright law, trade secret laws and other laws 
regulating use of information, or even generally prohibiting the subsequent conduct, such as 
processing personal data in excess of what is necessary and online piracy, fraud etc. These illegal 
acts are not related to access to information, but the subsequent use of information. Rather the 
access, in combination with other facts, may be indicative of an attempted crime that directly 
prohibits a specific use of information, such as disclosure of trade secrets. This distinction between 
use and access is no less important in the context of outsiders than it is in the context of insiders.  
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12 AUTHORIZATION - INSIDERS 
The threat that insiders pose to companies, governments and other organizations has frequently 
been called one of the most serious security issues.
980
 The clear distinction there once was between 
insiders and outsiders has become increasingly fluid and vague due to the use of the internet and the 
general pervasiveness of computing.
981
 One common denominator seems to recur in papers on 
insiders and insider threats is that the issue centers around the “unique security threats arising from 
[the insider‟s] privileged status.”
982
 Who is an insider and how that privileged status is acquired 
(legitimately or not) is disputed. 
The CFAA‟s (a)(2)(C) and several other provisions in the CFAA distinguish between “without 
authorization” and “exceeding authorized access”. Only the latter is defined in the CFAA, but the 
definition is still hinged upon “authorization” which remains undefined by the legislature. 
In Denmark, the hacking statute (criminal code § 263 (2)) prohibits access without right to 
information and programs intended for use on an information system. Decreasing the level of 
abstraction from computers to information and programs arguably makes a specific “exceeding 
authorized access” term unnecessary, since the statute reaches beyond the initial authorized access 
to the computer itself in that it targets access on a lower level of abstraction (the information and 
programs rather than the computer as a whole). However, as will be evident after the analysis in this 
chapter, regulating insiders and outsiders with the same language, that is, without distinguishing 
between the two in the statutory language, is troublesome. 
The crux of the matter though is that distinguishing between insiders and outsiders in statutory 
language is very difficult to do clearly. But the consequences of not distinguishing between the two 
in statutory language means that the courts‟ construction of the statute with respect to insiders 
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affects outsider and vice versa – even though the cases are factually very different at the extreme 
ends of what is a scale of “insider-ness” rather than a binary state of “either or”. 
 
12.1 Defining the term “insider” 
The term insider has no singular or universally accepted definition.
983
 The term is used frequently in 
the field of IT security, especially with regards to tackling “the insider threat”. However, as 
discussed in the chapter on problem of description, more specifically the problem with terminology, 
the term “insider” is not consistently given the same meaning. Rather, as has been noted by Hunker 
and Probst, “we are forced to conclude that the definition chosen depends on the threat of concern 
to the specific audience; unfortunately sometimes terminology is used without the precise definition 
being made clear.”
984
 The difficulty associated with defining who is an insider is compounded by 
the difficulty of defining what the perimeter is (assuming a perimeter can realistically be defined 
given how the internet, outsourcing and contracting etc. muddy the waters), so that a person inside 
the perimeter can be considered an “insider” with respect to someone outside the perimeter.
985
 
Furthermore, organizations are not consistent in their categorization of insiders nor do they apply a 
uniform approach to determining when (and in which context) a perceived attacker is categorized as 
an insider or outsider.
986
 The meaning of the term “insider” is thus heavily dependent on the 
context, the system and the organization in which it is used.
987
 Thus, it is arguably not appropriate 
to apply the organization‟s definition of the perimeter between the outside and the inside, its 
definition of “insider” in a given context and its definition of an act as an “insider threat” due to the 
lack of uniformity in the categorization (rendering the categorization somewhat subjective in nature 
and unforeseeable) and with respect to the requirement that criminal provisions be clear and precise. 
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In the IT security sector, an insider has been given many meanings; some focusing solely on anyone 
within the security perimeter, others any “trusted” person within the perimeter, and yet another 
definition focusing on those that have knowledge and privilege of the system.
988
 That is, on the one 
hand, an outsider (e.g. a hacker) can, going by one definition, become an insider merely by crossing 
into the perimeter regardless of whether that person ever had legitimate access. 
An insider could thus be anyone with access to materials residing within the “perimeter”. Typically, 
an insider could be an employee, contractor or other service providers with access to systems and 
information belonging to others. 
 
 
12.2 Insiders in US law 
12.2.1 Both “insider” and “exceeding authorized access” are relative  
Moreover, the term “insider” is necessarily relative. An insider cannot be an “insider” without 
someone having lesser privileges than the “insider” (including an entity with no privileges at all). 
Bishop‟s model of the insider is explained using an example of three users: 
R1 = “physical access” 
R2 = “physical access, user account” 
R3 = “physical access, user account, administrative privileges” 
“To people who do not satisfy R1, any person satisfying any rule is “more inside” than they, and so would be classified 
as an insider. Similarly, for people satisfying rule R1 but not meeting rule R2, any user who meets R2 or R3, is an insider 
with respect to the people meeting R1 only. Hence being an insider is relative to some other set of people. Further, as 
anyone meeting R3 also meets R2 and R1, and any person meeting R2 also meets R1, there is a natural, linear hierarchy of 
insiders. 
More generally, let I(Ri) be the set of users who have the property described in Ri. Then I(R1) ≤ I(R2) ≤ I(R3). To the 
members of I(Ri), the members of I(Rj), i < j, are insiders. Hence one cannot say that an entity is an “insider”. Instead, 
one must say that the entity is an “insider with respect to the rule set R” or, when there is an inclusive relationship 
between the rule sets restricting two distinct entities, that one entity is an insider with respect to the other entity.”
989
 
 
The concept “insider”, albeit binary in that a person is either an insider or an outsider with respect 
to another person with greater or lesser privilege, the concept also has linear properties. Person A, 
                                                 
988
 Matt Bishop and Carrie Gates: Defining the Insider Threat (2008) 
989
 Matt Bishop: Position: ”Insider is Relative” (2006), p. 78 
 
267 
 
who has very limited access, is an insider with respect to person B, who has no access at all. 
However, at the same time as A is an insider with respect to B, A is not an insider with respect to 
person C, who has complete access and thus is an insider with respect to both A and B. Hence, the 
linear hierarchy of insiders described by Bishop emerges. 
Because of the pervasiveness of computing and the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, 
no one is truly an outsider with respect to publicly accessible systems because at least some access 
is allowed to everyone, however limited. The term “insider”, if used to refer to the entire global 
population in the context of publicly accessible systems, thus loses its meaning because the 
concept‟s relative nature requires the existence of an entity with lesser or no privileges. The 
argument was thus that the term “exceeding authorized access” was not applicable with respect to 
ordinary users who possess no greater privilege than anyone else in the entire set of users in 
existence, i.e. the global population. 
As described in the same chapter, the model breaks down where the courts have allowed system 
owners to selectively exclude a user from accessing the public website despite authorization being 
granted to the remainder of the global population. Allowing that to take place creates the 
comparative element required by Bishop‟s model in order for someone to be an “insider”. The 
single user allowed to be excluded, through his “demotion” effectively “promotes” the remaining 
users to “insiders” with respect to himself. He (or rather the courts) thereby creates a new bottom 
level in the linear hierarchy where “exceeding authorized access” (the insider rule) becomes 
applicable to ordinary users of web servers. This would essentially lead to an inflated applicability 
of either “exceeding authorized access” or “without authorization” (depending on the chosen frame 
of reference), since only the excluded person is truly without authorization, ordinary users would 
owing to the “insider” concept‟s relative nature, “without authorization” could be applied to 
“insider” actions as well, since the insider‟s (apart from the superuser/root/administrator) action 
would be “without authorization” (an outsider action) with respect to a more privileged user (an 
insider higher up in the hierarchy). The superuser (R3 in Bishop‟s example) would be incapable of 
exceeding authorized access, because he cannot exceed that which is unlimited. 
Thus, the term “exceeding authorized access” is relative like the term insider and logically follows 
Bishop‟s model, requiring the existence of a person with lesser privilege. The Committee Reports 
on the CFAA, which explicitly use the terms insiders and outsiders, support the notion of relativity 
that lies behind the statutory language. In addition, because no one is an insider with respect to the 
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superuser, it follows that the superuser cannot exceed authorized access, as the term “exceeding” 
necessarily alludes to the possibility of attaining greater privilege (since that which is ultimate 
cannot be exceeded). 
Perhaps it is simpler to say that the additional privileges belonging to R2 (and not possessed by R1) 
can simultaneously be seen as being (1) entirely outside the authorization of R1, and (2) in excess of 
R1‟s authorization. Both “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access” can 
theoretically be triggered. 
Because of the global-scale authorization that follows from choosing to view ordinary web site 
users‟ authorization as being based on implied consent (the basis of the authorization) it renders 
application of the 30 year old CFAA rather awkward, because everyone is an “insider” since they 
have some authorization, but it ignores the comparative element in that for the vast majority of 
public systems there exist no outsiders (except those few the courts have granted injunctions 
against). 
 
12.2.2 Who defines “authorization”? 
Bishop defines an insider based on two basic acts: (1) “violation of a security policy using 
legitimate access, and”, (2) “violation of an access control policy by obtaining unauthorized 
access.”
990
 
However, from a criminal law perspective, it could be perceived as a weakness that the legitimacy 
of access and thus its counterpart, unauthorized access, is defined by the organization (that defines 
the policy). Because the organization is free to define what legitimate access is, it follows that they 
define the scope of acts covered by the criminal law prohibiting unauthorized access. Furthermore, 
there is a risk that whatever has been written in an organizations policy is not actually being 
enforced or followed in the organization; i.e. there is a risk that the enforcement of the written 
policy is arbitrary because the policy does not describe the practice followed in the organization. 
There has been rather substantial debate among U.S. courts as to the meaning of “authorization”, 
with the debate particularly centering on how or whether to apply the CFAA in cases where an 
employee had authorization to access their employer‟s computer but did so for a purpose that was 
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contrary to the interests of the employer or where such access was contrary to the organization‟s use 
policy. The CFAA defines “exceeding authorized access”, but not “authorization” upon which the 
definition is reliant. 18 USC § 1030(e)(6) defines “exceeding authorized access”: 
“the term “exceeds authorized access” means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain 
or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter;” 
 
12.2.3 Former employees 
Although the majority of cases involve a person who was an employee at the time of the access, 
several cases involve former employees accessing their former employer‟s computers or computers 
belonging to a third-party providing access to computers to an organization‟s employees. For the 
most part, these cases do not seem to give rise to any disagreement among the courts. After all, one 
could argue that common sense dictates that a former employee does not retain authorization to 
access the organization‟s computers after they have left their position – even if the organization 
fails to disable the former employee‟s access credentials. 
In the criminal case United States v. Sablan
991
, the defendant had recently been fired from her 
position at a bank for “circumventing security procedures in retrieving files”. After her being fired, 
Sablan went to her former place of employment, entered the building using an old key she had 
retained, and used an old password to gain access to the bank‟s mainframe. Sablan then allegedly 
proceeded to alter and delete several files, thereby causing damages to the bank‟s files. The CFAA 
subsection brought into play in her prosecution was (a)(5); the subsection that prohibits the 
intentional accessing without authorization and then causing damages to information. In the 1986 
version of the CFAA (the applicable version at the time of Sablan‟s prosecution) subsection (a)(5) 
was squarely aimed at “outsiders” (those with no authorization to access the system).
992
 It can 
therefore be surmised that it was undisputed that Sablan lacked any and all authorization to access 
her former employer‟s computers. Therefore, the fact that a former employee‟s access credentials 
have not been revoked by the organization and that the computer will thus grant access if those 
access credentials are supplied by the former employee, does not mean that the access was 
“authorized” within the meaning of the CFAA. That is, although the access appears authorized from 
a technical point of view (in that the computer is configured to grant access when valid access 
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credentials are provided) that consideration does not negate or override the fact that authorization 
was terminated at the end of the employment.
993
 
The same applies where an employee, through his employment, has had access to the computers of 
a third party rendering services to his employer. In United States v. Shen
994
, a former employee of a 
university continued accessing the password-protected computers of a third party service provider 
to which he had had access in connection with his employment at the university. The court argued 
that “[t]here is significant authority that such access is unauthorized under §1030(a)(2)(C)”. Shen 
argued that § 1030(a)(2)(C) was vague “as applied” to him, based on the fact that authorization to 
access the third party‟s computers had its basis in an agreement between the university and the third 
party. Shen had never seen the agreement and claimed that he was thus not on notice that his access 
was unauthorized and therefore criminal. The court responded that “[t]here is some disagreement as 
to whether an employee who properly accesses a computer and then misuses the information can be 
convicted under § 1030(a)(2)(C). However, courts are clear that employees who gain access to a 
computer through their employment lose authorization once they have resigned or been terminated. 
Moreover, persons of common intelligence would understand as much.” (citations omitted) 
However, the CFAA‟s applicability to persons accessing computers belonging to their former 
employers is not always so cut-and-dried. In EF v. Explorica, a case also discussed in connection 
with outsiders, a former employee was held to have accessed EF‟s public website in excess of his 
authorization. EF‟s website, as may be recalled, allows visitors to browse tour prices for various 
destinations. The abbreviations chosen by EF for gateways, destinations etc. were an element in the 
URL (visible to anyone in the address bar of the browser; such as BOS for Boston). EF claimed that 
these “codes” were proprietary and subject to the former employees confidentiality agreement. 
These “codes” had been used by the defendant in order to create a scraper that would allow for the 
automated retrieval of price information from EF‟s public website. Competition thus became more 
efficient for Explorica. The court argued that because the former employee “voluntarily entered into 
a broad confidentiality agreement prohibiting his disclosure of any information “which might 
reasonably be construed to be contrary to the interests of EF””, he then exceeded his authorization 
to navigate EF‟s public website “by providing proprietary  information and know-how” to the party 
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that created the scraper.
995
 The court boldly stated that Explorica‟s use of the “codes” to gather 
prices from EF‟s website reeked of use and abuse of proprietary information that exceeded 
authorized “use” of EF‟s website.
996
 Zefer, the third party who developed the scraper, appealed the 
injunction. In that case, the 1
st
 Circuit clarified its position in the Explorica case
997
, and furthermore 
stated that it was by no means clear that Zefer could have known that the “codes” were confidential, 
and that the codes could have been extracted manually had Zefer not received them from 
Explorica.
998
 
The case, in my opinion, is particularly odd
999
 in the sense that the information accessed on the 
website (as well as the “codes” in the URL) were publicly accessible and visible to anyone (any 
information obtained could equally have been obtained by any member of the public). It would 
seem that knowledge obtained during employment about the website‟s structure that would allow 
more efficient browsing and retrieval of information from the website can, if used contrary to 
agreement, incur liability under the CFAA. This would seem to apply regardless of whether such 
knowledge could be independently obtained by anyone by viewing the website and its URLs. For 
example, if A, an employee of B, has prior knowledge of the address of the location of B‟s apple 
stand and has signed a confidentiality agreement covering that information, including that A cannot 
use that address information in a way that is contrary to B‟s interests. A then quits his job with B 
and takes a job with B‟s competitor C. The new employer, C, then charges A with retrieving the 
prices from the signs at B‟s apple stand for the purposes of undercutting B‟s apple prices. Does it 
matter whether A spends extra time looking up the address of B‟s apple stand (which is in the 
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employment, and even if they were, knowledge and/or use of the codes is not necessary to access the public price 
information. They were not passwords that granted access to information to which other members of the public did not 
have access. Arguably, EF got lucky in that they managed to cut off their competitor‟s access to information available 
to anyone on their public website. 
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phonebook) just to be able to claim that he did not make use of prior knowledge, or if he 
immediately relies on his prior knowledge of the address? And, how then does use of the prior 
knowledge of the address relate to A‟s authority to read the prices off B‟s signs at the apple stand? 
It does not. 
The Explorica case, however odd it may be, is then ostensibly a contract-based construction of 
“authorization” (where the contract in question does not purport to regulate access or authorization 
to such access), since the excess of authorization was held to derive from use of proprietary “codes” 
contrary to a confidentiality agreement. 
In fact, “authorization” in all the cases analyzed in the context of former employees rest on a 
contract-based approach to construing “authorization” in the context of the CFAA. The 
authorization of the former employee to access the organization‟s computers is terminated not 
because the former employee‟s access credentials have been revoked and technical access is no 
longer possible, but because the employment relationship is terminated.  
It would be awkward if a former employee could continue to access the organization‟s (non-public) 
computers until his access is technically revoked by a system administrator. However, it is equally 
awkward to construe the CFAA to cover a former employee‟s post-employment access to the public 
website of the organization where the information accessed is equally accessibly to any member of 
the public, irrespective of whether the former employee possessed knowledge that allowed him to 
do it more efficiently. He was authorized to obtain the price information. The latter begs the 
question: What is being protected? 
 
12.2.4 Current employees 
The application of hacking statutes to current employees is more complicated. Employees already 
have access and thus the attention centers not on preventing access to the “perimeter”, but keeping 
employees from trespassing into other domains within the perimeter. For example, a person 
working in the HR department does not need access to the accounting system. People in assembly 
may need access to technical drawings, but do not need access to HR systems. Although most 
organizations would (and should) restrict such intradepartmental access through code, where there 
is no general reason for such accessibility, many organizations are equally concerned with for what 
reason an employee accesses the organizations computers and information. Similarly, organizations 
 
273 
 
may be concerned with to what use an employee might put the information afterwards. It is not 
uncommon for organizations to spell out access restrictions (including e.g. that the computers may 
only be used for business-related purposes) and they may also have employees sign confidentiality 
agreements. The question is whether a breach of use policy and confidentiality/non-disclosure 
agreements (or any trade secret-related agreement) can form the sole basis for criminal and/or civil 
liability under the CFAA. 
Use policies are written by the organization. They vary in qualitative terms such as clarity and 
specificity. Furthermore, use policies may only be the de jure policy whilst the de facto policy may 
differ significantly from the former. A policy may, for example, prohibit personal use of the 
organization‟s computers. However, in practice, some personal use is clearly tolerated by the 
organization. Just because the organization has a use policy and that (de jure) use policy has been 
breached, it is incredibly problematic, and suspect from a due process point of view, if a court 
blindly enforces such a policy or punishes the breach of such a policy under a criminal statute. It 
should not be a foregone conclusion that criminal or civil liability has been incurred. That is, there 
has to be consistency between the policy on paper and the policy in practice before a court 
considers using such a policy to interpret “authorization”. The enforcement of the policy cannot 
have the appearance of being arbitrary or contrary to the organization‟s de facto practice. 
 
12.2.4.1 Agency-based approach 
The agency-approach is based on the rather vague concepts of loyalty and adverse interest as well 
as the questions that relate to the very existence of an agency relationship (which under some 
circumstances can be formed without the employee‟s knowledge) the approach is understandably 
very favorable to employers seeking to punish disloyal employees.
1000
 
In Shurgard v. Safeguard
1001
 the parties were competitors in the self-storage business. Shurgard had 
filed suit against Safeguard because several of Shurgard‟s employees had allegedly accessed its 
computers to send trade secrets to Safeguard, who subsequently hired those employees. At the time 
                                                 
1000
 See Katherine Mesenbring Field: Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees‟ Authorization Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (2009), 107 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 824 (“Notable as well is the fact that this agency-based 
interpretation is undoubtedly the most employer-favorable approach, since simply characterizing the employee‟s actions 
as against the employer‟s interests will likely result in liability.” Field further points out that the 7
th
 Circuit‟s acceptance 
of the agency approach appeared to increase the number of companies filing claims under the CFAA.) 
1001
 Shurgard v. Safeguard, 119 F.Supp.3d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
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of their access to Shurgard‟s computers, the employees had had full authorization to access the 
information in question. Therefore, in order to state a claim under the CFAA, the Shurgard had to 
show that the employees, despite the apparent authorization, were not authorized to access the 
computers. To do so, Shurgard relied on Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 (1958) and claimed 
that the employees had acquired adverse interests the effect of which was an automatic termination 
of authorization. Under Shurgard‟s theory, the employees had lost their authorization when they 
accessed the computers for the purpose of sending trade secrets to Safeguard; a purpose that did not 
further the interests of Shurgard. The court agreed, and held that Shurgard had stated a claim under 
the CFAA. 
The cessation-of-agency theory gained some traction when the Seventh Circuit rendered its decision 
in International Airport Centers v. Citrin
1002
. Jacob Citrin had decided to quit his job at IAC and 
start his own business. This constituted a breach of his employment contract with IAC. 
Furthermore, before Citrin returned his company-issued laptop, he erased all the data on it, and to 
prevent the recovery of the data, he ran a “secure-erasure” program that overwrote the files. The 
court had the unenviable task of determining whether Citrin had authorization to access the 
computer and destroy the files.
1003
 The court looked to Shurgard and the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 112 and 387 (1958), and argued that Citrin‟s deletion of the files was “in violation of the 
duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an employee.”
1004
 The court thus concluded that Citrin‟s 
authorization had been terminated, and his deletion of files was “without authorization”, as opposed 
to in “excess of authorization”.
1005
 
The Seventh Circuit‟s formal adoption of the cessation-of-agency in the context of applying the 
CFAA to disloyal employees started an, at times, heated debate between the appellate courts, 
effectively dividing them in their approach to construing authorization under the CFAA, and even 
dividing the lower courts within circuits that had not yet addressed the applicability of the CFAA in 
this context. The agency-based approach has also attracted criticism from commentators.
1006
 
                                                 
1002
 International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7
th
 Cir. 2006) 
1003
 Curiously, it appears that Citrin‟s employment contract explicitly permitted him to “return or destroy” data on the 
laptop at the end of employment. The court proceeds to guess as to the purpose of such a contract clause arguing that 
the purpose could not have extended to Citrin‟s decision to delete files. See Citrin, at 421. 
1004
 Citrin, at 420 
1005
 Citrin, at 420-421 
1006
 See e.g. Katherine Mesenbring Field: Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees‟ Authorization Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (2009), 107 Mich. L. Rev. 819 and Orin S. Kerr: Cybercrime‟s Scope: Interpreting 
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It appears that no other appellate court has fully agreed to follow the very broad interpretation of 
“authorization” inherent in the Seventh Circuit‟s agency approach, although not for the lack of 
plaintiffs attempting to rely on the agency theory in Citrin in other jurisdictions; after all, the 
agency theory is very employer-friendly, since the fluid concept of disloyalty suffices to state a 
CFAA claim
1007
. Several lower courts within other circuits subscribed to the agency theory.
1008
 
Even though other appellate courts have not adopted the Seventh Circuit‟s line of thinking entirely, 
that does not mean that the courts have generally discounted broad interpretations of 
“authorization” either, particularly where the purpose with which the employee accessed the 
computers was contrary to the organization‟s computer use policy and where that policy was known 
to the employee. That is, the cases are more grounded in a slightly less broad approach based on 
contractual obligations. 
 
12.2.4.2 Contract-based approach 
Even though the agency approach is a kind of variant of a contract-based approach, the agency 
approach is focused on the special duties (namely, loyalty) that follow from the nature of the 
employer-employee relationship, rather than being an approach applicable to all contracts in 
general. Whereas the plaintiff, under the agency-based approach, need not specify any access 
restrictions as the lack of authorization is rooted in “disloyalty”, the contract-based approach 
requires there be a contract that regulates access and that the defendant accessed the computer in 
violation of that contract. This approach has been applied with respect to both employees (insiders) 
as well as outsiders. 
United States v. Czubinski
1009
, a case before the First Circuit court, concerned the act of an 
employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Czubinski had a valid password to access any 
taxpayer‟s income tax return information. The IRS‟ rules of conduct, of which Czubinski had 
acknowledged his receipt and which he had signed, clearly prohibited employees from accessing the 
files outside the course of his official duties. Czubinski had searched the database on several 
occasions and looked at taxpayer information without there being an official purpose for doing so. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
„Access‟ and „Authorization‟ in Computer Misuse Statutes (2003), NYU L. Rev., Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 1596-1668 (the 
article predates Citrin, but comments on the agency-approach in Shurgard as being “strikingly broad”) 
1007
 In addition to one the prerequisites for stating a civil claim under the CFAA. 
1008
 See e.g. ViChip v. Lee, 438 F.Supp.2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
1009
 United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1
st
 Cir. 1997) 
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The First Circuit stated that Czubinski had “unquestionably exceeded authorized access to a Federal 
interest computer.”
1010
 The court, however, did not explain its interpretation of “authorization”, nor 
did it need to, because the government had charged Czubinski under subsection (a)(4) which 
requires that the prosecution prove that Czubinski had the additional scienter of intent to defraud as 
and that he had obtained “anything of value” in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. Since the 
court found that Czubinski had done no more than satisfy idle curiosity and that the information 
obtained did not constitute “anything of value”, the court reversed Czubinski‟s conviction without 
needing to explain its understanding of “authorization”. The First Circuit court can at least be said 
to have hinted at the acceptance contract-approach, in that the court‟s opinion intimates that a 
contract, such as the IRS rules of conduct, can stipulate the scope of authorization and that such a 
contractually defined scope may form the basis of a CFAA claim or prosecution.
1011
 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the interpretation of authorization in an employee context in United 
States v. John
1012
. John was an account manager at Citigroup and had access to the company‟s 
“internal computer system and customer account information contained in it.” She had supplied her 
half-brother with the customer account information of 76 corporate customer accounts, and he then 
incurred fraudulent charges to four of the accounts. John had provided him the information by 
accessing and then printing the information from Citigroup‟s computers. She was charged with, 
amongst other things, exceeding authorized access to a protected computer in violation of 
subsections (a)(2)(A)
1013
 and (a)(2)(C). In her appeal to the Fifth Circuit, John proffered the 
argument that she was authorized to view and print the information, and furthermore, that the 
CFAA did not prohibit unlawful use of the information she had been authorized to access. The 
court argued that the use of information that a person is permitted to access may be covered by 
“authorization”, “at least, when the user knows or reasonably should know that he or she is not 
authorized to access a computer and information obtainable from that access in furtherance of or to 
perpetrate a crime.”
1014
 Furthermore, the court averred that using Citigroup‟s computers “to 
                                                 
1010
 United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1
st
 Cir. 1997) 
1011
 See similarly Katherine Mesenbring Field: Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees‟ Authorization 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (2009), 107 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 828 
1012
 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5
th
 Cir. 2010) 
1013
 (a)(2)(A) is a subsection of the CFAA that pertains to unauthorized access to a computer and obtaining information 
in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer, or information contained in a file of a consumer 
reporting agency on a consumer. (a)(2)(C) is aimed at information on a protected computer in general, rather than 
specific types of computers and information. 
1014
 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5
th
 Cir. 2010) 
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perpetrate fraud was not an intended use of that system.”
1015
 Moreover, John‟s use of the computer 
was in violation of a use her employer‟s employee policy – a policy of which John had knowledge. 
The policy, which John had been taught about during training programs, prohibited misuse of 
Citigroup‟s systems and misuse of customer information. In an effort to substantiate that such a 
policy could delineate the scope of authorization, the court cited EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica – 
albeit, explicitly disagreeing with the First Circuit‟s holding that a confidentiality agreement under 
the circumstances in Explorica could form a basis for a CFAA claim – agreeing with the First 
Circuit‟s argument that “exceeding authorized access” may include “exceeding the purposes for 
which access is “authorized.” Access to a computer and data that can be obtained from that access 
may be exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”
1016
  
The Fifth Circuit‟s explanation of its disagreement with the First Circuit‟s holding in Explorica that a confidentiality 
agreement could define limit access authorization and thus create criminal liability under those circumstances reveals 
that the John court may have misunderstood the underlying facts of the Explorica case – or perhaps rather, the John 
court inadvertently relied on the Explorica court‟s ostensibly faulty logic and arguably misguided application of the 
CFAA. The First Circuit‟s “authorization limited by purpose” argument in Explorica had, in fact, nothing to do with the 
defendant‟s purpose of accessing EF‟s website or the purpose of the defendant‟s use of the information accessed (that 
is, the accessed price information on the public website). The Explorica case involved a very broad confidentiality 
contract that forbade disclosing any information that might be construed contrary to the interests of EF Cultural. The 
agreement therefore had nothing to do with regulating the authorization to access the publicly accessible price 
information or EF‟s public website, nor did it more generally regulate the use of, any publicly accessible information 
(such as EF‟s online prices) or the use of publicly accessible computers owned by EF Cultural Travel. In fact, the 
confidentiality agreement could impossibly have covered the price information available on a public website, because 
that information could not in any plausible way be construed as confidential or proprietary. In other words, access to the 
price information on EF‟s website was completely unrestricted. Why a breach of such a confidentiality agreement was 
allowed to regulate authorization under the CFAA when the agreement did not relate to any access restrictions to the 
information on the website in question is nothing short of confounding. Thus, not only is the First Circuit‟s construction 
of “authorization” not appropriate in a criminal context, it is inappropriate in any context. However, in John there is no 
such disconnect between the agreement, the access and the information obtained. The employee policy directly targeted 
the limitation on use at the information that John accessed and subsequently misused. Notwithstanding that the Fifth 
Circuit‟s deference to EF v. Explorica is arguably misguided and Explorica fails to lend persuasive authority to the Fifth 
Circuit‟s “access limited to certain purposes through contract”-argument in John, the theory is not necessarily without 
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 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5
th
 Cir. 2010). The “intended use” is a reference to the Second Circuit‟s 
“intended function” argument in United States v. Morris. The Fifth Circuit had cited the argument in an earlier case, 
United States v. Phillips. However, the original “intended function” test proffered by the Second Circuit differs from the 
Fifth Circuit‟s “intended use” in John. In Morris, the defendant had exploited vulnerabilities in system utilities that he 
had access to and used that exploit to spread a worm on the early Internet. 
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merit for that reason alone. It depends on whether “purpose of access/use” comports with the language of the CFAA. 
Thus, I am not discounting the Fifth Circuit‟s reasoning simply because their reliance on Explorica, in my opinion, is 
misguided. 
According to the policy, John had not been authorized to access Citigroup‟s systems for all 
conceivable purposes, but for a limited purposes only. John acted in contradiction to the policies 
that applied to her as an employee of Citigroup. The court concluded that since John knew that she 
accessed the information on the computer in violation of Citigroup‟s employee policy and as a part 
of a criminal scheme, her conduct exceeded authorized access within the meaning of § 
1030(a)(2).
1017
 The court used that same reasoning to distinguish John from the Ninth Circuit‟s 
decision in Brekka in which the Ninth Circuit construed the CFAA narrowly in a civil case in light 
of the rule of lenity. Due to John‟s knowledge of her violation of the policy and her participation in 
a criminal scheme, the Fifth Circuit intimated that the rule of lenity need not be considered.
1018
 
Although the John decision does not include verbatim excerpts from the Citigroup policy she apparently violated, it is 
arguably safe to assume that even if the policy used a broad and malleable word like “misuse” with respect to its 
systems and confidential customer information, it is similarly safe to qualify the use of the customer information to 
incur fraudulent charges as “misuse”. However, “misuse” of Citigroup‟s systems is much broader than “misuse” of 
information. The logical temporal order of the events relevant to the CFAA dictates that misuse of information can only 
occur after the information has been obtained through use of the systems (whether it be use or misuse). Solely obtaining 
the information alludes to nothing about any subsequent events. It alludes only to knowledge, viewing, and perhaps 
retrieval, of the information, whereas use or misuse of the information implies that the information has, at least, been – 
at the risk of “sounding” redundant – put to use. Temporally, use of information not only comes after accessing them, 
but use also comes after obtaining the information. The CFAA declares no rules relevant to events involving the 
information after they have been obtained. Of course, one could argue that (a)(4) involves purpose of access or use of 
information, because the subsection requires an additional scienter of intent to defraud and that the unauthorized access 
or exceeding authorized access furthers a fraudulent scheme. However, such an argument fails, because such a reading 
of (a)(4) would make both “unauthorized” and “exceeding authorized” superfluous, since any access then, regardless of 
whether it is authorized or not, would violate (a)(4) so long as the access is done with intent to defraud. 
The Eleventh Circuit has also weighed in on the interpretation of authorization in the employee 
context. In United States v. Rodriguez
1019
, the defendant, an employee of the Social Security 
Administration, had accessed and obtained a relatively wide range of personal information 
regarding 17 people he knew to various extents. He was charged with exceeding authorized access 
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in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(B)
1020
, the subsection specifically aimed at information obtained from 
any department or agency of the United States. The Administration had a clear policy prohibiting 
obtaining information from the Administration‟s databases for non-work related reasons. In fact, 
employees were informed about that policy through mandatory training, notice signs around the 
office, and a warning banner on the computer screens on a daily basis. Furthermore, Rodriguez, like 
the other employees, had renew his commitment to the policy on an annual basis by attaching his 
signature to a form acknowledging the receipt of the policy. The policy included a warning that a 
violation would incur criminal liability. For three consecutive years, Rodriguez refused to sign for 
the receipt of the policy. During trial, Rodriguez admitted that he had accessed information without 
authorization. However, in his appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Rodriguez attempted to rely on 
Brekka, claiming that the only databases he accessed were the ones he was authorized to access. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Rodriguez‟ case from Brekka in that whereas there 
was no policy regulating Brekka‟s use and there was no dispute as to Brekka‟s authorization to 
access the documents in question, Rodriguez‟s access had been subject to the Administration‟s 
employee policy that limited the authorization to access for business reasons only and Rodriguez 
had conceded at trial that he did not access the information in question for business reasons. Thus, 
under the Eleventh Circuit‟s theory, Rodriguez‟ authorized access was converted to unauthorized 
access (“exceeding authorized access”), because the access was in violation of his employer‟s 
policy.
1021
 
 
12.2.4.3 Code-based approach 
So far, the two broader approaches to interpreting “authorization” in the employee context have 
been accounted for. The broadest, the agency-based approach having been accepted by the Seventh 
Circuit, and the less broad contract-based approach having been accepted in the First, Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits. 
                                                 
1020
 See also United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119 (8
th
 Cir. 2011). Teague also involved access to personal 
information residing in a government database. Teague had access through her job at a company contracted by the 
government to collect debts (student loans) and generally answer questions related to student loans. It seems Teague did 
not dispute the claimed lack of authorization. Rather she claimed that someone else had used her access credentials. The 
court thus never engages in an analysis of the meaning of “authorization”, even though it states that lack of 
authorization must be proved by the government. The decision, however, only discusses efforts made to prove that 
Teague was indeed the person using her access credentials at the time of access, not whether her access was subject to 
any policies regarding non-business use etc. 
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 See also Audra A. Dial and John M. Moye: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Disloyal Employees: How Far 
Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret Theft? (2013), 64 Hastings L.J. 1447 
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The narrow code-based approach essentially involves not reading “use” or “purpose” into the 
language of the CFAA. Although, the approach is called “code-based”, the approach, in its purest 
form, cannot reconcile cases where the code-based approach is reasonably warranted in light of 
notice (foreseeability) issues and those cases where e.g. a janitor (who is also an employee and also 
a type of insider) has physical access to an unprotected computer in the course of his building 
maintenance duties. Nor is the approach as applied by the courts truly “code-based”, but rather, 
those courts are rejecting the contract and agency-based approaches. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
have accepted this approach. The Second, Third
1022
, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts have yet 
to explicitly adopt an approach. The Second Circuit may have implicitly adopted the narrow 
approach.
1023
 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the narrow approach in its decision in Brekka
1024
 and in United States v. 
Nosal
1025
. In Brekka, the defendant had been hired by LVRC, a treatment center for addicted 
persons, in part to conduct internet marketing and interacting with a third party service provider 
retained by LVRC to provide email service, website services etc. LVRC and Brekka did not have a 
written employment agreement, nor was there any employee policy regarding Brekka‟s use of the 
computer. Since Brekka resided out-of-state and had to commute to back and forth between the 
treatment center and his home, Brekka had emailed himself some documents that related to his 
work for LVRC and documents that related to earlier negotiations with LVRC regarding Brekka 
purchasing an ownership interest in the center in order to access them on his own computer. When 
Brekka later resigned, he left his computer at LVRC without deleting anything from it. Upon 
discovering that Brekka had emailed himself work-related documents, LVRC brought action against 
Brekka under the CFAA
1026
 claiming that Brekka‟s authorization had ceased when he used the 
computer contrary to LVRC‟s interests
1027
.
1028
 The court did not agree with LVRC‟s perception of 
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 The two dissenting judges in Nosal aver that the Third Circuit has implicitly adopted the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits‟ reasoning. However, the judges, regrettably, do not provide any case citations to substantiate that assertion. 
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 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9
th
 Cir. 2012) 
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 § 1030(a)(2) and (a)(4) 
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 I.e. LVRC relied on the Seventh Circuit‟s agency-based interpretation of authorization in Citrin. 
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 Brekka also involved alleged unauthorized access after Brekka‟s employment ended. However, that allegation was 
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court‟s summary of facts relevant to the case, there is mention of Brekka‟s owning two consulting businesses whose 
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authorization. The court‟s opinion was rooted in the plain meaning of the statute, the language of 
which, the court found, did not support the agency-based approach to interpreting “authorization”. 
The court‟s reasoning was that for the purposes of the CFAA, an employee who has been granted 
authorization to use a computer “subject to certain limitations, the employee remains authorized to 
use the computer even if the employee violates those limitations.”
1029
 The court argued that this 
resulted in a more sensible interpretation of the “without authorization” and “exceeding 
authorization” dilemma, because a person without authorization to access a computer, has no 
permission to use the computer at all, whereas a person that has permission to access the computer 
but who accesses information they are not entitled to access exceed their authorization. One lacks 
any and all authorization to access the computer whereas the latter has authorization to access the 
computer but is only authorized to access some, but not all, information on that computer. Thus, 
entirely lacking authorization to access the computer differs from being authorized to access the 
computer but entirely lacking authorization to access certain information. It is thus not a question of 
what the person does with the information he is entitled to access, rather whether one was entitled to 
access the information - period. Thus, in Brekka, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the agency-
based interpretation on the grounds that it did not comport with the plain language of the statute, 
and given the fact that the CFAA is a criminal statute, also rejected the approach on lenity
1030
 
grounds. 
Certain passages in Brekka might have given plaintiffs and the government reason to assume that 
the existence of a policy regulating for what purposes information could be accessed and a violation 
of that policy could suffice to state a claim under the CFAA.
1031
 However, the Ninth Circuit set the 
record straight in United States v. Nosal
1032
. The Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Brekka was rendered at 
a time when another employee, albeit caught up in a CFAA criminal case
1033
, had just been denied 
                                                                                                                                                                  
operations included referral of potential patients to rehabilitation centers. The decision mentions only the plaintiff‟s 
allegation of access to further his own personal interests. 
1029
 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9
th
 Cir. 2009) 
1030
 I discussed the rule of lenity above in the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege. Brekka is arguably one of those cases 
where the rule of lenity is cited only in order to bolster a conclusion that has already been reached. Here, the Ninth 
Circuit, had already concluded that the agency theory is not supported by the plain language of the statute. Arguably, 
the court either only pays lip service to the rule of lenity in that it has already rejected the agency theory, or this may or 
may not be a reference to that the agency-based construction might have been acceptable had it not been proffered in 
the context of a criminal statute. The latter of course is speculative. 
1031
 The Brekka court specifically mentioned the absence of an employee policy with respect to computer use. 
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 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9
th
 Cir. (en banc) 2012) 
1033
 Nosal, a former employee, had been charged under (a)(4) for aiding and abetting current employees in exceeding 
their authorized access with intent to defraud. 
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the dismissal of his CFAA charges. The Ninth Circuit court, thus, granted Nosal a rehearing en 
banc. 
The government‟s interpretation of “exceeding authorized access” was that a company computer 
use policy gives employees certain rights, and employees that violated the policy exceeded their 
authorized access. The court disagreed and explained that “entitled” in the statutory definition of 
“exceeding authorized access” “refers to how an accesser “obtain[s] or alter[s]” the information, 
whereas the computer use policy uses “entitled” to limit how the information is used after it is 
obtained. This is a poor fit with the statutory language. An equally and more sensible reading of 
“entitled” is as a synonym of “authorized.” So read, “exceeds authorized access” would refer to data 
or files on a computer that one is not authorized to access.”
1034
 (citations omitted) 
Similar to my argument above in connection with United States v. John, the Ninth Circuit points out in a footnote that 
the government‟s proposed construction of “exceeds authorized access” in Nosal renders the entire “intent to defraud” 
element in (a)(4) superfluous, because using a computer with intent to defraud necessarily violates company policy.
1035
 
To that one can safely add that that conclusion is even more certain with respect to the agency-based approach, which 
relies on the agent acquiring adverse interests. 
The government‟s theory, according to the court, would expand the CFAA and criminalize “any 
authorized use of information obtained from a computer.”
1036
 Furthermore, the government‟s 
assertion that the defendant was on notice that his act was wrongful because it was fraudulent and 
the access furthered the fraud (i.e. Nosal was supposedly on notice that the former employees‟ 
access was unauthorized under § 1030(a)(4) because the access furthered a fraudulent scheme – that 
is, the government effectively eliminates the need for the term “unauthorized”; an essential element 
of the statute) ignored that “exceeds authorized access” is used elsewhere in the CFAA. For 
example in § 1030(a)(2), which requires no fraudulent intent. If an intent to defraud in itself negates 
authorization to access then (a)(4), which specifically requires an intent to defraud, would be 
entirely superfluous.
1037
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Of further concern to the court was that the government‟s proposed construction “allows private 
parties to manipulate their computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into 
ones policed by the criminal law” whereas those relationships would normally be regulated by tort 
and contract law.
1038
 
1039
 The court furthermore looks to the consequences of yielding to the 
government‟s argument. If private use policies can dictate the meaning of “authorization” in the 
context of the CFAA, that will not only effect employees, but any internet user who interacts with 
computers the use of which is subject to terms of service or terms use. That is, the consequences of 
recognizing private policies as limitations on authorization (in the meaning of criminal statute) will 
affect the construction of authorization also with respect to “outsiders”; not just employee cases and 
not just in the case before the court. The court did not accept, either, the government‟s assurances 
that it would not pursue minor violations under the CFAA. To that promise it responded: “[…][W]e 
shouldn‟t have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor.”
1040
 The Ninth Circuit said of its sister 
circuits that had adopted the contract-based approach and the agency-based approach, that “[t]hese 
courts looked only at the culpable behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the 
effect on millions of ordinary citizens caused by the statute‟s unitary definition of “exceeds 
authorized access.””
1041
 And so, the court concluded that if Congress wanted to include liability for 
misappropriation into the CFAA it would have to do so more clearly. Until then, lenity would 
prevail.
1042
 The CFAA‟s concept “exceeds authorized access” prohibits unauthorized access to 
information, not the unauthorized use thereof.
1043
 
The Fourth Circuit followed in the Ninth Circuit‟s footsteps and adopted the narrow code-based 
approach in WEC v. Miller
1044
. Shortly before Miller resigned from his position with WEC, WEC 
alleged that Miller and his assistant had downloaded proprietary and confidential information from 
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WEC‟s computers
1045
, and used that information to make a presentation to a potential customer on 
behalf of WEC‟s competitor, Arc
1046
. WEC had promulgated policies prohibiting unauthorized use 
of information or downloading the information to a personal computer. The policy did not regulate 
access to information. 
Not surprisingly, at trial, WEC relied on Citrin and claimed that by violating the use policy, the 
defendant had breached his fiduciary duties to WEC and that breach meant that Miller had lost his 
authorization to access the information or he had exceeded his authorization by accessing the 
information.
1047
 In other words, WEC argued that Miller had become an agent of Arc.
1048
  On 
appeal, WEC relied on the earlier Ninth Circuit panel decision in Nosal, which had, however, been 
reversed en banc, arguing that the policy described the manner in which employees were allowed to 
access, and that the defendant had violated that policy. 
The court framed the question before it as a question of whether the terms “without authorization” 
and “exceeds authorized access” extended to violations of information/computer use policies. It 
concluded that it did not. The Fourth Circuit discussed both the Seventh Circuit‟s agency approach 
and the Ninth Circuit‟s narrow approach, and opted for the latter because Congress had not clearly 
criminalized the unauthorized “manner” of obtaining or altering information as claimed by WEC. 
The court cited lenity as a reason to choose the narrower approach. In completely rejecting the 
Seventh Circuit‟s agency-based approach, the WEC court acknowledged that Citrin‟s behavior had 
been “egregious” and that Citrin clearly violated his duty of loyalty. However, the Fourth Circuit 
believed that the consequences of adopting such an approach in the context of the CFAA would 
have “far-reaching effects unintended by Congress.”
1049
 
This chapter began with an attempt to show the diversity of the people who could be considered 
insiders; the people who have physical access to the computers (e.g. a janitor or other people 
allowed in the room where the computer is), the people who are authorized to access the computer 
logically (using the computer is a part of their job), the people who have legitimate remote access to 
the computer, and the people who have gained illegitimate access to the computer and are 
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masquerading as a legitimate user and can do everything a legitimate user can do. The masquerader, 
although some may include it in the definition of insider for risk assessment purposes, is not 
appropriate in a legal context, but some situations may muddy the waters. Some situations fall 
outside all, or some, of the approaches to construe authorization because all the theories have 
various weaknesses. 
The agency-based approach is only applicable in an employer-employee relationship. The contract-
based approach only makes sense where there is a contract of some sort, and even then, it gives 
cause for concern to enforce every clause of every contract in every situation. Contracts (including 
policies) can range from the very vague to the very specific. Even assuming the contract is 
sufficiently specific, it raises the question whether the particular clause that has been violated, is a 
clause that should be enforced by threat of criminal punishment rather being subject to civil 
liability. Computer owners can put anything in their computer use policies and make the access 
authorization contingent on observance of any kind of rule; for example, if authorization to access 
the computer, programs or information on it, were contingent on that access being work-related, 
everything from whether you emailed your spouse from your work email address to using the 
computer to access and email trade secrets. Even though the latter is clearly deserving of some kind 
of punishment (in fact, the legislature has already thought of that by enacting misappropriation 
provisions criminalizing misappropriation!), it is worth remembering that allowing violation of 
computer use policies to trigger criminal liability in the “trade secret stealing” end of the scale of 
unacceptable behavior, also affects the other end of the scale because the emailing of a spouse 
contrary to computer use policy requiring a work-related purpose for access is equally a violation of 
policy. Either policies are considered a source of limitation of authorization in the context of 
hacking statutes, or they are not. In for a dime, in for a dollar. Picking and choosing whether 
violation of an organization‟s computer use policy is appropriate to enforce under a hacking statute 
based on the particular conduct of the defendant before the court invites arbitrary decisions, because 
the court would be hard-pressed to distinguish between the two previously mentioned examples 
where a clear policy exists prohibiting the defendant‟s use of the computer in both cases. The 
authorization to access the computers would be equally absent in both cases, if the access was for 
“non-business reasons”. The law would not distinguish between the two in terms of determining 
guilt. Both the person misappropriating trade secrets and the person emailing his wife would have 
accessed a computer contrary to policy and lacked authorization. Only the sentencing phase would 
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take into account the differences between using a computer to email your spouse contrary to policy 
and emailing trade secrets to a competitor contrary to policy. 
Allowing contracts to define and/or limit authorization in the context of hacking statutes arguably 
means allowing contracts to dictate the scope of “authorization” in hacking statutes in all cases. Not 
just insider cases, but outsider cases as well. After all, “exceeds authorization”, which typically is 
applied to insiders, hinges on the definition of “authorization”. In order to figure out whether 
authorization has been exceeded, one must first know what authorization is. Authorization can be 
delegated via contract. In terms of public websites, for example, the distinction between insider and 
outsider becomes obfuscated. As discussed in the chapter on outsiders, particularly in terms of 
public websites, an implied authorization to access a public website is presumed. In turn that means 
that someone accessing a public website is not entirely without authorization. Furthermore, 
allowing contracts to define the limits of the authorization would mean that website terms of use 
and terms of service could define the authorization within the context of hacking statutes.
1050
 
Although employers are particularly vulnerable to employee misbehavior when the employer 
authorizes an employee to access computer and information, the price for including the employer‟s 
computer use policy within “authorization” or “exceeds authorization” is high, especially in light of 
the fact that trade secret law already provides criminal law protection for aggrieved employers.
1051
 
Rodriguez and John both involved access to information that is specifically protected under the 
CFAA. In the case of Rodriguez, the defendant had accessed the government databases of the Social 
Security Administration (§ 1030(a)(2)(B)), and in John, the defendant had accessed the records of a 
financial institution (§ 1030(a)(2)(A)). When the facts of the cases are viewed in isolation, it is 
tempting to conclude that of course should the defendants be punished. John, because she used the 
information she had authorization to access as a part of fraudulent scheme. Rodriguez because he 
used the information gathered from the government database to ostensibly do background checks on 
women he was romantically interested in, e.g. showing up at their address without them having 
given him their address. In United States v. Sablan, an employee had looked up President Obama in 
the Department of Education‟s student loan database to which she had access.
1052
 In short, the cases 
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are not lacking unethical behavior. The question is whether the costs associated with accepting a 
contract-based construction of “authorization” and “exceeds authorization” are acceptable. The 
Nosal court discussed this issue at length, citing several terms of use/service agreements from 
various websites, such as Google and Yahoo! and gave examples of behavior that would become 
criminal. As may be recalled, in Nosal, the government stated that it would not use its prosecutorial 
discretion to prosecute minor violations regardless of the scope of the CFAA. However, only three 
years prior to Nosal, the government did the exact opposite in United States v. Drew
1053
. Drew had 
bullied a 13-year-old schoolmate of her daughter‟s on MySpace whilst pretending to be a sixteen-
year-old boy whose name and photograph she had used without permission. Tragically, the girl 
committed suicide. Presumably as it is extremely hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
person has caused another person to commit suicide, the government used § 1030(a)(2)(C) as what 
can best be described as a “proxy” charge. The government averred that Drew had accessed 
MySpace without authorization or by exceeding her authorization, because she had consciously 
breached the MySpace terms of service.
1054
 Although the jury convicted Drew, the court 
subsequently granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of unconstitutional 
vagueness (as applied).
1055
 
As may be recalled from the chapter on nullum crimen sine lege, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is 
essentially two-pronged. First, there must be sufficient notice of an act being criminal. Second, the 
law must give minimal guidance to those enforcing the law, so that the law‟s enforcement is not 
capricious and arbitrary. The Drew court explained why it held that letting website terms of service 
define the scope of authorization in the context of the CFAA failed both prongs, although primarily 
it failed the minimal guidelines prong. 
As to notice, first, the court stated that breaches of contract do generally not incur criminal liability. 
Whereas people might expect civil liability, they would not expect criminal liability – particularly 
noting that all breach of terms of service cases have been civil cases, not criminal.
1056
 Second, the 
court stated that if terms of service were allowed to govern what is “unauthorized” and “exceeds 
authorization”, which then determines whether a person has committed a crime under the CFAA, 
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“would be unacceptably vague because it is unclear whether any or all violations of terms of service 
will render the access unauthorized, or whether only certain ones will.”
1057
 “If any violation of any 
term of service is held to make the access unauthorized, that strategy would probably resolve this 
particular vagueness issue; but it would, in turn, render the statute incredibly overbroad and 
contravene the second prong of the void-for-vagueness doctrine as to setting guidelines to govern 
law enforcement.”
1058
 Third, the court stated that allowing terms of service to constitute a basis for a 
CFAA crime, “that approach makes the website owner-in essence-the party who ultimately defines 
the criminal conduct. This will lead to further vagueness problems.”
1059
 The court was concerned 
with the fact that the terms of service themselves may be so vague that a website visitor would not 
reasonably be able to understand what the terms of service encompass, such as what the prohibition 
against “unfair content” might mean in the MySpace terms of service, the meaning of which would 
be unilaterally be determined by MySpace. The court also pointed out that a breach of contract does 
not necessarily discharge the contract.
1060
  
With respect to minimal guidelines to law enforcement, the court essentially argues that the breadth 
of the terms of service become the breadth of the criminalization. Lying about one‟s weight and age 
would constitute a breach under the MySpace terms of service, and so would advertising a 
product.
1061
 People who are helping their kids who are younger than thirteen open a Facebook 
account might then be aiding their child in committing a crime since such conduct is contrary to 
Facebook‟s terms of service.
1062
 Such overbreadth raises the question “whether Congress has 
“establish[ed] minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.””
1063
 Letting website terms of service 
govern what is authorized in terms of the CFAA would create a “standardless sweep” that would 
enable federal law enforcement entities to be “improperly free to “pursue their personal 
predilections.””
1064
 
Granted, the Drew court was addressing vagueness introduced into the CFAA by contracts in terms 
of accounts on public websites. However, company use policies are not necessarily much clearer 
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and narrower than then terms of service on a public website. What is more is that the company 
culture might be such that the policies are disregarded or workarounds for security protocols 
defined in the policy have become commonplace. Such a culture cannot “breed internally” in the 
same way between thousands or millions of website users and a website owner as it can between 
employees and management in an organization. 
In other words, like in the outsider cases, these approaches that have been applied in the insider 
cases are not really working. The code-based approach arguably works, because it is not so much a 
code-based approach in reality, but rather a rejection of the very broad contract-based and agency-
based approaches. The Fourth and Ninth Circuit are applying narrower approaches, but they have 
really only said what they do not think should be used to construe authorization in a criminal 
statute. If only a code-based approach were left, then it would be an implicit acceptance of the code-
based approach. However, note that the Ninth Circuit in Brekka, regarding the plaintiff‟s claim that 
Brekka accessed the admin interface of the company‟s website statistics service after his 
employment ended, states that such access would have been unauthorized under the CFAA.
1065
 The 
plaintiff failed to prove that Brekka had accessed the admin interface, but that does not change the 
court‟s point that such access would, had it been proven, fallen within the scope of the CFAA‟s 
“without authorization” concept. A true code-based approach would have held such access outside 
the scope of “without authorization” if Brekka had gained access using a still-active login name and 
password. “Code” cannot account for the court‟s argument.
1066
 
 
12.2.5 Social norms-based approach 
The conclusion in the chapter on authorization with respect to outsiders (primarily, authorization in 
the context of the web as an open space) was that the code-based approach and the contract-based 
approach were inadequate in that the former exempts from the scope any access that code allows 
and also includes under the scope any access that is only mildly frustrated by code (it over- and 
under-includes, respectively), and the latter fails because of the breathtaking, rather alarming, notice 
issues and serious risk of arbitrary enforcement that accompany it. The agency-based approach, 
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which is only applicable in situations where an agency relationship exists, leaves no possibility of 
giving “exceeding authorized access” any meaning, since access for a purpose contrary to the 
interest of the employer automatically de-authorizes the employee completely, leading to only 
“without authorization” being applicable in insider cases, even though it is clear that Congress 
intended “exceeding authorized access” to apply to insiders. 
Kerr suggests a social norms approach that is rooted in the trespass doctrine, as mentioned before, 
and proposes a three-pronged analysis to determine authorization based on traditional common law 
trespass analysis; (1) the nature of the space, (2) the means of access, and (3) the context of entry. 
Whereas, the chapter on outsiders mainly discussed open spaces (i.e. spaces where the information 
is accessible to anyone, and thus, no one is truly an insider), this chapter, discusses closed spaces 
that require special permission to access. 
For example, the nature of the space in Brekka is closed. LVRC specifically delegated special 
access authorization to Brekka – authorization that LVRC would only delegate to an employee, not 
just any random person who requests access authorization. The documents obtained by Brekka 
resided within a security perimeter that required Brekka to authenticate himself at the perimeter. 
Brekka had been given access credentials so that he could authenticate himself as a person 
authorized to access the documents. Those access credentials were a result of delegation of 
authorization to Brekka. Thus, there was nothing abnormal about how Brekka gained access, 
because he used a password where a password was required, and furthermore, there was a clear line 
of delegation of authority from the computer owner to Brekka. He did not use another person‟s 
password or guessed a password in order to masquerade as a legitimate user. A closed space 
indicates that special authorization is required in order to gain legal access. Brekka had that 
authorization because, as an employee of LVRC, he was granted such authorization. After the 
employment ended, the space would of course remain closed, and even if LVRC had failed to 
deactivate Brekka‟s access credentials (means of access would remain consistent with social 
norms), Brekka‟s authorization to access would have been revoked as a result of the employment 
having ended. 
Although the typical idea of an insider is an employee or other person who truly has privileged 
access to information that is not publicly accessible, in cases such as Drew one would be hard 
pressed not to view Drew as an insider of sorts in some respects, at least regarding access to her 
own account. But she would not be an insider in all respects or even in the most important respect 
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that she has access to information that MySpace wants to keep from the public; Drew only had 
access to information that she herself might want to keep from the public. Drew created a personal 
account with MySpace and only her access credentials would provide access to the account. Yet, it 
is hard to imagine that merely having created a social network account would make one an insider 
with respect to the computer(s) that contains all information pertaining to the account. For example, 
as a hypothetical scenario, let us imagine that a person has a Facebook account. That person then 
later goes on to hacking into another person‟s Facebook account, or even Facebook‟s employee 
mail server. One would again be hard pressed to characterize the perpetrator as an insider with 
respect to Facebook merely by virtue of having registered for a Facebook account or merely 
because some or all of the information accessed happened to reside on the same hardware.  
In the past, it was much easier to determine whether one was exceeding authorized access to a 
computer by accessing information one was not authorized to access (remember, earlier in the 
dissertation it was argued that exceeding authorized access meant accessing a computer to which 
one had authorization to access, and accessing information on that computer that one was not 
authorized to access). Today, cloud computing makes it hard or impossible not to access multiple 
computers just when accessing one‟s own data in the cloud, since data may be spread around across 
many computers in many jurisdictions (which also begs the question whether a breach of terms of 
service would then trigger criminal liability in every single jurisdiction where the information and 
computers may reside). In most cases involving unauthorized remote access to information, 
physical hardware becomes irrelevant in determining whether access was authorized or not. For 
example, a webserver could very well be hosted on the same physical hardware that also hosts 
another system for another system owner. The same hardware can host many virtual machines, but 
is it the access to the computer as a piece of hardware that counts or is it the access to the computer 
as an information system that counts? Imagine that one has been banned from accessing a website 
that is hosted on the same hardware as thirty other websites. Given the language of the CFAA, how 
could a court qualify one website owner‟s de-authorizing of another person‟s access to the website 
(if one were intent on letting the CFAA cover such situations)? The only way would be to qualify 
the access to the computer (the hardware) as being in excess of authorization, since the hardware 
hosts 29 other websites that the banned person is still authorized to access, and over which this 
particular website owner cannot exercise proprietary rights, such as the right to exclude others. But 
the banned person would almost always be oblivious to the fact that the website is hosted on the 
same hardware as 29 other websites that he still has authorization to access, unless he for some 
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reason were interested enough to look up that fact. Does the fact that the website owner happens to 
use shared hosting really make the banned person an insider with respect to the website from which 
he now is banned, just because the hardware happens to host other websites that he is still 
authorized to access? The point is, that in today‟s world of IT, anyone can be construed as an 
“insider” because we all have authorization to access an enormous number of computers and yet 
only have very limited rights to access information on those computers; that information typically 
being information created by us or otherwise belonging to us, or information that has been made 
publicly accessible by the computer owner or service provider. But our account information may 
reside on the same computer as account information of thousands or millions of other people. 
 
12.2.5.1 Accounts 
Accounts are closed spaces, because they require authentication to access and thus create a barrier 
with respect to access by others who have not been authorized to access. I.e. accounts are a specific 
delegation of authorization to access information or services.
1067
 This characteristic of accounts 
sufficiently distinguishes them from websites that allow free and open access by any member of the 
public. If the account is blocked, then authorization is withdrawn and access becomes unauthorized. 
This would be true regardless of whether the blocked account is an Instagram account (which any 
member of the public can create at any time) or an employee account within an organization. 
However, whereas an employee would be barred from simply creating a new account, an Instagram 
user can create a new account if his old account is blocked. As Orin Kerr points out, where an 
account requires no special relationship with the online service and a new account can easily be 
created, a prior blocking of a user‟s account does not necessarily mean that he is completely barred 
from interacting with the service or even create a new account. It depends on the context. For 
example, the user‟s actions that led to the blocking of the first account, the user may not intend to 
repeat with his new account because he risks losing access to his new account.
1068
 However, if the 
                                                 
1067
 See Orin S. Kerr: Norms of Computer Trespass (May 2015 draft) Columbia Law Review (Forthcoming 2016), p. 
31. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601707 
1068
 Orin S. Kerr: Norms of Computer Trespass (May 2015 draft) Columbia Law Review (Forthcoming 2016), p. 33. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601707 
 
293 
 
user is informed that he cannot create a new account ever again (a total ban), that might make his 
access unauthorized.
1069
 Such a direct action should at least be required to revoke authorization.
1070
 
As pointed out in the above section on former employees, even though an employer fails to block or 
delete the account of a former employee, the former employee does not retain authorization to 
access the account merely because it is still active. As was made clear in Sablan, if the relationship 
between the employer and the employee ends, then the authorization to utilize that account is 
revoked, even if the account still allows access.
1071
 That is, access subsequent to the end of 
employment is unauthorized. The employment relationship provides the context in which access to 
a closed space becomes authorized, whereas an ended employment relationship means that there no 
longer is any delegation of authorization as required because of the closed nature of the space. 
Thus, the circumventing a total ban where the space is open should not incur criminal liability, 
because IP blocking, for example, is aimed at an IP address, which the user is free to change and 
frequently will change without the user getting requesting so, anyway. That is, in open space, those 
who attempt to block certain users are blocking them based on characteristics that are under the 
user‟s control – not the person who is doing the blocking. Conversely, in closed space, the person 
doing the blocking is in complete control of the access possibility, because he can simply block or 
delete the account. Circumventing that ban will in some contexts be acceptable, such as where 
anyone can sign up for an account, e.g. a gmail account, because the blocking of an account does 
not necessarily preclude the owner of the blocked account to create a new account and then avoid 
the behavior that caused the first account to be block. This context differs from the context of 
employee accounts on work computers. Once that account is blocked or deleted that definitively 
means that the employee is no longer authorized to access the system, and the same applies where 
the account remains active, but the employee has been terminated or has resigned. Authorization is 
not automatically revoked when a user violates the terms of use or service; the revocation of 
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 Arguably, the courts should be wary with respect to allowing just any such claim of unauthorized access to pass 
without scrutinizing the claim; especially, in light of the fact that just about any violation of terms of service might 
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his services were accessed without authorization subsequent to undesirable speech. 
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 See Orin S. Kerr: Norms of Computer Trespass (May 2015 draft) Columbia Law Review (Forthcoming 2016), p. 
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authorization depends on a direct action taken by the owner of the system.
1072
 Such an approach 
would also conform better to the fact that breaches of contract do not automatically discharge the 
contract, but requires the party to rely on a particular remedy available to him, one of which may 
involve the discharge of the contract. 
 
12.3 Insiders in Danish law 
In 1986, the late Professor Vagn Greve addressed computer crime in a short book called “edb-
strafferet” (computer crime law).
1073
 Due to the very limited number of computer crime cases in 
Denmark at the time, he also looked to the US and to the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (the precursor to the CFAA), as well as some computer crime related 
prosecutions under the US mail and wire fraud acts. 
He also briefly addressed insiders with respect to their access to and use of computers and 
information on them. Greve argued that unauthorized use of the employer‟s computers for purposes 
unrelated to the employee‟s job was not necessarily criminal under § 293(1), which prohibits the 
unauthorized use of things belonging to others. He argued that for the criminal law to apply, the 
misuse must reach a certain level of seriousness; the misuse could not be of a trivial character, such 
as playing a computer game during a break or writing personal Christmas cards.
1074
 If the misuse 
were excessive in nature, remedies available in civil law should apply, rather than letting such 
misuse trigger criminal liability.
1075
 However, if the misuse for example involves using the 
employer‟s computer to build up a competing business, such misuse would trigger the application 
of § 293(1).
1076
 Thus, Greve seemed to focus on the purpose of the misuse; his argument seems also 
to implicate use for purposes that are disloyal to the employer. However, a 1996 case, which is 
analyzed below, indicates that purpose may not matter.
1077
 
As noted previously, the legislative history of the Danish hacking provision also distinguishes 
between insiders and outsiders, even though the same statutory language covers both. Trade secret 
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law also applies with respect to employees who improperly obtain trade secrets and employees who 
use or share trade secrets without being authorized to do so. I.e. there is some overlap between trade 
secret law and the criminal code‟s § 263(2) and (3), because the Marketing Act § 19 also covers 
unauthorized obtaining of a specific type of information: trade secrets. The Marketing Act § 19 
covers much more than mere unauthorized access to (obtaining of) trade secrets. It also prohibits 
unauthorized use and disclosure of trade secrets. Thus, whereas the criminal code § 263(2) and (3) 
prohibit unauthorized access to trade secrets, the Marketing Act § 19, additionally covers situations 
where the access to the trade secrets was authorized, but the trade secrets were misappropriated, i.e. 
disclosed, used, etc. That is, the scope of the Marketing Act § 19 goes beyond mere access and also 
addresses what happens subsequent to the access, regardless of whether the access itself was 
authorized or unauthorized. 
The trespass provision in the criminal code, § 264(2), like § 263(3), states that criminal trespass that 
is committed with the intent to obtain trade secrets is subject to a harsher penalty bracket than 
simple trespass absent any aggravating circumstances. That is, in cases involving access to trade 
secrets, it is an indispensable prerequisite for a finding that there has been a violation of § 264(2) 
and § 263(3) that the access has already been found to be unauthorized under § 264(1) and § 263(2), 
respectively. The fact that trade secrets were accessed is not sufficient to trigger criminal liability; 
the access must also be unauthorized. Accessing trade secrets is only an example of purpose of 
access. Purpose of access may trigger an enhanced penalty bracket, but purpose of access does not 
determine whether the access was authorized. This is illustrated in U 1996.979Ø.  
In U 1996.979Ø, an employee in a bank had accessed trade secrets on the bank‟s computer system, 
using his own password, and printed out confidential information, shortly before resigning from his 
position. The employee was initially found guilty of unauthorized access (§ 263(2) and (3)) in the 
district court but was acquitted on appeal. It appears to have been the prosecution‟s theory that the 
access was unauthorized because the employee did not access the information for any business-
related purpose.
1078
 The prosecution also alleged that the defendant must have known that his 
authorization would be rescinded the moment he tendered his resignation.
1079
 The district court 
found the defendant guilty arguing that the defendant‟s access trade secrets shortly prior to his 
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resignation was unauthorized regardless of the fact that he used his own password.
1080
 On appeal, 
the High Court disagreed and acquitted the defendant. The High Court held, briefly (as is customary 
in Danish court decisions), that the defendant, being an employee at the time of the access, had 
access to the bank‟s computer system, and thus, it was not unauthorized access when the defendant 
did so using his own password. Furthermore, the High Court added that it was not proven that the 
defendant had known that his authorization to access the system would have been rescinded 
immediately upon tendering his resignation. The High Court‟s concise opinion steers perfectly clear 
of any mention of purpose for the access. The defendant was an employee at the time and had 
authorization access to the system and the information in question; ergo, his access was authorized.  
The prosecution clearly invited the High Court to indulge in a construction of “authorization” that 
would entail an examination of a defendant‟s purpose for accessing information, but the High 
Court‟s silence on the matter equally clearly calls for the inference that purpose for access cannot 
negate the existence of authorization.
1081
  However, it is unclear what role, if any, it would have 
played had the defendant been found to have been aware that his authorization would be rescinded 
later the same day. There were no allegations of access after the authorization had in fact been 
withdrawn when the employee resigned. Anticipation of the rescinding of authorization in the 
immediate future would not render the defendant‟s access any more or less non-business-related 
compared to if he had not anticipated the revocation of authorization. Nor can an anticipated 
revocation be equate with an actual, affirmative, instant revocation of authorization; otherwise, the 
mere anticipation of revocation would in itself automatically implicitly revoke authorization to 
access even prior to the employee‟s resignation and without any affirmative steps taken by the 
employer to actually revoke authorization. 
Make no mistake, the fact that the password works and thus technically allows access is not 
important. In United States v. Sablan the defendant had used her still-active password after her 
employment ended. The defendant in the Danish case was still employed at the time of access. 
Sablan‟s authorization was revoked when her employment ended, but the Danish defendant‟s 
employment had not ended at the time of access, even though he intended to resign later that day. 
The fact that the password grants access does not mean the access is authorized; as is apparent from 
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cases where a person guesses or steals another person‟s password. The important question is 
whether authorization had been delegated by the owner to the person using the password. In the 
Danish case, the answer is yes. Under circumstances such as those in Sablan, the answer would be 
no, because the employment had already ended at the time of access, and thus, there was no 
authorization delegated to the defendant at the time of access.
1082
 From that perspective, the 
prosecution in the Danish case was part right and part wrong; the fact that the defendant had used 
his own password, and the fact that it worked, was immaterial to authorization as such, but the 
defendant‟s authorization to use that password flowed from his status as employee at the time of the 
access regardless of what he may or may not have intended to do in the future. The access would 
have been undesired regardless of whether the employee had intended to resign later that day, in a 
month or not at all. Arguably, it would have been much more fruitful for the prosecution to 
prosecute the defendant for attempted violation of trade secret laws (the misappropriation, intent to 
disclose or use or the likes) rather than trying to get the defendant convicted for a completed crime 
of unauthorized access on a theory that the access was unauthorized because the defendant had 
allegedly misappropriated confidential information the day he resigned. 
The prosecution‟s theory shows the serious weakness of any construction of “authorization” that 
implicates the purpose of access. It would be no different than prosecuting a person for trespassing 
in a supermarket because the hypothetical defendant entered to buy anti-freeze they intended to use 
to poison someone. Of course, the supermarket, had they known the hypothetical defendant‟s 
purpose, would never have allowed him access. The unwanted behavior is not the access to the store 
nor the purchase of anti-freeze, but the attempted murder. If purpose is invoked to negate already 
existing authorization, any regular activity can be made criminal as long as the access is a step in 
preparation of the illegal conduct the defendant intends to engage in later.
1083
 Of course, the nature 
of space in this example is different from the nature of the space in the Danish case, but the point is 
simply that an objectionable purpose for legal conduct can be rendered illegal if the purpose of legal 
conduct is allowed to negate its legality. It is arbitrary, and generally has not place in open nor 
closed spaces. 
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Furthermore, enquiring as to purpose could render any violation of data protection laws an 
automatic violation of the hacking provision even though violation of data protection law is already 
separately criminalized in the Data Protection Act. Conflating purpose of use or purpose of access 
with access authorization significantly inflates that the scope of an illegal access provision. 
Contrary to a general illegal access provision, the data protection law actually focuses on purposes 
of processing personal information, rather than merely access to information. For example, if a data 
controller or processor processes information for purposes contrary to law or contract, the 
information was inevitably accessed in the process, and thus accessed for an illegal or unwanted 
purpose.
1084
 Ergo, implicating purpose of access (i.e. intended use of information accessed) converts 
data protection law violations into criminal hacking, subject to imprisonment up to six years instead 
of the maximum of four months under data protection law.
1085
 
In another Danish case, U 2004.2204Ø, the defendant had obtained and disclosed, for non-business 
reasons, credit information from a credit information database he had access to by virtue of his 
employment at a real estate agency. He was prosecuted for violating the Data Protection Act 
because he had no legal purpose for obtaining the personal information as required under data 
protection law. He was not prosecuted for unauthorized access under the criminal code‟s § 263(2), 
and arguably, such a prosecution would have been less than fruitful because the defendant clearly 
had authorized access to the database, regardless of whether his later use of the information he 
obtained was illegal under other laws. 
 
 
12.4 Summary 
As mentioned in the chapter explaining the structure of the dissertation, the Convention and EU law 
were omitted from the chapter on insiders, because the Convention and EU cybercrime law does not 
offer anything new with respect to insiders that does not equally apply to outsiders. Thus, covering 
the Convention and EU cybercrime law again in this chapter would be quite redundant. There is a 
single important exception with respect to EU law. The Directive on attacks against information 
systems exempts labor disputes and terms of service/use from its scope. Thus, every EU country, 
                                                 
1084
 See generally Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data. 
1085
 See the Danish Data Protection Act § 70. 
 
299 
 
except Denmark, will be barred from enforcing their domestic implementation of the illegal access 
article in cases where the only basis for lack of authorization is a breach of terms or a labor dispute. 
This may have been done for a good reason, which could also be used (although, unlikely to 
succeed) with respect to the CFAA and agency and contract-based approaches to the interpretation 
of authorization. Namely, a combination of the principle of subsidiarity and the fact that 
competences which have not been conferred upon the Union are retained by the member states, who 
can freely legislate in those areas retained. The Tenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution
1086
 similarly states the United States can only act within the boundaries of the 
competences conferred upon it. A claim based on the Tenth Amendment is highly unlikely to 
succeed and the US Supreme Court has stated that the Amendment merely states a truism.
1087
 
Considering that the CFAA was adopted on the basis of the commerce clause, which is 
exceptionally broad as a legal basis, it is unlikely that a Tenth Amendment challenge against the 
CFAA would succeed. Conversely, the Directive was adopted on the basis of a treaty article that is 
limited to criminal law cooperation, not the treaty article that closely resembles the broad commerce 
clause of the United States Constitution, the Directive arguably cannot, on that legal basis, encroach 
on member states‟ national law so as to displace domestic trade secret laws and contract law. 
Also a likely explanation is that a trade secrets directive that addresses the illegal obtaining, 
disclosure and use of trade secrets has already been proposed.
1088
 That is, the specific harm is being 
more appropriately addressed in its own directive rather than relying on convoluted and very broad 
constructions of hacking laws as a proxy to reach undesirable behavior; behavior that in fact occurs 
subsequent to the access because the offenders often have authorized access to the information, but 
misappropriate the information. 
As explained in the beginning of this chapter on insiders, the concepts of insider and outsider are 
relative to each other with respect to a given resource. The distinction between without 
authorization and exceeding authorization is important in the CFAA, because the CFAA focuses on 
access to the computer. Had the CFAA only forbidden access without authorization, then the statute 
would only apply where the person accessing had no authorization at all (i.e. is without 
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authorization). The only way to get that hypothetical version of the CFAA to cover access to 
information that the person is not allowed to access would be to ask why he accessed the 
information and finding him to have accessed without authorization if he had an undesirable 
purpose for accessing the computer. But adding the language such as “exceeds authorized access” 
allows application to those who are not without authorization to access the computer, but who 
nonetheless were not authorized to access the particular information he accessed. Adding the 
language obviates the need to construe the hypothetical CFAA, which only covers access to the 
computer that is without authorization, as if it did contain the words “exceeds authorized access”. 
For example: A is authorized to access a computer to which B lacks any authorization to access. B is then an outsider 
with respect to A in terms of the computer in question. If B accessed the computer regardless of his lack of 
authorization, he would be accessing the computer without authorization. 
Another example: A is a manager and has authorized access to the HR records relating to his department‟s employees. 
Furthermore, he is granted access to case files for cases that are being handled by his department as needed, and is 
blocked from accessing other cases. B is one of A‟s employees and is granted access to case files for cases that he is 
assigned, and access to other case files are blocked. Both B and A are insiders with respect to non-employees and 
employees of other departments, and B is also an insider with respect to other employees in the department who are not 
working the same case as he. B is an outsider, and A is an insider with respect to B, in terms of the HR records on the 
employees in the department. B is also an outsider, and A is an insider with respect to B, in terms of the case files on 
cases that are being handled by other employees in the department, but are not being handled by B. So, for example, if 
A accesses HR records on other employees than those in his department he exceeds his authorized access. He does not 
access the computer on which the HR records reside without authorization, because he is allowed to access the 
computer to obtain files on his own employees. The same applies if B accesses case files related to cases that he has not 
been assigned. He is authorized to access the computer on which the files reside, so he is not without authorization in 
terms of access to the computers, but he does exceed his authorized access in terms of the computer because he 
accessed information on the computer that he was not authorized to access. Purpose of access does not, and should not, 
matter in any of these examples. 
Asking about the purpose of access that is otherwise authorized allows the courts to take one step 
into the future.
1089
 For example, if the hypothetical CFAA only prohibits access without 
authorization, asking about purpose of access allows the courts to find a violation as if the statutory 
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language had included exceeds authorized access. The courts are essentially asking “well, you have 
authorized access to the computer, but what happens next?” If the courts ask about purpose when 
applying the actual CFAA, which contains both without authorization and exceeds authorized 
access, then asking about purpose again pushes the scope one step further when the courts again ask 
“well, you have authorization to access both the computer and the information, but what happens 
next”? This enables the court to construe the CFAA as if it included prohibitions as to how the 
information were used after they had been accessed with authorization. Asking about purpose 
always equates to asking “then what happened?”, which is quite problematic where what happened 
next (i.e. the use of information) is not actually an element of the crime. 
Because the Danish criminal code § 263(2) does not prohibit access to computers, but instead 
prohibits access to information and programs, having both “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorization” as a part of the statutory language is not necessary. The Danish criminal code § 
263(2) only prohibits access to information and programs “without authorization”. Thus, there is no 
need to construe authorization based on the purpose of the access to a computer. A person who has 
no authorization to access the computer, also has no authorization to access any information on the 
computer. If the person accesses information without authorization on a computer to which he has 
some authorization to access, he also accesses without authorization within the meaning of § 263(2) 
because the provision targets authorization with respect to the information accessed. Adding 
“exceeds authorization” to the language of § 263(2) would mean the courts would have to ask about 
the purpose of accessing information, because the only way authorization to access a piece of 
information would be to do something more than merely access it. In that case, asking “then what 
happened?” would be mandated by the language, because the language then obviously asks what 
happened after the access. But § 263(2) does not contain such language, and thus, asking about the 
purpose of the access (i.e. what happened after the access) in order to convert an authorized access 
to an unauthorized access would be contrary to the statutory language, because it would essentially 
entail adding elements to crime that are not there. 
Even though terms of use and service, computer use policies and the likes, state for which purposes 
information may be accessed, violations of such terms and policies may well constitute a 
contractual breach, but the contractual breach does not automatically trigger criminal liability, 
because a contractual breach does not automatically discharge the contract, e.g. employment 
contract, that provides the authorization. Even if such policies were scrutinized ostensibly solely to 
establish the scope of the authorization, and the policies stated that information or computers may 
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only be accessed for certain purposes, the statutory language does not support an inquiry into 
purposes of access, because resorting to an inquiry into purpose with a view to construing 
authorization to access, both under the CFAA and the Danish hacking provision, effectively pushes 
the scope a step further to cover use of information, because access to both computers and 
information are fully covered under both the CFAA and the Danish hacking provision. Asking why 
information was accessed is always in inquiry into what would happen after the access, and thus, 
always adds elements to illegal access statutes such as the CFAA and the Danish hacking provision, 
as well as provisions that implement article 2 of the Framework Decision, article 3 of the Directive 
and article 2 of the Convention on Cybercrime. None of these prohibit unauthorized use of 
information. 
A pure code-based approach does not account for all the conduct that one might consider 
unauthorized access. For example, where a sales employee has discovered he has access to payroll 
files, e.g. where the system mistakenly allows access, and he obtains information he knows he has 
not been granted access to; or where an employee uses a non-password protected computer and 
obtains information. It is important to remember that computers do not consent to anything, but 
where the nature of the space is open, there is a very strong presumption for authorization that the 
means and context of the access may negate. Where the nature of the space is closed, access is 
presumably unauthorized unless it is in the context where the person has been granted permission to 
access; such as where an employee is granted access because he is an employee. Anyone who has 
not been granted special permission to the closed space would access it without authorization. A 
pure and broad code-based approach could also unnecessarily include e.g. circumvention of 
Facebook blocks on the organization‟s network, even though such conduct is hardly the type of 
harm hacking statutes seek to prevent, and it could include those employees who have found a 
short-cut in the system that allows them to avoid dealing with security protocols, because it is 
simply a more efficient way to work, but is without any harmful intent; a broad code-based reading 
could interpret that as a circumvention of a code barrier, even if the employees did so with the 
organization‟s best interests at heart. I.e. a lax security culture could mean that access restrictions 
are not enforced in practice and the restrictions could come back to haunt equally those who 
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violated them to simply get work done, and those who violated them to harm the organization. This 
example also shows the thin line between code and contract.
1090
 () 
The contract-based approach is for many reasons an inappropriate way of construing 
“authorization”. As mentioned earlier, violation of terms and policies do not automatically 
discharge the employment contract. It generally requires the employer to act on the breach by using 
one or more of the remedies provided in contract law. It is particularly odd if a breach of contract 
can automatically incur criminal liability, but cannot civilly discharge the contract which delegates 
the authorization. In other words, civilly, the authorization remains despite the breach of contract 
because the contract has not been avoided, but criminally the authorization is revoked based on the 
breach of contract. Furthermore, a contract-based approach under which every violation of terms 
and policies to revoke authorization automatically and incur criminal liability leaves the definition 
of the crime of unauthorized access in the hands of computer owners who can write whatever they 
want in their terms and policies. Even if only some breaches automatically revoke authorization and 
incur criminal liability, the question arises which ones would and which ones would not? It 
becomes unforeseeable which breaches (and thus which conduct) triggers criminal liability. 
As with authorization with respect to outsiders, the social norms-based approach seems the most 
appropriate. The closed space within which insiders operate typically means that they are authorized 
to access sensitive information. An approach that at least rejects contract and agency-based 
approaches, would arguably incentivize organizations to not only secure their outer security 
perimeter, but classify information by sensitivity and, by code, restrict employees‟ access to 
information that they do not need access to in order to do their job. However, because the social 
norms-approach considers means of access, it is possible that the approach could construe 
authorization, or lack thereof, to cover acts that are technically a circumvention of a code 
restriction, such as where a security measure can be trivially circumvented, but the circumvention 
does not result in access to information the person is unauthorized to access. That is, e.g. if 
employees start sharing passwords, or perhaps decide to use one password instead of logging 
another user out and logging themselves in every time they need to service a customer, the means of 
access is technically not in conformity with general social norms. However, the context norms 
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should be able to adjust for this, by taking into consideration that there had been a delegation of 
authorization to everyone who used the password that technically did not belong to them, even 
though such conduct is not optimal from a security point of view.
1091
 
Regulating insiders is decisively harder than regulating outsiders, and there is plenty of literature 
discussing the insider threat. One of the reasons it is so hard to regulate insiders with hacking 
statutes is that insiders have been granted authorization to access information to which others do not 
have access. To maximize their protection under unauthorized access statutes, organizations should 
classify information according to sensitivity and place code restrictions accordingly, allowing 
employees only to access what they need in order to do their job. Granting carte blanche 
authorizations to employees in hopes of being able to state a plausible “unauthorized access” claim 
by referencing written policies and by scrutinizing the purpose of access is not advisable. Where the 
user has authorization to access, illegal access statutes cannot cover the user‟s conduct.
1092
 The 
repercussions of giving a statute, which covers both insiders and outsiders, that kind of extensive 
and vague reach are lack of foreseeability and arbitrariness, as well as, arguably being contrary to 
the statutory language. 
Even though unauthorized access statutes should not be applied in cases where a legitimate user 
misappropriates trade secrets or other information that is not to say that there should be no law that 
punishes that conduct. Such laws do exist, and they are a more appropriate way of addressing the 
harm, which is not the legitimate user‟s authorized access, but his subsequent unauthorized use of 
the information. Copyright law, trade secret law and data protection law are just some examples of 
the legislature‟s proven ability to legislate against unauthorized use of information regardless of 
whether access to them was legitimate or not. 
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13 PUBLISHED ARTICLE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE § 193 (IN 
DANISH) 
 
En analyse af straffelovens § 193  
(Published in Juristen, Issue 3, July 2015) 
Af Helena Lybæk Guðmundsdóttir, ph.d.-stipendiat, International Economic Crime and Cybercrime 
Research Centre, Juridisk Institut, Aalborg Universitet 
 
Artiklen omhandler anvendelsesområdet for straffelovens § 193, der kriminaliserer den 
retsstridige fremkaldelse af omfattende forstyrrelse i driften af samfundsvigtige anlæg. 
Artiklen fokuserer på den usikkerhed vedrørende bestemmelsens anvendelsesområde, som 
indføjelsen af begrebet ”informationssystemer” medførte. Det er forfatterens opfattelse, at 
bestemmelsen bør fortolkes i lyset af de interesser, som er beskrevet i forarbejderne fra 1917 
og 1923, idet man herved dels opnår en acceptabel klarhed over, hvilke typer af 
informationssystemer, der kan være omfattet, dels undgår en betænkelig og unødvendig 
udvidelse af bestemmelsens anvendelsesområde. De to store hackersager, der indtil nu har 
involveret straffelovens § 193, og som er omtalt i denne artikel, viser en problematisk tilgang 
til og usikkerhed vedrørende fortolkningen af bestemmelsen. 
 
13.1 Indledning 
Angreb på centrale informationssystemer gennem hacking er et samfundsmæssigt stort og stadigt 
stigende problem. I takt med at sådanne angreb opdages og afdækkes, opstår der samtidig et pres på 
det strafferetlige system for at kunne håndtere sagerne. Straffeloven har ad to omgange været 
justeret for at kunne anvendes også på cyberkriminalitet, men med vekslende held. Nogle 
bestemmelser er således helt nye (f.eks. § 279 a), andre er uændrede, men søges ved, en nogle 
gange anstrengt, fortolkning anvendt på informationsteknologien (f.eks. § 291), og atter andre er i 
gerningsbeskrivelsen blevet suppleret med en henvisning til informationsteknologien. Dette sidste 
er tilfældet med § 193. I det følgende beskrives de problemer et sådant miks mellem gamle 
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bestemmelser med en given beskyttelsesinteresse og nye fænomener, der er søgt dækket med en 
bred – og måske for bred – henvisning i gerningsbeskrivelsen, kan medføre. Der er endnu ikke 
meget retspraksis vedrørende § 193 og informationsteknologien, men den praksis, der er, afslører 
stor usikkerhed hos retsanvenderne. Denne artikel har til formål at mindske denne usikkerhed i 
kommende sager.    
Det er ikke ualmindeligt, at lovgiver anvender brede begreber i lovgivningen, heller ikke i 
straffelovgivningen. Straffelovens § 193 angik frem til 1985 anlæg med specifikke funktioner af 
samfundsmæssig betydning. I 1985 vedtog lovgiver beskyttelse af databehandlingsanlæg hvis 
funktion ikke er specifikt afgrænset. I 2004 valgte man at erstatte begrebet databehandlingsanlæg 
med det mere teknisk neutrale begreb informationssystemer. Dette medfører, eksempelvis, at alt 
hvad der kan kaldes informationssystemer falder inden for ordlyden af § 193. Jo mere udbredte 
informationssystemer bliver og jo flere der kommer, jo bredere bliver bestemmelsen uagtet den 
reelle vigtighed af de diverse systemer. Bestemmelsens ordlyd skelner ikke mellem, på den ene 
side, nedbrud af centrale betalingssystemer, NemID, elforsyningen eller trafikdata til lufthavnene, 
og på den anden side, nedbrud af online spilleplatforme, sociale medier osv. Dette trods den store 
forskel i vigtigheden af systemerne.  
Domstolene stilles derfor over for en vanskelig opgave. Artiklen klargør, at bestemmelsen ikke 
alene eller overvejende, kan, eller bør, hvile på det, ”der kan tælles”. Hermed menes den 
kvantitative størrelse af den berørte personkreds. Forstyrrelser i driften af informationssystemer, der 
ikke er samfundsvigtige og derfor ikke omfattet af § 193, vil oftest være omfattet af andre 
bestemmelser i straffeloven, eksempelvis §§ 263, 291 eller 293. Derfor er der ikke behov for at 
udvide anvendelsesområdet for § 193. En analyse af beskyttelsesinteressen i § 193 er derfor vigtig 
for at sikre, at bestemmelsen kun anvendes, hvor de beskyttede interesser krænkes. 
 
13.2 Bestemmelsens ordlyd 
Ved straffelovens § 193, stk. 1, kriminaliseres den retsstridige handling, der fremkalder omfattende 
forstyrrelse i driften af almindelige samfærdselsmidler, offentlig postbesørgelse, telegraf- eller 
telefonanlæg, radio- eller fjernsynsanlæg, informationssystemer eller anlæg, der tjener til almindelig 
forsyning med vand, gas, elektrisk strøm eller varme. 
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Bestemmelsen har ikke gennemgået store ændringer siden 1930, da den borgerlige straffelov af 
1930 erstattede straffeloven af 1866. I 1985 vedtog Folketinget adskillige ændringer og tilføjelser til 
straffeloven på baggrund af Straffelovrådets betænkning
1093
 om datakriminalitet. En af disse 
ændringer vedrørte straffelovens § 193. I opregningen af anlæg, der beskyttes efter § 193, tilføjedes 
bl.a. ”databehandlingsanlæg”. Straffelovrådet overvejede i 1985-betænkningen at begrænse kredsen 
af de databehandlingsanlæg, der beskyttes efter § 193, men antog i stedet, at kravet om, at 
driftsforstyrrelsen skulle være ”omfattende”, var tilstrækkeligt til at begrænse bestemmelsens 
anvendelsesområde.
1094
 
Man kan af ordlyden udlede fire kumulative betingelser for bestemmelsens anvendelse. Den første 
betingelse er, at systemet/anlægget objektivt skal være omfattet af bestemmelsen, dvs. skal være en 
af de typer systemer/anlæg, der nævnes i bestemmelsen. Den første betingelse behandles i afsnit 
[13.3]. Den anden betingelse er, at der skal være sket en forstyrrelse. Den tredje betingelse er, at den 
fremkaldte forstyrrelse skal være omfattende. Den anden og tredje betingelse behandles i afsnit 
[13.4]. Den fjerde betingelse er, at forstyrrelsen skal være retsstridigt fremkaldt. Betydningen af 
begrebet retsstridighed diskuteres ikke nærmere i denne artikel. 
Men er alle informationssystemer lige stillet? Kan alene brugerantallet sige noget om hvor 
uundværligt og samfundsvigtigt systemet er? 
 
13.3 Anlæg objektivt omfattet af straffelovens § 193 
Da den nuværende formulering af § 193 har været relativt uændret siden dens debut i den borgerlige 
straffelov af 1930, er forarbejderne til denne lov fortsat relevante. Ingen af de senere ændringer har 
således lagt luft til, suppleret eller på anden måde lagt op til en ændret fortolkning heraf.    
 
13.3.1 Generelt om de beskyttede anlæg 
Der blev produceret tre betænkninger i forbindelse med forberedelsen af den borgerlige straffelov af 
1930. Kommissionsbetænkningen af 1912 forklarer, at grunden til, at den foreslåede § 394 
(nuværende § 193) er placeret i kapitlet om andre almenskadelige handlinger er, at det er 
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”Almenheden, nemlig Publikum i Almindelighed som interesseret i de Paragraferne ommeldte 
Indretningers uforstyrrede Funktioneren, der angribes ved Handlingerne.”
1095
 Yderligere forklares 
i betænkningen, at der er tale om retsstridige angreb på almene samfærdselsmidler og indretninger, 
der opfylder basale behov, der satte disse offentlige eller offentlig godkendte indretninger ud af 
brug. Uden for anvendelsesområdet vil kun falde private anlæg med en meget begrænset 
brugerkreds, og som ikke engang har en indirekte interesse for almenheden.
1096
  
I Carl Torps betænkning af 1917 kritiseres bestemmelsen for de meget almindelige og omfattende 
begreber, der dannede grænsen for bestemmelsens anvendelsesområde, navnlig fordi det i 1912 
definerede anvendelsesområde ville inkludere, for eksempel, apoteker, trykkerier (hvis man valgte 
at anse f.eks. aviser som en almen fornødenhed), fødemiddelforretninger når der krævedes bevilling 
for driften, osv.
1097
 Det fandtes derfor vigtigt at begrænse anvendelsesområdet til virksomheder, der 
allerede var særligt beskyttede i lovgivningen. Begrænsningen udgør i princippet dele af den, vi 
kender fra den nugældende § 193, nemlig 1) jernbaner og lignende transportmidler, 2) telegraf- og 
telefontjenesten, og 3) anlæg, der tjener til almindelig forsyning med vand, gas eller elektrisk strøm. 
Dertil konkluderede man, at ”[d]erigennem værnes utvivlsomt de vigtigste af de Indretninger, som 
under de bestaaende Samfundsforhold opfattes som uundværlige.”
1098
 
I kommissionsbetænkningen fra 1923 uddybes det, at kapitlet om andre almenskadelige handlinger, 
omfatter handlinger, der ikke i sig selv er almenfarlige, men som rammer almeninteresser. Nærmere 
forklares specifikt i forhold til den foreslåede § 177 (forslag til nuværende § 193), at der er tale om 
almenskadelige handlinger, ”fordi Borgerne i Almindelighed er interesserede i, at Driften af de der 
omtalte Anlæg og Indretninger ikke forstyrres.”
1099
 Kommissionen er enig i betænkelighederne ved, 
at give bestemmelsen så bredt et anvendelsesområde, som foreslået i 1912. I denne forbindelse 
diskuterer man særligt betænkelighederne ved en mulig anvendelse af reglen på ulovlige 
arbejdsstandsninger. Kun når disse arbejdsstandsninger ”direkte rammer de Indretninger, som 
under den bestaaende Samfundsorden er uundværlige for Borgerne, saaledes at der fremkaldes en 
omfattende Forstyrrelse i Driften af disse Indretninger, maa Samfundet kunne søge Beskyttelse ved 
Anvendelse af Straf.” Herefter foreslår Kommissionen bestemmelsen begrænset til, i princippet, de 
                                                 
1095
 Straffelovkommissionens betænkning af 1912, mot. 323 
1096
 Straffelovkommissionens betænkning af 1912, mot. 323 
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samme anlægstyper, som foreslået af Carl Torp i 1917, og som vi kender fra den nuværende § 193, 
nemlig: 1) almindelige samfærdselsmidler, 2) offentlig postbesørgelse og almindeligt benyttede
1100
 
telegraf- og telefonanlæg, og 3) anlæg, der tjener til almindelig forsyning med vand, gas og 
elektrisk strøm. I umiddelbar forlængelse af afgrænsningen af de beskyttede anlæg fremhæver 
Kommissionen, at ikke enhver forstyrrelse i driften af disse indretninger er strafbar. Strafbarheden 
er betinget af, at forstyrrelsen er omfattende. ”Kun derved antager Handlingen en almenskadelig 
Karakter.”
1101
 
Gennemgående i alle betænkningerne er hensynet til almenhedens interesse, og at de beskyttede 
indretninger er særlig vigtige og uundværlige for borgerne. Yderligere begrænsede man de 
beskyttede anlæg til anlæg, der var særligt beskyttede under den gældende lovgivning. Man afviste 
eksplicit den i 1912 oprindelige foreslåede bestemmelses afgrænsning, hvor begrænsningen af 
anvendelsesområdet lå i, at indretningerne var offentlige eller offentlig godkendte, og at de tjente 
opfyldelsen af almenhedens basale behov. Det er derfor klart, at indretninger, blot fordi de er 
offentlige (eller offentlig godkendte), ikke alene af den grund er beskyttede af § 193. 
Derudover, som yderligere baggrund for begrænsningen af beskyttelsen til de opregnede anlæg, 
beskytter bestemmelsen kun anlæg, der er uundværlige for borgerne. 
 
13.3.2 Tilføjelsen af ”databehandlingsanlæg”/”informationssystemer”  
I 1985 indføjes ”databehandlingsanlæg” samt ”radio- og fjernsynsanlæg” til de i § 193 beskyttede 
anlæg. For så vidt angår radio- og fjernsynsanlæg lagde Straffelovrådet vægt på, at disse anlæg 
sammenholdt med andre anlæg, der omfattes af § 193, har fået en ”stadig stigende samfundsmæssig 
betydning som kommunikationsmidler”. 
Blot få eksempler af omfattede systemer er nævnt i forarbejderne. For eksempel nævnes den 
centrale elektroniske databehandling hos de store banker, motorregistret og SKATs centrale 
systemer. De lokale filialer og skattekontorers terminaler er nævnt som eksempler på ikke-
omfattende forstyrrelser, da virkningerne af forstyrrelsen i disse tilfælde ikke vil antage den efter § 
193 påkrævede almenskadelige karakter.
1102
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Det bemærkes, at alle de i § 193 beskyttede anlæg, bortset fra ”databehandlingsanlæg”
1103
, har en 
specifik funktion. Derimod kan databehandlingsanlæg indgå både som angrebsmiddel i forhold til 
angreb på alle de andre opregnede anlæg, og desuden også indgå som led i driften af hvilken som 
helst type virksomhed – også dem, man i de tidligere forarbejder fra 1917 og 1923 eksplicit ønskede 
at udelade fra anvendelsesområdet, og som i øvrigt ikke nødvendigvis, selv under vores nuværende 
samfundsorden, vil betragtes som uundværlige for borgerne. Inklusionen af 
”databehandlingsanlæg” udvisker, i det moderne IT-baserede samfund, den ellers rimelig klare 
afgrænsning mellem de for borgerne uundværlige anlæg og andre anlæg. Den mere eller mindre 
indbyggede kvalitative afgrænsning eksisterer ikke i forhold til informationssystemer. 
Straffelovrådet i 1985 og Brydensholt-udvalget i 2002 overvejede begge, men afstod i sidste ende 
også begge fra at begrænse kredsen af de beskyttede radio-, fjernsyns- og databehandlingsanlæg, 
med det rationale, at kravet om, at driftsforstyrrelsen skal være ”omfattende”, begrænsede 
bestemmelsens rækkevidde i tilstrækkeligt omfang.
1104
 
Straffelovrådets konklusion fra 1985 førte senere til, at Justitsministeriet i sin besvarelse af 
spørgsmål fra Retsudvalget om, hvad der bør forstås ved ”omfattende forstyrrelser i driften”, 
udtalte, at ”[d]e anførte udtryk »omfattende forstyrrelse af driften« og »almenskadelig karakter« 
angiver, at der må anlægges en kvantitativ vurdering af angrebets omfang. Man må formentlig 
herved lægge afgørende vægt på størrelsen af den personkreds, der berøres af angrebet.”
1105
 
Denne fortolkning blev efterfølgende gentaget i Brydensholt-udvalgets betænkning nr. 1417/2002 
om økonomisk kriminalitet og datakriminalitet, samt i 2003 i Justitsministeriets bemærkninger
1106
 
til det lovforslag som betænkningen førte til.
1107
 I forbindelse med fortolkningen af det kvalitativt 
afgrænsende element henviser man altså blot til det kvantitative afgrænsende element. 
Den funktionsbaserede (kvalitative) afgrænsning baseret på, hvilke anlæg, der opfattes som de 
vigtigste indretninger, der er uundværlige for borgerne under den bestående samfundsorden, 
forsvinder derfor i vidt omfang ved tilføjelsen af ”informationssystemer” i det IT-baserede 
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samfund
1108
, hvor den eneste tilbageværende afgrænsende faktor er størrelsen af brugerkredsen. 
Dermed ender man tilsyneladende og uden nærmere overvejelser med en bredere gruppe af 
beskyttede anlæg, set ud fra de individuelle anlægs funktioner i samfundet. Er angreb på 
Berlingskes hjemmeside nu beskyttet efter § 193, fordi avisen er tilgængelig i digital form og 
sandsynligvis har tusindvis af læsere? Pressevirksomhed er jo ellers ikke nævnt som et beskyttet 
anlæg. Anlæg, der oprindelig ikke var beskyttet, da de i egenskab af deres primære funktion ikke er 
blevet medtaget i opregningen af beskyttede anlæg, vil nu kunne beskyttes, hvis 
informationssystemet indgår som led i deres distribution til brugerne, alene i lyset af brugerantallet. 
Uden den kvalitative vurdering af det pågældende informationssystem vil bestemmelsens 
anvendelsesområde være på linje med den kritiserede foreslåede bestemmelse fra 1912, der i det 
mindste, på den kvalitative side, begrænsede anlægstyperne til offentlige eller offentlig godkendte 
indretninger. Den kvalitative afgrænsning af bestemmelsens anvendelsesområde med 
”databehandlingsanlæg”
1109
, der i 2002 blev erstattet med det mere neutrale 
”informationssystemer”, er dermed forsvundet.
1110
 
Afgrænsningsproblemet er ikke nyt. Selvom der er tale om informationssystemer, som ikke fandtes 
i 1917, så er afgrænsningsproblemerne reelt en gentagelse af historien. I 1917 anerkendte man også, 
at en nærmere opregning af beskyttede anlæg ”altid maa blive noget vilkaarlig, og at der derfor 
altid vil kunne rejses Tvivl om, hvorvidt alle de Virksomheder, ved hvilke der er Trang til et saadant 
Værn, og omvendt kun disse, er medtagne, maa erkendes. Men Ulemperne derved er formentlig 
væsentlig ringere end Faren ved en Afgrænsning, der holdes i alt for ubestemte og omfattende 
Udtryk.”
1111
 
Domstolene har da også i relation til de oprindeligt omfattede typer af anlæg været opmærksomme 
på bestemmelsens specifikke beskyttelsesinteresse. I en sag omhandlende en havneblokade
1112
, 
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lagde Københavns byret således vægt på, at nogle fiskekuttere havde blokeret for færgeankomster 
og -afgange i ca. halvanden dag (antageligt som begrundelse for at forstyrrelsen derved havde været 
omfattende). Retten synes implicit ikke at tage anden havnetrafik end færgetrafik til offentlig 
transport i betragtning, hvilket også er i overensstemmelse med, at det er almindelige 
samfærdselsmidler, der er beskyttet. I en anden sag fra 1986
1113
, omhandlende en lastbilblokade af 
et befærdet kryds i udkanten af København i myldretiden, blev de tiltalte frifundet i landsretten. 
Retten konkluderer, at selvom privatbilismen er et uundværligt led i samfærdslen, findes det 
betænkeligt, når bestemmelsens ordlyd sammenholdes med forarbejderne, at anse sådan trafik for 
omfattet af begrebet almindelige samfærdselsmidler. Dette svarer i princippet til den dissentierende 
byretsdommers opfattelse, nemlig at almindelige samfærdselsmidler kun omfatter transportmidler, 
offentlige eller private, som offentligheden har adgang til. Dette burde ikke udvides til at omfatte 
privatbiler. Dvs. et ”anlæg” kan være uundværligt, men hvis ikke det er objektivt omfattet af 
begreberne i bestemmelsen, så er anlægget ikke beskyttet.
1114
 
Et tilsvarende problem vedrørende afgrænsningen kender vi fra radio- og fjernsynsanlæg. Det kan 
også her tænkes, at ikke alle radio- og fjernsynsanlæg pr. automatik er omfattet af bestemmelsen. 
Der foreligger ingen domme herom, men begrebet fjernsyns- og radioanlæg lider af samme svaghed 
som begrebet informationssystemer, dog i mere begrænset omfang.
1115
  
I en sag omhandlende afbrydelse af udsendelse af tv-avisen
1116
 blev der lagt vægt på, at der var tale 
om et landsdækkende program, der sås af mange mennesker. At fjernsynsanlægget var objektivt 
omfattet, tog man tilsyneladende for givet, hvilket i den pågældende sag heller ikke uden videre kan 
kritiseres. Afgørelsen må imidlertid ikke lede til, at enhver afbrydelse af udsendelse af andre 
kanaler eller programmer, vil være omfattet af § 193. Ligesom ved informationssystemer, fravalgte 
man som sagt også at afgrænse kredsen af de beskyttede radio- og fjernsynsanlæg nærmere, med 
samme rationale, nemlig at man må lægge størrelsen af brugerkredsen til grund. Efter forarbejderne 
til bestemmelsen må der således foretages en kvalitativ vurdering af, hvorvidt en specifik kanal er 
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omfattet af bestemmelsen eller ej. Kanalerne og programmerne vil således langt fra altid have den 
kvalitative karakter af at være uundværlige og, at ”omfattende” forstyrrelse i driften derfor er 
almenskadelig. På den anden side er det, som nævnt, også klart, at begrebet ”fjernsynsanlæg” i sig 
selv dog er bedre afgrænset end begrebet ”informationssystemer”, i den forstand, at alle og enhver 
kan levere en ydelse af en eller anden art til borgerne via et informationssystem, hvorimod der 
formodentlig er langt færre aktører, der driver fjernsyns- og radioanlæg, ligesom disse kræver en 
offentlig tilladelse. Man kan evt. tale om en delvist gennemført kvalitativ afgrænsning af radio- og 
fjernsynsanlæg, hvorimod der ingen kvalitativ afgrænsning er sket i forbindelse med 
informationssystemer. Dette fordi informationssystemer, som sagt, kan tjene alle mulige roller, 
herunder til driften af alle andre anlæg, der er nævnt i § 193, samt alle mulige virksomheder og 
tjenester, store eller små, private eller offentlige, der ellers falder uden for bestemmelsen. 
 
13.3.3 Afgrænsning fra straffelovens § 291 (hærværk) 
Det er vigtigt at holde sig for øje, at § 193 ikke er en skærpet version af straffelovens 
hærværksbestemmelse. Bestemmelserne har forskellige beskyttelsesinteresser. 
Som det også kom til udtryk i Carl Torps betænkning af 1917, kan man stille sig tvivlende over for, 
om der skulle være behov for særlig beskyttelse, ud over den eksisterende beskyttelse mod 
beskadigelse af fremmed ejendom, f.eks. i hærværksbestemmelsen (straffelovens § 291).
1117
 
Straffelovens § 193, som netop er placeret i kapitlet om andre almenskadelige handlinger, er da 
heller ikke en generel hærværksbestemmelse, men en bestemmelse, der beskytter mod omfattende 
forstyrrelser i driften af anlæg, der er uundværlige for borgerne. Det er vigtigt at være opmærksom 
på, at selvom en overtrædelse af § 193 nogle gange vil indebære groft hærværk (§ 291, stk. 2) udgør 
groft hærværk ikke nødvendigvis en overtrædelse af § 193. Der behøver tilsvarende heller ikke at 
foreligge hærværk for, at der kan ske en overtrædelse af § 193. 
Også hærværksbestemmelses ordlyd er i det væsentligste uændret siden 1930, hvor den fik sin 
nuværende formulering. Bestemmelsen gør det strafbart at ødelægge, beskadige eller bortskaffe 
ting, der tilhører en anden. Stk. 2 omhandler hærværk af betydeligt omfang, eller af mere 
systematisk eller organiseret karakter samt tilfælde, hvor gerningsmanden tidligere er fundet skyldig 
efter visse bestemmelser. Bestemmelsen befinder sig i straffelovens kapitel om formueforbrydelser. 
                                                 
1117
 Carl Torps betænkning af 1917, mot. 168 
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Bestemmelsens bortskaffelseselement afgrænses over for § 276 om tyveri ved, at der ved 
anvendelse af § 291 ikke kræves forsæt til tilegnelse og dermed berigelse ved borttagelsen. 
Ligesom i § 193, er midlet, som anvendes til at beskadige, ødelægge eller bortskaffe tingen uden 
betydning. Desuden er der ikke noget krav om, at tingen skal have nogen formueværdi.
 1118
 Der 
kræves heller ikke, at handlingen eller dens konsekvenser har haft en eller anden almenskadelig 
karakter, fordi bestemmelsens beskyttelsesområde er skader forvoldt på privat ejendom. 
Databærende medier anses som ting.
1119
 Der er ingen tvivl om, at hardware, der indgår i 
informationssystemer, udgør ”ting” i § 291‟s forstand. Landsretten tager ikke direkte stilling til 
dette spørgsmål. Retten konkluderer dog under alle omstændigheder, at sletninger af og ændringer i 
data på et databærende medium udgør ødelæggelse af en ting, når denne sletning af eller ændring i 
data medfører, ”at de databærende medier ikke længere – i hvert tilfælde ikke uden særlige 
foranstaltninger – kan anvendes efter deres formål.” Der er et godt stykke fra denne konklusion til 
en konklusion om, at ”data” i sig selv er ”ting”. Indtil videre foreligger der kun denne ene 
landsretsdom, der handler om data i en hærværkskontekst. Det er vel ikke udelukket, at domstolene 
i fremtiden vil nå frem til, at ”data” er uløseligt forbundet med ”ting” og tingens værdi. På 
nuværende tidspunkt, er U 1987.216Ø den eneste dom der forholder sig til, hvorvidt 
ændringen/sletning af data indebar ”ødelæggelse” af en ”ting” (nemlig, det databærende medium). 
Konklusionen i denne specifikke sag er ikke overraskende, da ændringer og sletning af data 
medførte, at den fysiske genstand ikke kunne anvendes efter dets formål.
1120
 Dette punkt diskuteres 
ikke videre i denne artikel. 
Som anført i det foregående afsnit, indebærer en overtrædelse af § 193 ikke nødvendigvis, at der 
også er sket overtrædelse af § 291 – eller omvendt. Man bør især holde sig for øje, at de 
økonomiske konsekvenser af enhver retsstridig handling mod et af de objektivt beskyttede anlæg i § 
193, herunder informationssystemer, som udgangspunkt ingen relevans har for fortolkningen af 
begrebet ”omfattende forstyrrelse”. Disse økonomiske konsekvenser hører til gengæld hjemme i 
vurderingen af hvorvidt der er tale om hærværk eller groft hærværk
1121
 (hærværk af betydeligt 
                                                 
1118
 Straffelovrådets betænkning nr. 1032/1985, s. 36 
1119
 Jf. U 1987.216Ø, s. 219 
1120
 Se også Mads Bryde Andersen: IT-retten (2005), s. 740 om § 291, s. 99 ff. om beskrivelsesproblematikken, samt s. 
107 ff. om informationsteori, herunder den matematiske kommunikationsteori. Se endvidere om 
beskrivelsesproblematikken i Mads Bryde Andersen: EDB og Ansvar (1988), s. 50 ff. 
1121
 Eksempelvis i U 1987.216Ø omhandlende ødelæggelse af programmel henførtes forholdet under § 291, stk. 2, da 
handlingernes indgribende karakter nødvendiggjorde indkaldelse af ekstern ekspertbistand. Se også U 2000.261Ø, hvor 
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omfang, jf. § 291, stk. 2).
1122
 En forstyrrelse i driften af ethvert informationssystem kan 
eksempelvis kræve indkaldelse af ekstern ekspertbistand, hvilket ofte vil indebære betydelige 
omkostninger, men denne omstændighed er ikke noget, der relaterer sig til vurderingen af, hvorvidt 
systemet overhovedet er objektivt omfattet af § 193. Derimod har dette i retspraksis medført, at et 
forhold blev henført under § 291, stk. 2 (hærværk af betydeligt omfang).
1123
 Økonomiske 
konsekvenser har i øvrigt aldrig indgået i den kvantitative vurdering (”omfattende”) i § 193, og 
dette var heller aldrig tanken. Denne økonomiske, kvantitative faktor hører til gengæld hjemme i § 
291. 
 
13.4 ”Omfattende forstyrrelse” 
Samfundet er blevet afhængigt af informationssystemer, og der er også behov for beskyttelse af de 
vigtigste af disse. Imidlertid er ikke alle informationssystemer uundværlige for borgerne, selv når de 
har et stort antal brugere. I modsat fald ville Facebook
1124
 være objektivt omfattet af § 193, da alene 
det danske brugerantal sandsynligvis er langt større end antallet af brugere af andre 
informationssystemer i Danmark. En fornuftig, kvalitativ afgrænsning bør foretrækkes, da der er 
alvorlige betænkeligheder ved for bredt et anvendelsesområde.  
De eksisterende domme viser, at selv ganske kortvarige nedbrud i driften af anlæggene, så længe 
anlæggene kvalitativt er blevet vurderet som værende objektivt omfattet af bestemmelsen, kan 
opfylde kravet om ”omfattende forstyrrelse”, i kombination med brugerantallet. Det er endvidere 
klart, at forstyrrelsen, dvs. typisk et nedbrud i driften, skal kunne mærkes af borgerne. Ligesom 
forarbejderne tilsiger, er borgerne de subjekter, lovgiver forsøger at beskytte mod nedbrud i disse 
                                                                                                                                                                  
hærværk til 10.000 kr. ikke kunne anses som værende af ”betydeligt omfang”. Hærværk til knap 295.000 kr. var 
hærværk af betydeligt omfang, jf. TfK 2011.668. Hærværk til 90.000 kr. og ”reelt uerstattelige værdier” var hærværk af 
betydeligt omfang, jf. TfK 2003.160. 
1122
 Rigsadvokatens meddelelse nr. 9/2005 skalerende også strafpåstande i hærværkssager efter skadens økonomiske 
størrelse. Jf. meddelelsen skal forholdet henføres under § 291, stk. 2, hvis skadestørrelsen overstiger 15.000 kr. 
1123
 Jf. U 1987.216Ø 
1124
 I forslag til Europa-parlamentets og Rådets direktiv om foranstaltninger, der skal sikre et højt fælles niveau for net- 
og informationssikkerhed i hele EU COM/2013/48 nævnes sociale medier som markedsaktører, der skal være omfattet 
af direktivet. Det fremgår dog af Kommissionens impact assessment (SWD (2013) 32 final), s. 88, at man ikke anser 
sociale netværk for værende kritisk infrastruktur. Inklusionen af sociale netværk i direktivet (samt andre Internet 
services) er blevet kritiseret af Europa-parlamentet 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1342725&t=e&l=en) samt i komité rapport 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1337255&t=e&l=en). Kommissionen, i dennes svar på 
Europa-parlamentets ændringsforslag, kunne kun acceptere nogle af forslagene 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=24217&j=0&l=en).  
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samfundsvigtige systemer, der er uundværlige for borgerne. Bortset fra én enkelt 
byretsafgørelse
1125
, er bestemmelsen indtil videre fortolket således, at den ikke omfatter nedbrud af 
informationssystemer eller andre beskyttede anlægstyper, der kun påvirker ”interne brugere” og 
dermed aldrig rækker så vidt at ramme den almindelige borger.
1126
 Forstyrrelsen skal også i øvrigt 
være realiseret, og ikke blot være potentiel
1127
. Dette er også i overensstemmelse med det i 
forarbejderne beskrevne anvendelsesområde. 
Antallet af brugere har selvfølgelig fået en fortjent plads i domstolenes vurdering af, hvor 
omfattende forstyrrelsen i driften af anlæggene har været. Men man bør have in mente, at når 
brugerantallet indgår i vurderingen af, hvor omfattende forstyrrelsen har været, har det altid været i 
forbindelse med sager, der er baseret på forstyrrelser i driften af anlæg, der i forvejen er blevet 
kvalitativt vurderet som værende omfattet grundet deres funktion, så som vandforsyning. Det vil 
sige, at de beskyttede anlæg grundet deres specifikke samfundsrolle, fx vandforsyning, elforsyning 
eller lignende, allerede er kvalitativt afgrænset til reelt samfundsvigtige anlæg. Som også fremhævet 
i det ovenstående, har informationssystemer vidt forskellige roller i samfundet, og de færreste burde 
være omfattet af § 193, uanset at nogle har flere millioner brugere. I en sag omhandlende 
vandforsyning
1128
, havde den tiltalte skåret en vandledning over, hvilket bevirkede, at et 
landsbyssamfund på ca. 80 husstande og ca. 15.000 husdyr var uden vand i flere timer. I en anden 
sag
1129
, der dog endte med frifindelse grundet fravær af grov uagtsomhed, havde forurening af 
drikkevand gjort ikke mindre end 150 personer syge, og forureningen havde påvirket forsyningen af 
drikkevand til ca. 7.000 borgere. Ligeledes i en førnævnt dom
1130
 omhandlende afbrydelse af 
udsendelsen af TV-avisen, lagde retten vægt på, at der var tale om en landsdækkende kanal, at der 
var tale om et program med et meget stort antal seere, samt at afbrydelsen ikke var helt kortvarig 
(ca. 20 minutter). 
                                                 
1125
 Dom afsagt af Retten i Roskilde 19.december 1996, der omhandler hacking af en række systemer i forskellige 
lande, herunder amerikanske militære systemer. Det forslåede direktiv vil, i sin nuværende form, ikke blot dække kritisk 
infrastruktur men også andre markedsaktører. 
1126
 Se fx U 2002.2700V hvor der ganske vist manglende forsæt til overtrædelse af § 193, men hvor retten endvidere 
konstaterede, at forstyrrelsen faktisk ikke var realiseret, selvom om potentialet for en forstyrrelse havde været til stede. 
1127
 U 2002.2700V. Forsøgsstraf er selvfølgelig en mulighed, hvis der er forsæt til den realiserede forbrydelse. 
1128
 U 2005.1357V 
1129
 U 2011.1144Ø 
1130
 U 2001.1187Ø 
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Forvirringen angående informationssystemer viser sig i en af de to hackerdomme omhandlende 
forstyrrelse af informationssystemer, som er en utrykt byretsdom
1131
 fra 1996. Sagen, som nok kan 
beskrives som den største hackersag i Danmark før CSC-hackersagen,
1132
 omhandlede bl.a. hacking 
af informationssystemer ejet af den amerikanske regering. Retten nåede frem til, at ét af systemerne, 
tilhørende det amerikanske militær, var objektivt omfattet af § 193, ligesom et andet system, 
tilhørende den amerikanske vejrtjeneste, der tjente operationelle formål, også ansås som omfattet af 
bestemmelsen. Derimod var der to andre systemer, ligeledes tilhørende den amerikanske 
vejrtjeneste, der tjente udviklings- og forskningsformål, der af retten ikke blev anset som værende 
objektivt omfattet af § 193. Retten fandt den tiltalte skyldig i overtrædelse af § 193, for forstyrrelsen 
i driften af systemet tilhørende det amerikanske militær, på trods af at de 5.000 brugere var 
militærets ”interne brugere”. Retten fandt, som nævnt, at også forstyrrelsen i driften af den 
amerikanske vejrtjenestes operative system, var omfattet af § 193. Dette sidste forekommer mere 
oplagt, idet systemet leverede vejroplysninger, der bl.a. modtoges mere eller mindre direkte af 
borgere og kunne have væsentlig betydning for dem. Slutteligt fandt byretten den tiltalte skyldig i 
forsøg på overtrædelse af § 193 for forstyrrelsen i driften af de to forsknings- og 
udviklingssystemer, tilhørende den amerikanske vejrtjeneste, som retten allerede havde konkluderet 
ikke var objektivt omfattet af bestemmelsen. Rettens begrundelse for den del af afgørelsen, der 
relaterer sig til de ikke-objektivt omfattede systemer, var, at tiltalte vidste, at der var tale om 
regeringscomputere, selvom han ikke vidste, at de tilhørte den amerikanske vejrtjeneste eller kendte 
deres rolle, at tiltalte var klar over, at der var tale om computere med særlig stor regnekraft, og at 
tiltalte havde accepteret konsekvenserne af sine handlinger. 
Bortset fra det led, der omhandler vejrtjenestens operationelle systemer, er det ikke nemt at forstå 
hvordan afgørelsen harmonerer med forarbejderne.  I forarbejderne fremgår det af eksemplerne på 
beskyttede systemer, at det forhold, at en computer er en regeringscomputer, netop ikke i sig selv 
skaber en formodning om, at systemet objektivt er omfattet af § 193. Selvom der ikke er 
formodning for, at regeringsejede systemer er objektivt omfattet af § 193, er angreb mod 
                                                 
1131
 Utrykt byretsdom afsagt af Retten i Roskilde, 19.december 1996. Omtalt i eksempelvis bet. 2002/1417. 
1132
 Den 30.oktober 2014 afsagde Retten på Frederiksberg dom i CSC-sagen. De tiltalte blev frifundet for overtrædelse 
af § 193, idet der ikke var sket ”nedbrud eller andre betydelige forstyrrelser i driften hos CSC som følge af angrebet.” 
Landsretten frifandt også T1 for overtrædelse af straffelovens § 193. De ændringer, der blev foretaget i systemet i 
forbindelse med hackerangrebet havde ikke fremkaldt omfattende forstyrrelse i driften af systemerne. CSC‟s kunders 
økonomiske tab ifm. periodevis lukning af systemerne med henblik på at patche systemerne udgjorde heller ikke en 
omfattende forstyrrelse i driften af systemerne. Se Østre Landsrets afgørelse afsagt 17.juni 2015, s. 2. 
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regeringssystemer i forarbejderne
1133
 nævnt som et eksempel på skærpende omstændigheder, som 
straffelovens § 263, stk. 3 (uberettiget adgang under skærpende omstændigheder) sigter mod. 
Strafferammen er i øvrigt identisk med strafferammen i § 193. 
Det må derfor særligt undre, at tiltalte blev fundet skyldig i forsøg på overtrædelse af § 193 i 
realiteten alene af den grund, at han var klar over, at der var tale om en regeringscomputer, og at 
computeren havde særlig stor regnekraft, selvom systemet altså ikke objektivt var omfattet af § 193, 
og selvom han ikke – bedømt efter rettens egne præmisser – havde forsæt til at volde omfattende 
forstyrrelser. 
I CSC-sagen stod det klart allerede før de pågældende personer blev sigtet, at der ikke var sket en 
konkret forstyrrelse i driften af selve informationssystemet. Et af anklagemyndighedens vidner, som 
var ansat hos CSC (kaldt vidnet G i afgørelsen) forklarede i retten, ”at der ikke var nedbrud eller 
andre betydelige forstyrrelser af driften hos CSC som følge af angrebet.”
1134
 Alle nødvendige 
fejlrettelser var allerede foretaget den 6. marts 2013 uden at der var sket nedbrud. I juni 2013 blev 
de senere tiltalte alligevel sigtet for bl.a. overtrædelse af straffelovens § 193 i forbindelse med 
angrebet på CSC. Anklagemyndigheden forklarede den første retsdag
1135
 ikke rigtigt hvori 
forstyrrelsen i driften lå, men forklarede alene, at der ved anvendelsen af § 193 skal tages hensyn til 
antallet af berørte personer. De berørte personer, mente anklagemyndigheden, var alle borgere i 
Danmark, i og med at angrebet involverede uberettiget adgang til CPR-registret, og at uddrag fra 
CPR-registret muligvis var blevet videregivet til andre personer (uden at dette dog på noget 
tidspunkt blev bevist under retssagen). Det er klart, at anklagemyndigheden har løsrevet to uløseligt 
forbundne begreber, nemlig ”omfattende” og ”forstyrrelse i driften” af informationssystemet. Ud fra 
sagens fakta, som forelå, allerede før de tiltalte blev sigtet, var det klart, at straffelovens § 193 ikke 
var overtrådt, fordi der ikke var fremkaldt en forstyrrelse i driften af systemet. Det var følgelig ikke 
relevant at tage stilling til størrelsen af den berørte personkreds, som kun ville indgå i vurderingen 
af, om en konkret forstyrrelse faktisk var ”omfattende”. Et abstrakt risikomoment forbundet med et 
potentielt efterfølgende misbrug af CPR-numrene er ikke foreneligt med ordlyden af straffelovens § 
193, der kræver (hvor der ikke er tale om forsøg), at forstyrrelsen er realiseret – ikke blot 
                                                 
1133
 KBET nr. 1032/1985, s. 79 
1134
 Se afgørelsen af skyldspørgsmålet i sagen på rettens hjemmeside: 
http://www.domstol.dk/frederiksberg/nyheder/domsresumeer/Pages/Afg%C3%B8relseafskyldssp%C3%B8rgsm%C3%
A5letisagomhackingafCSC.aspx 
1135
 Den 2.september 2014. Forfatteren var til stede i retten. 
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potentiel.
1136
 Derudover synes anklagemyndigheden at have løsrevet ”forstyrrelsen” fra ”driften” af 
selve systemet, da usikkerheden forbundet med en mulig videregivelse af CPR-numre i sig selv er 
irrelevant for informationssystemets fortsatte uforstyrrede drift. Baseret på den ovenfor omtalte 
vidneforklaring om, at der ikke var sket forstyrrelse i driften af systemet, frifandt byretten da også, 
som nævnt, de tiltalte for overtrædelse af straffelovens § 193.
1137
 
Det man kan udlede af retspraksis er, at forstyrrelsen i driften af systemet skal være realiseret og 
ikke kun være potentiel. Desuden skal forstyrrelsen være omfattende, hvilket tager hensyn til 
antallet af påvirkede borgere. Dette er i overensstemmelse med forarbejderne, da den omfattende 
forstyrrelse skal være almenskadelig.  
 
13.5 Afsluttende bemærkninger 
Domstolene har ikke fået en nem rolle, i og med de skal forsøge at forene forarbejderne med 
tilføjelsen af det tilsyneladende altomfattende begreb ”informationssystemer” i § 193. Som Vagn 
Greve også har påpeget,
1138
 så er det ikke nok, at virksomhedens eller myndighedens ”interne 
brugere” er påvirkede. Der skal mere til for at nå op på det ”almenskadelige niveau” – og her bør 
det fremhæves igen, at der netop ikke er tale om ”almenfarlige handlinger”. Konsekvenserne af at 
sige, at den kvalitative vurdering baseres på en kvantitativ vurdering, er det samme som at sige, at 
alt, der kan tælles, tæller. Det er dog indlysende, at dette aldrig har været var meningen med § 193, 
da man netop lagde afstand til det næsten ”alt-inkluderende” 1912-forslag til bestemmelsen, og 
positivt valgte at afgrænse de beskyttede anlæg til dem, man anså for værende uundværlige for 
borgerne. Ikke alle informationssystemer er skabt lige, og de færreste af dem vil i bund og grund 
være uundværlige for borgerne i forarbejdernes forstand. Selvom vi bor i et forholdsvis rigt land 
med en høj levestandard, må man være påpasselig med at udvande betydningen af ”uundværligt”, 
især når dette ord indgår i fortolkningen af en meget alvorlig bestemmelse i straffeloven. 
                                                 
1136
 Det kan yderligere diskuteres, hvorvidt sådan en fortolkning ville være forenelig med artikel 7 EMRK, der 
udtrykker princippet om nullum crimen sine lege. I sagen Liivik mod Estland konstaterede 
Menneskerettighedsdomstolen i Strasbourg, at en straffebestemmelse, der efter sin ordlyd kræver at skaden er realiseret, 
ikke kan fortolkes udvidende således, at den også omfatter den blotte risiko for skade. Se Liivik mod Estland, dom af 
25.september 2009, § 99. 
1137
 Se afgørelsen af skyldsspørgsmålet i sagen på rettens hjemmeside: 
http://www.domstol.dk/frederiksberg/nyheder/domsresumeer/Pages/Afg%C3%B8relseafskyldssp%C3%B8rgsm%C3%
A5letisagomhackingafCSC.aspx 
1138
 Vagn Greve: EDB-kriminalitet (2. Rev.udg. 1986, s. 24) 
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Antallet af de påvirkede brugere (andre end myndighedens eller virksomhedens egne interne 
brugere) indgår i vurderingen af, hvor ”omfattende” forstyrrelsen rent faktisk har været, men dette 
er ikke det samme som at lade antallet af berørte brugere være det eneste vurderingskriterium når 
det skal afgøres, hvorvidt et system overhovedet er omfattet af § 193. Antallet af påvirkede borgere 
alene var under alle omstændigheder ikke nok til at fortolke begrebet ”almindelige 
samfærdselsmidler” så bredt, at det omfattede privatbilismen.
1139
 Der er grund til at afvise at 
anvende § 193 i sager, hvor der nok er tale om angreb på regeringssystemer, men hvor virkningerne 
kun føles ”internt”. Der er en række andre bestemmelser i straffeloven, der kan omfatte sådanne 
angreb. Nævnes kan fx § 263, stk. 2 og stk. 3 (hvor der ikke nødvendigvis er sket en forstyrrelse, 
men hvor gerningsmændene har været inde i systemet), § 291, stk. 1 og stk. 2 (hvor 
gerningsmændene har forvoldt skade) og/eller § 293, stk. 2 (hvor gerningsmændene har forårsaget 
elektronisk rådighedshindring). § 263, stk. 3, jf. stk. 2 og § 291 stk. 2, har i øvrigt den samme 
strafferamme som § 193. Det er derfor svært at finde noget godt argument for at anvende en så 
udvidet fortolkning af § 193, som en ren kvantificering af kvalificeringen giver anledning til. 
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14 CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
The Danish hacking provision turned thirty years old this year. Yet, it has not undergone much 
development in terms of exploration and clarification of its scope. Granted, for half of its life 
computers were not a household commodity and the pool of possible defendants was relatively 
small. In later years, computers can be found in almost every home, internet access is widespread 
and cheap, and information is shared globally through interlinked sites on the world wide web. 
Today, computers are so small that we can wear them on our wrists or carry them in our pockets, 
and a world of information is available to us at the press of a button. But we heavily rely on 
computers and networks of other people moving our packets around and hosting information and 
services, all of which necessarily necessitates accessing computers, programs and information 
belonging to others at a grand scale that the legislature in 1985 could not have anticipated. Global 
resource and information sharing is vital to our modern society and we rely heavily on access to 
computers, programs and information belonging to others for research, hobbies, day-to-day 
communications, business, government, education, news reports and much more. 
Both the Danish and the US statute grew out of traditional trespass theories.
1140
 The Danish hacking 
provision is rooted in a chapter on privacy violations (which includes trespass), and forms a 
subsection of a provision that is aimed at protecting information, chattels and communications, 
rather than forming a part of the trespassing provision aimed a buildings, land property, etc. This 
makes it tempting liken a computer to a residence and then apply whatever norms have already been 
established with respect to private residences. For example, by giving an owner an almost absolute 
right to exclude e.g. competitors from public websites simply by telling them directly that they are 
unwelcome and would be trespassing if they would access the public website which is hosted on a 
computer that is private property. Is it really possible to liken such “trespass” with trespass onto 
physical property? In terms of a public website there is no privacy to protect, a competitor or other 
unwanted visitor visiting the website along with perhaps thousands of other users who are generally 
completely unaware of each others “presence” on the website, and making the website publicly 
accessible a choice as long as there is no law that mandates making the information publicly 
accessible. Someone physically entering onto your private property is much more intrusive, because 
it is impossible for you to “disconnect” your physical property from the surrounding world such that 
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 See Orin Kerr: Cybercrime‟s Scope: Interpreting „Access‟ and „Authorization‟ in Computer Misuse Statutes (2003), 
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it would impossible for others to enter it, and it was not your choice to “connect” it to the world in 
the first place. Furthermore, the norms developed in connection with trespass in the physical world 
are heavily reliant on what signals we get from the environment. We instinctively know, in most 
cases, whether a building is a private residence, commercial property, government building, and 
know from experience with norms whether we need prior permission to enter or not. Even if all 
these buildings belong to others, we know that different rules apply. Trespass statutes are generally 
broad and do not explain as such when access is authorized or unauthorized, and they do not state 
that we need prior permission in some cases but not in others. If we disregard these and other 
differences and blindly follow the norms associated with physical trespass, the results are likely to 
be odd and impractical. The computer environment is different, especially online, and there is not 
yet a broad, common understanding of what in the environment signals a closed off area and what 
signals an open area. Recall again the Explorica case. The circumstances that the plaintiff relied on 
as indications that the defendant‟s access was unauthorized would require a user to interpret a 
copyright symbol as a signal that he must ask permission to use information that is not covered by 
copyright law, as well as interpreting the presence of hyperlinks as excluding any other method of 
browsing. There is no such common understanding relating to copyright symbols and hyperlinks, 
and thus, it would be arbitrary and unforeseeable to choose these circumstances as legally relevant 
facts that indicate lack of authorization to access.  
There is little guidance in the statutory language and the legislative history with respect to when 
access is unauthorized, apart from using passwords not belonging to oneself. The Framework 
Decision and the Directive appear to refer back to domestic law with respect to determining the 
meaning of “without right”. The Convention‟s explanatory report also refers back to domestic 
law
1141
, but adds that access to systems that allow free and open access by the public is with right. 
This is not reflected in the statutory language of either the Danish or the US provisions, nor is it 
reflected in the Council‟s Framework Decision on attacks against information systems or directly in 
the EU Directive that repealed and amended the Framework Decision. The Directive makes it 
mandatory to limit the scope of implementing illegal access provisions to those cases where security 
measures were circumvented in order for access to be gained. However, it is regrettably unclear 
what constitutes a security measure under the Directive, which leaves the door open for inclusion of 
“barriers” that are based on client-side controlled information e.g. IP addresses, cookies, user-agent 
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strings and other factors that are completely within the user‟s power to change, and often are 
changed or modified for e.g. privacy or research reasons. 
The Directive has taken what is arguably a code-based approach, and it inherits the flaws and 
inconsistencies of a pure code-based approach that have been revealed through the years in US case 
law and literature. The preamble of the Directive explicitly rejects a contract-based approach as 
well as an agency-based approach – at least were a breach of contract or labor dispute is the sole 
basis for claiming that the access was unauthorized. These are the approaches that have been subject 
to harsh criticism from courts and commentators in the US, since the approaches often involve 
automatic revocation of authorization based on the motive for the access which is otherwise 
authorized; e.g. breaches of terms of use (public website‟s and employer‟s terms) and motives that 
are contrary to the interest of the employer (disloyalty). Although the contract-based approach is 
still applied in several jurisdictions in the US, it is entirely unclear if all breaches of contract 
relating to the access to or use of a computer are criminal or if it is just some breaches that are 
criminal. If all breaches are criminal, then it is effectively the computer owners who define the 
scope of hacking statutes. If only some breaches are criminal, the question becomes which ones are 
criminal, and how can the courts provide the sufficient foreseeability and protection against 
arbitrary enforcement if it is now foreseeable which breaches trigger criminal liability. Since 
policies are generally unilaterally drafted and issued and may be changed without notice, this again 
makes them suspect as a basis for determining lack of authorization.  Furthermore, the content of 
terms of use/service and other policies can be very vague, such as Facebook‟s terms that prohibit 
violating the spirit of the terms or employer policies prohibiting non-business uses. In such cases, 
one would first have to interpret the vague terms the violation of which supposedly trigger criminal 
liability. Additionally, courts would have to be wary of written policies that do not reflect the actual 
organization culture; e.g. where the written policies are neither complied with or enforced, but may 
nonetheless be called upon as a basis for the purposes of establishing lack of authorization to access 
– i.e. arbitrary enforcement of the terms. Finally, breaches of contract do not automatically 
discharge the contract (and thus, the authorization). A party must notify the party in breach that he 
is avoiding the contract due to the breach. The wronged party may not even necessarily be entitled 
to avoid the contract if the breach is not considered fundamental. Then the wronged party must 
explore what other less extreme remedies are available to him. 
For all of the above reasons, the contract-based approach gives cause for concern if adopted by 
Danish courts. 
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The agency-based approach has not been widely adopted in the US. It is extremely plaintiff-
friendly, and typically had been used to target trade secret violations based on the argument that the 
purpose of the access was contrary to the interests of the employer; the defendant automatically 
ceases to be an agent of the employer when he accesses the information he is generally authorized 
to access, but does so for reasons that are disloyal to his employer. In other words, the planned 
subsequent unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets supposedly convert an authorized access 
into unauthorized access. This approach to construing unauthorized access statutes can only be 
applied in the employer-employee context. Such an approach has ostensibly been rejected in the 
Danish case U 1996.979 Ø, albeit absent explicit references to disloyalty and possible trade secret 
law violations. Here the High court rejected letting the purpose of the access negate the fact that the 
defendant was authorized to access the information. The court did not provide extensive reasoning 
for its conclusion, but laconically stated that at the time the defendant was an employee and thus 
had authorized access to the information. The court did not explain why it implicitly rejected the 
prosecution‟s theory. However, the conclusion appears correct – especially given that the 
information were not confidential with respect to the defendant as he had full authorized access, and 
the objectionable conduct clearly related to the alleged intention to disclose the information to a 
competitor.
1142
 Since disclosure and use of information are not covered by the Danish hacking 
statute, it is inappropriate to construe it as triggering criminal liability simply by restating that later 
disclosure or use rendered the authorized access unauthorized due to the motive. This of course is 
not an argument against protection of trade secrets or other confidential information. These 
information are already protected by criminal sanctions, and there is no justification for judicially 
expanding the scope of the hacking provision beyond “access” to include future use of information. 
The legislature has proven itself perfectly capable of phrasing statutory language in terms of 
purpose, use of information and disclosure of information – it did not do so in either the CFAA, the 
Danish § 263(2), the Convention, the Framework Decision or the Directive. 
The social norms approach has not been mentioned by US courts as a specific approach. The 
approach is largely derived from the Second Circuit‟s decision in US v. Morris, which covered 
various conduct the means of access and context of which the court relied on to determine whether 
the access was unauthorized or not. The usefulness of the court‟s decision in Morris becomes 
clearer when compared to other approaches developed through US case law over the years and as 
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the weaknesses of the other approaches become apparent through aggressive prosecution and civil 
litigation.  
It is true what the Australian court said; that computers cannot authorize anything. However, now 
we live in a world where the majority of our authorization to access computers belonging to others 
relies on tacit consent. The Convention‟s explanatory report states that maintaining a public website 
implies consent. In other words, given the open nature of the Internet, if one desires to limit access 
to a website, one should take steps to “close” that particular space in order to be able to specifically 
authorize those allowed to access and keep the rest out. Code defines the space to a significant 
extent and also defines how it is possible to access information. Code signals what is closed and 
what is open on the Internet, for example. However, the code-based approach is too narrow in the 
sense that it fails to reach conduct that we all agree is unauthorized access (such as guessing 
passwords, without permission, to gain access to accounts that do not belong to us) but code 
nonetheless does not prevent.  
Since code defines the nature of the space and how it can be accessed, code is not irrelevant either, 
even though the code-based approach needs some adjustments. In a draft paper dated May 2015, 
Orin Kerr recognized this weakness in the code-based approach, for which he had previously 
advocated. He proposes a social norms approach that appears to be rooted in code, thus, in a way 
patching the vulnerabilities and bugs of a pure code-based approach.
1143
 This approach entails the 
analysis of three factors; 1) the nature of the space, 2) the means of entry/access, and 3) the context 
of entry/access. For example, if the space is open, such as a public website, there is presumably no 
criminal protection against access to the public-facing parts of the website. The context of the entry 
should not be understood as an inquiry into the purpose of entry of a person who is authorized to 
access, but does so for objectionable reasons. Rather, the context can clarify the meaning of 
authorization where there person would generally be unauthorized to access, but does so for a 
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 The code-based approach was initially understandably attractive in comparison to the contract and agency 
approaches. Over the years, several courts have cited Kerr‟s work in which he argues in favor of a code-based approach. 
But in the last several years, Kerr‟s ideas of relying on code to determine authorization saw some, perhaps unexpected, 
applications, as courts began interpreting code restrictions to encompass barriers that relied on IP address blocking, 
user-agent strings, cookies and so on. Ostensibly, these restrictions bear not even a passing resemblance to the code 
restrictions Kerr seemingly envisaged in his 2003 “Cybercrime‟s Scope” article. In other words, it must have become 
apparent to Kerr, as it became apparent to me – particularly in light of US v. Auernheimer (2014) (he represented the 
defendant on appeal), Craigslist v. 3Taps (2013), and US v. Lowson (2010), that the code-based approach could be 
turned to serve interests that have little or nothing to do with the protected interests at the heart of hacking statutes, and 
more to do with protecting the bottomline by keeping out direct or indirect competitors, or to serve as tools for 
aggressive prosecution. 
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socially recognized purpose, such as the mailman entering the property to deliver the mail, or where 
a person who is not authorized but does not gain access through objectionable means, e.g. a person 
guessing a password to access a closed space (without the means of access being suspect as such, 
i.e. against the intended function) under circumstances where no delegation of authority from the 
owner has taken place. The social norms-approach is not free from consideration of code. In fact, 
code inherently defines the nature of the (virtual) space, because the code provides the framework 
for the space (whether it is open or closed) and thus naturally influences the social norms that will 
later attach themselves to that particular space. Furthermore, code provides the framework for the 
means of access. However, code free from interpretation as a legal basis for a criminal conviction 
will produce absurd and arbitrary results, and hence, results that are irreconcilable with social 
norms; including both cases where the conduct was clearly unauthorized even though the code did 
not prevent the access, and cases where code (perhaps contract-inspired) arbitrarily triggers criminal 
protection of use of and access to publicly accessible information. The social norms approach can 
be said to correct and amend the code-based approach in that the social norms approach does not 
disregard code but injects some common sense and foreseeability into the analysis of authorization 
in a virtual environment as well as reducing, to some extent, the risk of arbitrary enforcement 
compared to the risks associated with a pure code-based approach and the contract-based approach. 
However, a social norms approach, if construed too liberally, can drastically increase the risk of 
arbitrary enforcement and reduce foreseeability if social norms are widely construed to mean e.g. 
“courteous” conduct or construed as prohibiting “annoying” conduct. Therefore, it is important to 
remain focused on the three prongs related to the access; not on the purpose of the access where 
access is generally authorized, or on the subsequent use of information obtained through the 
otherwise authorized access etc. Thus, ultimately, what matters is whether society recognizes the 
computer owner‟s expectations of protection against trespass; hence, barring indiscriminate, 
surprising and/or arbitrary criminal enforcement of ambiguous, broad statutory language that may 
be at odds with the constitutional and/or human rights related to due process, clarity of criminal law 
provision, etc. The social norms in the computer context need time to develop; norms related to 
traditional trespass did not develop overnight. The space, particularly the virtual space, associated 
with computers and networks is different from physical space. Simply indiscriminately transferring 
traditional trespass rules into the computer context, by relying on (often inappropriate or inaccurate) 
analogies, ignores the differences between the spaces. 
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Efforts have been made to rein in the broad scope of hacking statutes in both the EU and the US. In 
the US, a bill popularly known as Aaron’s Law
1144
 was proposed in 2013. The bill proposes several 
amendments to title 18 USC, one of which serves to exclude from unauthorized access situations 
where the access is in violation of terms of service and user policy agreements with online service 
providers, Internet websites or employers, and situations where access was gained by proxy server, 
or by the user preventing identification of user hardware or software.
1145
 And as mentioned earlier, 
the preamble to the EU Directive suggests a similar narrowing of the scope of illegal access, 
combined with the mandatory requirement that illegal access must have been gained by 
circumvention of a security measure. 
The social norms approach implies that circumvention of security measures is generally needed, but 
also recognizes that there are contexts, such as where a random visitor in an office building accesses 
an unprotected computer without ever having been authorized and thereby obtains information, and 
yet he is not hindered by code. Neither the contract-based approach nor the agency-based approach 
would be able to catch this type of unauthorized access either. 
Where circumvention of security measures is required to trigger criminal liability for unauthorized 
access, the courts‟ construction of “security measures” becomes critical to the scope. If “security 
measures” are interpreted to mean “code barriers” more broadly, IP address blocking, and similar 
efforts that rely on information the user has full control over and is free to change, cookies and so 
on, may be considered “security measures” by the courts. 
Recall the cases involving URL hacking that are discussed above in the chapter on outsiders. In 
cases where companies accidentally make personal information publicly accessible through minor 
changes in the URL, these companies might face fines in the millions of euro under the coming EU 
Data Protection Regulation. Thus, more cases will likely arise, when the EU‟s General Data 
Protection Regulation enters into force, in terms of URL hacking that has led to discovery of 
security vulnerabilities, because the proposed fines for non-compliance (including failing to 
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bin/query/z?c113:H.R.2454:. accessed June 23
rd
 2014. The bill was stalled in committee, but was reintroduced in 2015. 
Available at Senator Ron Wyden‟s (D-Ore.) Senate webpage at https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-
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implement security) are based on the company‟s annual global turnover
1146
 – meaning the fines will 
be dramatically higher than at present time – and companies may possibly be less forgiving and less 
willing to consider discoveries and reporting of vulnerabilities that involve personal data exposures 
“helpful suggestions”. The companies‟ only defense strategy to attempt to avoid the hefty fines 
might arguably be to claim they have been “hacked” – that is, that the access to unintentionally 
accessible information was unauthorized, because URL hacking, under a creative reading of 
“security measures” does not technically distinguish itself from password guessing, regardless of 
the fact that “secret” URLs are a poor password-analogy given their intended function as web 
addresses (resource locators). 
Also, as importantly noted by numerous US federal courts, Marco Gercke (in the context of the 
Convention on Cybercrime and several domestic legal systems), Orin Kerr, and others, it is 
imperative to separate the access from subsequent conduct (typically, this is accomplished by 
inquiring into the purpose of the access) that is either illegal and/or a breach of contract. This 
problem is only relevant where the defendant had implicit or explicit authorization to access and 
this is sought to be negated by later conduct. Allowing other legal rules concerning subsequent acts 
to negate authorization opens up the scope of hacking statutes giving them enormous reach. For 
example, access to information for the purposes of using the information in violatation of any law 
would automatically also trigger liability under the hacking statute. This would make breaches of 
data protection law, copyright law, trade secret laws and other laws regulating use of information, 
such as processing personal data in excess of what is necessary and online piracy, etc. Furthermore, 
it would allow constructions such as that from US v. John, where a person with authorized access 
was nonetheless convicted of unauthorized access, because she intended to use the information to 
commit fraud. These illegal acts are not related to access to information, but the subsequent use of 
information. Rather the access, in combination with other facts, may be indicative of an attempted 
crime that directly prohibits a specific use of information, such as disclosure of trade secrets, or 
where the information is used to commit other crimes, such as fraud. 
All in all, it can be said that the harmonization to which the Convention on Cybercrime aspired is 
largely symbolic. The broad and imprecise language of the illegal access article is primarily owed to 
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the main supposed limitation of the criminalization, namely the term “without right”. When the 
legal meaning of the defining term of the article is practically entirely left to be determined in 
domestic law, it is no wonder that national courts, even within the same legal system, cannot agree 
on its meaning and consequently on the extent of criminalization. Thus, whereas in some 
jurisdictions one may commit a crime by violating terms of service of a website, the same conduct 
is legal elsewhere – even if the language of the statutes is identical or very similar, and implements 
the same Convention. 
The hacking statutes are unlikely to violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine or article 7 ECHR 
facially, because both the US Supreme Court and the ECtHR allow broad statutes that are clarified 
in through case law. However, the various approaches to construing hacking statutes can seemingly 
render the statutes incompatible as applied, if the application was not reasonably foreseeable and/or 
if the application was arbitrary. Thus, the need for clarification of broad hacking statutes. 
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15 ABSTRAKT PÅ DANSK 
I år er det tredive år siden den danske hackerbestemmelse blev vedtaget. Allerede den gang var man 
bevidst om, at bestemmelsens ordlyd var egnet til at fange flere forhold end nødvendigt for at opnå 
bestemmelsens formål. For at stemme op om et ellers alt for bredt anvendelsesområde, indsatte man 
ordet ”uberettiget”. Begrebet ”uberettiget” skulle medføre, at domstolene var bevidste om, at der 
var straffri forhold, der kunne falde inden for ordlyden, og dermed gøre dem opmærksomme på, at 
de var nødt til at foretage en konkret vurdering i hver sag. Dette svarer i princippet til straffelovens 
andre bestemmelser om fredskrænkelser. Det interessant er, hvordan domstolene kan eller burde 
udøve dette skøn i forbindelse med bestemmelsens anvendelse. 
Bestemmelserne om freds- og æreskrænkelser er generelt meget brede og deres indhold følger ikke 
klart alene af bestemmelsernes ordlyd. De andre bestemmelser anvendelse, fx straffelovens § 264 
om uberettiget adgang til fremmed hus, er bygget på flere hundrede år af normudvikling, der delvist 
præciserer indholdet af § 264, og gør anvendelsen af bestemmelsen mere eller mindre forudsigelig i 
de fleste tilfælde. Vi ved af erfaring og sociale normer, at vi ikke blot kan gå ind i et privat hus, og 
vi må afvente invitation til at komme indenfor. Men hvad der konstaterer et privat hus, og dermed 
hvornår en særlig invitation er nødvendig, er noget vi fornemmer og udleder fra vores omgivelser; 
bestemmelsen beskriver ikke hvad et privat hus er, og beskriver derfor hverken hvornår man kun 
må komme indenfor hvis man er inviteret eller hvilke undtagelser der måtte gælde hertil. Men det er 
ikke en overtrædelse af § 264 hver gang vi går ind i ”fremmed hus” uden særlig tilladelse, fordi der 
er signaler fra vores omgivelser, der indikerer, at andre regler gælder fx når vi skal ud at handle i et 
supermarked. Her ved vi ud fra erfaring og ud fra signaler fra omgivelserne, at vores adgang til fx et 
supermarked, selvom det er fremmed hus, ikke er uberettiget – også selv om vi ikke har modtaget 
en særlig indbydelse til at komme indenfor. Men som sagt, dette er intet der følger af 
bestemmelsens vage ordlyd, og domstolene udtrykker heller ikke hvorfor disse normer er som de er 
(hvilket der måske heller ikke er behov for i forhold til fremmed hus – men grundet at normerne i 
forhold til computere stadig er uklare, er det vigtigt at forstå domstolens rationale). 
I 1985, da straffelovens § 263, stk. 2 blev vedtaget, var der ikke nogen bred erfaring med computere 
i samfundet. I midten af 90erne var det ikke længere så ualmindeligt at eje en computer. Dette samt 
at adgang til internet og world wide web blev mere tilgængeligt for befolkningen indebar også at 
antallet af handlingerne som kunne blive omfattet af bestemmelsen blev forøget. Især Internettet og 
world wide web, som jo direkte indebærer adgang til andres informationer og programmer, 
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krævede, at man tog stilling til hvornår adgang så var uberettiget. Det rejser utallige spørgsmål i 
forhold til fortolkningen af § 263, stk. 2, fordi er vi har ikke haft særlig lang tid til at finde ud af 
hvilke normer der gælder på internettet og generelt i forhold til computere; dvs. hvornår adgang er 
uberettiget og hvornår den er berettiget, om der kræves særlig invitation, eller hvilke signaler 
indikerer, at et område er frit tilgængeligt og derfor ikke kræver særlig invitation. 
Selv i de tilfælde, der omhandler ansatte og deres adgang til arbejdsgiverens computere og netværk, 
er det ikke klart hvilke handlinger udgør overtrædelse af bestemmelsen. Denne usikkerhed var 
allerede udtrykt af straffelovrådet i 1985 i betænkning nr. 1032/1985. 
Desværre er der få afgørelser omhandlende overtrædelser af straffelovens § 263, stk. 2, og de få der 
eksisterer er, med en enkelt undtagelse eller to, sager der utvivlsomt udgjorde overtrædelse, eller 
forsøg på overtrædelse, af § 263, stk. 2; eksempelvis forsøg på at skaffe sig adgang til en andens 
computer ved brug af kendte hackerværktøjer med henblik på at omgå sikkerhedsforanstaltninger. 
Desuden beskriver danske domstoles afgørelser, som bekendt, sjældent særlig udførligt hvordan 
domstolene nåede frem til deres konklusion, hvilket gør det svært at analysere afgørelserne med 
henblik på at udfinde principper eller en analyseramme, der kan bidrage til forudsigeligheden af 
anvendelsen af en bestemmelse med et ret uklart, og potentielt utrolig bredt, anvendelsesområde. 
Domstolene er blevet pålagt at udøve skøn i forbindelse med anvendelsen af en bestemmelse til 
hvilken forarbejderne mildest sagt tilknytter meget sparsom vejledning. Domstolene sidder foran en 
svær opgave, der selv i 1985 var upræcis, trods at computere dengang ikke var almeneje og der ikke 
var udbredt åben adgang til andres informationer og programmer. Deres opgave er under ingen 
omstændigheder blevet forenklet ved tilkomsten af udbredt internetadgang og brug af world wide 
web, der forudsætter adgang til andres information og programmer, hvorfor fortolkningen af 
”uberettiget” bliver afgørende for rækkevidden af kriminaliseringen i § 263, stk. 2. 
Heldigvis er Danmark ikke det eneste land, der har indført en bredt formuleret hackerbestemmelse. 
De amerikanske føderale domstole har flere års erfaring med anvendelsen af en bestemmelse, der 
også indebærer, at den primære begrænsning af bestemmelsens anvendelsesområde ligger i 
”without authorization”. Da amerikanske domstoles afgørelser er langt mere udførlige i 
argumentationen for deres konklusioner, giver de i det mindste idéer – nogle gode og andre mindre 
gode – om hvordan man kunne fortolke bestemmelsen; fx hvilke faktiske omstændigheder har 
signaleret, at adgangen var ”without authorization” eller endda ”authorized”. Derudover skal både 
den amerikanske føderale hackerlovgivning og den danske hackerbestemmelse implementere 
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Europarådets cybercrimekonvention. På grund af de amerikanske domstoles større erfaring med 
cybercrime samt at USA, både på føderalt niveau og delstatsniveau havde haft hackerlovgivning i 
årevis, fik de amerikanske repræsentanter ved forhandlingerne og udarbejdelsen af konventionen 
angiveligt en særlig indflydelse. Dette følger både af de amerikanske myndigheders udtalelser, men 
det følger formentlig også naturligt af, at USA, på dette tidspunkt, utvivlsomt havde den største 
erfaring med emnet. Denne større amerikanske erfaring er også noteret i de danske forarbejder til 
hackerbestemmelsen, og er endvidere kommet til udtryk i Vagn Greves bog edb-strafferet, der 
udkom året efter hackerbestemmelsen blev vedtaget. 
Afhandlingen analyserer derfor amerikansk føderal retspraksis med det til formål at få indblik i 
denne erfaring, som vores fælles konvention angiveligt er blev påvirket af og som gav anledning til 
bemærkninger i forarbejderne til den danske hackerbestemmelse. Formålet er at lære af denne 
erfaring – både det gode og det mindre gode – ikke med henblik på at overføre retsregler, da vi 
allerede har sammenlignelige bestemmelser, men for at finde frem til en analyseramme til brug ved 
anvendelsen af den meget bredt formulerede danske bestemmelse. Fordi begge bestemmelsers 
ordlyd er plaget af forholdsvis stor grad af uklarhed, så er det blevet domstolenes rolle, i begge 
lande, at frembringe en klarhed i anvendelsen. Denne retsanvendelse skal være tilstrækkelig 
forudsigelig og må ikke udgøre arbitrær retsanvendelse. Disse krav følger af den amerikanske 
forfatning og forfatningsretlige principper for de amerikanske domstoles vedkommende, og af 
artikel 7 EMRK og tilhørende principper udledt af EMD for de danske domstoles vedkommende. 
Derfor må den mulige analyseramme kunne leve op til disse krav om tilstrækkelig forudsigelighed 
og ikke-arbitrær retsanvendelse. 
Resultatet af denne afhandling er derfor en analyseramme til brug for fortolkningen af ”uberettiget”, 
der ikke blot tager hensyn til den tekniske virkelighed og sociale normer, men som også er praktisk 
anvendelig for de danske domstole samt konventionskonform, i mangel af en ønskværdig nærmere 
præcisering af hackerbestemmelsens anvendelsesområde fra lovgivers side. Analyserammen 
fokuserer på udviklingen af sociale normer, men er i høj grad bygget på ”kode”, da det er kodens 
funktion, der i høj grad bestemmer hvorledes man opfatter de digitale omgivelser. Ved at ”patche” 
den amerikanske ”code-based approach” med sociale normer (inkluderet en slags berettiget 
forventning, som 1985-betænkningen lægger op til), opnås en analyseramme, der dels burde 
forhindre overinklusion af handlinger, der ikke har meget at gøre med de beskyttede interesser, og 
dels gør anvendelsen af hackerbestemmelsen mere konsekvent og forudsigelig, og dermed bliver 
det mindre sandsynligt, at arbitrære faktorer lægges til grund for domfældelse i sager hvor 
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handlingen nok er moralsk uacceptabel, men ikke klart er omfattet af bestemmelsen. Dette fordi 
risikoen for arbitrær håndhævelse stiger i takt med, at domstolene gives bred mulighed for 
skønsudøvelse ved uden at domstolene også har fået tilstrækkelig vejledning ift. hvad der faktisk 
ønskes kriminaliseret. 
Inkluderet i afhandlingen, og i øvrigt i tråd med afhandlingens tema om uklarhed og IT-relaterede 
bestemmelser, er en artikel der omhandler straffelovens § 193. Straffelovens § 193 kriminaliserer 
den retsstridigt fremkaldte forstyrrelse i driften af nærmere angivne anlægstyper. Samtidig med at 
hackerbestemmelsen (straffelovens § 263, stk. 2) blev indført i 1985 indføjedes begrebet 
”databehandlingsanlæg” (senere ændret til ”informationssystemer”) i opremsningen af de 
samfundsvigtige anlæg beskyttet af § 193. De andre anlæg, der er nævnt i bestemmelsen, har en 
meget mere specifik funktion, så som almene samfærdselsmidler og el-, gas- og vandværk, og er der 
er derfor sjældent tvivl om hvorvidt anlægget er objektivt omfattet af bestemmelsen. Hvorvidt en 
forstyrrelse af en af disse anlæg er ”omfattende” vil i så fald typisk være afhængigt af antallet af 
borgere, der påvirkes af forstyrrelsen. Der er ingen tvivl om, at begrebet ”informationssystemer” er 
utrolig bredt i mangel af nærmere afgrænsning, og at ikke alle informationssystemer har den 
samfundsvigtige karakter som bestemmelsen synes at forudsætte. I forarbejderne er den eneste 
vejledning til afgrænsningen af de for bestemmelsen relevante informationssystemer, at dette må 
være afhængigt af antal brugere. Denne afgrænsning af bestemmelsen er uden meget nytte, da 
mange informationssystemer har millioner af brugere uden at opfylde nogen som helst 
samfundsvigtig rolle, der tilnærmelsesvis er på højde med de andre samfundsvigtige systemer, som 
bestemmelsen nævner. Artiklen påpeger derfor, at der mangler en kvalitativ afgræsning, hvorefter 
man må foretage en kvalitativ vurdering af hvorvidt et givet informationssystem er samfundsvigtigt 
og derfor objektivt omfattet af bestemmelsen.  
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16 ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH 
This year it has been thirty years since the Danish hacking provision was enacted. The drafters and 
the legislature were already at that time aware that the provision‟s language was capable of reaching 
conduct that was not meant to be criminalized. In order to rein in the very broad language the term 
“without right” was added. The term “without right” was meant to put the courts on notice 
regarding the fact that some conduct that fit the statutory language was legal nonetheless. The 
legislature meant for the courts to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the conduct was without 
right. The term “without right” is also used in other criminal law provisions on privacy violations 
for the same reason. It is of interest to gain understanding of how courts can or should exercise this 
rather broad discretion. 
The provisions on privacy and dignity violations are generally very broadly phrased and their legal 
content does not follow clearly from the statutory language. The application of the other provisions, 
such as the criminal code § 264 on trespass onto another‟s property, is based on social norms that 
have been developing over the course of hundreds of years that then serve to clarify the provision 
and makes its application more or less foreseeable in the majority of cases. We know from 
experience and social norms that we cannot just enter a private residence, and we know that we 
must await an invitation to enter. But what constitutes a private residence, and thus when to expect 
the need to obtain a special permission to enter, is something we sense and deduce from the 
surroundings and circumstances; the statutory does not determine when a house is a private 
residence and thus does not determine when a special permission to enter is required or if there are 
circumstances where a special permission is not required nonetheless. It is not a violation of § 264 
every time we enter another‟s property with special permission, because the environment and 
context may indicate other rules. For example when we go food shopping at a supermarket. Here we 
know that we do not need to obtain special permission to enter, even though the supermarket is the 
property of another. But, as mentioned, this does not follow from the statutory language, and 
Danish courts do not spend time explaining why this is the norm – perhaps because there is no need 
to when the norm is so widely known that it requires no explaining. However, with respect to 
interactions with computers to gain access to information and programs, the norms are still in their 
infancy and the courts are taking part in developing those norms, it is therefore rather important that 
courts explain why they perceive access to information and programs as being without right.  
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In 1985, when the hacking provision was enacted, there was no widespread experience with 
computers in society. In the mid-90s owning a computer had become more common, and combined 
with the advent of the web and more widespread availability of internet access the act of accessing 
information and programs belonging to others meant that the conduct the provision was capable of 
covering became more common. Especially the Internet and the world wide web, both of which 
directly involve accessing information and programs belonging to others, meant that “without right” 
become that much more important as a limiting factor on the hacking provision‟s application. Many 
questions arise regarding the interpretation of § 263(2) because we have not had that long a time to 
figure out what norms apply on the Internet or general with respect to computers; that is, when 
access is unauthorized and when it is authorized, whether a special permission is required and what 
circumstances indicate that an area is private or freely accessible without the need for special 
permission. 
Even in cases involving employees and their access to their employers‟ computers and networks, 
which are the examples provided for in legislative history, it is still unclear what conduct constitutes 
a violation of the hacking provision. This uncertainty was already expressed in the 1985 Committee 
report, which proposed the provision. 
Regrettably, there are few Danish court decisions regarding violations of § 263 (2), and the few that 
do exist are, with an exception or two, cases that are rather clearly a violation, or an attempted 
violation, of the hacking statute; for example, attempted access to another‟s computer using well-
known hacking tools for the purposes of circumventing security measures. Compounding the 
problem related to understanding the scope of § 263(2) is the fact that Danish courts rarely provide 
detailed reasoning as to how they arrived at their conclusion. This frustrates an analysis of “why” 
and “how” a court arrived at any given decision, and makes it close to impossible to understand 
how they would apply the provision in other circumstances, because there are no hints as to their 
approach to interpreting and construing the provision other than the result of that process. This 
hinders foreseeability to a certain extent, which is problematic when the norms with respect to 
computers are not well-established, and the provision is capable of a very broad reach. 
The courts have been delegated substantial discretion and there is little guidance to be found in 
legislative history. The courts are facing a tough assignment, which in 1985 was not particularly 
clear either even though computers were not a common household item and there was no 
widespread open access to information and programs belonging to others. Their task has not 
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become easier or better guided since the advent of the world wide web and massive 
interconnectivity made possible by the Internet, both of which are based on and serve the idea of 
information sharing. This means that courts must be careful in their application of the hacking 
statute, especially if it is not entirely clear whether access was with right. 
Luckily, Denmark was not the only country that had enacted a broadly phrased hacking provision. 
The American federal courts have a few decades of experience with applying the federal hacking 
statute (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), which also heavily relies on a similar term, “without 
authorization”, to delimit the scope of the hacking statute. The benefit of looking towards the US 
lies in the fact that US courts are by far more verbose and explicate their reasoning. This provides 
insights into how one could interpret the Danish hacking provision – whether the interpretations are 
desirable or not; for example, the courts often recount what may have signaled the presence or 
absence of authorization. Besides being ripe with interesting case law, the federal hacking statute 
also shares the fact with the Danish hacking provision that it implements the Convention on 
Cybercrime. Because the significant experience with cybercrime law in the US legal system, the US 
allegedly had significant influence on the drafting of the Convention. At least this is stated by the 
Department of Justice, but it does not seem like an unnatural or unreasonable suggestion given that 
the US was the first state in the world to enact hacking statutes, and thus, its experience was longer. 
This significant experience in the US is also noted in the legislative history of the Danish hacking 
provision, but also noted by one of the first Danish works on computer crime law, a book by Vagn 
Greve published the year after the hacking provision was enacted. 
This dissertation analyzes US federal case law with a view to gaining an insight into US 
experiences, which to a greater or lesser degree influenced our common convention and which was 
noted in the Danish legislative history. The purpose of learning from US experience with hacking 
statutes – both good and bad experiences – is not to transfer legal rules, since we already have very 
similar hacking provisions. The purpose is to see what factual circumstances give rise to the 
application of the hacking statute and how the courts approach the discretion implicitly granted to 
them when the legislature used the words “without authorization”. In other words, the interest is 
centered on deriving an analytical framework that avoids unforeseeable applications and 
arbitrariness. That criminal law must live up to requirements of clarity, including reasonable 
foreseeability (fair notice) and guarding against arbitrary enforcement of the law. This follows from 
the US Constitution and constitutional doctrines, and from article 7 ECHR and the ECtHR‟s article 
7 case law. Any analytical framework would have to meet these requirements. 
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The dissertation discusses several approaches to interpreting and construing unauthorized access 
statutes in US law. The result of this dissertation is an analytical framework that can be used to 
interpret and construe “without right” in the Danish hacking provision. This framework takes into 
account the technical reality and social norms (developing and existing), and thus, contributes to 
foreseeability of the application of hacking statutes. The choice of framework is based on the results 
of analyses of the apparent inconsistencies and weaknesses of other approaches to construing 
unauthorized hacking statutes. This could perhaps in part make up for legislative inaction with 
respect to updating the very broad Danish hacking provision to provide more clarity and 
foreseeability of its application in a world that has changed significantly in terms of use of 
information technology since 1985. 
Included in this dissertation is an article on the Danish criminal code § 193. The article follows the 
general underlying theme that is lack of clarity in technology-related criminal code provisions. The 
provision criminalizes the unlawful substantial interference with the operation of various systems 
that are best characterized as critical infrastructure. In 1985, “information systems” was added to 
the list of protected systems that until that point comprised e.g. water and power plants, public 
transportation, and the telephone network. Information systems can provide or support a long list of 
service, not all of which can be characterized as critical infrastructure. Thus, the article points out 
that not just any popular information system is protected by § 193, but that courts have to determine 
– not just through sheer number of users – whether the system performs a function that is 
considered critical for society, the interruption of which would be especially harmful, and thus calls 
for enhanced punishment.  
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